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Abstract 
During the 1990s Yugoslavia and Rwanda were swept by wars accompanied by serious 
violations of international humanitarian law. Grave and severe crimes wiped away lives and 
destroyed properties. The United Nations Security Council determined that the violations 
committed constituted threats to international peace and security, declaring itself empowered to 
take action. It established international ad hoc criminal tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda 
with the mandate of prosecuting individuals responsible for those crimes as an enforcement 
measure under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.  Investigating the tribunals’ 
effectiveness enables one to assess whether they achieved the anticipated outcomes based on the 
tribunals’ mission, goals, and objectives without creating other problems.  
The research relies on naturalism and positivism to put the tribunals in a moral and ethical 
perspective. By examining how the tribunals were established, their objectives, the investigation 
and prosecution processes, the reliance on guilty plea and judicial notice and the imputation of 
criminal responsibility by applying joint criminal enterprise and command responsibility 
doctrines; the study argues that prosecution has not been an effective tool as contemplated by the 
Security Council.  
An analytical and comparative review of various domestic and international legal resources 
helped to provide an insightful approach for an effective prosecution of international crimes. 
Credible, legitimate and legal judicial institutions in which professional judges and prosecutors 
discharge their function independently, impartially and are accountable may achieve justice for 
the victims of international crimes. Ad hoc tribunals failed to thoroughly investigate and assume 
the dual role of prosecution. They conveniently used legal procedural tools that fit petty domestic 
crimes; unfortunately demeaning the magnitude of international crimes of concern. Criminal 
responsibility was mostly imputed without properly scrutinising the legality, extent, actual 
participation and guilty mind of the alleged perpetrators. Effectiveness should be a value 
assessment. Imposed and overburdened ad hoc tribunals are inappropriate and should be 
abandoned.  
Key words 
Command responsibility – Effectiveness – Ethics - Guilty plea – International crimes - 
International tribunal – Investigations - Joint criminal enterprise - Judicial notice - Prosecution  
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CHAPTER ONE:  INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1. Subject – matter and scope  
 
The topic of this research is “The United Nations ad hoc Tribunals’ effectiveness in 
prosecuting international crimes.” The tribunals of concern are the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (ICTR). The major research problem is whether the two United Nations (UN) ad hoc 
tribunals have been effective in their task or whether they have failed. Questioning the 
effectiveness of the ad hoc tribunals becomes an exercise that contrasts the stated purposes for 
which the tribunals were established, the outcome results of their work, and their legacy.  
According to Julnes “an effective programme achieves the desired outcomes, which typically 
follow from the programme’s mission, goals, and objectives without creating other problems.”1  
 
Punishing individuals for international crimes is not a new phenomenon. Among previous 
undertakings, history reckons the establishment of the International Military Tribunal (IMT) by 
the Allies after the end of World War II to prosecute Nazi criminals of occupied Germany. 
Other prosecutions took place in the Far East under the International Military Tribunal for the 
Far East (IMTFE) and military commissions. These tribunals set legal precedents, some of 
which benefited the ad hoc tribunals. They were created by the victorious nations of World 
War II. The ICTY and ICTR were established by the UNSC binding resolutions as means, short 
of use of armed forces, to perform its primary mandate of restoring and maintaining 
international peace and security. For all purposes therefore the decision to establish ad hoc 
tribunals was a political one but with legal implications.  The ICTY and ICTR were novel 
compared to their predecessors, namely the IMT and IMTFE, and military commissions.   
 
In recent years, the world also witnessed the creation of hybrid tribunals like in East Timor by 
the UN Transition Authority in Timor Leste (UNTATL), the Special Court for Sierra Leone 
(SCSL), and the Special Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (SCCC). National prosecutions 
                                                          
1
 Julnes Patricia de Lancer, “Productivity and Effectiveness”, in Encyclopedia of Public Administration and Public 
Policy, 2
nd
 Edition, Taylor and Francis, New York, 2011, pp. 1575 – 1578, p. 1575 
2 
 
of an international character were also undertaken by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. Finally 
the states assembled in Rome to establish a treaty-based permanent International Criminal 
Court (ICC).  
 
The ICTY and ICTR are “extremely important cases to examine, especially when looking at the 
effectiveness of international courts, as their establishment is considered to be among the most 
important contributions to international criminal law.”2 In fact the work of ad hoc tribunals is 
believed to have provided groundwork for the development of international criminal law. The 
tribunals’ work has now become a strong foundation for future international crimes institutions. 
The work also opens opportunities to fill the gaps that the tribunals left behind. The word 
“effectiveness” is therefore purposely chosen in the title of this research to cover all kinds of 
triumphs and tribulations encountered by the ad hoc tribunals. Ad hoc tribunals must be 
evaluated having in mind how and why they come into existence. The feasibility and clarity of 
the tribunals’ goals and objectives must be investigated. The goals may be dubious; yet the 
institution exists and works. Questioning the quality of the work is another exercise.  
 
For the ad hoc tribunals, the question revolves around the way they investigate and prosecute 
the crimes that are material to their mandate. There are rules of procedure and evidence 
criminal courts use to discharge their prosecutorial functions. Ad hoc tribunals relied heavily or 
unwarrantedly on guilty pleas and judicial notices among many other techniques. Are these 
methods commensurate with the serious crimes the ad hoc tribunals had the responsibility to 
prosecute?  
 
After some analysis, it will appear that these techniques are not appropriate methods to 
adjudicate grave crimes of international concern.  In the same reasoning, the role of the 
individual in the commission of the crimes is misrepresented by the reliance on the doctrines of 
joint criminal enterprise and command responsibility. Joint criminal enterprise overstates the 
individual participation in a crime.  
 
                                                          
2
 Croket Sophie, “Are International Courts Effective?”, November 27, 2011, available at http://www.e-
ir.info/2011/11/27/are-international-courts-effective/, accessed on 8 October 2012 
3 
 
Assessing the extent of an individual accused of the gravest crimes helps to take measures 
aimed at preventing such occurrences in the future. Ad hoc tribunals privileged the concept of 
command responsibility to attribute liability to offenders in positions of authority. Yet, some 
states have been reluctant to apply the concept to punish the crimes committed by their own 
troops. Though this reluctance may be politically motivated, it nevertheless bears serious 
implications in terms of the development of the doctrine of command responsibility 
internationally.  
 
Caroll questions what is to be done in the aftermath of mass atrocities. She seeks to understand 
the most effective way of achieving justice for the victims and survivors, holding individuals 
accountable, deterring future mass atrocities, and establishing lasting peace.
3
 She suggests that 
given the scope of the problem, there are no easy solutions.
4
 Specifically ad hoc tribunals are 
not the solution.  The degree to which the ICTR prosecuted genocide, crimes against humanity 
and violations of article 3 common to the Geneva Convention and Additional Protocol II, as 
provided for in Article 1 of its Statute
5
 is not satisfactory. The ICTY did not set a commendable 
jurisprudence to prosecute the grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949
6
, violations 
of the laws and customs of war,
7
 and genocide.
8
   
 
In order to evaluate the effectiveness and impact of the ad hoc tribunals, it is important to 
consider what the UNSC had in mind when it passed resolutions 827(1993) and 955(1994).  
There are doubts that the Council had the power to take such a move. The Council advanced 
that it was a way of performing its own mandate of maintaining international peace and 
security. The objectives the Council had in mind are found in the introductory part of 
                                                          
3
 Carroll M. Christina, “An assessment of the role and effectiveness of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda and the Rwandan national justice system in dealing with the mass atrocities of 1994”, Boston University 
International Law Journal, Vol. 18, 2000, pp. 163 – 200, p.164 
4
 Idem 
5
 Article 1 of the ICTR Statute says:  
The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations 
of international humanitarian law committed in Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible for such violations 
committed in the territory of neigbouring States, between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994, in accordance 
with the provisions of the present Statute. 
6
 Article 2 of the ICTY Statute 
7
 Article 3 of the ICTY Statute 
8
 Article 4 of the ICTY Statute 
4 
 
Resolution 827(1993) that established the ICTY and Resolution 955(1994) that created the 
ICTR.  The first ICTY annual report also provides, under the principal objectives, that “the 
purposes of the Tribunal have been laid down in Security Council Resolution 808(1993) and, in 
even more detailed form, in Security Council resolution 827(1993). They are threefold: to do 
justice, to deter further crimes and to contribute to the restoration and maintenance of peace.”9 
 
According to Resolution 827(1993), the UNSC expressed a “grave alarm at continuing reports of 
widespread and flagrant violations of international humanitarian law occurring in the territory of 
the former Yugoslavia.”10 The Council then determined that the situation “continues to constitute 
a threat to international peace and security.”11 In Rwanda likewise, the Council expressed “its 
grave concern at the reports indicating that genocide and other systematic, widespread and 
flagrant violations of [international humanitarian law] have been committed in Rwanda.”12 It 
held that the situation also constituted a “threat to international peace and security.”13 
 
By establishing an international criminal tribunal “in the particular circumstances of the former 
Yugoslavia”14, the Council aimed at putting “an end to such crimes and to take effective 
measures to bring to justice the persons who are responsible for [the crimes]”15, and that such a 
measure “would contribute to the restoration and maintenance of peace.”16 On Rwanda, the 
UNSC was “determined to put an end to such crimes and to take effective measures to bring to 
justice the persons who are responsible for them.”17 Moreover, the prosecution of those persons 
responsible “in the particular circumstance of Rwanda […], would enable this aim to be 
achieved and would contribute to the process of national reconciliation and to the restoration 
                                                          
9
 Report of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of 
International Humanitarian Law committed in the territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, A/49/342, 
S/1994/1007, (Hereinafter referred to as ICTY Annual Report 1994) 29 August 1994, para 11  
10
 Resolution 827(1993), adopted by the Security Council at its 3217
th
 meeting, on 25 May 1993, S/RES/827(1993, 
25 May 1993 
11
 Ibiden 
12
 Resolution 955(1994), adopted by the Security Council at its 3453
rd
 meeting, on 8 November 1994, S/RES/955, 8 
November 1994 
13
 Ibiden 
14
 Resolution 827(1993), op. cit.  
15
 Ibiden. The Council also believed that “the establishment of an international tribunal and the prosecution of 
persons responsible for the above-mentioned violations of international humanitarian law will contribute to ensuring 
that such violations are halted and effectively redressed.” Id. 
16
 Idem 
17
 Resolution 955(1994), op. cit. 
5 
 
and maintenance of peace.”18Those crimes will be “halted and effectively redressed.”19 
According to the Council, there was also “the need for international cooperation to strengthen 
the courts and judicial system of Rwanda, having regard in particular to the necessity for those 
courts to deal with large numbers of suspects.”20  
 
The first ICTY annual report stressed that the establishment of the tribunal was “a judicial 
response to the demands posed by the situation in the former Yugoslavia, where appalling war 
crimes and crimes against humanity are reported to have been perpetrated on a large scale.”21 In 
the case of the ICTR the tribunal aimed at “bringing to justice those persons who were most 
responsible for genocide and violations of international humanitarian law that were committed 
in Rwanda in 1994.”22  
 
Beigbeder
23
 detailed the objectives, aims and goals of the ICTY. According to him, the 
establishment of the ICTY assisted in putting an end to atrocities and discouraged some 
subordinates from being involved in crimes.
24
 This could be achieved by bringing the alleged 
perpetrators to justice, contributing therefore to the restoration and maintenance of peace.
25
 By 
bringing those involved to justice, the tribunal would “enforce international law, expand and 
interpret application of international law; end impunity for violations, especially for senior 
political and military leaders and re-establish the rule of law in the countries concerned.”26 The 
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tribunal would become a deterrent of crimes in an ongoing conflict. It would restore the dignity 
of the victims and set the highest standard of fairness, and due process. Finally, it would 
contribute to civil peace and reconciliation in the affected community and create an accurate 
historical record.
27
  
 
Johnson, former UN Assistant Secretary General for Legal Affairs, summarised the goals of the 
ad hoc tribunals as mechanism of accountability for heinous crimes, ending impunity for those 
who committed them and hopefully, through that process, to contribute to peace and 
reconciliation in the community concerned.
28
 
 
Goldstone, the first Chief Prosecutor for the ICTY and ICTR was of the view that the UNSC 
“acted on Yugoslavia because of a convergence of circumstances in the middle of 1993.”29 He 
held that the Serbian policy in Bosnia was seen as ethnic cleansing reminiscent to the 
Holocaust. This was widely broadcasted in the media that found in it a resemblance of World 
War II concentration camps.
30
 “Politically abhorrent events were taking place in Europe that 
the European powers had assumed could never happen again.”31 Goldstone also believed that 
there was a pressure from governmental and non-governmental humanitarian organisations that 
publicised repeated violations of humanitarian law.
32
 The UNSC had already determined that 
the situation in the region called for the invocation of Chapter VII of the UN Charter.  The 
Council acted upon a Report of the Commission of Experts that provided insightful evidence of 
war crimes being committed.  The time was convenient to quickly establish an international 
criminal tribunal as earlier contemplated without necessarily going through a treaty which 
could have been too laborious and time consuming, but not necessarily binding on all States.
33
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According to Goldstone the trials assisted in the process of uncovering the truth. However, he 
doubted whether criminal tribunals assist in the process of reconciliation.
34
  
 
In the case of the ICTR, Manusama emphasises the fact that the speed of the events in Rwanda 
and the reluctance of the international community to intervene favoured the discussions about 
bringing the perpetrators to justice by judicial means even though the conflict and the tragedy 
were already over.
35
 Having made a determination that genocide and other systematic, 
widespread and flagrant violations of international humanitarian law constituted a threat to 
international peace and security, the UNSC created the ICTR as a means to restore peace and 
security.  
 
In contrast with the ICTY which was directly linked to the cessation of the threat to peace; the 
ICTR was not so much aimed at halting the conflict, but at contributing to the rebuilding of a 
peaceful Rwandan society. The ICTR had a broader horizon beyond the actual conflict.
36
 Judge 
Byron, once President of the ICTR, concurs with the broader ambitious political goal.
37
  
 
According to the UNSC the ICTY and the ICTR were established for a threefold objective, 
namely doing justice, deterring further crimes and contributing to the restoration and 
maintenance of peace.
38
 The tribunals were expected to serve as a “tool for promoting 
reconciliation and restoring true peace.”39 Several years after their establishment, it is worth 
assessing their effectiveness and determining whether these objectives have been achieved. 
 
The tribunals were created because there was a situation to deal with. The fundamental question 
remains, however, to know whether establishing ad hoc  criminal tribunals was a worthy 
undertaking to respond to the violations of international humanitarian law in the former 
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Yugoslavia and Rwanda? From various perspectives a lot can be said on the causes of the 
tribunals’ effectiveness or ineffectiveness. The attempt in this research is narrower than that. It 
consists of objectively looking into and evaluating the work of the ad hoc tribunals in five 
chosen areas; namely the establishment of the tribunals; their aims and objectives; the 
investigation and prosecution of the crimes under the tribunals’ mandate; the usage of pragmatic 
legal techniques of guilty plea and judicial notice and the tribunals’ imputation of criminal 
responsibility using the doctrines of joint criminal enterprise and command responsibility. The 
study cannot and will not cover all the aspects of the tribunals’ work that are believed to 
constitute the problems that the tribunals were faced with. For instance, this research will not 
deal with the administration and internal functioning of the tribunals, the difficulties the tribunals 
had in establishing themselves during their initial stages, the securing of indictments and arrest 
of major war criminals, or the claim that the trials took too long to complete.
40
 There are many 
other issues that will not be addressed here including the role of the defense in international 
crimes adjudication. 
 
1.2. Statement and research questions 
 
Several factors had a great impact on the effectiveness of the ad hoc tribunals. These factors 
come in successive sequences that progressively dilute the tribunals of their substance. The 
unusual manner in which the ad hoc tribunals were established poses a concern of legality and 
legitimacy. The mandate of prosecuting that envisioned the achievement of multiple and 
ambitious objectives diminished the tribunals’ ability to focus on the ordinary work of a 
criminal tribunal.  In a resolve to meet the UNSC mandate, the tribunals prosecuted the alleged 
perpetrators with the aim of convicting them with minor concern whether doing justice should 
have been the priority. From the observation of those who have been qualified as most 
responsible, one may argue that the prosecutor investigated people rather than investigating 
allegations of what they had done wrong.  The disposition of some cases using administratively 
convenient techniques, like plea bargaining and judicial notice, yet morally questionable, did 
not consider the magnitude and gravity of the crimes of concern. The imputation of criminal 
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liability did not clearly reflect the objective extent of the accused participation because of two 
doctrines, namely joint criminal enterprise and command responsibility. 
 
It is true that prosecuting serious violations of international humanitarian law through ad hoc 
international tribunals is a complex, huge and wide process. International crimes occur on large 
scales, expand over a wide geographical area and involve numerous actors and perpetrators. 
Their victims are too many to all be accounted for. Investigating, prosecuting and ascribing 
responsibility to those believed to be responsible becomes cumbersome. A whole apparatus of 
various legal and non-legal instruments needs to be searched and assembled normatively, 
institutionally, functionally and judicially. This goes with acceptance, criticism, objection, 
problems, rejection, and so on. These difficulties should however not be excuses for not doing 
the job properly. Indeed, this thesis attempts to offer an insight of good practice in this area of 
international crimes prosecution. It appraises the achievements made and acknowledges 
shortcomings and failures, addresses how they should be redressed.  
 
Much work is still needed to ensure that international criminal justice ceases to be an 
exceptional undertaking but is instead increasingly seen as simply another dimension of 
ordinary criminal justice practised at the international level.
41
 The questions that the research 
poses are the following:  
(1) What is the legality and legitimacy of the ad hoc tribunals? 
(2) Was the establishment of ad hoc tribunals a proper and effective response to the 
situation that prevailed in the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda in the 1990s? 
(3) What was their mandate? 
(4) How were investigations and prosecution conducted in the pursuit of the mandate, 
objectives and goals for which the ad hoc tribunals were established? 
(5) Do the techniques of guilty plea and judicial notice reflect the seriousness and gravity of 
the crimes the ad hoc tribunals were established to prosecute and to what extent do they 
serve to meet the objectives and goals of such tribunals? 
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(6) What is the substance of the doctrine of joint criminal enterprise as a mode of imputing 
responsibility beyond its role to palliate the lack of evidence and the complexity of the 
crimes the ad hoc tribunals adjudicated? 
(7)  Is command responsibility a universally applicable doctrine to impute responsibility to 
commanders and superiors? 
(8) Finally, how effective have the ad hoc tribunals been? 
1.3. Aims and interest of the study 
 
The study aims to reflect on and assess the effectiveness of two selected ad hoc tribunals, 
namely the ICTY and the ICTR. It will highlight the process leading up to their establishment, 
their founding instruments, mandate, organisation and prosecution processes as well as their 
achievements and failures, their prospects and on how they could be improved. As Damaska 
argues, it would be wrong to close our eyes to the shortcomings
42
 of international justice. This 
is one of those many works that aim to contribute to a more effective international criminal 
justice and to the development of international criminal law.  
 
Ratner argues that “the enterprise of international criminal law remains underdeveloped in 
treaties, customs, judicial opinion, and doctrine.”43 For Darcy international criminal law is a 
“discipline that is only just past its infancy, and from its very inception it has borrowed its rules 
and principles almost entirely from domestic criminal systems.”44 This status has remained the 
same even “more than sixty years after the Nuremberg trials.”45 Haque suggests that the 
literature on the philosophical foundations of this area is still too young and small, but also that it 
is quickly growing.
46
 More telling is Bassiouni and Osiel’s observations that “the struggle for 
international criminal justice is still a work in progress, and how it develops and evolves is 
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something history will record.”47 The reason is simple, because, “in its fundamental theoretical 
ideas no less than in its practical implementation, international criminal law is very much a work 
in in progress.”48 
 
Taking the international criminal law initiative forward “is yet to be ascertained” because 
“international justice will always have a tortuous and painstaking path.”49 On the other hand, 
Groome held that:  
international criminal justice must mature into a juridical entity internationally designed to realize its 
unique mandate and potential. The test of our success is whether this nascent legal system fairly 
adjudicates individual responsibility, whether it effectively and uniformly enforces international norms, 
whether it mitigates war’s unconscionable results, whether it furthers reconciliation and that it achieves 
all of this in a sustainable way.
50
  
 
Robertson complains that we have not yet found the right procedures for delivering international 
criminal justice fairly, expeditiously and effectively.
51
  
 
This research on the effectiveness of the ad hoc tribunals is a modest contribution to construct 
an international criminal justice system with more confidence, credence and legitimacy. To 
borrow again from Groome, “international criminal justice must establish with certainty and 
predictability our resolve to end impunity – it must become expected and routine. The future of 
international criminal law lies in it becoming our ordinary response to extraordinary crimes.”52 
Anderson concurs by saying that the system is “the promise for the future, and perhaps it is 
well and truly coming to be.”53 Osiel expresses this very well by suggesting that: 
it is tempting to say that the more accurately law can reflect the real distribution of responsibility for such 
large-scale horrors, the more likely its conclusion will be accepted, rather than rejected as scapegoating or 
mythmaking. If law can find a way to get the facts right – in all their admitted complexity – its 
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conclusions cannot be so readily dismissed, one hopes, by the often sceptical communities whose leaders 
are thereby impugned.
54
  
 
Simply put, questioning the effectiveness of a system or an institution is a search for quality 
justice and for better results that meet the expectations and for the highest return. It is a normal, 
necessary and desirable inquiry. Tallgren envisions a system: 
effective enough to finally live up to the public desire after almost 50 years of lip service and neglect […] 
to enforce this responsibility in real trial that send real criminal to real prisons. In other words, nothing less 
than to discourage future offenses, deter vigilante justice, promote reconciliation, and reinforce respect for 
the law and new democratic regimes.
55
 
 
The ad hoc tribunals could have done no less than this. It is therefore fair and reasonable to 
look objectively at the ad hoc tribunals’ mandate and to take account of the complexity of the 
task and the environment in which these tribunals operate. Particularly, these prosecutions, 
according to Bassiouni, “are the ones most fraught with political considerations, and thus are 
difficult to pursue.”56 He continues by arguing that “there will always be instances where some 
governments or the Security Council will manipulate international criminal justice to achieve 
the goals of realpolitik, which so frequently conflict with international criminal justice.”57  
 
More generally, the project of international criminal justice from the time of its inception has 
always been “a political undertaking which serves the interests of the ‘greater powers.”58 In 
fact, the project of international criminal justice “came to be hijacked for purposes alien to its 
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ideals.”59 Therefore, a research in this domain provides a modest addition to the development 
of knowledge in the field where much still need to be revealed.  
 
1.4. Assumptions and hypotheses 
 
Prosecuting violations of international humanitarian law is an appraisable enterprise. Designing 
the institution entrusted with the task must be a disinterested action. The United Nations ad hoc 
tribunals, in the particular circumstances of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, were 
“desirable and necessary.60 They enable the international community to intervene where the 
domestic judicial systems had been unable or unwilling to act in the presence of mass atrocities. 
The international community regains its moral authority over recalcitrant States by representing 
an entire human society aggrieved by atrocious crimes. As Osiel put it “trials seek to influence 
collective memory of the catastrophic events they publicly recount and officially evaluate.”61 
International crimes prosecution can and must work and “evolve into a fully functional system 
of institutional international justice.”62 The international criminal justice rendered through ad 
hoc tribunals needs to emerge in response to novel and genuine concerns for the safety of 
humanity and not as only a “manifestation of global governance priorities in post conflict 
scenarios.”63 
 
Groome is also of the view that “sustainable international criminal justice must be certain in its 
application, predictable in its process and have the moral authority of the world 
community.”64As an instrument to address serious violations of international humanitarian law, 
prosecution is an optimal way to deliver retributive justice for victims and to pursue due 
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process for perpetrators.
65
 Can the effectiveness of the ad hoc tribunals be tested against these 
assumptions? It is possible and this is what this work strives to do. 
 
Ad hoc tribunals have worked as normal judicial institutions. They have accomplished, to the 
fullest of their ability, the task assigned to them
66
 and they may have been effective.
67
 
However, the picture depicted through the adjudication of the cases before the ad hoc tribunals 
is partial and conceals many terrible episodes of the events they were called to hear. The legal 
techniques used are contestable in many respects.  
 
International prosecutors tend to interpret the statutes establishing international ad hoc criminal 
tribunals as giving them the powers to investigate and prosecute the individuals whose 
responsibility was the greatest.
68
 At the outset, prosecutors assume that those people are also 
the most responsible for the crimes. Though this may appear practically tempting based on the 
seriousness of the crimes to be investigated and prosecuted, it is, however, a simplistic 
approach which is not legally founded, even for policy purposes.
69
 On the one hand, experience 
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has shown that prosecutors do not investigate the persons most responsible for crimes, but the 
ones who held senior positions in government, politics and military or other similar structures.  
 
On the other hand, judges have refrained from direct the proper conduct of investigation and 
prosecution, apparently to give deference to the separation of their role and that of the 
prosecutor. The current work argues, however, that it is an abuse of the office of the trial 
prosecutor and a failure of the function of judging. The prosecution policy lacks transparency 
and openness; heavily relying on discretion. The prosecutors underuse or overuse the law when 
they deem it to advance the prosecution theory of the case. The various prosecutors of the 
ICTY and ICTR have also consistently argued that “the tribunal was not established to 
prosecute all the crimes that falls within its jurisdiction, and [that] from the outset careful 
consideration had to be given to the selection of targets.”70  
 
It is true that ad hoc tribunals dealt with atrocities and horrors of extreme complexity. There 
are, however, other available avenues that can be resorted to when dealing with mass atrocities.  
If the ad hoc tribunals were genuinely fair and fully independent, they would “contribute to the 
prevention and redress of future human rights abuses.”71 The ad hoc tribunals did not offer the 
so much anticipated effectiveness as foreseen in the funding instruments. Their effectiveness 
could have been attained if they independently concentrate on the suspects whom the 
prosecutor believes has really committed the gravest crimes, and for whom sufficient evidence 
is available. Such suspects should also be prosecuted based on the crimes they have allegedly 
commited. Responsibility should be attributed based on the extent of the suspect’s involvement 
in the crimes. However, this does not happen. The whole process should aim at upholding and 
maintaining the moral value of justice in the search of substantive truth.  
 
                                                          
70
 Del Ponte Carla, “Investigation and Prosecution of Large-scale Crimes at the International Level : The experience 
of the ICTY”, Journal of International Criminal Justice, Vol. 4, Iss.3, 2006, pp. 539 – 558, p. 541 
71
 The promises and limits of International Criminal Justice: The “Extraordinary Chambers” in Cambodia, a 
Roundtable Discussion, hosted by: UBC Centre for Southeast Asia Research of the Institute for Asian; the Liu 
Institute for Global Issues; and the Centre for Asian Legal Studies at the Faculty of Law, 2 – 3 February 2006 
16 
 
1.5. Literature review 
 
Much has been written on Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, most particularly describing 
how genocide happened in Rwanda and the deliberate ethnic cleansing which took place in the 
Balkans.  Were all the narratives on Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia to be reviewed, this 
would require more time and volumes of theses, not just a single and modest academic work.  
What is most common in the whole literature about events in Rwanda and the former 
Yugoslavia is that serious violations of international humanitarian law were actually 
committed. Unanimity is, however, far from being reached on the way the prosecution of the 
alleged perpetrators of these crimes has been conducted and the methods and means used to 
that effect. What also varies is the analysis and interpretation of those facts. Little has been 
written on the effectiveness of the ad hoc tribunals.
72
 
 
Barria and Roper attempted to assess the effectiveness of the ICTY and ICTR and concluded 
that “these tribunals have not been more effective in providing peace and security, justice to 
victims and defendants, as well as fostering national reconciliation.”73 Based on a case study of 
the ICTY and ICTR, they observed that the lack of effective apprehension of suspects 
diminishes the deterrant effect of the tribunals and provided one of the primary justifications 
for the creation of an ICC.
74
 Damaska extended the inquiry a bit further in arguing that politics 
still plays a greater role in shaping international criminal tribunals and their operations, the 
combination of which continues to weaken the delivery of international criminal justice. He, 
however, hopefully suggests that these weakenesses can be cured if the international criminal 
tribunals were to lessen the array of goals they pursue.
75
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In his book “A history of political trials: from Charles I to Saddam Hussein”  writing about the 
historical prosecution of heads of states and other sovereigns, Laughland
76
 emphasises an 
important issue that is also relevant to international criminal prosecution in general and to the 
ad hoc tribunals in particular. The author suggests that, “generally speaking, we know more 
about the reasons why ex-sovereigns were prosecuted than about what they said in reply.”77 
Laughland aims therefore to “encourage people to reflect on the true nature and motives of the 
prosecution, and of course on the procedural shortcomings of these trials; there is a danger of 
too naively believing that because evil men were punished, the prosecution must have been 
flawless.”78 The establishment and working of the ICTY and ICTR have been the easy way of 
handling embarrassing situations, but not necessarily the best and most effective way. Had the 
establishment of the tribunals been combined with a targeted military operation, the situation in 
both the former Yugoslavia nd Rwanda could have improved to the better. 
 
The breakdown of the states constituting the former Socialist and Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia attracted attention when the world became aware of atrocities that were committed.  
According to Morris and Scharf: 
International observers, including information gathering missions conducted under the auspices of the 
United Nations Human Rights Commission, the European Community, the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe, the International Committee of the Red Cross, Amnesty International and 
Helsinki Watch, began to document widespread violations of international humanitarian law occurring in 
Bosnia.
79
  
 
These reports eventually prompted the UNSC to pay particular attention to what was happening 
in the Balkans. In resolution 780
80
, the UNSC requested the UN Secretary General to establish 
an independent commission of Experts “with a view to providing the Secretary General with its 
conclusion on the evidence of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other violations 
of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia.”81 Had it 
not been the perspicacity and resolute determination of its chairperson Bassiouni, Resolution 
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780 Commission could have died a natural death.
82
 Its UN sponsors wanted its mandate to be 
terminated without any tangible results. Bassiouni stressed “that international accountability 
would achieve five goals.”83 Those goals were: “establishing individual responsibility, 
discrediting institutions and leaders responsible for the commission of atrocities, establishing 
an accurate historical record, providing victims’ catharsis, and promoting deterrence.”84 
Bassiouni’s statements in 1993 provided much impetus for the main achievements of the ICTY 
in the summer of 2008. The tribunal was proud that its work contributed to “bringing justice to 
victims, holding leaders accountable, individualising guilty, giving victims a voice, establishing 
the facts, strengthening the rule of law, and developing international law.”85 
 
After examining and analysing the data collected, the Commission of Experts concluded that 
“Bosnia was the scene of massive and systematic violations of human rights, as well as serious 
and grave violation of humanitarian law’ and that harassment of Muslims, including torture and 
violence, was ‘commonplace’ by the invading power, the Bosnian Serbs.”86  The Commission 
prepared and presented a preliminary report to the Security Council at the end of August 1992
87
 
confirming the nature and character of the atrocities that were being committed.  
 
It is, however, through the Report of the Secretary General pursuant to paragraph 2 of Security 
Council Resolution 808 (1993)
88
 that the ICTY was actually established. Bassiouni, who led  
the Commission, held that  “the conflict in the former Yugoslavia and the efforts to assign 
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international responsibility to its senior leaders and worst perpetrators of ‘crimes against 
humanity’ and ‘war crimes’ reflect the classic historic tensions between Realpolitik and 
justice.”89  
 
The difficulties on the establishment of the ICTY also appear in Scharf’s work.90 It is 
interesting to find the true reason of the ICTY establishment where the author emphasises that: 
Most observers believe that the Security Council, led by the United States, could have put an early halt to 
the bloodshed in the Balkans, but that the members of the council lacked the political will to take the 
necessary measures, such as air strikes and committing troops to a combat situation which had the 
potential of turning into a quagmire like Vietnam. Consequently, the idea of a war crimes tribunal 
appealed to the members of the council as a means of countering accusations that they tolerated massive 
violations of international humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia and stood by idly while a 
defenceless Bosnia succumbed to Serb and Croat aggression.
91
 
 
Robertson shares the same feeling by observing that “the United Nations could not be taken 
seriously unless something was done: the utter failure of diplomacy and sanctions, and the 
refusal to risk the lives of allied soldiers by armed intervention, made a war crimes tribunal the 
only face-saving device left.”92 It was also “a less expensive and easier option than military 
intervention to stop the human rights atrocities in the former Yugoslavia.”93 
 
The confusion and mixed agendas fortunately brought about the creation of a judicial 
institution through a process that was “completely novel”94 and “controversial.”95 For some, 
“there is widespread recognition that the decision of the Security Council to establish the ad 
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hoc tribunals constitutes a landmark in the fight against impunity and a major advance in 
international law.”96 
 
Events that unfolded in Rwanda can be traced back from a review of the Final Report of the 
International Commission of Investigation on Human Rights Violations in Rwanda Since 
October 1990 (January 7 – 21, 1993).97 The Commission did not have a specific mandate. It 
was only responding to a request from two Rwandan organisations for human rights with the 
approval of the Rwandan Government.
98
 Based on the findings of the International 
Commission of Investigation and other information from various sources, the Report of the 
Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on Extrajudicial, Summary or 
Arbitrary Executions, Mr. N’diaye99, on his mission to Rwanda from 8-17 April 1993 later 
reported on the events that occurred in Rwanda as well. It “concluded that the substance of the 
allegations contained in the Commission’s Report could, by and large, be regarded as 
established.”100 
 
In August 1993, the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) was tasked to assist the 
belligerents, namely the Rwandan Armed Forces (RAF) and the Rwandan Patriotic Army 
(RPA) to implement the peace accords signed in Arusha on 4 August 1993.
101
 In its 
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reconnaissance mission report, it observed that after the signing of the peace accord, the 
situation in Rwanda was calm
102
 despite problems of population displacement, strong resistance 
to the Arusha Accord and large quantities of arms hidden throught the country which might, if 
the UN delays the deployment of the International Neutral Force, destabilise the country. Up 
until April 5, 1994, while everyone assisted to a series of killings, no one raised a hand on an 
alleged plan to wipe out the Tutsis.  
 
It is only Special Rapporteur Segui who for the first time, on the international level, and on 
behalf of the Commission of Human Rights, spoke of planned genocide. He also pointed out 
that other crimes had been committed as well.
103
 The various reports drafted by Mr. Segui 
constituted the direct basis for the establishment of the ICTR. But, they were not the only 
collection of information related to Rwanda. The French and Belgian governments also 
established parliamentary commissions to investigate the events.  After the establishment of the 
ICTR, Morris and Scharf
104
 compiled most of the legal instruments aimed at investigations and 
prosecutions. A complete compilation of legal, political and diplomatic archives on how events 
in Rwanda were viewed at the UN and in other spheres appears exhaustively in The United 
Nations and Rwanda 1993 – 1996105 UN book series.  This work relies on almost all those 
documents to re-establish the factual and legal contexts. 
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The events in Rwanda attracted not only the legal, but also the political and diplomatic 
communities on what to do and how to do it. UNAMIR withdrew while the then governmental 
structures were actively involved in massacres and RPF was consistently refusing to agree to 
any ceasefire. RPF undertook a double pressure; first on the ground to force the governmental 
forces out and political one on the UN to admit that genocide was being committed. Once in 
power from 19July 1994, it requested an international criminal tribunal to try the 
perpetrators.
106
 Since then, all eyes and ears turned towards Rwanda. Journalists, scholars, 
human rights activists spent sleepless nights writing about the genocide. A first generation of 
reporters
107
 openly and emotionally sympathised with the RPF and the victims without 
presenting the real situation on the ground. The horror and massive nature of the killings 
prevailed over a deep investigation and analysis of the events that were unfolding in Rwanda. 
 
Another generation of authors hastily wrote on Rwanda, but their work was based on 
manipulated information which was not checked thoroughly for accuracy. Some reviewed their 
position and wrote again or contradicted their previous understanding in other fora.
108
 The gist 
of their argument was to nuance their first hand understanding of genocide, emphasising that 
the information they relied on was not accurate. 
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A third generation of writers recounted the reality on the ground but was to be accused of 
denying genocide or revising it. Some landed in court due to their expressed opinions.
109
 RPF 
dissenters and deserters
110
 also wrote on the criminal activities of the organisation when it was 
still in the field. Desouter went even further and openly accused the RPF of genocide, war 
crimes and crimes against humanity in his book.
111
 UN officials’ also broke their silence even 
though they did not tell it all.
112
 Renowned researchers and academics
113
 entered the game in an 
attempt to explain the Rwandan tragedy; and their writings present some degree of objectivity 
in their analysis.  
 
Insiders of the ICTR enlightened the public regarding the ways proceedings were conducted.  
Hartman
114
, a former spokesperson of the ICTR prosecutor, revealed the political games behind 
closed doors on the granting of a blank amnesty to RPF and the diplomatic fight over how the 
Balkan case was to be resolved. Cruvellier, a journalist who witnessed the proceedings in 
Arusha concluded that the ICTR is a Nuremberg for Africa.
115
 Essoungou, another journalist 
who reported the Arusha proceedings, titled his book “Justice à Arusha: Un tribunal 
international politiquement encadré face au genocide rwandais”116, or “Justice at Arusha: an 
international criminal tribunal politically flanked vis-à-vis the Rwandan genocide.” 
Ngirabatware
117, a former Rwandan cabinet minister and academic echoed Cruvellier’s 
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findings, but he also landed at the United Nations Detention Facilities (UNDF) to respond to 
the allegations of genocide.  
 
Both the ICTY and ICTR were labelled “a mechanism for the restoration and maintenance of 
international peace and security.”118 According to Kerr119 the Security Council powers in this 
respect were the “manifestation of an explicit link between peace and justice, politics and 
law.”120  Kerr contends that “the main drawback of ad hoc tribunals is that they are inherently 
political and selective by virtue of their method of establishment, even if in themselves they are 
legitimate judicial institutions.”121 Kerr recognises that the demarcation between justice and 
politics was possible conceptually, but not in practice.
122
 This assertion finds its justification in 
“Judicial behaviour” where Segal writes, citing Gibson that, “judges’ decisions are a function 
of what they prefer to do, tempered by what they think they ought to do, but constrained by 
what they perceive is feasible to do.”123 In the strategic judicial decision making, Pritchett, an 
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American scholar has also found that “both politicians and judges decide important public 
policy issues, formulate opinions, and issue a vote, enjoying substantial discretion.”124 
 
Commenting on the ICTY, Kerr remarked that “the decision to establish the Tribunal was 
political, and it was established for a political purpose, but its internal mandate was to deliver 
justice.”125 Kerr is right because the ad hoc tribunals were established with a broad agenda 
including political goals; like the restoration and maintenance of peace and security and as 
contributions to the process of national reconciliation in the affected States. Delivering justice, 
as traditionally understood is a proper mandate of a court of law. Unfortunately, a criminal 
court cannot become a forum for political agendas to the scale the ad hoc tribunals did.  
 
Kerr’s view is nevertheless shared by Scharf and Schabas. Writing on the Milosevic case, they 
posed and answered some questions in an interesting fashion:  
Will history remember Milosevic as a victim of victor’s justice, a scapegoat tried in a show trial before a 
one-sided court? Or will the Milosevic trial be seen as fair and free of political influence? More than 
anything else, the answer to these questions may dictate the ultimate success or failure of the 
proceedings.
126
 
 
The two scholars rhetorically justified their position and argued that the ICTY was legitimate as 
was the trial of Milosevic. Scharf played a key role behind the political deciding figures to 
which he was a firsthand legal advisor.
127
 There is no doubt about Scharf and Schabas’ 
                                                          
124
 Pritchett, C. H., The voting behaviour of the Supreme Court, 1941 – 1942, Journal of Politics, 4: 491 – 506, cited 
by Spilller P. T., and Gely R.,  Strategic Judicial decision-making, The oxford Handbook of Political Science, op. 
cit., pp. 34 - 45 
125
 Kerr Rachel, op. cit., p. 2 
126
 Scharf P. Michael & Schabas A. William, Slobodan Milosevich on Trial: A companion, The Continum 
International Publishing Library Group Inc, New York, 2002, p. 97 
127
 Scharf proudly writes:  
To the extent possible, consistent with State Department rules of confidentiality, I have filled these pages 
with behind-the-scene information gleaned from my days at the State Department….(p. xvi) having failed 
to take action to halt the atrocities in Bosnia, the Security Council became  determined to at least take steps 
to hold the violators accountable…..as Attorney-Advisor for U.N Affairs at the State Department, I was 
assigned to prepare the initial draft of Resolution 771. 
Scharf P. Michael, “The Balkan Justice”, op. cit., p. 37 - 44; as well in the Preface in Paul R. Williams & Scharf P. 
Michael, Peace with Justice: war crimes and accountability in the former Yugoslavia, Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, Inc., Lanham – Boulder – New York & Oxford, 2002. Both professors Williams and Scharf 
acknowledge that they began their professional engagement with peace-building and the former Yugoslavia when 
they served as attorney-advisers in the Office of the Legal Advisor for the U.S. Department of State. Professor 
Williams was deeply involved in the legal aspects of the U. S. response to the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the 
accompanying widespread commission of ethnic cleansing and attempted genocide and other efforts to bring about 
peace in Yugoslavia. Professor Scharf was likewise intensively involved in U. S. government efforts to utilize  
26 
 
objectivity and expertise if one considers their authoritative standing in the academe and in the 
international criminal prosecutions arenas.  But, it is also true that these authors are parts and 
parcels of the great enterprise which is a by-product of political decisions. They cannot 
therefore contradict themselves in all respects. How credible and reliable they are is a question 
they can answer to as academics. Simpson distances himself from Scharf and Schabas by 
characterising war crimes trial as show trials. 
128
  
 
Late Cassese contributed substantially to “the fundamentals of both substantive and procedural 
international criminal law”129 even though their interpretation and application gave rise to many 
controversies. The ad hoc tribunals’ jurisprudence added value to the development of some 
principles and fundamentals, most particularly the substantive law, as elaborated on by Van 
Den Herik.
130
 Some such controversies are discussed in this thesis, namely the investigation 
aspect, guilty pleas, judicial notice, command and superior responsibility and joint criminal 
enterprise.  
 
When investigating and prosecuting crimes committed in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, 
under the umbrella of discretion, the prosecutor used and abused the powers vested in him. 
Gershman writes widely on these abuses of prosecutorial powers.
131
 Danner proposes that, to 
be accountable and to legitimise the international prosecutor’s actions, a “good process should 
include the public articulation of prosecutorial guidelines that will shape and constrain his 
discretionary decisions.”132 Is this enough? It is an opinion here that the international 
prosecutor should, by all means, seek to do justice and abide by professional ethics. It requires 
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a commitment “to achieve a just, and not necessarily the most harsh result.”133 This imperative 
is twofold. It means that, on the one hand, only plausible charges that could lead to a finding of 
guilt need to be brought to court instead of over-investigating and over-prosecuting
134
 targets in 
a zealous fashion, possibly without merit. As will be discussed later in chapter five on 
professionalism, investigations and prosecutions lacked thoroughness in some respects. For 
example, Robertson observes in the foreward of Boas’ book on the Milosevic trial, that:  
the prosecution was over-zealous and over-expensive, trying to impute too much to Milosevic and to 
attribute too much to his ‘Greater Serbia’ policy. This is borne out by the fact that it failed, at the close of 
its case, to establish over 1,000 of the allegations it made at the outset.
135
  
 
On the other hand, “the power to decline to prosecute in case of provable criminal liability”136 
also needs to be guided. Prosecutors should avoid guaranteeing blank amnesties by not 
thoroughly investigating and prosecuting all crimes to serve some known or unknown interests, 
even for peace purposes. In this regard, Bassiouni argues that:  
 in a world based on the rule of law and not on the rule of might, the attainment of peace to end conflicts 
cannot be totally severed from the pursuit of justice whenever that may be required in the aftermath of 
violence […]. If peace is not intended to be a brief interlude between conflicts, then in order to avoid 
future conflict, it must encompass what justice is intended to accomplish: prevent, deter, punish, and 
rehabilitate.
137
  
 
Morris shares the same view by suggesting that “ideally full accountability for genocide, war 
crimes, crimes against humanity and other serious violations would be the norm.”138 It would 
moreover avoid the chronic obstacles of political constraints and resources required to achieve 
full accountability.
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The international prosecutor’s tendency nowadays is to charge as much as he/she can. He/she 
uses means and ways that can better facilitate his work. Some means are of a procedural nature 
like the ones discussed above. This thesis will look into judicial notice, guilty pleas in their 
procedural aspect and as attributes of the prosecutor. Other legal arms that the prosecutor 
frequently relies on are command or superior responsibility and joint criminal enterprise. A 
brief look into the literature on these doctrinal concepts presents a disparity of opinions. 
 
Combs explores “the ways in which a widespread and systematic effort to obtain guilty pleas 
can enhance international criminal accountability by increasing the number of prosecutions that 
feasibly can be undertaken”140 This exercise can be fruitful if it is based on a strong factual 
basis and tends to uncover the nature of atrocities that have been committed by a suspect. Plea 
bargains may save time and money, and serve other ends.  But there is doubt as to whether the 
saving is worth the cost. Cohen and Doob, after a careful consideration of data concluded that 
“most Canadians disapprove of plea bargaining.”141 A plea bargain is good and helpful if it is 
used reasonably. 
  
The other tool is judicial notice.  Judicial notice is first of all utilised by a prosecutor who seeks 
a decision from a chamber to not adduce evidence on uncontested issues before the court. As a 
matter of principle, it is used in exceptional circumstances. In a previous work
142
, the author 
tackled this doctrine.  Bringing it back in the current research reinforces the previous 
opposition to the doctrine particularly the way it had been resorted to by the ICTR and ICTY 
prosecutors. 
 
Command or superior responsibility as well as joint criminal enterprise are the most 
controversial tools to impute criminal liability. These concepts were abundantly used in the 
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prosecutions before the ad hoc tribunals.
143
 In many instances both doctrines are applied 
together. There is, however, a growing tendency to abandon the doctrine of command 
responsibility in favour of joint criminal enterprise.
144
 It may be the case, for example, when 
the prosecution fails to prove the superior-subordinate relationship or the constructive 
knowledge element.  
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Joint criminal enterprise has taken a lion’s share in the prosecution of international crimes. It 
has become “a magic weapon”145 used as a form of accomplice liability. The doctrine still gives 
rise to conceptual confusion and conflicts with some fundamental principles of (international) 
criminal law.
146
 It is resorted to when the prosecution evidence fails to prove command 
responsibility on one or more legs. It also helps to punish anyone who, in some way, has made 
it possible for the perpetrator of the reprehensible act to carry it out.
147
 It is based on the 
assumption that international crimes involve many people who at different levels and in various 
capacities, knowingly or unknowingly, contribute to the realisation of what comes out of their 
disjointed effort, as a common design. According to Bigi, “the person concretely committing 
the crime can often be regarded as a mere participant in a broader criminal venture planned and 
organised by senior political or military leaders.”148 Such a person cannot be shed from 
criminal liability nor should his contribution be underestimated.
149
 
 
Conceptually, command responsibility and joint criminal enterprise differ.  Joint criminal 
enterprise “requires a positive act or contribution”150 while “an omission suffices”151 to engage 
command responsibility. Ohlin finds within the joint criminal enterprise alone three conceptual 
problems
152
, namely the mistaken attribution of criminal liability for contributors who do not 
intend to further the criminal purpose of the enterprise, the imposition of criminal liability for 
the foreseeable acts of one’s co-conspirators and the mistaken claim that all members of a joint 
criminal enterprise are equally culpable for the actions of its members.
153
 He unfortunately 
concludes that “the three conceptual problems with joint criminal enterprise identified […] do 
                                                          
145
 Ambos Kai, “Joint Criminal Enterprise and Command Responsibility”, Journal of International Criminal Justice, 
Vol. 5, Iss.1, 2007, pp 159 – 183, p. 153 
146
 Idem 
147
 See Kirs Eszter, “Ante Gotovina and the Joint Criminal Enterprise concept at the ICTY”, International Relations 
Quarterly, Vol. 2 No.1, 2011, pp. 1 – 5, p. 3 
148
 Bigi Giulia, “Joint Criminal Enterprise in the Jurisprudence of the International Criminal tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia and the Prosecution of Senior Political and Military leaders: the Krajsnik Case”, Max Planck Yearbook 
of United Nations Law, Vol. 2010, pp. 51 – 83, p. 53 
149
 Idem 
150
 Ambos Kai,  op. cit., p. 180 
151
 Ibiden 
152
 Ohlin J. David, “Three conceptual problems with the doctrine of joint criminal enterprise”, Journal of 
International Criminal Justice, Vol. 5, Iss.1, 2007, pp. 69 - 90 
153
 Idem, p. 69 
31 
 
not implicate the essential core of the doctrine.”154 He advocates for the amendment of article 
25 of the Rome Statute to adequately deal with “the problems of intentionality, foreseability 
and culpability.”155 
 
Ohlin’s opinion fails to address the very essence of the doctrine. Hamdorf argues that its 
expansive use “may run the risk of violating the principles of legality and individual criminal 
liability.”156 Judge Cassese attempts to set the “proper limits of individual responsibility under 
the doctrine of joint criminal enterprise”157; but does not pre-empt the question. The enterprise 
as such, is confusedly defined. There is a complete confusion of terms. Is it an enterprise, a 
purpose, design, an agreement or any other thing of that nature? There is no definitive answer.  
Darcy moves forward and attacks the overreliance on both command responsibility and joint 
criminal enterprise. She demonstrates “how aspects of joint criminal enterprise liability and 
superior responsibility fall short of basic principles of criminal law, including the mens rea 
requirement and causation.”158 She contends that “convictions secured under these modes of 
imputed liability may not accurately reflect the personal wrongdoing of an accused.”159 She 
also points out that “reliance on modes of imputed criminal liability which overstate the 
responsibility of a particular accused may undermine public support for the work of 
international tribunals and hinder the prospects for reconciliation, the breaking of cycles of 
collective blame, and the maintenance of peace.”160 To a certain extent, the public would be 
justified to reject the jurisprudence gained by the application of joint criminal enterprise in its 
current status.
161
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Darcy courageously and frankly breaks the silence and reveals the true reasons why those 
doctrines are overused. She suggests “that the employment of joint criminal enterprise and 
superior responsibility is primarily motivated by a prosecutorial desire for expediency, as 
exemplified in the construction of the majority of indictments.”162 She quotes Drumbl noting 
“how various factors such as political pressure to obtain convictions have made reliance on 
these imputed liability concepts all the more tempting.”163 Darcy maintains that: 
One cannot discount the idea that the tribunals are relying on these modes of imputed liability in order to 
ensure the conviction of indicted individuals and thus, in their view, the automatic fulfilment of the 
numerous objectives ascribed to international trials. Needless to say, it would be unacceptable for such 
trials to be used as a means to the end of achieving the ancillary goals, in disregard of the primary 
objectives of holding individuals accountable in accordance with established principles of criminal 
liability and fair trial.
164
 
 
The doctrine of command responsibility evolved over the ages. Bantekas is an outstanding 
authority who extensively wrote on command responsibility.
165
 He is of the view that 
“superiors do not incur responsibility for the crimes of their subordinate simply because they 
happen to occupy that position.”166 Despite its rationale, some states have been reluctant to rely 
on it to hold their commanders responsible for criminal acts committed by their subordinates. 
Those states have instead excelled in imputing severe penalties to fallen enemy commanders 
for failure to control their troops.  
 
Command responsibility developed unevenly particularly after the Allies trial of Nazi and 
Japanese commanders.  The case of General Tomuyuki Yamashita and captain Medina are 
good illustrations of this assertion.  In the Yamashita case, Justice Murphy, dissenting from the 
majority was of the opinion that the charges against General Yamashita amounted to victors 
punishing the vanquished only because they lost the war.
167
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In the majority judgment, the judges assumed knowledge of General Yamashita pursuant to the 
widespread and systematic nature of the atrocities committed without considering the general 
situation in which Yamashita operated as an ordinary human general. The majority did not  
bother considering the General’s ability to stop the atrocities or even to punish the perpetrators, 
if he was able to identify them and if time so allowed. In Medina, judges did not apply the same 
reasoning. In Medina, an American military tribunal failed to apply the Yamashita standard. It 
found captain Medina not guilty of acts committed by his forces.   Reasonably the tribunal 
could have concluded that Medina knew of the crimes committed, that he ordered or condoned 
those crimes. No superior to Medina was ever prosecuted. How could the doctrine of command 
responsibility born out of these two situations conclusively evolve as a norm of customary law?  
 
The question becomes an inquiry into how to properly impute responsibility to a failing 
commander or superior; whether American or Japanese. The inquiry seeks to establish the real 
and actual responsibility of a commander taking into account all the circumstances that did not 
facilitate the discharge of his duties as a responsible commander, whoever he might be. “Every 
case needs to be decided on its own particular set of facts” as advanced by Hendrin.168  
  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
having been inefficient in maintaining control of your troops during the period when we were so effectively 
besieging and eliminating your forces and blocking your ability to maintain effective control. Many terrible 
atrocities were committed by your disorganized troops. Because these atrocities were so widespread we 
will not bother to charge or prove that you committed, ordered or condoned any of them. We will assume 
that they must have resulted from your inefficiency and negligence as a commander. In short, we charge 
you with the crime of inefficiency in controlling your troops. We will judge the discharge of your duties by 
the disorganisation which ourselves created in large part. Our standards of judgment are whatever we wish 
to make them. Nothing in all history or in international law, at least as far as I am aware, justifies such a 
charge against a fallen commander of a defeated force. To use the very inefficiency and disorganisation 
created by the victorious forces as the primary basis for condemning officers of the defeated armies bears 
no resemblance to justice or to military reality. 
Judge Murphy dissenting, Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, Selected and Prepared by the United Nations 
War Crimes Commission, Vol IV, London, HMSO 1948, Trial of General Tomuyuki Yamashita, United States 
Military Commission, Manila, 8
th
 October – 7th December 1945, and the Supreme Court of the United States, 
Judgment delivered on 4
th
 February, 1946, p. 51 
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Following the jurisprudence of particularly the ICTY, some scholars have elaborated on these 
two concepts, not necessarily in the traditional understanding of the doctrines but in what may 
be called a “must-to-be” relationship between commanders and superiors.  They in fact praised 
how judges went about extending those principles in a legislative fashion. Boas, Bischoff and 
Reid contend, commenting on the Osman Osmanovic and Ramiz Becirovic trial judgment, that:  
The relationship between a chief of staff and a commander is such that the former reports to the latter, 
takes orders from him and implement them. In this way, a commander exercises effective control over the 
chief of staff. There is no evidence that would indicate that the situation was different in the case of 
Osman Osmanovic and Ramiz Becirovic.
169
 
 
This approach is too unfair and detached from military reality. Prosecutors assume that a 
commander has control over a single foot soldier whatever the level of the unit might be. The 
prosecutor relies solely on the practice of reporting, giving orders and the military hierarchy 
structure. The prosecutor does not bother checking which orders have been given, whether they 
have been received and the feedback provided.  How to properly ascribe criminal liability to  
the accused? This is the crux of the current research under joint criminal enterprise and 
command responsibility. It is also a contribution to the effectiveness of current and future 
international crimes tribunals. 
 
The literature review has aimed at putting the current research in its factual and legal context. 
The breakdown of the former Yugoslavia was preceded by many events that facilitated the 
outbreak of war. It cannot be said with certainty that what has been written about those events 
has pre-empted the root causes of the conflict. It is a work historians may complete. The factual 
analysis of conflict in Rwanda was not unanimous. Some believed that it was a civil war. 
Others supported the idea that the war facilitated the commission of genocide. Again, historical 
and social research may better clarify what happened in Rwanda. Any factual conclusion 
necessitates a proper legal qualification.  
 
The literature reviewed highlighted the writings that are relevant and upon which the current 
study needs to stand.  A part of the literature pertaining to the five areas highlighted for the 
effectiveness of the ad hoc tribunals shows many shortcomings or partially touches on the 
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questions posed. The other part addresses substantially the subjects of the inquiry that this 
research intends to develop. From the weaknesses observed, the current work will suggest 
improvements. From the strength noted, the research will take stock and add ingredients for 
sustainability and larger impact. The research methodology that follows emphasises how, from 
diverse sources of information, the focal point remains the diagnosis of the ad hoc tribunals for 
the best outcome of their work that can serve for the future.  
 
1.6. Research methodology and sources  
 
A lot of materials have been used to carry out this research. The approach consists firstly in 
describing the events in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Secondly, the analysis compares 
relevant and best practice of law borrowed from international or domestic levels. The facts 
relevant to the five areas of the study were systematically and critically analysed in their 
historical and legal context. To arrive at theoretical and practical findings, a comparative 
approach looked into the domestic good practices and international odious or imperfect ones. 
The attempt is a search of consistency, coherence and stability. The legal analysis is 
predominantly used in this research. The work relies on the ad hoc tribunals’ statutes, the rules 
of procedures and evidence, the judgments and other judicial decisions; the UNSC resolutions 
and other official documents.  
 
International criminal law as applied by the ad hoc tribunals is not an autonomous discipline.  It 
is also evolving.  The working approach is therefore an interdisciplinary one. Measuring the 
effectiveness of the ad hoc tribunals refers not only to international criminal law, but also to 
disciplines like criminology, humanitarian law, human rights law, international relations, 
penology and politics; to just mention a few.
170
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From a fair and modest knowledge of the topic, the current research relies extensively on the 
work of others. The researcher worked at the ICTR as a Defence Legal Assistant and 
Investigator for more than twelve years.
171
 The author also researched the ICTR approach to 
international humanitarian law through Article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions and 
Additional Protocol II.
172
 
 
The background information on facts and events that help apply the legal principles is found in 
materials utilised by international tribunals and courts such as transcripts of proceedings, expert 
reports, motions and briefs from parties which are in the public domain and other such 
information.  All these sources are acknowledged within this work and clear indications are 
provided where the sources are not easily accessible to the public. For example, this is done 
when some materials were discussed on camera or were intended to be confidential or 
otherwise protected. 
 
There are also abundant declassified documents from the United States of America Department 
of State
173
 and UNAMIR reports which relate to the Rwandan events. These correspondences 
were facts on events at the time. They reflected what was happening in Rwanda. However, 
some important details contained in those correspondences were overlooked during the trial.  
They could have assisted in replaying the scene and allow to draw truthful and objective 
conclusions and worthy inferences. The same exercise is done with regard to most, if not all, of 
the United Nations documents, particularly the resolutions of the UNSC on the events in 
Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, as well as such documents and reports related to the 
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working of the two ad hoc tribunals, like the tribunals’ annual reports. The study refers many 
times to reports of the UN Secretary General, reports of internationally appointed commissions 
of experts on Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, and letters from the diplomatic community.  
 
The documentation further comprises reports by nongovernmental organisations such as 
Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, African Rights and major research centres and 
schools’ records on the events in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia from 1990 onwards. All 
these sources contain rich original and firsthand information and observations that are relevant 
to the identified research problem. They are indeed indispensable for the research. 
 
Sources include many extracts from books and articles from prominent scholars that are related 
to any of the five areas identified for the study. The chosen writings constitute the best and most 
updated authorities in the domain of international criminal law, ICTY and ICTR. This required 
thorough library research and intensive readings of the literature. Books, journal articles and 
chapters in books assisted to shape different opinions expressed in the whole work, and to 
articulate conclusions. Articles from outstanding academics, scholars, experts, other prominent 
international criminal lawyers and social scientists on various disciplines and topics did the 
same.  A great deal of international criminal law reviews which focus principally on prosecution 
of international crimes, particularly those related to ad hoc tribunals, are better evidence in this 
area of study. 
 
The commentaries on the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals, namely the ICTY, the ICTR 
and other such tribunals and courts of an international or hybrid character also helped to 
understand, argue and articulate the themes raised. The ICC, it is believed; has at its disposal 
plenty documents, that has been used as well. This jurisprudence is composed of appeal and 
trial chamber judgments and decisions. Before the ad hoc tribunals, there was the IMT that 
tried major war criminals of the Nazi regime in Europe. They left behind an abundant 
jurisprudence and enunciated principles that are still applied nowadays, albeit with much 
improvement. The same type of approach will be used as was applied in the IMTFE or such 
prosecutions of war criminals in the aftermath of World War II that were conducted in 
domestic jurisdictions and other forums.  
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The criticisms that accompanied all these prosecutions inspire one to make useful comparisons 
with the law and practice of the ad hoc tribunals. This thesis would be incomplete if the author 
did not consider the different reports of amnesty commissions because their work may help in 
understanding some proposed ways forward to pre-empt atrocities by such truth–telling 
commissions. What needs to be remembered however is that the research is undertaken with a 
postulate of improving retributive justice with relatively little emphasis on restorative justice. 
Truth commissions belong to the second category. These constitute the secondary sources. 
 
1.7. Structure of the thesis 
 
The thesis is divided into eight chapters. Chapter one introduces the topic and lays foundations 
for subsequent developments. The introductory remarks state the problem the research intends 
to investigate. It affirms the aim, objectives and interests of the research. It sets up its 
assumptions and the working hypothesis. The introduction contains the literature that is 
relevant to the research, the methodology and the sources. 
Chapter two introduces and confronts legal positivism and naturalism in international criminal 
prosecutions. It shows how each theory applies to the themes of the study. Adjudicating 
international crimes portrays a more positivistic appraisal, while it should attempt to conform to 
justice as prescribed by natural law. There are moral and ethical imperatives that need to be 
looked at more seriously, what positive law does not comply with. 
 
Chapter three elaborates on the events that brought about the establishment of ad hoc tribunals 
for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda in 1993 and 1994. It further analyses the legal 
problematic of establishing these ad hoc international criminal tribunals. It emphasises 
particularly the opportunistic question of responding to the failure of the UNSC, to adequately 
and timely address the war that fuelled the commission of serious violations of international 
humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. An analysis of four cases held by both 
tribunals in which defendants contested the jurisdiction concludes that the UNSC did not have 
power to establish ad hoc tribunals. 
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Chapter four defines the objective of justice and other general criminal law objectives of 
deterrence, end to impunity, retribution and incapacitation. The chapter claims that it was too 
ambitious and unrealistic to expect criminal tribunals to contribute to the process of restoration 
and the maintenance of peace and national reconciliation.  In the case of the former Yugoslavia, 
some objectives have begun to be achieved. For Rwanda, many questions remain unanswered. 
  
Chapter five investigates the prosecution aspect of the ad hoc tribunals, emphasising the role of 
the prosecutor in the process. Ordinarily a prosecutor plays a double role. He must vigorously 
lead a criminal case in order to win it at all costs. By doing so, however, he must ensure that 
justice is done, that is his second priority. This twin obligation must consistently appear in the 
investigation and prosecution phases. To discharge its function, the prosecutor must be 
independent, accountable and professional. The ad hoc tribunals’ experience shows the most 
dangerous power of the prosecutor that is picking people that he/she thinks he/she should, 
rather than picking cases that needed to be prosecuted.
174
 The chapter looks moreover into the 
investigative and charging decisions vested in the international prosecutor. The chapter tests 
how the prosecutor uses his/her powers and discretion when adjudicating high profile cases 
involving for example heads of states and government and the passive role played by judges in 
the process.  
 
Chapter six discusses the overuse of the guilty plea and judicial notice as speedy means to 
dispose of cases before the ad hoc tribunals. These techniques facilitate the work of the 
tribunals, secure time and resources.  They nevertheless demean the gravity and seriousness of 
the crimes under the jurisdiction of the international criminal tribunals.  One arguable 
suggestion is that guilty pleas do not allow the uncovering of the truth. Prosecutors tend to 
manipulate the accused persons who, under the false hope of benefiting from lighter sentences, 
plead to crimes they have not actually committed in order to minimise their responsibility. 
Judicial notice is adopted to avoid the necessity of the formal introduction of evidence in 
certain cases where there is no real need for doing so. Though sometimes legitimate, these 
doctrines are often misused. 
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Chapter seven analyses joint criminal enterprise and command responsibility as preferred 
modes of imputing criminal liability. Joint criminal enterprise is a judicial creation, highly 
contested, but mostly used to alleviate the prosecution burden of uncovering evidence in 
complex criminal cases. Though the judges justified that joint criminal enterprise was part of 
customary law, the doctrine’s application proved difficult and inconsistent in the cases held at 
the ICTY and ICTR. 
 
Command or superior responsibility is an ancient concept that aims to hold superiors criminally 
responsible for illegal acts committed by their subordinates. After the end of World War II, the 
victorious nations applied it to punish the Nazis in Germany and the Japanese in the Far Eastern 
Theatre of Operations.  Domestically the same nations have consistently resisted applying it to 
their nationals.  The doctrine has not evolved evenly. 
   
Chapter eight concludes the research. It recaps the main ideas developed throughout and 
presents the findings and new perspectives to improve the delivery of international criminal 
justice. Adjudicating international crimes needs to distance itself from political agendas
175
 to 
actually deliver justice and nothing else, only guided by principles as in domestic jurisdictions. 
Justice must be seen to be done. This will enhance the popular respect for the rule of law and 
the restoration of trust in the international criminal justice system.  
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CHAPTER 2: THE AD HOC TRIBUNALS’ EFFECTIVENESS 
VIEWED THROUGH THE LENS OF POSITIVISM AND 
NATURALISM 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
It would be fair to assume that the ad hoc tribunals were designed to achieve the standard 
objectives of domestic criminal law enforcement like retribution, deterrence, incapacitation and 
rehabilitation. They moreover sought to become instruments contributing to peace, security and 
national reconciliation processes.
176
 Ad hoc tribunals were believed to also contribute to the 
emerging and development of the system of international criminal justice, more generally. All 
these matters are not only varied in their meaning, content, practicability and impact, they are 
also unclear.  
 
Matters of clarification, focus, elucidation, consistency, uniformity and ownership could only 
be facilitated through a theoretical grounding in this perspective. It is not disputable that the 
UNSC used its powers to establish the ad hoc tribunals; yet the impact and consequences of 
their work fall on individual persons. Everyone has and must claim a say in this enterprise in an 
orderly, comprehensive and logical manner. Koerner rightly explains that “the command of our 
innermost destiny by a well-directed philosophy of life toward objective reality is one of the 
most important agencies of controlled orientation that is entrusted to the sound exercise of the 
human will.”177 
 
A theoretical legal inquiry and analysis into the substance, process and best practice of the ad 
hoc tribunals is warranted. What theory can promote human rights and humanitarian law 
through ad hoc tribunals’ prosecution? As some have argued, human rights promotion is an 
area where “we might look for greater theoretical coherence.”178 Is a theory on the effectiveness 
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of the ad hoc tribunal needed and what would it look like? This is the convenient time to 
answer all these questions. If this attempt succeeds it can serve not only in understanding the 
philosophy of ad hoc tribunals, but it can furthermore be a step in shaping international 
criminal justice more generally.  
 
Law is constantly tested to find out whether it rightly serves the interests of those it purports to 
protect. The standard envisaged here can be formulated through a naturalistic approach to the 
problem. This approach is desirable because what the UNSC did was to dictate, by its binding 
resolutions, the establishment of institutions which also worked in the framework of their 
mandate. This is called positivism in legal theory. Law as posited aims at upholding the natural 
rights of people. Neither naturalism nor positivism is novel in legal fraternity. In any event 
however, naturalism claims precedence over positivism. Before opting for naturalism, an 
understanding of what both theories encompass is necessary. 
 
2.2. Meaning and relevance of naturalism and positivism in law 
 
Naturalism and positivism have always been two opposed theories in legal philosophy. 
According to Adams, “the history of legal philosophy is importantly shaped by the conflict 
between these two opposing general conceptions of law and legality: law as power and law as 
justice.”179 The conflict is older and deeper than that exists between each one’s advocates.180  
Law as power may signify the process of making that law. Law as justice is the substance 
contained in the made or posited law. The question is then one of understanding which has 
primacy between the substance and its regulation. Process also has a great impact because the 
broader the participation in law-making, the bigger its’ acceptance will be. It is through the 
process that the purpose and function of law appears.  
 
The law reflects the will of its makers who allegedly represent the masses. However, law-making 
process should be a stakeholders’ analysis exercise. Stakeholder analysis was initially developed 
                                                          
179
 Adams  M. David, Philosophical Problems in the Law, 3
rd
 ed., Wadisworth, 2000, p. 46 
180
 Barnett E. Randy, “Towards a theory of Legal Naturalism”, Journal of Libertarian Studies, Vol. 2, No. 2, 1978, 
pp. 97 – 107, p. 97 
43 
 
in business sciences, but currently, it serves to frame all kinds of activities, from policy 
initiatives to policy implementation. The method consists in gathering all necessary information 
from anyone who has an interest in a policy. Bryson
181
 identifies the variants of stakeholders. 
They include all parties that will be affected by or will affect a decision, a policy or an action.  
They also comprise any person, group or organization that can place a claim for attention, 
resources, or output, or who is affected by that output.
182
 In theory a stakeholder is “any entity 
with a declared or conceivable interest or stake in a policy concern. […] Stakeholders can be of 
any form, size, and capacity. They can be individuals, organisations, or unorganized 
groups.”183Stakeholders as a term revolves around the idea of interconnectedness, that no one is 
fully in charge, that many individuals, groups and organizations are involved or affected or have 
some partial responsibility to act. Figuring out what the problem is and what solutions might 
work are actually part of the problem, and taking stakeholders into account is a crucial aspect of 
problem solving.
184
The law of the ad hoc tribunal was not made in the traditional international 
law making process.
185
  
 
Law is an abstract science which in the final analysis is designed to operate amongst 
individuals; and for the betterment of individuals. It regulates the conduct of individuals in a 
society. It is a “project to protect society, fundamental values and to solve conflict well.”186 
Where does law come from, and how is it designed to regulate the conduct of the people? This 
is in fact a question of the origins of the law per se and its purposes. There are two sets of law, 
namely natural and positive law. On one hand, natural law can be anything self-regulated 
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without the intervention of legislators or lawmakers. It goes beyond the regulation of human 
conduct. The law of gravity for example, does not regulate human conduct. When natural law 
directs the conduct of individuals, it “is based on ideas of morality and justice, independent of 
sovereign created rules.”187Adams emphasises this argument in maintaining that “the 
phenomenon we call ‘law’ can adequately be understood only in relation to a certain view 
about the nature of moral judgments and standards.”188 George appraises this argument because 
“theories of natural law are reflective critical accounts of the constitutive aspects of the well-
being and fulfilment of human persons and the communities they form.”189 Such a law sets 
principles aimed at ensuring “respect for rights people possess simply by virtue of their 
humanity – rights which, as a matter of justice, others are bound to respect and governments are 
bound not only to respect, but, to the extent possible, also to protect.”190 Without the purpose of 
protecting these rights, law will have no meaning. So, at the bottom line there are rights which 
constitute the foundation of any regulatory process that is called law. The foundation is 
therefore very important to understand the resulting law. 
 
Positive law, on the other hand, is a rule decreed by persons vested with authority like a 
legislature or a precedent set by a court and followed subsequently. Such a law may be an act 
of a representative body, like an elected parliament in a democracy; as it may also be an act of a 
self-appointed body or person, like in monarchies, dictatorship, totalitarianism, or that powerful 
institution beyond everyone’s control. In some instances the law does not necessarily reflect the 
reasonable fulfilment of individuals even if it is a resultant act of the majority. It is a derivative 
of natural law. It mainly vests three characteristics, namely imperativism, normativism and 
realism.
191
 In its first characteristic, law is a command that enjoins everyone to follow willingly 
or unwillingly. It does not offer a choice because it binds. Adams further suggests that: “the 
phenomenon of law is best understood as a system of orders, commands, or rules enforced by 
power.”192He furthermore posits that “law is that which has been ‘posited’, that is, made, 
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enacted, or laid down in some prescribed fashion. It is as such a purely human product, 
‘artificial’, rather than ‘natural.”193It establishes a new norm in the society. Finally, law reflects 
what is happening in the society irrespective of whether it contributes to justice or injustice at 
the time of its enactment. It becomes a fact in that time and place. Despite these characteristics 
of positive law, the principles of natural law still control human law.
194
 Positive law must 
therefore conform to its source; which is natural law. The corpus of international criminal law, 
for example, comprises two distinct elements: a regulatory element constituted of positive law, 
and a regulated element that needs more than law. This latter element falls in the area of 
morality and ethics. Both elements cannot be dissociated.  In the area of international 
prosecution, law becomes a matter of sanctions and punishment.
195
 A clear demarcation must 
be drawn beforehand between the regulatory nature of law, to be properly applied to the 
regulated. George expresses this idea much better by drawing a distinction between what he 
calls strict “individualism” and “collectivism.” He highlights that natural law theorists reject 
both.
196
 Naturalists reject the narrow vision as well as the wide vision of a person that have the 
potential to militate against self-fulfilment. On the one hand, George argues that: 
Individualism overlooks the intrinsic value of human sociability and tends to view human beings 
atomistically. It reduces all forms of human association to the instrumental value they possess. To 
criticize this reductionism is not to deny that some forms of association are indeed purely instrumental 
valuable or that virtually all forms of human association have instrumental value in addition to whatever 
intrinsic value they may have, but instead to remember that sociability is an intrinsic aspect of human 
well-being and fulfilment.
197
 
 
On the other hand, he suggests that: 
Collectivism compromises the dignity of human beings by tending to instrumentalize and subordinate 
their well-being to the interests of larger social units. It reduces the individual to the status of a cog in the 
wheel whose flourishing is merely a means rather than an end to which other things – such as 
governments, system of public and private law, and other institutions created by members of human 
communities for the sake of their common good – however noble and important (…) are ultimately 
merely means.
198
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George finally maintains that whether individualists and collectivists have theories of justice 
and human rights, they remain highly unsatisfactory because they are rooted in grave 
misunderstandings of human nature and the human good.
199
 This is an interesting debate 
between those who believe that an individual exists as a member of the society in which he or 
she lives and those who postulate that one lives in society because he exists. The society is 
made of individuals. The individual is central to the existence of the society, which in fact is 
the sum of individuals.  
 
In broader generalisation, yet in complete concurrence with George; the Matwijkiws’200 
understand positivism as “legal law”201, and naturalism as “natural law.”202 According to them, 
“natural law’” means “morality.”203 Quoting Bassiouni, they argue that natural law is also the 
“law of humanity.”204 This proposition is in perfect agreement with the early concept of natural 
law. Natural law was fundamentally considered as unchanging and universally applicable. It 
remained an ideal to which humanity aspires or a general fact, the way human beings usually 
act.
205
 The powerful standing of natural law resides in its characteristic of being autonomous, 
universally valid and having a special weight in the sense that its standards are deemed to be 
more important than other guidelines of human conduct.
206
 Law generally speaking falls in this 
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category of instruments that regulate human conduct. A binding resolution of the UNSC is also 
in the same category. It must therefore be analysed through this lens. 
 
Koller also speaks of “rational morality”, which he defines as “a set of moral standards that are 
based on good reason rather than mere convention or non-rational beliefs.”207According to 
Koller, “conventional morality, understood as a set of moral norms that have effective validity 
in a certain aggregate of people, be it a social group, a society, a culture, or even humankind in 
general, because they are acknowledged by a vast majority of its individual members as 
supreme standards of their conduct.”208 Fuller divides morality into two aspects, namely the 
morality of aspiration and the morality of duty.
209
 The morality of aspiration aims at the full 
realisation of the human person. The morality of duty condemns men for failing to respect the 
basic requirements of social living.
210
 Aspiration is within the individual while duty is outside 
of the individual. In Fuller’s view, law deals with duty. Law creates conditions that are 
essential for rational human existence. It operates at that lower level because it is only 
concerned with the “discernment and enforcement of legal duties and nothing more.”211 Once 
again, the individual’s nature comes into play. Law regulates and enforces that which existed 
already. Law does not create entitlement; it only states and proclaims rights an individual had 
already by virtue of being a person. The law of nature dictates the examination of the individual 
first before examining factors surrounding him, including law.  What is then the working 
definition of natural law? 
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2.2.1. Definition and characteristics of natural law  
 
According to Washington, natural law dates back to the ancient Greek philosophy of Aristotle, 
Cicero, Plutarch and others, and was further developed by the Roman ideals of the natural 
dignity of mankind.
212
 Before these philosophers, Socrates:  
is reputed to have once said that ‘the unexamined life is not worth living.’ He meant by this that it is 
important to critically reflect upon our own lives, the principles by which we live them, the values we 
cherish, and the cognitive and affective forces and processes that inform our decisions and actions – in 
short, the people we are, have been, and want to be.
213
  
 
This is a good combination of natural law, morality and ethics. Tracing a theory in ancient 
times therefore, and purporting that the theory is still holding clearly shows how strong the 
theory is and how useful it is to rely on it.  Looking back in the Romans’ times, Cicero held in 
his De Republica that “true law is right reason in agreement with nature; it is of universal 
application, unchanging and everlasting; it summons to duty by its commands, and averts from 
wrongdoing by its prohibitions [...] There will not be different laws at Rome and at Athens, or 
different laws now and in the future, but one eternal and unchangeable law will be valid for all 
nations and for all times.”214  
 
This philosophical thought of law dating back to the 1
st
 century B.C had evolved alongside the 
Christian conception of natural law, particularly with the input of theologian Saint Thomas 
Aquinas at around 1265-1273 in his Suma Theologica. Aquinas spoke of an Eternal Law that 
“gives all beings the inclination to those actions and aims that are proper to them. Rational 
creatures, by directing their own actions and guiding the actions of others, share in divine 
reason itself. This participation in the Eternal Law by rational creatures is called the Natural 
Law.”215Aquinas is believed to be the naturalist of all times, but if one carefully analyses this 
statement, it comprises the idea of “own action” and “directing the actions of others” all of 
which are relevant if and only when they adhere to the Eternal Law.  
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Though Socrates did not involve the idea of God in his ethics, as did Aquinas, he insisted on 
self-introspection. Look at yourself before preoccupying about what others are doing. Ask your 
heart, and be at peace with it. Socrates’ ethics “not only asks that we reflect upon the issues 
and/or controversies that we encounter in our personal and professional lives, it also asks us to 
examine ourselves […], ethics asks that we live mindfully – to take some care in how we act, 
what and how we feel, what we think and believe.”216 For Aquinas, law is nothing other than an 
ordinance of reason for the common good
217
 issued by one who has care for the 
community.
218
This argument contains both the idea of naturalism and ethical positivism. 
Naturalism may be considered here as the substance of the law and its righteous application.  
Positivism, in Aquinas’ understanding may be taken as the formalisation of the right way of 
applying the law.  
 
According to Aquinas “human law is necessary to implement and adapt the basic precepts of 
natural law, which are quite general, to the changing needs and contexts of human societies.”219 
Those precepts are the same for everyone and do not change because of time and place.
220
 The 
point of departure and the point of arrival on the road of lawmaking are, in this understanding, 
the same for everyone everywhere. What differs from place to place and time to time, is the 
detailed conclusions drawn from these basic precepts and human law reflects this fact.
221
Adams 
adds that: “human law must adjust the principles of natural law to specific situations. 
Moreover, since human communities need many detailed regulations and ordinances simply to 
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function, natural law requires that they be made, although it does not, of course, dictate their 
particular content.”222 Adams reinforces the basic idea of Aquinas’ philosophy in that “the 
force of human law necessarily depends upon its justice: human enactments or measures that 
contravene natural law are not laws ‘but a perversion of law’; they are acts of violence and do 
not bind in conscience.”223 
 
Stepping in the footsteps of Saint Thomas Aquinas, Hugo Grotius, a Dutch jurist and diplomat, 
founded and developed the modern theory of natural law. He does not view law as having any 
divine origin. He considers law as emanating solely from the use of reason.
224
Though Grotius 
hypothetically divorced from the idea of God as the source and giver of true law, he however 
revisited and reinforced the idea of “use of reason”. In vulgar language reason can be 
contrasted with emotion or ideas without use of reason, or use of power and force without 
substantiation. To echo Grotius’ argument of the use of reason without necessarily referring to 
God, Murphy understands law as a rational standard for conduct. If reason has been used in 
law-making, then the agents for whom law is made have strong, even decisive, reasons to 
comply to.
225
 
 
 All in all, one is asked to do the right thing without caring about the consequences. Kant, a 
great German philosopher principled this idea as a categorical imperative, which is “the basis 
of morality.”226This means that “there are some rules that must be followed no matter what 
consequences may befall an individual, a group, a social institution, and/or society more 
generally.”227 Kant termed this a maxim of universal application and formulated it in saying 
“act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become 
a universal law.”228 In fact, from a good will results a right action irrespective of consequences 
which may be contingent.  According to Kant:  
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No matter how intelligently one acts, the results of human actions are subject to accident and 
circumstance; therefore, the morality of an act must not be judged by its consequence, but only by its 
motivation. Intention alone is good, for it leads a person to act, not from inclination, but from duty, which 
is based on a general principle that is right in itself.
229
  
 
It is quite interesting to see that both positivism and naturalism meet somewhere in Kant’s 
philosophy. The intersection requires that legislators be sufficiently illuminated and personally 
disinterested in the process of making law. 
 
William and Arrigo are of the view that “once we figure out the rule or maxim we are adopting, 
the next step is to ask ourselves whether we would be willing to make it a universal law. By 
universal law, Kant meant a rule that would be followed by everyone, all of the time.”230 With 
the topic of inquiry, of course, people will start asking whether this is feasible or even possible. 
In Kant’s thought, the answer is positive. Moral actions, suggests Kant, “must be undertaken 
from a sense of duty ultimately dictated by reason, and no action performed out of inclination, 
for expediency, or solely in obedience to law or custom can be regarded as moral.”231 This is 
very crucial to measuring the effectiveness of ad hoc tribunals.  They were established for 
expediency sake and operated solely relying on their Statutes. They should, howver, have 
considered some moral issues in dischargingtheir mandate.  
 
The failure ensues because of a lack of rationality in reasoning and acting, but also a lack of 
consensus.
232
 In view of this, a human being should mean what he says, and do what he or she 
believes to be right without preoccupying himself or herself of the unpredictable and uncertain 
consequences or the reactions of others. The critical test is therefore the intention at the 
inception of an act. Although consequences may also be relevant, they are secondary.  
 
In the context of human rights that must be protected by the prosecution of the potential 
violators, Kant would liken it to the principle to “act so as to treat humanity, whether in your 
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own person or that of any other, as an end and never as a means only.”233 In the domain of 
international criminal prosecution as well as in any other domain, this principle equally applies. 
People would only do their best if they can pursue their moral duty and let the consequences 
come as they may.
234
 Kant also “believed that the world was progressing towards an ideal 
society in which reason would bind every lawgiver to make his laws in such a way that they 
could have sprung from the united will of an entire people, and to regard every subject, in so far 
as he wishes to be a citizen, on the basis of whether he has conformed to that will.”235 
 
Tyler
236
 echoed Kant’s thought in what he calls normative commitment through personal 
morality and normative commitment through legitimacy, as opposed to instrumental modes of 
obedience to law.
237
 On the one hand, people obey good laws because they feel those laws are 
just. Moreover, people will abide by the laws because they feel the authority that makes the law 
and that enforces it has the right to do so.
238
 The body exercises legitimate authority. In this 
scenario everyone benefits. Lawmakers are ensured that the laws they enact will be complied 
with easily.
239
 The law abiding citizenry will feel that authorities have done what the people 
want. This normative perspective focuses on “people’s internalized norms of justice and 
obligation.”240 Compliance with a law from an authority is based upon factors which are 
“inherent in authority, such as the capacity of its decision-making process to produce correct 
decisions, and not on the basis of elements related to the command itself, such as a 
consideration of its correctness.”241One of the reasons why a person complies with the dictate 
of the law is its correctness. This means moreover that the process leading to the enactment of 
the law was fair and each stakeholder’s view has been considered directly or indirectly. The 
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law vests a double character. The procedure for the adoption of the law was incontestably right. 
The purpose of the law must also respond to the aspirations of the governed. 
 
On the other hand, if people resist complying with an unjust law, the lawmaker resorts to 
external instruments to enforce compliance. Tyler calls this an instrumental approach to 
compliance.
242
 Arguably this may better translate the way the UNSC understood how to enforce 
compliance with international humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda by 
establishing ad hoc tribunals. The UNSC assumes its legitimacy even though it is made up of 
fifteen members among them five permanent members. Those members, particularly the five 
permanent ones, cannot always assume that the intention of the UN founders in 1945 is still the 
same. Things have evolved, yet the Council has not adapted itself to the changed environment 
that it, unfortunately, still regulates. It is naïve to believe that the UNSC as a powerful body 
representing the rest of the UN members acts disinterestedly. The men and women who sit in the 
Council may pursue various and most of the time diverging interests. Even assuming that its 
decision to establish an ad hoc tribunal could bring about effective results; it is still a fact that, as 
Horton observes, that it is an exercise of coercive power through force, deception or some other 
means.
243
 The effectiveness of such power does not, simply of itself, confer legitimacy on the 
Council. In other words, might does not make right.
244
 
 
Having defined natural law and showed how it translates both issues of morality and ethics, it is 
time to explore positive law and to understand the relationship between them.  Nystuen rightly 
believes that such a relationship is even more apparent in international law than it is in national 
legal systems. The international legal system shares and agrees to legislate on values widely 
considered as relevant everywhere beyond the national borders.
245
 Legislation with these 
considerations in mind is virtually impossible to explain the formation of international 
customary law from a purely positivist view.
246
 This brings back the earlier take on values that 
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are common to society.  This opinion may offend realists who believe that “the nature of 
international relations precludes morality in that sphere. And because morality is not operative 
in the international sphere, a moral theory of international law is an exercise in futility.”247 But, 
the point is not being missed here. The point is one of international criminal justice. “Justice in 
itself”, according to Findlay and McLean, “is a moral imperative at the heart of the law and of 
human rights.”248 International criminal justice becomes, therefore, in the opinion of Tallgren, 
the:  
local interpreter of common values, offering a solution, a remedy to social problems, and thereby setting 
on them the miraculous seal of finality. Most importantly, criminal law carries utilitarian aspirations vis-
à-vis the future: prevention of further crime, integration of society and rehabilitation of offenders.
249
  
 
It needs to be repeated that a mechanical approach to law, in theory or in practice, worsens any 
undertaking. Morality and ethics should guide at all levels: domestically or internationally. An 
analysis of the shortcomings or weaknesses of positive law reinforces this argument. On the 
practical side of the venture, positivism in its ethical dimension also assists in arriving at a 
comprehensible and feasible mixture. The interest of this undertaking is so simple. Positive law 
is only important when it helps to solve practical problems. It also bars leaders and countries 
from natural law’s moral norms to fit their own selfish interests.250 Positivism will therefore be 
looked at with this view in mind.  
 
2.2.2. Positive law and positivism 
 
Lawmakers enact law that imposes command on what existed already.  From the nature of 
things, law traces its way. So, natural law and positive law live side by side. Bix defines legal 
positivism as:  
a theory about the nature of law, by its self-characterization a descriptive or conceptual theory. By its 
terms, legal positivism does not have consequences for how particular disputes are decided, how texts are 
interpreted, or how institutions are organized. At most, the theory may have something to say about how 
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certain ways of operating are characterized (it is ‘law’ or is it, for some reason, ‘not law”? but not on how 
they should be evaluated or reformed.
251
  
 
Bix’s definition portrays a law that looks like a mechanised instrument that is set in motion to 
work without inner-self regulation. It goes where it is programmed to go and does what it is 
designed to do and no more. The people only need to follow its dictates whether right or wrong. 
Positivists deny any connection whatsoever between law and morality. They are not concerned 
by the correctness, the righteousness, even the truthfulness of an enacted law. For them, these 
characteristics are not necessary to make a law what it is.  
 
Though Koller does not make a point about the separation of law and morality, he defines law 
as “a system of heteronymous norms which are based on authoritative enactment rather than 
voluntary acceptance and made effective by formal enforcement rather than informal social 
pressure.”252 Koller remarks that differences between law and morality are only “functional.” 
He reinforces his argument in holding that “any law is connected to morality in the sense that it 
requires a moral justification.”253 
 
Washington suggests that the origins of legal positivism correspond:  
to the height of the secular revival movement called ‘The Enlightenment Period’. During this time men of 
learning and erudition consciously sought to discover knowledge solely through the use and development 
of their own natural faculties, apart from acknowledging any divine source as men of learning had done 
for centuries before. The two major theorists of positive law were the British philosophers, John Austin 
(1790 – 1859) and Jeremy Bentham (1748 – 1832). The common theme through their writings insisted 
that ‘law as it is’ is not necessarily the same as ‘law as it should be’. In other words, law and morals were 
viewed as distinct and separate entities.
254
 
 
This was the florescent and emerging time of the sovereign State from the nineteenth century 
onwards. Positive law even ascended to a level whereby it surpassed natural law in importance 
and took precedence and preference in legal thinking.  The excitement over the emergence of 
positivism reduced the impact of natural law to the point where the State was heralded as the 
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final arbiter on issues of right and wrong.
255
 Positivism’s honeymoon phase did not last as 
naturalism regained the terrain. 
 
As Bix posited earlier, positivism is a by-product of human will and wish to self-reliance in 
terms of thought. It centres on the human without consideration of divinity.  It does not even 
consider what a human cherishes. Obeying the law is not instinctively drawn from oneself, but 
imposed from elsewhere. The flaws in legal positivism appear in its subsequent evolution. 
Once again, Washington highlights them as follows:  
Positive law is actually an outgrowth of utilitarianism or the view that regarded the consequences of an 
act as demonstrative of what is good or morally right. This idea wasn’t as innovative as one may think for 
over three centuries before positivism began to be applied to law, the great Italian political philosopher, 
Niccolo Machiavelli (1469 – 1527) coined the infamous phrase of political expediency: “the end justifies 
the means” in his famous treatise on political statecraft, The Prince (1513).
256
 
 
Legal positivism in legal philosophy “holds that natural law involves a confusion between law 
as it is and law as it ought to be and contends that the definition of law does not require any 
reference to justice or other moral values.”257It is called a “cynical view”258 of law, as Souryal 
suggests. The positivist movement relegates ethical knowledge and moral character on the 
periphery in the administration of justice.
259
 This conception of law has also influenced the 
development of political science, which separates values from facts.
260
 This position, one may 
argue, misses the point and becomes the artificial representation of the reality. Sindjoun 
realises, instead, that “in the domain of political science, ethics is closely connected to political 
and moral philosophy and to normativism.”261 
 
Looking at the argument of Machiavelli in The Prince, and later Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan, it 
will be fair to advance the idea that the positivist movement was aimed at strengthening the 
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political power with a means called “law.” Law could be enforced by the threat of force or 
actual use of force to coerce compliance. Was power politics involved? Could manipulations 
and intrigues play a role in the development and sustenance of positivism? What were the 
reasons behind such an effervescence of positivism? The movement was facilitated by three 
kinds of power-holders. Raz grouped those power-holders as people who exert naked power, de 
facto authorities and legitimate authorities.
262
 While lacking any kind of right to rule or 
claiming that the population is under any obligation to obey, the first group shines by cynically 
terrorising the people.
263
  The power-holders expect compliance and obedience through a 
combination of physical coercion, fear, or self-interested calculation of the consequences of 
resistance. The relationship between the authorities and the governed is one of power without 
right on either side. The ones who exercise de facto power resemble the first group, but unlike 
them, they always claim legitimacy, the right to rule.
264
 The mere fact that they claim the right 
to rule means that they become authorities. In Raz’s third classification, authorities are like 
their counterpart in category two with the difference being that their claim is accepted. Their 
right to rule is recognised.
265
 From this posture of positivism, Sindjoun realises the promotion 
of political science as a value-free science.
266
  
 
Thomas Hobbes, as notes Thivet, argues that it: 
is usually regarded as the pre-eminent representative of the power-politics school of classic realism. He is 
frequently quoted for his pessimistic depiction of the state of nature that he so famously described as a 
brutal and anarchic arena in which each individual seeks his own advantage to the detriment of all other 
individuals, in a perpetual struggle for power.
267
  
 
Despite this statement, Zagorin believes that Thomas Hobbes was not entirely positivist for two 
reasons: 
First, natural law was a doctrine he could not have avoided or ignored because it occupied such a 
dominant position in the classical and Christian philosophical tradition of reflection on morality and law 
and their transcendental grounding in nature, the order of the universe, and the reason and will of God the 
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creator. Second, from the later sixteenth century onward, natural law constituted a strand in the formation 
in Western Europe of a revolutionary political theory sanctioning a right of resistance to kings and unjust 
governments.
268
 
 
Positivism is structured in a way that, as in all political organisations, on the top, there is a 
thinking head and below, there is a huge class of followers. The means between the head and 
the followers is law. How the leaders and the followers interact is the domain where law 
intervenes. It is enforced by force if compliance fails. Interaction will be much healthier if the 
law is good and accommodative for everyone. Relations will sour if the law remains strictly 
positive without adjustment and the followers abide unwillingly.  
 
The evolution from naturalism to positivism was premised on an assumption that the existence 
of natural law could not be proven. In short, toward 1832 John Austin, believed to be the 
founder of legal positivism, conceived the idea that: 
the existence of law is one thing; its merit or demerit is another. Whether it be or not be is one enquiry; 
whether it be or not conformable to an assumed standard, is a different enquiry. A law, which actually 
exists, is a law, though we happen to dislike it, or though it varies from the text, by which we regulate our 
approbation and disapprobation.
269
 
 
Finis concurs with Austin by suggesting that “Legal positivism is in principle a more modest 
proposal: that state law is, or should systematically be studied as if it were a set of standards 
originated exclusively by conventions, commands, or other such social facts.” 270 This is short-
circuiting the law and its ambit, one may also argue. Law cannot be studied as a kind of 
mechanised instrument that only focuses in one pre-established direction of obedience without 
consideration of its finality. Contrary to Finis, Fuller is of the opinion that:  
law is not merely an object or entity, to be studied dispassionately under a microscope; law is a human 
project, with an implied goal – and an implied moral goal – the ability of people to coexist and cooperate 
within society. It is not merely that law has an ideal, but that one cannot truly understand law unless one 
understands the (moral) ideal towards which it is striving. Law is the enterprise of subjecting human 
conduct to the governance of rules. Law thus is a process, to be contrasted with the slightly different 
process of managerial direction […]
271
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What Fuller attempts to do is to bridge the gaps between law as a regulatory process of human 
conduct and what that conduct ought to be. Fuller does not categorically separate law from its 
aims, neither does Finnis.
272
 Fuller’s argument is that “law is better understood as being the 
official response to certain kinds of problem – in particular, the guidance and coordination of 
citizens’ actions in society.”273 He looks at the law through the prism of its purposes, function, 
aims and finality.  So, “once one takes a ‘functional’ approach to law, then the mantra often 
ascribed to natural law theory, ‘an unjust law is no law at all’, begins to make sense.”274 The 
prosecution of international crimes in any forum be it through ad hoc tribunals or anything else 
remains an application of law. So, to be “meaningful, rational and obeyable”275 this law needs 
to cover itself with the umbrella of ethics and morality. The positivists could have attempted to 
refine the rough material of natural law in a net positive law. The attempt to separate law from 
its morality suggests the failure the positivists registered. 
 
2.3. Converging concerns of natural and positive law  
 
2.3.1. Natural law and positive law are not mutually exclusive 
 
Marina suggests that “every legal solution must preserve the fundamental value of society.”276 
He is right. Natural law represents those fundamental values, while positivism stands for a legal 
solution. There is a kind of interlink between naturalism and positivism. The literature utilised 
above has shown that neither positivism nor naturalism is independent from each other. They 
do not exclude each other. In probability, a thing is exclusive of the other if the occurrence of 
thing “A” excludes the likelihood of occurrence of thing “B”. Positive law theorist like Austin 
and Hart have attempted to separate law, in fact decreed law, from its underlying validity 
(morality). Yet others like Dworkin, a natural law theorist, reject the strict separation between 
law and morality. The argument for the inseparability of both concepts resides in the 
consideration that moral evaluations are a necessary part of determining the content of a legal 
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system.
277
 Both naturalist and positivist’s encounter difficulties to explain why they may stand 
for one and ignore the other. Rohr argues that “the positivist knows no higher law to stand in 
moral judgment on duly enacted laws of the state. The natural law school has difficulty 
explaining the content of the moral order of the universe to which the law of the state should 
conform.”278 Yet, such order exists. According to Koller, “morality and law have, essentially, 
the same object, namely the social interaction of people, and serve a similar function, namely 
making a just and efficient social life possible.”279 The reasons for such a rejection are quite 
simple to discern in any system of law. William and Arrigo underscore that “it is always 
important to remember that laws are made by people”280 and that in all instances, those people 
are fallible and “subject to the same biases, pressures, conflicts, and errors.”281 Moreover, they 
have divergent and conflicting interests in mind.  
 
Looking into Dworkin’s approach, Finnis dismisses the suggestion that one can determine what 
law is without assessing its morality. Law may even be a reflection of “something different 
from the official decisions that most people conventionally associate with the term.”282 What is 
of particular interest, however, is to know the valid reasons that were behind each law. Those 
reasons need not be clearly stated. For Finnis, “law cannot be properly understood without 
morality, especially the moral values towards which all law necessarily aspires.”283 This quest 
is in fact a return to or a confirmation of the powerful stand of natural law, which clearly shows 
the weaknesses and shortcomings of positive law. Positive law cannot deny where it comes 
from. It may even be argued that positive law is an outgrowth of natural law. Moreover, “the 
philosophers of positive law differ among themselves about the exact relation of law to justice 
and to morality more broadly, but all of them want clearly to distinguish the law enforced by 
courts from the demands of justice and morality.”284 In addition, positivists are unable to deal 
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with the moral questions when they manage to get the two separated. That inability stems from 
the positivists’ “simultaneous attempt to assert and to prove that law and morality are 
separated, the argument reduces to a vicious circle.”285 These philosophers do not, however, 
say why such a separation is of utility. Steinitz observes that “they make no attempt to connect 
their philosophy of law either to political philosophy generally or to substantive legal practice, 
scholarship, or theory.”286 Emphasizing such a separation deprives the law of its substantive 
meaning and aims. In any case, the separation cannot hold. 
 
The explanation that these philosophers give of the separation is not sufficient, instead it is self 
destructive.  Murphy insists on the fact that “just because a law is enforced by a court does not 
conclusively prove that it is consistent with the demands of justice. It is essential to the whole 
project of criticism and reform of law that we not confuse the existence of a law with its 
justice.”287 Murphy also adds that:  
even when consistent with the demands of justice, law plays a role in regulating human conduct different 
from that played by rule of morality. Legal precepts must provide much more specific guidance to human 
conduct than do moral precepts because law must provide clear and determinate guidelines if it is to 
coordinate myriad human endeavours.
288
 
 
Again this position does not advance any further. Were positivists to be understood, they 
simply mean that laws are details of generic moral values. They are not separate entities per se, 
existing by and on their own. 
 
Murphy points out other attempts to explain the positivists’ arguments about law but none 
stands still against natural law. He, moreover, remarks that “in any system of social 
interdependence, we cannot achieve our goals without relying on our expectations of the 
conduct of others. Within broad moral boundaries, we value, above all, that others’ conduct is 
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stable and predictable.”289 What positivists miss here is that there must be a common goal 
towards which any law aspires for the regulation of conduct of individuals and the collective. 
Even Murphy’s final argument that “moral law governs all thoughts, words, and deeds, while 
positive law governs only that which is publicly manifest; courts can take no notice of thoughts, 
words, or deeds that are private”290 does not resolve the matter. Positive law remains partial, a 
form without substance.  When explaining this unfulfilled status of positive law
291
, Murphy 
shows a law that is not worthy of its name unless it vests both the formal and substantive 
aspects.  Contrary to Murphy, Washington is of the view that:     
moral theorists are not trying to force any ideas upon anyone, but to instruct, to teach, to demand, and to 
require morality in law as an irrevocable prerequisite against mob rule and civilization backwardness. 
[…] Truth doesn’t require a majority vote. Martin Luther King stated, “truth crushed to the ground will 
rise again”. Truth, though held by one person, because of its intrinsic verity, ultimately overrules all other 
competing ideas and ideologies […] truth is inevitable.
292
 
 
On the nature of truth and on how to measure its reach, Souryal resorts to the Greeks’ concept 
of veritas which is the focal point of philosophy. He argues that: 
Without knowing the truth, the human race would be like children living in a world of fantasy, or worse 
still, a herd of animals in an open pasture. The truth is the central point of reference around which all 
intelligible forms revolve. Without establishing this point, living would be random, and reasoning would 
be meaningless, because neither the purpose of life nor the goodness of society would make any 
distinguishable difference.
293
 
 
Both Washington’s stand and the Greeks’ concept of truth are diametrically opposed to 
Kelsen’s philosophy of law.  In Finnis’ view, “Kelsen’s official theory – at least when he was 
doing legal philosophy – was that there may be moral truths, but if so they are completely 
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outside the field of vision of legal science or philosophy.”294 In a way, Kelsen is a pure 
positivist, and nothing else. Koller mediates between a positive law and its morality. In his 
opinion, “under social conditions where a conventional morality alone cannot secure a just and 
peaceful social order, establishing an appropriate system of law is itself a moral imperative that 
is directed to the ultimate aim of any law, namely to ensure a just and generally advantageous 
social lie.”295  
 
On the one hand, Koller’s second argument that justifies the inseparability of law and morality 
is that “any law must take the moral convictions of its addressees into account in order to gain 
their acceptance without which it cannot achieve sufficient effectiveness.”296 On the other hand, 
Nemeth sustains that “positive law is not intended to contradict natural law, but rather to 
complement it, almost as a commentary.”297 
 
Washington’s stand is, however, very radical and she severely criticises how, for instance, the 
trials were conducted at Nuremberg. She suggests that the adjudication of the Nuremberg cases 
could have condemned the Nazi regime as evil in itself, rather than concentrating on the 
outcome of such evil deeds.
298
 Adherence to the Nazi regime “led to injustice.”299 This means 
that the Nuremberg adjudication flew over without looking at the root causes of the evils 
surrounding the crimes the tribunal was to prosecute. The thrust of Washington’s point is that 
the rhetoric of international treaties or conventions, if not accompanied by a moral commitment 
to realise their objectives, becomes nothing or is self-destructive. To borrow the proper terms 
used by Washington, she suggests:  
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International treaties, as important as they are in maintaining civility among the nations of the world, in 
reality became merely symbolic posturing by politicians which are usually broken before the ink dries on 
the document signed. […] It is imperative to understand that treaties are not sacrosanct and for one to fail 
to understand that belies an ignorance of the intractable perversity of human nature and international 
law.
300
 
 
According to Washington, history has demonstrated that “all attempts to separate law from 
morality have only devolved into some forms of ineffective public policy, societal instability, 
socialism anarchy, nihilism and death.”301 The inseparability of law and morality transpires 
much better in Aquinas’ thoughts.  Basing his argument on law as an ordinance of reason as 
earlier seen, Aquinas introduces both morality and ethics in positive law. Aquinas argues that 
“law is a rule not concerning an individual qua individual, but for the governance of the group 
conduct; and just as what determines reasonable conduct of an individual is that individual’s 
good, what determines reasonable conduct for members of a group is the common good of that 
group.”302  
 
2.3.2. Natural law as foundation of proper law 
 
Even though natural law is an old legal theory, its importance in the making of positive law 
cannot be denied. At a time in Europe:  
the operation of power politics was comfortable with a philosophy that permitted states to shape rules to 
their liking. Although positivism ascended to a superior position in the nineteenth century, natural law 
was not entirely eclipsed. Natural law made an important come-back in the post-Second World war 
period with the birth of the modern human rights movement.
303
 
 
The human rights movement revisited the centrality of the human person. The movement gave 
particular attention to “the perennial need of human beings to find significance in their lives, to 
integrate their personalities around some clear, consistent, and compelling view of existence, 
and to seek definite and reliable methods in the solution of their problems.”304 
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The reason for this choice is again borrowed from the Matwijkiws’. They argue that “any 
conflict between legal and moral law must be resolved by using moral law or morality as a test 
for legal law, meaning that legal law must accord or conform in order to be said to have status 
as law proper, that is, as a rule of law – as opposed to the mere might.”305 This also applies to 
the rulers or sovereigns who are depositors of authority and powers. Koerner suggests that:  
the real meaning of sovereignty is seen as a moral power – the ultimate (not unlimited) right of decision 
possessed by a political body, taken together with the correlative obligation on the part of the subjects to 
obey its decisions as a consequence of their social nature. Mere will, in the sense of the arbitrary 
imposition of physical force as a justification for legal command, can have no place in such a 
definition.
306
 
 
But, why law should be subjugated to morality to remain “law proper”? A simple answer is that 
laws are not infallible; they can be immoral, and they do not include all moral concerns.
307
 Law 
must reflect the intention of those who entrusted confidence in their rulers. Globally, “it is not 
enough to do the right thing”308, let alone that “even if we do the right thing by legal standard 
we are not necessarily acting morally.”309 We act morally when we do the right thing for the 
right reason. Koller suggests that “law is not an appropriate means for enforcing inner 
convictions, attitudes and virtues: using it for this purpose unavoidably would turn it into an 
instrument of terror.”310 Williams and Arrigo support this proposition arguing that “laws, 
policies, rules, guidelines, codes”311 and anything like that “are made by fallible people who are 
subject to the same sorts of biases, pressures, conflicts, and errors in reasoning as the rest of 
us.”312 These authors also believe that laws respond to specific circumstances.  
 
Lawmakers arrive at conclusions about what they believe is right or wrong based on what, at 
the time, amounts to good reasons or sound justifications. These reasons and justifications, in 
turn, may or may not be suspect. Laws may or may not be moral; they may or may not promote 
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moral behaviour.
313
 An exemple of this argument is taken from the laws that applied during the 
Nazi reign in Germany and the South African Apartheid legal regime. Anyone undertaking a 
study of crimes and justice, politics, society and life must bear in mind that “right does not 
equal righteous. That is to say, just because something is a legal right does not make it a moral 
right.”314 Neither do legal rights necessarily achieve justice.  William and Arrigo finally 
observe that “there is much more to morality than law.”315 MacIntyre calls this the “thomistic 
view” of law.  For MacIntyre, only laws that conform to reason and justice are genuine laws.316 
This is what Finnis referred to as “objectivity.”  According to Finnis objectivity: 
is a matter of openness to the data, and willingness to entertain all relevant questions, and to subject every 
insight to the critique of further questions. It is a matter of our intellectual operations being free from all 
biases that would make the attainment of truth the goal of enquiry – less likely. To the extent that we as 
subjects (acting persons) have this openness and this freedom from truth-obscuring biases, we are being 
objective, our enquiries and judgments are objective, not merely subjective, and, subject to occasional 
error and deception, the realities we affirm and the goods we judge to be truly pursuit-worthy and 
beneficial are objectively what we judge them to be.
317
 
 
Furthermore, the law of a system; be it international or domestic, “does not supplant morality 
even for the judges acting within the system.”318 The judge’s moral duty consists in ensuring 
that justice is done, not necessarily that law has been applied.  When the law fails to produce 
the just result, considerations of justice should prevail.
319
 Judges must use their wisdom without 
contravening the requirements of the law. Nemeth advocates for a separation between the legal 
and moral obligation of a judge. He argues that:  
Distinguishing in this way between a judge’s legal and moral duties is important, though morality surely 
has the last word. The law (understood conventionally) might or might not do justice in a case. Even 
when the law fails, a judge may have a moral duty to follow the law. The moral values of a Rule of Law – 
predictability, coordination, separation of powers, fairness, equal treatment, and the like, may require the 
judge to follow the law despite the instant injustice. Consequently, a separate understanding of a legal 
judge’s legal duty is needed in order to identify what the law requires in its own terms, separate from 
balancing the moral reasons for following the law against the moral reasons for doing something else.
320
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 This is quite confusing, because, it may seem, legal and moral duties are inseparable. The legal 
duty is to apply the law as it is. There is no morality required in this instance. The moral duty is 
to question the rationality of the law even though one may be constrained to apply it 
unquestionably. The judge must find the justice of the law. The judge then avoids applying the 
law mechanically without using his reason. It is self-evident that there is no absolute moral duty 
to follow an unjust law as Nemeth suggests.
321
 This is because moral duties are not written, 
neither are they conventional. The fact that moral duties are not couched in writing or 
conventionally accepted does not rob them their authority over the written law. 
 
The powerful argument of natural law over positive law is also overemphasized by Bix who 
suggests that: 
While some schools of thought have faded in a matter of decades, by contrast at least one approach to 
legal theory, natural law theory, has been around literally for millennia, yet remains vibrant. Legal 
positivism is neither thousands of years old nor the product of recent fashion.  While in some circles, 
legal positivism now seems the dominant approach to the nature of law, this dominance has never meant 
that the approach was without critics.
322
 
 
In very strong and edifying terms, Washington sounds a clarion call that: 
Former and current legal and philosophical approaches to the law like: democracy, positive law, 
utilitarianism, relativism, egalitarianism, secularism, liberalism, feminism, progressivism, pragmatism, 
materialism, have in modern times proven themselves to be wholly untenable, dangerous and inevitably 
lead to a corruption of societal morality.
323
 
 
Her contention is that natural law principles should always be put back in place as the 
controlling philosophy of the Constitution. The same would apply to the legal framework of 
strict construction as the only form of legitimate constitutional jurisprudence and judicial 
decision-making.
324
  
 
These arguments are quite eloquent to give natural law the place that it deserves, either before 
the UNSC in its various decisions or before the ad hoc tribunals in their criminal adjudication 
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procedures.  It is a value-oriented approach in critically answering some crucial questions. 
What outcome should one expect from the prosecution of international crimes? How should 
this be done from the outset though various procedures? Is there a better way of doing it? It is 
in fact the whole system that is tested.  
 
2.4. Relevance of both naturalism and positivism to ad hoc tribunals’ adjudication 
of international crimes  
 
It is obvious that ad hoc tribunals apply the law posited by the UNSC. This law has the 
characteristics of other laws irrespective of whether they have been enacted by a domestic body 
or an international institution that follows and adheres to the decision-making process of 
international law. The law of the ad hoc tribunals is a criminal law designed to apply at an 
international level. Criminal law in this respect, like any other category of human law is designed 
to help men live the best possible lives.
325
 The commission of egregious crimes in the former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda disturbed not only the social order in those two states, but it dislocated 
the conscience of the whole of humanity. So, designing a proper law to prosecute the violators 
and to re-establish the harmonious order is extremely important in this area. A balanced law that 
tends to achieve human expectations is key. There is no doubt that laws are enacted to operate on 
individuals, so was the law of the ad hoc tribunals. Irrespective of the institution that crafted the 
statutes of the ad hoc tribunal, the double aspect of law had to be consistently present. The 
depository authority must firstly posit it. Laws cannot be enacted without a properly empowered 
political authority; whether a parliament, a UNSC or any other representative body. Some laws 
are enacted by authoritarian or dictatorial regimes and continue to impact on individuals. There 
is a difference between representative bodies and non-representative ones.  In non-representative 
bodies, like dictatorships, “power is usurped, legitimacy can be manufactured or purchased, and 
authority is conferred by the possession of instruments of coercion.”326 Law, must, secondly and 
ultimately respond to those expectations.  This means a law that is not imposed by might even in 
representative bodies like the UNSC, but the one that is value-oriented and upholds rights. 
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Representative bodies should enact law in which each individual finds his fulfilment as a person 
who lives in a society.  
 
This is not to suggest that a body like the UNSC must consult with people even in countries that 
have concerns regarding its resolutions. It only means that the resolutions, which we call here 
law, must reflect what the people anticipate to see happening. The resolutions must be an 
expression of the will and expectations of the “people of the world”.  The people’s desire from 
the UNSC legislation is to see justice done. An act that is aimed at justice will be complied with. 
Tyler argues firstly that, studies of a decision’s acceptance suggest that it is usually procedural 
justice that is especially important in shaping people’s willingness to defer to the decisions made 
by legal authorities.
327
 It is procedural fairness that shapes both the acceptance of the decision 
and the deference to the authority that has taken the decision. When people find that the 
procedure that leads to a decision was fair and that the outcome of the decision was desirable, 
they are more willing to accept it.
328
 Secondly, Tyler suggests that “people are more willing to 
defer to authorities when they trust their motives.”329 
 
According to Sindjoun, the creation of the ad hoc tribunals reflects, to some extent, historical 
universal ethics or the conception of the good as expressed by member states of the United 
Nations.
330
  The statutes of both the ICTY and ICTR provide that the prosecution of the crimes 
committed will ensure that such crimes are haltered and the conflicting situation in which human 
rights violations were committed will be redressed. The statutes provide moreover that justice 
will be done to the victims, the process of national reconciliation will be embarked on and that 
peace and security will be maintained. The criminal law posited through the ad hoc tribunals, it 
may be argued, was aimed at the betterment of humanity. Osiel finds that these efforts to bring 
perpetrators to justice are inspired by sincere humanitarian sentiment and by remorse at not 
having done more to prevent the wrong.
331
 Osiel is not that naïve and he believes in what he 
says. He sets a good point of departure for any discussion of international criminal law in the 
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broader understanding of the topic. Osiel’s opinion, however, envisages international 
prosecutions as an alternative to something else that could have been done. 
 
The purpose of international crimes prosecution should be straightforward. International criminal 
law dispensed through ad hoc tribunals may re-establish the uneven balance brought about by 
violations of the dictates of that law. That is what justice is all about.  In the words of Hyman, 
this means that “when a crime is committed, justice must be done.”332 The question then 
becomes to know how to go about obtaining justice. The enacted law is the answer. But because 
the focus is justice, the procedure to apply needs to be fair and not an automatic application of 
the law as it stands.  Procedural law must go beyond its formalism and compliment the purpose 
for which a judicial institution has been put into place. Hyman argues that “though it is easy to 
create an appearance of justice, mere appearance may turn out to be only an illusion.”333 In 
concrete terms, this bears on the institutional and normative aspects of international criminal 
justice. Rubin suggests that “the international legal order has its own complex history and 
traditions; its own legislative process; its own reflections of the conceptual antagonism between 
those who find ‘natural law’ and those who find ‘positive law’ models to be more congenial.”334 
Yet, as demonstrated elsewhere, this order is nothing less than an expansion of domestic shared 
values to the international level. At the end of the day, those values are the same among all 
people. In the centre there is a human who attempts to regulate and improve.  
 
The distinction between rules of international law (as well as national law) from other rules is not 
whether they are positively formulated or not, but rather that they are binding.  Rubin contends 
that rules are binding if there is a legal obligation to follow them. This obligation must steam 
from the content of those rules. That content reflects the aspiration of the people who have 
entrusted their confidence in rule-makers. This is the reason why the content of the legal rule 
must be tackled. In Rubin’s thought, exploring the content of the rules of international law goes 
as follows:  
Some writers have held that natural law or moral considerations form the ultimate basis for international 
law, others that such obligations arise out of consent to be bound (which can be seen to be a logic 
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consequence of state sovereignty). The reason why an obligation to be bound arises from consent would, 
in a positivist view, be because this followed from authoritative rules laid down by competent organs. 
The natural law approach would be that rules are authoritative because they are rooted in a higher set of 
norms, having an a priori existence as jus divinum (divine law) or as moral norms that have an inevitable 
force through their reflection of right and wrong. Legal positivists will hardly dispute the fact that moral 
and ethical norms are a basis for positive rules, they would just claim that the binding force of positive 
rules stem from the fact that they have been adopted by a competent organ, or otherwise have acquired 
their status as legal norms through, for example, formation of customary law. From this point of view, 
there is a close relationship between natural law and legal positivism.
335
 
 
Nystuen agrees with this position by giving the example of human rights which clearly have a 
basis in natural law.
336
 States are not considering themselves as bound by the prescript of 
human rights because they are enshrined in conventional binding treaties.  Rather, they 
consider themselves bound “because it seems morally or ethically correct.”337 Nystruen 
synthesizes his argument in holding that the formation of international customary law happens, 
partly as a result of State practice, but also partly as a result of opinio juris. In other words, 
States are following rules they presume to be binding. He concurs with Brierly who states that: 
implied consent is not a philosophically explanation of customary law, international or municipal; a 
customary rule is observed, not because it has been consented to, but because it is believed to be binding, 
and whatever may be the explanation or the justification for that belief, its binding force does not depend, 
and is not felt by those who follow it to depend, on the approval of the individual or the state to which it 
is addressed.
338
   
 
It is therefore fair to argue that “legal positivism and natural law are thus not mutually 
exclusive; they are descriptive concepts which can be used to facilitate the understanding of 
different aspects of law.”339 Whereas there might be diverging interest in international relations 
and how they regulate them, there are also many shared values. Buchanan and Golove contend 
that “the implication is that the lack of shared ends severely limits the normative content of 
international law and hence the scope of a moral theory of international law.”340 Nations may 
not even share substantive ends, but still they share the core concept of justice, for example. 
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According to these authors, “this shared core conception of justice in liberal societies provides 
the foundation for a more morally robust system of law; its absence implies that the moral 
content of international law, at least as it pertains to human rights, must be minimal.”341 
Moreover, in accordance with Engle, “human rights are universal. Not in the sense of being the 
same positive laws, at all times and places, but rather as being aspirational goals, at all times 
and places, and also as containing core values which are indeed universal, such as the right to 
life (no irrational deprivation of life).”342 There is therefore a common understanding about 
human rights as the foundation of any society. Such an understanding is also implied in the 
defence of those rights. The law governing the ad hoc tribunal cannot, on its own, depart from 
these precepts.  
 
2.4.1. Naturalism and positivism’s impact on the effectiveness of the ad hoc tribunals 
 
It is quite interesting to elucidate how the shared moral values discussed above apply to the ad 
hoc tribunals’ effectiveness. Positivists may argue that the tribunals have been effective 
because they discharged the functions entrusted to them. From a naturalistic view, however, the 
tribunals have not been effective because they did not follow the values they were supposed to 
be guided by. It would moreover be naïve to believe that because the ad hoc tribunals are courts 
of law they can resist the influence and pressure of the mother founder, the UNSC.  Ad hoc 
tribunals, like any other court, enforced the resolutions of the UNSC. They served to block and 
repulse any challenge brought about by those resolutions; giving an appearance that the rule of 
law prevailed.  
 
The effectiveness of the ad hoc tribunals should not be conceived as the optimum delivery in 
terms of numbers. It is instead the delivery of a good and right work that any reasonable person 
would expect.  An effective prosecution of international crimes by an ad hoc institution is not a 
work done in isolation. The whole system that includes the establishment, the procedure, the 
functionality, the outcome and the legacy of the courts must be analysed in the lenses of natural 
law. Barlow writes that this approach must holistically look at the institutions, the policies, and 
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the practices “that achieve justice in the present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to have the benefits of a just society. It is justice for one (person or place) that does 
not preclude the possibility of justice for all.”343 This means that the whole range of legal, 
moral and ethical concerns must be addressed without fear, favour or prejudice. These concerns 
make sense only if they are approached reasonably, rationally and objectively. It is not an easy 
task. Had, for example, the ad hoc tribunals been set up by a regularly empowered body, like 
the UN General Assembly; had they prosecuted a token of individuals in the only pursuit of 
justice without political concerns, using a properly sound jurisprudence, no one would be 
questioning their effectiveness. 
 
How to apply the concept and tenets of natural law, of morality and ethics to this matter is the 
exercise to embark on. There was a situation and facts associated with it.  The task is to dispose 
of the situation and the facts. The tools are available; they are morality and ethics. They must 
guide the process of re-claiming the natural order that was disturbed by the violations of 
international humanitarian law. Perhaps a clear understanding of ethics is warranted at this 
level, because ethics and morality are different concepts. Souryal conceives ethics as “a 
philosophy that examines the principles of right and wrong, good and bad.”344 He defines 
morality as being:  
the practice of these principles on a regular basis, culminating in a moral life. As such, morality is 
conduct that is much akin to integrity. Consequently, while most people may be technically viewed as 
ethical (by virtue of knowing the principles of right and wrong), only those who internalize these 
principles and faithfully apply them in their relationships with others should be considered moral.
345
 
 
Both ethics and morality must form an individual’s character in order to create a proper 
balance. They must reflect the work of an individual wherever he is called to serve. Singer 
provides a useful insight into how ethics and morality interact in an individual’s life, as a 
person and as an agent of society. He suggests that:  
The ethical life is the most fundamental alternative to the conventional pursuit of self-interest. Deciding 
to live ethically is both more far-reaching and more powerful than a political commitment of the 
traditional kind. Living an ethically reflective life is not a matter of strictly observing a set of rules that 
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lay down what you should or should not do. To live ethically is to reflect in a particular way on how you 
live, and to try to act in accordance with the conclusion of that reflection.
346
 
 
Easily stated, international crimes are prosecuted to ensure future respect of human rights, to 
secure humankind and to do justice. According to Haque “human dignity, the equal moral 
worth of every human person, is now accepted as the precondition of all other legal and 
political values.”347 International criminal law exists to vindicate the rights of humanity.348 The 
question of the forum in which these crimes are prosecuted does not have relevance at this 
stage.  No better outcome may, however, emerge from a flawed foundation. This is where the 
institutional setting has relevance.   
 
Fighting evil deeds therefore needs to rely on principles and standards that are devoid of any 
treachery, manipulation or deceit. In the words of Bassiouni “no matter what today’s 
manipulative purpose may be, however, this law [international criminal justice] may one day 
become effectively and fairly applied.”349 An international ad hoc tribunal set up to prosecute 
crimes of unimaginable cruelty, with concerns other than the stated intention does not have its 
place here. Yet, through ad hoc tribunals, the UNSC manipulated the international community 
by portraying facial objectives while the intentions were something else. By means of 
manipulation, the UNSC, as dominant elite on the international scene, led the international 
community to conform to its political objectives.  The UNSC used its unfeterred discretion to 
advance the interest of the powers, especially those of the five permanent members that 
compose the Council. The rest of the international community even those represented in the 
General Assembly remained simple spectators. Out of that process, ad hoc tribunals were born. 
They carried out their work with little or no deference to moral and ethical principles in judging 
the crimes that offend the conscience of humanity as a whole.   
 
The argument here is that the UNSC disregarded the principles of ethics and morality when it 
established the ad hoc tribunals. Faced with a dilemma about whether or not to send  military 
interventions to stop the war that fuelled the killing, it opted for the establishment of ad hoc 
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tribunals in a legally contested environment that raised many questions about the tribunals’ 
legitimacy. Legitimacy here has a double meaning. It is firstly the legitimacy of the UNSC 
action’s itself, namely Resolution 827(1993) and Resolution 955(1994); and secondly, the 
institutions that the two resolutions created. This is very important because, as Horton 
articulates:  
legitimacy determines who has political authority, by virtue of what characteristics, qualities or processes 
it is possessed, and also what those who have political authority may properly do. Moreover, it follows 
that if a law or policy is enacted by a legitimate political authority, those subject to it are afforded good, 
though not necessarily decisive, reasons to comply with its directives.
350
 
 
Surely the UNSC has authority flowing from the UN Charter. But, what about the 
characteristics of that authority? How is it possible to properly exercise that authority? Can that 
authority be questioned on ethical and moral grounds? To the extent that the Council exercises 
this authority for the maintenance of international peace and security, it remains in its 
boundaries. Once it has decided, compliance follows. Tyler suggests that:  
The existence of authority ultimately depends on its ability to ensure that a majority of the governed 
complies with its commands a majority of the time, which requires the establishment and maintenance of 
conditions which lead to compliance. One such condition is the belief in the legitimacy of authority, 
which is an appeal to the normative values and the internalized obligations held by the governed: ‘citizen 
may comply with the law because they view the legal authority they are dealing with as having a 
legitimate right to dictate their behaviour; this represents an acceptance by people of the need to bring 
their behaviour into line with the dictates of an eternal authority.
351
 
 
To the other extent, however, the questions may remain unanswered. It is, for instance arguable 
whether the UNSC has a vested authority to establish ad hoc tribunals. The Council claims that 
it has. The UNSC adopted binding resolutions that bypassed the traditional consent process of 
the states through negotiated treaties. The work of the tribunals likewise reflects a mismatch 
between the imperative of natural justice and loyalty to the mother founder, namely the UNSC. 
Judge Lloyd Williams, presiding over a case before the ICTR expressed this loyalty to the 
mother body by stating that:  
We are here. The United Nations gave a mandate to this Tribunal to try these cases. We took an oath to 
carry out that mandate, and we will take whatever steps are necessary to get the proceedings going and to 
have the cases tried. We cannot have either the Defence counsel or the accused obstructing the process.
352
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Without inquiring into what the alleged obstruction was about or the circumstances that 
brought the judge to make the statement; it is clear that judge Williams firmly applied the law 
of the UNSC. He was less concerned about any other legitimate claim that challenged that 
authority. Whether the judge intended to do justice begs a response. He further stated: 
But let it be clearly understood, the Court is not going to operate under threats. No decent Court could 
allow that sort of situation to exist. We are going to uphold the law, and we are going to act in accordance 
with the Rules. And your interpretation of the Rules seems to differ from our interpretation.  But so far as 
this trial is concerned, it is the interpretation that the Chamber makes that is the interpretation that must 
be obeyed and carried out.
353
 
 
Judge Williams is one among many judges who were elected by the General Assembly from a 
list submitted by the UNSC to serve at the ad hoc tribunals. The judge’s remarks reflect the 
common and shared understanding of the panel of judges of the ad hoc tribunals who apply the 
UNSC law.  
 
The prosecution likewise was very concerned with the exercise of this power vested into the 
judges. Objecting to a defence question posed to an expert witness, a prosecution counsel 
argued that:  
Your Honours, your powers are clearly laid out in the Statute of the tribunal and it is of no relevance what 
the expert thinks or perceives your powers to be. Your powers are not an issue and that is the question 
that should be left for final submissions not to elicit an answer from the witness.
354
 
 
The presiding judge upheld the prosecution’s objection. What lacks from Judge Williams and 
the prosecution’s counsel representatatives is the idea of objectivity, of justice, of fairness; and 
the search for truth as well.  The prosecutor and the judges were not interested in the fairness of 
the procedure. They did not want to hear any other input. They only wanted the UNSC’s law to 
be applied as it was irrespective of its lack of justice. The representations show the positivist 
character of the law the ad hoc tribunals must apply, whether immoral or unethical. David 
Scheffer, a former US Ambassador for war crimes observed in his assessment notes that in the 
ICTY’s 10 years of existence “the diplomatic underpinnings of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) are critical to any understanding of the ‘why’ and 
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‘how’ of the tribunal’s creation in 1993 and subsequent operation.”355 There is therefore no 
question about the connection and collusion between the way the ad hoc tribunals were 
established, their statutes and how they operated.  It is also stressed in the first ICTY annual 
report that: 
Being the newest institutional arrival on the international judicial scene, the Tribunal has had to face a 
number of practical uncertainties and, indeed, criticism as to its legal basis and effectiveness.[...] The 
fundamental uncertainty, for some, lies in the very method by which the Tribunal was created. [...] Thus, 
the traditional approach of establishing such a body by treaty was discarded as being too slow (possibly 
taking many years to reach full ratification) and insufficiently effective as Member States could not be 
forced to ratify such a treaty against their wishes. Instead, the Security Council proceeded to establish the 
Tribunal by exercising its special powers under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.
356
 
 
The lack of the definition and delimitation of the objectives that the tribunals were to achieve is 
also another indication of a lack or disrespect of rules of ethics and morality. A chapter on the 
prosecution and its role will show that many aspects of natural justice were not observed. The 
reliance on guilty pleas and judicial notices portrays an alarming lack of ethical practices in 
adjudicating genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and serious breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions. Imputing criminal liability through the doctrines of joint criminal enterprise and 
command responsibility proves a positivist approach that only comforted the whims and wishes 
of the UNSC, without any moral or ethical consideration whatsoever. These criticisms are not 
meaningless or unfounded. In Campbell’s view, they are aimed at “devising and seeking 
conformity to appropriate rules of conduct, but also involve the choice of alternative 
performances when the rules do not or cannot adequately cover the situations in question.”357 
Ethics can fulfil this function if taken as “a matter both of the moral standards of conduct which 
ought to govern the performance of the various legal roles and of the required commitment and 
conformity to these standards, typically where there are no legal sanctions involved.”358  
 
The better way to arrive at this objective is through truth and reason.  St. Thomas Aquinas 
emphasises the concept of “truth” as self-serving and virtuous. He says:  
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The truth is the truth whereby a thing is true, not whereby a person says it’s true. Like anything else is 
said to be true, from the fact it attains its rule and measure, namely, the divine law: since rectitude of life 
depends on the conformity to that law. This truth of rectitude is common to every virtue
359
  
 
Without capturing the truths around the ad hoc tribunals, we are left with images that may not 
only be irrational, but more importantly, disgraceful.
360
 Without an honest and full inquiry into 
the truthfulness of these institutions by focusing particularly on the “weaknesses, biases, and 
prejudices”361 of all who are involved, their legacy may “grow into a degenerative field; more 
like a temple without a god, a body without a soul, and a theory without a meaning.”362 
 
The preamble to the UN Charter reads: “we the people of the United Nations determined to 
reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person.”363 
This introduction to the UN Charter reflects an earlier statement by an American great leader, 
James Wilson, who once said: 
All men are, by nature, equal and free. No one has a right to any authority over another without his 
consent; all lawful government is founded on the consent of those who are subject to it; such consent was 
given with a  view to ensure and to increase the happiness of the governed, above what they could enjoy 
in an independent and unconnected state of nature. The consequence is that the happiness of society is the 
first law of every government.
364
 
 
The Matwijkiws in their often cited contribution to a book maintain again that:  
a law void of human rights does not count as law proper. If the law does not recognize human rights, then 
it is illegitimate, although still legal in Bassiouni’s opinion. But the ultimate source of validity is morality. 
It is more important, therefore, to determine whether the law is just or right, or per Bassiouni, civilized or 
humane than to know whether it is binding in a merely formalistic sense.
365
   
 
Washington argues in this respect that “the philosophical presuppositions of international law 
were not based on secular, humanistic, abstract notions of positive law, where ‘he who is 
sovereign rules’, but was originally based on the immutable, objective, universal principles 
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rooted in the Judeo-Christian traditions of theism, the Bible, the Rule of Law, morality and 
natural law.”366 Likewise this is the philosophy of the UN, as it expresses the will of the people 
of the world. Short-circuiting this endevour devalues the wishes of the nations and of the entire 
humanity. Any law and its application must therefore abide by this imperative. Law needs to 
undergo a double test. First, the moral content of the law must prevail at its inception. Putting 
people at the epicentre of any law is a must. The Preamble of the UN Charter refers explicitly 
to the dignity and worth of the human person in whatsoever business the international 
organisation does. Law must undergo a second test when it is being applied to a situation. 
Unethical professionals can subvert the aim of the law. Burton summarises this approach in 
holding that “law can appear to be objective, neutral, and determinate body of rules, but really 
is situated in a social context, exposed to political bias, and indeterminate to a significant 
extent.”367 
 
Perhaps it is apposite to return to the earlier discussion on the law of the Security Council when 
it established the ad hoc tribunals. The representative of Spain at the Security Council, for 
example, commented that “in the final analysis, the Council, by adopting resolution 827(1993) 
is seeking to make a reality of the determination contained in the preamble of the Charter to 
reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person.”368 
Assuming that this was a sincere statement, the argument can therefore be taken further by 
looking at the application of that law by the tribunals so established. Whenever such 
application tends to ignore or underestimate the rationale of its existence, which is the defence 
of human rights, it is no longer “law proper.”  
 
The prosecution of international crimes should therefore uphold these moral values. 
Ambassador Arria who represented Venezuela at the Security Council stated that: 
“accountability for criminal conduct affecting and offending humanity should also entail global 
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accountability.”369 This requirement is valid at all stages in the building up of the system of 
international criminal adjudication. Its relevance starts with a determination to act from the 
UNSC itself. It continues in the investigation and prosecution of those responsible for the 
crimes committed.  The final judgment will reveal that order has been re-established because 
the guilty has been punished proportionately and the innocent has been acquitted. The process 
need to be consistent throughout. Establishing ad hoc tribunals was an inconsistent undertaking 
because not everyone at the UNSC believed that the tribunals could work.
370
  Talking about the 
criminal justice system in general, but also contributing to this suggestion as far as ad hoc 
tribunals are concerned, Souryal argues that: 
During the maturation process, serious excesses and failures appear, creating contradiction between the 
goals of the field and the means by which objectives are to be met. In attempting to reason away 
contradiction, an introspection usually emerges, urging caution, denouncing falsity, and searching for the 
truth. This introspection gradually hardens, constituting the collective conscience of the discipline – its 
soul. In time, the soul becomes instrumental in halting intellectual ostentation, in exposing fallacies, and 
in reaffirming basic values.
371
 
  
What Souryal calls the goals of the field and the means by which the goals are to be met
372
, 
once again, constitutes the demarcation between natural and positive law. Natural law leads to 
the goals, the purpose and the intention. Positive law constitutes the means.  Souryal further 
advances that “it is in responding to immoral behaviours that civilized governments must 
employ moral means. Succinctly stated, the more civilized a state is, the more willing it is to 
address the ‘worst among us’ by the most noble means we have.”373 Souryal does not question 
the validity of laws as posited. Instead he presents ethics as an “umbrella of civility” under 
which the laws can be more meaningful, rational, and obeyable.
374
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MacIntyre schematizes Souryal’s thought regarding law saying that “every account of natural 
law, no matter how minimal, makes at least two claims”375: the one of precepts and the one of 
enforcement of those precepts. What is needed therefore is to bridge “goals” and “means”.  
 
Obviously “goals” are good in themselves. The means must conform to the goals; and not 
contradict, manipulate or defeat them. This is where ethics becomes very important. Once a 
fact has been identified, many alternative courses of action are available. Out of those 
alternatives, an ethical decision is one that considers a decision that is likely to produce more 
good, and eventually produce little or no harm or damage to anyone. The decision must be 
tested and reflected on. The one who takes the decision ensures follow up and feedback. 
Pojman and Fieser highlight how ethical awareness is “the necessary condition for human 
survival and flourishing.”376 They argue that: 
If we are to endure as a free, civilized people, we must take ethics more seriously than we have before. 
Ethical theory may rid us of simplistic extremism and emotionalism—where shouting matches replace 
arguments. Ethical theory clarifies relevant concepts, constructs and evaluates arguments, and guides us 
on how to live our lives. It is important that the educated person be able to discuss ethical situations with 
precision and subtlety.
377
 
 
It is no surprise that ethical demands concern everyone, whether acting as an individual or as 
part of a structure of social life. In international politics, there is a conception of realism that 
can interpose with ethics. It is a way of thinking “that places high value on such conditions as 
stability, order, and peace, which provide a context in which all those secured by these 
conditions are provided the space to contemplate questions of morality and principles of ethical 
action.”378 The realists do not ignore the conflicting relationships that characterise international 
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relations and the interests that may come to dominate those relations. Realists recognise, 
however, “the tension between guiding principles of universal applicability and the 
arrangements of power.”379 The question is therefore not one of excluding ethics outright, but 
of looking at one’s own interests without ignoring others people’s interests. Ignoring something 
does not mean that the thing does not exist or that one is not bound to be guided by it or live 
according to it. It is only a regrettable failure. Ethicists consider both. Realists also, “point to 
the commonplace that the most powerful frequently assert claims to universality while the less 
powerful assert aspirations for justice in putting forth their own claims.”380 The higher norm 
remains ethics once again. Realists may only stick to an interest-oriented value; but which they 
know not to be right. Realists know what right is; and what doing right means. They choose not 
to do the right thing knowingly and deliberately. They know they can do otherwise. They 
hesitate to do right because they consider prudence as being the supreme virtue in 
politics.
381Politicians evaluate their action with much attention to “worldly consequences 
external to the agent.”382 This is more a question of integrity than a lack of a meaningful sense 
of ethics. Were realists to keep their integrity, they would take action that they know is right 
and just. They would stand by and remain truthful to that action. Their action would be a matter 
of principles. Montessori notes, “a loss of integrity is a loss of oneself.”383 Yet, as Bassiouni 
observes,  
From both an ethical and moral perspective, there is no price tag for doing what is right; there is no 
utilitarian test that can measure the objective outcomes of doing the right thing. To curtail impunity for 
core international crimes and to have enhanced accountability, no matter by what margins, is an 
accomplishment that the international community should herald.
384
 
 
Groome steps in, arguing that “the theoretical basis of international criminal trials is not to 
create a ‘fair contest’ to resolve a dispute – but to accurately and fairly identify, investigate and 
adjudicate which individuals have violated  international norms.”385 Groome is further of the 
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view that “accurately identifying and adjudicating transgressions of international norms is the 
foundational and animating principle of international criminal trials.”386 
 
It is an assumption that when the Security Council undertook to establish the ad hoc tribunals 
for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, it had genuine, frank and sincere objectives to attain. It 
is said that it was discharging its main mandate of maintaining international peace and security. 
The worry is, however, that like in Nuremberg; Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia have 
become, as Mutua suggests: “the model of the triumph of convenience over principle, the 
subordination of justice to politics, and the arrogance of might over morality.”387 It is clear that 
the UNSC was driven more “by consideration of expediency […] rather than by any more 
fundamental principles.”388The power of principles was clearly expressed by its philosophical 
master, Aristotle. He once exclaimed: “Magnus amicus Plato Maior amica vertas, or ‘Dear is 
Plato, but dearer still is truth.”389 This sends out a very powerful message on the precedence 
that principles occupy over convenience. Souryal takes it that:  
[Aristotle] dictum demonstrates that even among the best of friends, one should, out of conviction, still 
courageously disagree and argue one’s point of reasoning. Furthermore, the dictum implies that personal 
loyalty to a superior or a boss is not that important when the resolution of the issue at hand must be based 
on truths rather than sentiments. Unquestionable loyalty to an individual, rather than to a principle or an 
ideal, may be harmful – if not outright dangerous, it can, as in the case of Watergate, Iran-Contra, and 
many other lesser cases, compel well-trained professionals to overlook the truth.
390
 
 
Humanism in the action of the UNSC was represented by the values that the Council wanted to 
secure, namely human rights, and the “dignity of humankind as a whole, and of each and every 
person in particular.”391 Those values to defend, according to Marina are “previous to every set 
of rules as they are created to defend them.”392 Unfortunately, power triumphed over reason 
and imposed itself. 
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The tribunals mandate was to render justice which is a universal aspiration. Anderson 
emphasises that “the right to administer [justice] is earned on the basis of having shown oneself 
to be, not the neutral, but the just party or the party of the just party. Appeal to the rule of law 
does not offer international criminal law the blanket moral independence from the conditions 
under which it is administered.”393 Specifically that conception of justice, in the opinion of 
Bassiouni, is a matter of value-oriented goals.
394
 This is of course the minimum that can be 
achieved. Bassiouni then sums up those value-oriented goals as being:  
(1) prevention through deterrence and the strengthening of social values; (2) enhancement of peace by 
providing retribution and corrective justice which makes violators accountable and punishable, which in 
turn reduces the victims’ needs for revenge; and (3) provide victims with redress, which in some ways 
compensates them the harm they have suffered and the losses they incurred.
395
  
 
Bassiouni goes further in explaining what needs to be understood through these value-oriented 
goals. He suggests that: 
To attain these value-oriented goals, the international criminal justice system, as a whole, as well as in its 
parts, must, in its processes, be impartial and fair. These notions of impartiality and fairness include three 
other unarticulated philosophical premises – equality, liberty, and individual dignity, which are reflected 
in almost all legal systems throughout history, and evidence the philosophical understanding that human 
justice is achieved by processes that are perceived as impartial and fair because they uphold equality, 
liberty and human dignity. Experience also reveals that in order for legal processes to be impartial and 
fair, they must also be effective, for without effectiveness, they cannot have such characteristics of the 
international criminal justice system whose processes are to be impartial and fair.
396
 
 
 The study provides evidence which indicates that the ad hoc tribunals did not reach this 
minimum. The tribunals only attempted to do so. 
 
There are reasons to doubt that the UNSC was animated by the search for truth and justice. 
Mutua observes in the case of Rwanda that “from the start the tribunal was intended to achieve 
neither the abolitionist impulses nor the just ends trumpeted by the United Nations.”397 It was a 
self-deceiving statement that by establishing the ad hoc tribunal, the aim was to render justice.  
It was just a claim, not properly and genuinely grounded. One may suggest that in the 
circumstances that prevailed in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda at the time, the proper and 
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effective action the UNSC could have undertaken was military intervention. Justice could have 
followed after the war was over, or even during the fighting where possible.  The question of 
legitimacy re-emerges again. Without halting the war, there was no way justice could take its 
course. Anderson draws the sequence:   
It is your actions to stop and prevent today that give you the right to be the administrator of justice 
tomorrow. It is lexically and morally ordered looking forward, not the other way around. Justice may be a 
matter for the angels, above all things and looking down, but the administration of justice is an earthly 
mission that partakes as much of partiality as impartiality, peculiar as that must sound to international 
criminal lawyers and those, like the human rights organizations, who believe they have unique purchase on 
the categorical imperative because they incarnate Kant.
398
 
 
Even after the tribunals’ establishment as alternative to effective military action, the Council did 
not dedicate much energies and resources to enable the tribunals to function effectively. 
  
The action of the Council was conventional and binding only to the extent that Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda were concerned. Though there were no consistent precedents to rely on, there existed 
however, since time immemorial, principles and standards of universal application for the 
search of justice and truth. The core concern was to protect human rights in the former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Human rights are also shared universal values. The protection of 
these values required a consideration of norms of justice, equity and fairness from the inception 
of the tribunals as well as throughout their functioning, and not only to serve as laboratories for 
the development of international humanitarian law or international criminal law. Mutua 
dismisses this later concern of developing international humanitarian law and international 
criminal law. According to him:   
There is little doubt that the establishment of the tribunals affords the international community an 
opportunity to develop international law with respect to atrocities. While that effect is salutary, it does 
little to respond to the real and graphic abuses and sufferings of the victims in Rwanda and the former 
Yugoslavia. Laws are less meaningful if they cannot be applied or enforced without prejudice to redress 
transgressions or unless they have a deterrent effect such as behaviour modification on the part of would 
be perpetrators.
399
 
 
The applicable international laws that existed at the time of establishing the ad hoc tribunals 
were sufficient to enable a judicial institution to do the right job. This does not mean that the 
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development of law has to be left aside. It means that law must be developed to the extent that it 
serves the needs of the people. Groome supports Mutua’s argument by arguing that:  
Integral to the theoretical basis of international criminal justice must be a consideration as to how its 
methods further this paramount purpose of international humanitarian law. While the eradication of 
impunity hopefully becomes a deterrent to a violation of international norms – the methodology we 
employ must be informed by and contribute to a reduction of the excesses of armed conflict. The future of 
international criminal justice must not only seek to hold violators accountable but must make it more 
difficult to violate the laws and customs of war.
400
  
 
What follows demonstrates, however, that the Security Council’s action masked its failure to 
take appropriate measures. The positivist approach was used to establish the institutions and 
compel everyone concerned to follow. When the tribunals started their work, many principles 
and standards of universal application were likewise not rigorously adhered to, missing once 
again the precepts of natural law. The whole process becomes ineffective. The enormity and 
gravity of the crimes committed prompted the UNSC to act.  Yet the action it took was not an 
effective tool for the task at hand. 
 
2.4.2. Negative consequences of might over morality 
 
The ICTY recognises that it was established in speed and that it adopted the same speed to start 
its work.
401
 This argument is not enough to justify the way the tribunal was established or the 
manner in which it discharged its functions. Reasons of effectiveness and expedition were 
likewise invoked to establish the ICTR. In both scenarios, expeditious action overtook other 
reasonable and convincing alternatives. It is quite agreeable that the establishment of the ad hoc 
tribunals was a political decision and that the UNSC is empowered to take political decisions. It 
is another way of saying that the Council has the power of might and can do everything 
unquestionably. There is structurally and in reality, no “higher authority in or outside the UN to 
monitor the Security Council and interpret [its] proper application of the Charter.”402 Halliday 
underscores that that “might is alive and perceived by some to be acceptable.”403 Halliday speaks 
as a former UN Assistant Secretary General, who served the UN for 34 years. Can that power 
alone be questioned on reasonable grounds? Yes, it must, because “it is international law and its 
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proper application that must drive the work of the United Nations not the ‘might’ and national 
interests of some, the most powerful member states.”404 The proper application of international 
law requires a return to the very basic principles upon which that law is founded. Those are the 
moral values that nations share. But the examples that follow prove that power is given priority 
over reason and by that token negates the moral value of an action. 
 
The first case is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) bombing over Serbia in 1999. 
During Operation Allied Forces conducted from 24 March to 10 June 1999, NATO forces 
bombed the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The operation cost the lives of approximately 500 
civilians
405
 and damaged properties and the environment. Allegedly, the operation intended to 
weaken the Yugoslav Army in Kosovo and press for its pullout from Kosovo.
406
  
 
The number of the victims and the circumstances under which they were killed raised a public 
outcry. The question was whether NATO forces had committed a war crime under the 
jurisdiction of the ICTY. Prosecutor Louise Arbour established a working group “to assess the 
allegations and advise her as to whether or not there was evidence of sufficient weight to merit a 
full investigation.”407 Del Ponte pursued the work of the team. She was particularly interested in 
an air attack over a bridge that collapsed with a passenger’s train, attacks on Serbia’s television 
and the Embassy of China in Belgrade, and NATO’s use of cluster bombs.408 The prosecutor 
eventually attempted to seek information from the NATO hierarchy and nothing was availed to 
her.
409
 Her assessment team also concluded that “no further investigation was warranted, because 
no information before it led the members to suspect that further investigation would ever lead to 
prosecution of persons higher up the chain of command.”410 In June 2000, having considered the 
report of the commission, the prosecutor concluded that there was no basis to initiate 
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investigations for an eventual prosecution before the ICTY. For all purposes, the NATO air 
campaign was not authorised by the UNSC. Apparently, had NATO sought authorisation, “it 
could have been more difficult to get public support for a military action which had actually been 
vetoed in the UN, and the whole process might expose divisions in the alliance.”411 This is a 
clear illustration of power politics. NATO action was illegal because no principles or guidelines 
could justify the intervention.  
 
The Rwandan genocide case is a second telling illustration of might over morality. In December 
1999, Carla Del Ponte, Former ICTR/ICTY Prosecutor, had opened investigations into Tutsi 
officers of the army of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) under Kagame’s command. These 
investigations were known as “special investigations.”412 They were “so secret that many high-
ranking prosecution officials were not privy to their status.”413 Had Del Ponte successfully 
investigated and eventually prosecuted at least a token of Tutsi officers, this would have erased 
any suspicion of selective prosecutions. But, as Del Ponte writes “the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan 
government was effectively blackmailing the tribunal, sabotaging its trials of accused Hutu 
génocidaires in order to halt the Office of the Prosecutor’s Special Investigation of crimes 
allegedly committed by the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in 1994.”414 Her 
predecessor, Justice Louise Arbour of Canada even “feared that the Rwandan Government might 
carry out reprisals against her investigators based in Rwanda to derail the investigations of RPF 
officers.”415 Arbour recalls that “the Rwandan government was reading my mail. […] we were 
infiltrated. They knew what I was doing. So if I sent someone off to do an investigation, they 
might be killed. I wouldn’t do it.”416 She eventually managed to open “a preliminary probe of 
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RPF atrocities. The probe, which was carried out quietly and cautiously, laid the groundwork for 
Del Ponte’s subsequent investigation of specific RPF war crimes suspects.”417  
 
Del Ponte remembers how she was intimidated to not carry any investigation of crimes allegedly 
committed by the Rwandan Patriotic Front. She relates a visit she paid to President Kagame on 
28 June 2002. She recalls President Kagame instructing her that the tribunal must not investigate 
the Tutsi militia, the militia Kagame had commanded and that had metamorphosed into 
Rwanda’a Army.418 She quotes Kagame saying:  
you are destroying Rwanda. You must investigate and prosecute the genocide. You haven’t gotten Kabuga, 
go and get him. Don’t look into the military. We have done this, and we will do this. […] you will disrupt 
the reconstruction of the nation….I am rebuilding this country….I have to maintain internal order…. If you 
investigate, people will believe there were two genocides….All we did was liberate Rwanda.
419
 
 
Kagame himself and the RPF in general admitted to have killed in cold blood a group of bishops 
and other clergymen in Gakurazo in Southern Rwanda on June 4, 1994. The ICTR Prosecutor 
was investigating those facts. Yet, Kagame made it clear that: 
You misunderstood what I told you before. Now I’m telling you what we are doing…. We will not allow 
you to do this. It is damaging our country. It is possible that soldiers have committed crimes. But we have 
punished these soldiers. And we will do it.
420
 
 
Following this encounter, Del Ponte regrets that she did not inform the international community 
of Rwanda’s obstruction of justice. In her own words, Del Ponte suggests:  
And with that, the last conversation I ever had with Kagame came to an abrupt close. I refused even to 
consider answering questions from journalists. This was a mistake. I should have exploited the opportunity 
to explain to the world how Rwanda’s government was obstructing justice in order to blackmail the tribunal 
to drop an investigation of these men who had become the country’s political and military elite.
421
 
 
Whereas President Kagame addressed the Chief Prosecutor openly as the Chief of the Rwandan 
State, he was not acting alone in order to decline investigations into RPF crimes, in fact to 
obstruct justice. Hartman, acting in her capacity as the spokeswoman of Del Ponte assisted at a 
meeting at the State Department. During the 15 May 2003 meeting, Richard Prosper, US 
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Ambassador at large for war crimes made it clear that Del Ponte should drop any special 
investigation she was conducting. As an eye witness of the event, Hartman recalls that Prosper 
intervened on several occasions to encourage the prosecutor to give up the special investigations 
to Rwanda. Del Ponte was ready to grant the Kigali authorities a few months to show evidence of 
their desire to do justice. The crimes have been committed and the commission was 
acknowledged. Yet, they were overlooked.  Del Ponte believed that bringing perpetrators to 
justice would be a contribution to national reconciliation
422
, one of the ICTR objectives.  Del 
Ponte fought an unwinnable battle as she was finally dismissed from her responsibility as the 
ICTR prosecutor. 
 
From all the arguments raised above and relying on the prosecutor dropping of investigation into 
the bombing of the FRY and her forfeiture of investigation into RPF crimes in Rwanda, one can 
rightly state that law has always been what the powerful individuals and bodies wanted it to be. 
The rationale of the claim is that law should apply to everyone equally. Natural justice, as 
already seen requires that same cases be treated the same. It is only human behaviour, attitude 
and preference that bring about the imbalances. Rwanda was a case of selective prosecution. 
Yugoslavia frustrated the prosecutor who could not carry on her investigative work.  Similarly 
situated persons and circumstances have not been either investigated or prosecuted because of 
the might-power. Might-power justifies the lack of morality in the work of the ad hoc tribunals. 
 
2.5. Summary  
 
This chapter explored naturalism and positivism to explain what the world expected from the 
creation and work of the ICTY and the ICTR. Naturalism and positivism cannot help calibrate 
the various concerns of the ad hoc tribunals without themselves being defined within this 
perspective. Naturalism is the theory based on natural law.  Natural law can vest the character of 
divine given law. Theologian Saint Thomas Aquinas detailed how all human law has its origin in 
God. Aristotle, Socrates and Hugo Grotius decouple law from divine origin. A human being 
must use reason to discover the truth.  The search for the truth was largely developed by Souryal 
and principled by Kant with his categorical imperatives. Introducing natural law in the 
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prosecution of international crimes, especially in the ad hoc tribunals’ work is therefore not an 
exercise in futility. It is an insistence that any law that is enacted be founded on its truthfulness 
and be principled, and be characterised by its justice. The law must reflect the aspirations and 
values of those it intends to regulate. Positivism was a movement of thought that attempted to 
dissociate law as it is from law as it ought to be. Prince Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes and Brian 
Bix have been advocates of the law as an instrument that establishes a sort of contract between 
the ruler and the ruled. The ruled has a duty to unquestionably follow the commands of the ruler.  
 
Like any other law, whether domestic or international, the law of the ad hoc tribunals needs to be 
tested in its procedural enactment and its substantive content. The law governing the ad hoc 
tribunals was posited by the UNSC. Though the Council acted after making a determination that 
there was a threat to peace, it is questionable whether it had legitimate authority to establish ad 
hoc tribunals to fulfill its mandate of maintaining international peace and security, and whether 
this can be assessed on natural grounds. Using its mighty power, it voted binding resolutions that 
created the ad hoc tribunals. It decided to do so based on the assumption that its decisions will be 
followed and executed. By doing so, however, the UNSC defeated the purpose for which it 
enacted the tribunals’ statutes. A look into the situations in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda 
sheds light on the available options the UNSC had by the time it established the tribunals. What 
is at the epicenter of the discussion is the truthfulness of the armed conflict that swept both the 
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. If reason had prevailed, the UNSC could have used its armed 
teeth to halt the serious violations of international humanitarian law that the fighting brought 
about. Whether a criminal tribunal could be entirely naturalistic or positivistic will remain an 
unanswered theoretical question. What is most needed is the balance of the the interrelation 
between the two theories in the designing and functioning of criminal tribunals with the aim of 
searching for the truth.  
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 CHAPTER 3: BACKGROUND AND APPROPRIATENESS OF THE 
ESTABLISHMENT OF ICTY AND ICTR 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
The ICTY and ICTR were respectively established by binding Security Council resolutions 
827(1993), of 25 May 1993 and 955(1994) of 8 November 1994. The Council resorted to its 
powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The Council believed that the tribunals 
constituted enforcement measures taken without recourse to the use of armed force in the 
broader performance of the Council’s mandate of maintaining international peace and security. 
The Security Council’s action is a mixture of legal and political and diplomatic considerations. 
A resolution under Chapter VII of the Charter binds states to comply. The tribunals were also 
vested with jurisdictional powers. The question is whether the UNSC was legally empowered, 
under the provisions of the UN Charter, to establish judicial institutions. An ad hoc institution 
is circumstantial and exceptional in all respects.  What then is the explanation and why did the 
Council use the road of ad hoc tribunals?  
 
It is therefore necessary to explore the legal route taken and find out how effective that route 
was. The UNSC could not establish tribunals without a purpose. The UNSC allegedly intended 
to maintain peace and security and further attain the aims of justice, contribute to national 
reconciliation, and combat impunity. How appropriate and effective was the UNSC’s action? 
Before responding to these questions, it is important to understand how the situation was in the 
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda that warranted the establishment of ad hoc criminal tribunals.  
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3.2. The situation in the former Yugoslavia from 1991423 and the establishment of 
the ICTY 
 
The conflicts in the republics constituting the former Socialist and Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (SFRY) spread from 1991 with Serbia’s invasion of Slovenia until 2001 when a 
peaceful settlement was reached between conflicting parties in the Former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia.
424
 The ICTY was established when the war had already started in some 
republics. Despite the existence of the tribunal, the war continued unabated eight years later 
and eventually covered all the territory of the SFRY.  
 
It is beyond the scope of this research to rewrite the history and the causes of the conflicts in 
the former Yugoslavia that brought about the disastrous events of the 1990s.  Some well-
informed authors have done so extensively and accurately.
425
 It is, however, useful, for the 
purpose of this research, to note that “from 1946 to 1991 Yugoslavia comprised six 
republics”426 that were Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Serbia and 
Slovenia. Within Serbia there were two autonomous regions of Kosovo in the south and 
Vojvodina in the north.  
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Yugoslavia was also a mixture of ethnic and religious groups
427
, mainly Orthodox Christians, 
Catholics and Muslims.  Bosnia and Herzegovina also divided into three entities, namely 
Republika Srpska, and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina – and the Brcko district.428  
Apart from Slovenia; which was inhabited by homogenous population, other republics were 
populated by inter and intra-ethnic and religious groups. Yugoslavia, like other communist 
block states did not escape from the collapse of the 1990s and started to disintegrate. When the 
conflict started, each group fought for its kinsmen against the federal authorities or against the 
opposite group and vice-versa. 
 
Slovenia and Croatia declared independence on 25 June 1991. The declaration sparked an 
invasion by the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA), the majority of which were Serbs. In Slovenia, 
the conflict lasted for only 10 days with a victory of the Slovenian army and the withdrawal of 
the JNA.
429
 In Croatia, the war lasted until January 1992, when an unconditional ceasefire was 
agreed between the Croatian government and ethnic Serbs.
430
 This war was characterised by the 
shelling of cities and villages, destruction of historic monuments and large scale massacres of 
civilians. The destruction of Dubrovnik, in the South East of Croatia, and Vukovar, in the 
North East, by Serbs’ forces are worthy of note in this regard.  
 
 In Bosnia and Herzegovina the conflict was the deadliest in all the republics particularly with 
the massacre in Srebrenica, Prijedor, Omarska, Konjik, Foca, Brcko, Mostar, Sarajevo, to just 
cite a few massacre sites.  That war stopped with the signing of the Washington agreement in 
March 1994, which established a Muslim-Croat federation in Bosnia. Fighting between Croat-
Muslim forces and the Serbs continued despite international efforts to establish a lasting 
ceasefire.
431
On 14 July 1995, the UN protected enclave of Srebrenica was shelled with heavy 
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artillery by forces of Ratko Mladic, a Bosnian Serb general.
432
 The UN Implementation Forces 
(IFOR), “for fear of eventual reprisals”433 did not retaliate to save the civilians under attack. 
Instead the conflict increased in intensity with renewed Bosnian Serb attacks on Sarajevo 
which precipitated NATO air attacks on Bosnian-Serb targets across Bosnia and Herzegovina 
in August 1995.
434
  
 
On 21November 1995, the Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian governments agreed to a peace—
negotiated at Dayton, Ohio, in the United States.
435
 This accord was signed in Paris on 14 
December 1995 by the Presidents of Serbia Slobodan Milosevic, the President of Croatia 
Franjo Tudjman and the President of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegović.436 The 
Dayton accords constituted a package of various protocols aimed at ending the war in the three 
states. Among other provisions, there was that of cooperating with the ICTY in the arrest of 
suspect war criminals.
437
 But the question of dislocation and disintegration was not over yet 
because the war spread also to Kosovo and Macedonia. This research will concern itself with 
the territories in which crimes, under ICTY jurisdiction, were mainly committed. Therefore, 
neither Macedonia nor Slovenia will be dealt with here. 
 
The events in the Serbian province of Kosovo also attracted much attention.
438
 The tension was 
fueled by the oppression by the Serbian authorities and the sentiment of self-determination of 
Kosovo Albanians. The violence involved provocations, reactions and contra-reaction between 
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Kosovo Serbs and Kosovo Albanians.  The immediate conflict was triggered by acts of 
violence “between Serbian authorities and ethnic Albanians.”439 Bagget remarks that “between 
February 28 and March 1, Serbian police killed eighty ethnic Albanians in the Kosovo town of 
Drenica. The crackdown was in response to an attack on a bus-load of Serbian police by 
members of the Kosovo Liberation Army”440 (KLA).  According to Weller, the police and the 
Serbian armed forces destroyed several villages, including the town of Prekaz. There, families 
were massacred, including women and children, turning them into instant martyrs for the 
Kosovo Albanians.
441
 The violence seemed of a small-scale magnitude at the beginning, but it 
later led to a conflict that had ramifications with what has started earlier in Slovenia, Croatia 
and Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Before NATO’s intervention in Kosovo that eventually halted 
the violence, and the war to a large extent:  
many human rights abuses and war crimes were committed against ethnic Albanian civilians, but Serb 
civilians too were victims of abductions, beatings, and executions at the hands of members of ethnic 
Albanian paramilitary forces such as the KLA, which also targeted ethnic Albanians suspected of 
collaboration with the Serbs.
442
  
 
After the withdrawal of Serbian forces pursuant to NATO air strikes, the violence increased 
against Serbs and other minorities to “a horrific level during the first months of the UN 
Mission.”443 
 
The crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia came to be known through media coverage
444
 
and humanitarian non-governmental organisations and combined actions of the United Nations 
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Human Rights Commission and the UNSC. The Human Rights Commission appointed Mr. 
Tadeus Mazowiecki as its Special Rapporteur on the former Yugoslavia. He submitted his first 
Report on 28 August 1992 in which he proposed the establishment of an investigative 
commission.
445
 By resolution 713(1991), the Security Council imposed an arm embargo on 
Yugoslavia. It also determined that the fighting and heavy loss of life and material damage 
constituted a threat to international peace and security. The resolution contained many other 
enforcement measures including the creation of ‘safe areas” in Srebrenica, Sarajevo, Tuzla, 
Zepa, Gorazde, and Bihac.
446
 Hochkammer argues that this resolution brought too little too 
late.
447
 In his opinion, the UN’s “reaction to the Yugoslav conflict typified the world’s rush to 
condemn Serbian aggression, but reluctance to intervene”448 in a war that was spreading so 
quickly. 
 
Thereafter, the Council started exploring the possibility of prosecuting war crimes, having 
threatened to do so in resolutions 764 (1992) of 13 July 1992
449
 and 771(1992) of 13 August 
1992
450
 respectively. While the killings continued in Bosnia, the UN Security Council adopted 
Resolution 780(1992) on 6 October 1992 in which it decided to “establish a ‘commission of 
experts’ to gather evidence of war crimes in the former Yugoslavia.”451 The five members’ 
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210; see a narrative by Tatiana Vaksberg of the Bijeljina camp, “the first town in Bosnia to have fallen into the 
Serbian hands”, in Tatiana Vaksberg, “The Milosevic Trial: Writing History”, East European Constitutional Review, 
Vol. 12, 2003, pp. 120 - 125 
445
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 Kerr Rachel, The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia: An exercise in Law, Politics, and 
Diplomacy, op. cit., p. 33 
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449
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commission of experts
452
 was mandated to examine, inter alia, information submitted pursuant 
to Resolution 771(1992) and to advise the UN Secretary General on the evidence of grave 
breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other violations of international humanitarian law 
committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia.
453
  
 
Despite the obstacles
454
 under which the Commission worked, it produced significant results in 
its Final Report of May 1994.
455
 In an appraisal of the Commission’s work, Scharf highlights 
that the particular circumstance of the crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia, as 
documented by the Commission, required nothing less than the creation of an ad hoc tribunal 
“for moral, practical, and legal reasons.”456 This was done when the UN Security Council 
adopted Resolution 827 (1993) on 25 May 1993 establishing the ICTY. Hochkammer labelled 
the tribunal “an empty gesture through which Europe and the United States hope to assuage 
their guilt for failing to act when the war erupted, thereby permitting the carnage.”457  
 
In concluding with this background to the ICTY establishment, it is instructive to highlight two 
important issues. The first is the fact that the tribunal was established as a so-called effective 
means for the restoration and maintenance of international peace and security in the Balkans. 
                                                          
452
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The second fact is the actual knowledge that Milosevic (and many others) was the most wanted 
criminal. Yet, Milosevic was only arrested in April 2001 on allegations of corruption and abuse 
of power by authorities in Belgrade, not directly by the ICTY itself. Williams and Taft 
underscore that this slowness to act and the reluctance to assert a robust role for justice through 
strong statements demanding accountability limited the Yugoslav Tribunal’s effectiveness and 
established a questionable precedent for the operation of future tribunals.
458
 Had Prime 
Minister Zoran Djindjic
459
 not surrendered Milosevic to the tribunal’s investigators on 28 June 
of 2001 who took him to The Hague
460
, Milosevic could have died a free man. Neither the 
international tribunal nor NATO alliance has ever attempted to arrest the person they believed 
to be the mastermind of the atrocities in the Balkans. President Vojislav Koštunica, the Serbian 
President and successor of Milosevic, was himself unwilling to surrender Milosevic for 
international trial.
461
 This was also the position of Western Governments
462
, according to 
Goldstone, former ICTY Chief Prosecutor.  
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Like in other conflict hotspots, the situation in Kosovo was well known to the international 
community
463
 particularly the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe [now the 
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the European Union (EU), the 
UN General Assembly, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, the UN Security 
Council and powerful States, including the USA.
464
 International media also covered 
extensively the way events enfolded in Kosovo as early as January 1998. Despite this 
knowledge however, “the violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms in Kosovo, in 
particular the repression of the ethnic Albanian population, continued unabated.”465  
 
The situation and procedures of establishing the ICTY is not far different from the one adopted 
for Rwanda. On 8 November 1994, the UN Security Council, following the same scenario, 
adopted Resolution 955(1994) aimed at prosecuting genocide, crimes against humanity and war 
crimes committed in Rwanda. The background to this resolution follows. 
 
3.3. The situation in Rwanda (1990 – 1994) and the establishment of the ICTR 
 
It would require volumes of books if one were to write on the events which are at the heart of 
the idea of establishing an international criminal tribunal for Rwanda. The armed conflict that 
erupted in Rwanda from Uganda on October 1, 1990 is the direct beginning of the crisis. The 
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war opposed an aggressive movement codenamed Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) and the 
Rwandan Government armed forces. The RPF movement originated mainly from the Republic 
of Uganda. The war lasted for almost four years.  
 
Like any war, this conflict was no exception in terms of mass violations of human rights 
committed by both warring parties. Belligerents with the assistance of the international 
community undertook negotiations for a peaceful settlement of the crisis.
466
 It is, however, a 
fact that the Rwandese Patriotic Front
467
 (RPF) which was the invading force, took advantage 
of many misdeeds and weaknesses of the then Government of Rwanda to surround itself with 
ingredients
468
 and intransigence
469
 that later led to the abortion of all peaceful undertakings and 
facilitated the resumption of the war in April 1994 and the mass killings that ensued
470
, 
including the commission of genocide. 
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An analysis of archives of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR)
471
 
and of the Embassy of the United States of America
472
 accredited in Kigali in 1993 and 1994, 
and other such contemporaneous documents show clearly that the RPF was not interested in a 
peaceful resolution of the conflict. It was rather determined to continue the fighting
473
 in order 
to seize power at any cost. The Broad Based Transitional Government and Transitional 
Assembly composed of all political parties and the RPF provided for in the Arusha peace 
agreement, could not be set up until 06April 1994. On this day the RPF deliberately shot down 
the Rwandan President’s plane plunging the whole country into chaos. It would be tantamount 
to ignoring reality if one tried to isolate this grave incident
474
 when arguing that there was a 
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MIR – 451, Idem, at para. 6 
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civil war in Rwanda. Others would also support the idea that there was a plan to eliminate the 
Tutsis. Evidence on records before the ICTR suggests that the RPF, which is now ruling 
Rwanda, allegedly shot down President Juvénal Habyarimana’s plane.475  
The President was the only legal institution set up pursuant to the accords.  After his death, 
there was a power vacuum on the side of what could then be called the Government; the Peace 
Accords were not yet operational.
476
 An explosive climate prevailed at that time. The 
assassination of the President triggered the explosion. 
  
The scale of the human rights violations, particularly the right to life, and their intensity 
culminated in the unprecedented horrors that the end of the twentieth century witnessed.  
Laughland observes that “the killing sparked off was a huge scare. It is not known how many 
people died and it is not known what percentage of Hutus and Tutsis were killed. One figure 
which has gained currency is that 800,000 were killed but even the human rights activists who 
advance this figure say that they do not know the real tally.”477  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Habyarimana of Rwanda and President Cyprien Ntaryamira of Burundi crashed at Kigali airport, killing all on 
board. Following the deaths of the two Presidents, widespread killings, having both political and ethnic dimensions, 
began in Kigali and spread to other parts of Rwanda.” 
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 After this serious incident which RPF was clearly responsible for, this invading movement 
refused to recognise the Interim Government.  It was hardly set up on 09April 1994,
478
 and was 
viewed as legitimate by the UN at that time.
479
 RPF opposed any ceasefire that would have 
allowed the armed forces to restore law and order.
480
 It instead wanted the “genocide” to be 
consumed.
481
 The RPF ensured that the international forces that were present in Rwanda and 
elsewhere, which came for the rescue missions, left as early as 09April 1994.
482
  
                                                          
478
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What was to be later called “genocide” had not yet started.  If one were to call the massacres 
“genocide” at that particular moment, it was at its early beginning, and could have been halted. 
This required RPF to cease the fighting. It also required a reinforced UNAMIR presence and 
determined military action. Rather than reinforcing the UNAMIR operational capacity, the 
UNSC, by Resolution 912(1994)
483
 and in response to the countries that provided troops’484 
request, downsized the UNAMIR in the climax of the killings.  On one hand the RPF claimed 
that massacre should be halted
485
 before any ceasefire negotiation could take place.  On the 
other hand, some elements of the governmental forces were directly participating in the 
massacres mainly committed by the common populace and militias.  
 
The then Rwandan Armed Forces High Command requested a ceasefire as of 12April 1994
486
 
which the RPF refused. This attitude did not change until 14July 1994. The UN and other role 
players
487
 also called for a ceasefire that could have allowed the cessation of the massacres and 
the resumption of negotiations.  A part from the calls for ceasefire, the UN and the international 
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Department of Public Information (Publisher), The United Nations and Rwanda 1993 – 1996, op. cit., p. 255; Text 
of President Clinton’s Radio Message on Rwanda, April 30, 1994: “ On behalf of all the American people, I call on 
the Rwandan Army and the Rwandan Patriotic Front to agree to an immediate cease-fire and return to negotiations 
aimed at a lasting peace in their country.” 
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community as a whole
488
 did nothing else to stop the massive killings and left Rwanda on its 
own.  
 
When the RPF seized power in July 1994, the attitude changed.  The RPF continuously 
pressurised the international community to call the massacre “genocide” and to consider its 
belligerence as a salutary action. The UN lost completely its supposed neutrality. Instead of 
looking into all the crimes that were committed during this period and allocating 
responsibilities accordingly, the UN openly started siding with the newly established 
government, supporting the idea that there was a plan to exterminate Tutsis. The UN attitude 
aimed apparently at not embarrassing the new government and eventually weakening it.
489
 The 
UN Secretariat suppressed information gathered by a consultant acting under the mandate of 
the High Commissioner for Refugees where evidence showed that the RPF killed civilians in a 
widespread and systematic manner because the newly established Government of Rwanda 
simply denied those massacres.
490
  
 
It should once again be overemphasised that the issue of “planning” genocide has never 
featured in the two year negotiation period between the then Government of Rwanda and the 
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RPF. The UN also denied any knowledge of such a “plan.”491 In adjudicating the widely 
mediatised Military One
492
 case, the ICTR likewise failed to establish any plan or conspiracy to 
wipe out Tutsis.
493
 
 
Prosecuting the leaders of the defeated government was not really a search for truth and 
justice
494
 but vested a great deal of political agenda aimed at regime change. In the course of 
the war, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights appointed Mr. René Degni Ségui to 
investigate the massacres.
495
 He concluded that genocide, war crimes and crimes against 
humanity have been committed in Rwanda. In response to the information he provided, the 
UNSC adopted Resolution 935(1994) of 1 July 1994 requesting the Secretary General to 
establish a Commission of Experts to review the evidence of grave violation of international 
humanitarian law in Rwanda, including possible acts of genocide.
496
 The commission presented 
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its Preliminary Report on 1 October 1994 and a Final report on 9 December 1994.
497
 It 
concluded on the nature of the crimes committed by each part in the conflict and recommended 
that the Council amend the Statute of the ICTY to ensure that its jurisdiction covered crimes 
committed in Rwanda.
498
 
 
By passing Resolution 955 (1994) of 8 November 1994, the Council alleged to be acting under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter. It was resolved to initiate criminal trials for the alleged 
perpetrators of crimes.  One would however argue that this “duty to punish rests ultimately on 
the duty to protect, that invocation of the former implicitly admits failure to discharge the 
latter.”499 The UNSC failed to discharge the duty to protect in the first instance.  
  
Having covered the factual circumstances that brought about the establishment of the ad hoc 
tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, it is now time to venture into their eventual 
legal foundations. Here again, the debate becomes wider, as some believe that establishing an 
ad hoc tribunal is not a proper function of the UNSC. Others craft legal arguments to support 
this political decision.   
 
3.4. Legal foundations for the establishment of the ICTY and ICTR: analysis of 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter 
 
Paragraph 10 of the Report of the Secretary General on Yugoslavia 
500
 sets forth the reasons 
behind the framing of the ICTY Statute. It was pursuant to the UNSC’s determination that the 
situation in the former Yugoslavia constituted a threat to international peace and security.  The 
Council believed that establishing a criminal tribunal was an effective measure to bring to 
justice the persons who were responsible for the crimes. The action would also end those 
crimes. The UNSC further stated that it was its conviction that, in the particular circumstances 
of the former Yugoslavia, the establishment of an international tribunal would contribute to the 
restoration and maintenance of peace. 
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Goldstone supports the idea that “the establishment of the Yugoslav Tribunal was the most 
appropriate way of dealing with”501 the threat to international peace and security. In the case of 
Rwanda, “justice would help and hasten the return of refugees to their former homes.”502 
Goldstone also suggests that there was “only one way to curb criminal conduct that is through 
good policing and the implementation of efficient criminal justice.”503 Prosecution exposes “the 
nature and extent of human rights violations that frequently reveals a systematic and 
institutional pattern of gross human rights violations.”504  
 
The views of Goldstone are contradicted in many respects by the approach taken by Howland 
and Calathes.
505
 According to them, and in general terms, the “creation of an international 
justice system may or may not enhance respect for human rights.”506 They find this assumption 
to be wrong and naïve.
507
 They base their extreme pessimism on the fact that many states use 
the apparatus of state power, such as courts and the justice system, to violate rather than to 
protect human rights. Their theory is what some call the conflict paradigm in law. Sometimes, 
law becomes an “euphemism for inaction.”508  “Rather than viewing law as representative, this 
perspective sees law as a tool of power holders, which they use for their own purposes, to 
maintain and control the status quo. […] law is perceived as restrictive or repressive rather than 
representative, and as an instrument of special interests.”509 Judicial institutions in some parts 
of the world also act in this way.
510
 Justice may be a casualty of political interests. In the words 
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 Howland T. & Calathes W., “The U.N.’s International Criminal Tribunal, Is it Justice or Jingoism for Rwanda? A 
Call for Transformation”, Virginia Journal of International Law, Vol. 39, 1998, pp. 135 - 155 
506
 Howland and Calathes, idem, p. 139 
507
 Idem, p. 139 
508
 Bass J. Gary, Stay the Hands of Vengeance, op. cit., p. 215 
509
 Pollock M. Jocelyn, Ethics in Crime and Justice: Dilemas and Decisions, Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, 
Pacific Grove, California, 1989, p. 56; see also Telford Taylor, The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials, Little Brown 
and Company, Boston/ New York /Toronto /London, 1992. He says that the Soviets conceive law as the servant of 
the political leadership, p. 53 
510
 In El Salvador, the Retting Commission found on 15 March 1993, that a number of civilian officials in the civil 
service and the judiciary covered up serious acts of violence, or failed to discharge their responsibilities in the 
investigation of such acts. The report of the commission attributed tremendous responsibility to the judiciary for the 
impunity with which serious acts of violence occurred. It denounced the glaring inability of the judicial system 
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of Beigbeder “national justice is often influenced by political considerations leading to both 
extremes of too harsh or too lenient sentences, or even impunity.”511 This is not absent in 
international legal setting. The reality of the ad hoc tribunals was that they were established: 
because of the United Nations, or the powerful states that control it. They were not established because of 
an intrinsic value of punishing war criminals or upholding the rule of law. Rather, the mobilization of 
shame by non-governmental organizations and especially the grisly pictures beamed to the world by the 
television camera created a public relations nightmare and made liars of the centers of Western 
civilizations.
512
  
Their establishment was a post facto substitute for an effective, timely, military intervention by 
the UNSC. In both cases, the major powers showed their incapacity or unwillingness to prevent a 
man-made disaster of which warning signals had been given by the UN, their own diplomatic 
services, and/or by international and human rights organizations – or to stop its continuation.513 
Ad hoc tribunals were “a substitute, or an alibi for the lack of a timely, forceful intervention, or 
the lack of a credible threat of intervention.”514 In attempting to justify that the ICTY was 
established legally, the report of the Secretary General reveals that there was no genuine or moral 
reason to take such an action.  Reliance was only placed on the binding force of any decision 
taken by the security council.
515
  
 
A thorough reading of Resolution 808(1993) of 22 February 1993
516
 clearly indicates that the 
concerns of the UNSC during the war period in Yugoslavia   were not about finding means and 
ways to put an end to that war, as a primary responsibility. Nowhere in the resolution does the 
Council request the parties to stop the war.
517
 The council only reminded the belligerents that, 
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direct or indirect support of state institutions, quoted from Beigbeder Yves, Judging War Criminals: The politics of 
International Justice, Palgrave, Hampshire, 1999, p. 111 
511
 Ibiden, p135 
512
 Mutua Makau, “Never Again: Questioning the Yugoslav and Rwanda Tribunals”, Temple International and 
Comparative Law Journal, Vol. 11, pp. 167 – 187, at p. 174; reprinted in Simpson Gerry (ed.), War Crimes Law, 
Vol II, Ashgate, Dartmouth, 2004, pp. 355 - 375 
513
 Beigbeder Yves, op. cit., p. 183 
514
 Id.; for a complete legal analysis of the legal foundation of the ICTY, see Rowe Peter, “War Crimes and the 
Former Yugoslavia: the legal difficulties”, Military Law and the law of war Review, Vol. 32, Iss.4, 1993, pp. 317 - 
363 
515
 Laughland observes that though “the United Nations Lawyers fully understood the constitutional implications of 
what they were when they created the ICTY and the ICTR, they decided to create these tribunals by executive fiat 
for reasons of pure political expediency”, Laughland John, A history of political trials, op. cit, p. 211 
516
 Resolution 808(1993), adopted by the Security Council at its 3175
th
 Meeting, on 22 February 1993, S/RES/808 
(1993), 22 February 1993 
517
 Compare with its demand for immediate cessation of hostilities in Rwanda in resolution 912(1994). At paragraph 
6 of the resolution the Security Council “Demands an immediate cessation of hostilities between the forces of the 
111 
 
in their fighting they were “bound to comply with the obligations under international 
humanitarian law and in particular the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949.”518 All parties 
were only requested to immediately cease all breaches of international humanitarian law. In a 
simple mathematical formula, one may say that the Security Council’s action would be 
presented as follow. “Do the war, we will not intervene. If you violate international 
humanitarian law, then we will intervene.” Who then will intervene to stop the war? Was the 
Security Council not abdicating its primary responsibility by resorting to a more sensational 
action of judicial intervention?  
 
Maogoto answers this question by arguing that “by establishing the tribunal, the Security 
Council hoped to deflect criticism for its reluctance to take more decisive action to stop the 
bloodshed in the former Yugoslavia.”519 
 
By contrast, when the conflict broke out in Rwanda in 1994, the Secretary General of the UN 
advised the Security Council in his Report of 20 April 1994
520
 that the most urgent action was a 
cease-fire.
521
 This position was also echoed by the Nigerian representative to the Security 
Council, who, furthermore, was worried that it would be impossible to raise a military force 
immediately to intervene.
522
 The Secretary General did not advise for a strong military action, 
but his concern was on the cessation of hostilities in the very first instance. The Djibouti 
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representative likewise stressed that the Rwandan case was “a situation in which the United 
Nations is perhaps the only entity capable of preserving some order and saving lives, while 
bringing about a halt to the fighting […].”523   
 
In the case of former Yugoslavia, it is therefore quite surprising that the Council did not firmly 
order the parties to stop the war. It was the war that was fuelling the violations of international 
humanitarian law. A judicial action while the war was still ravaging was unrealistic because 
there is no war that can be fought without making casualties.  “Things are never as simple as 
we would like them to be! The use of an army is never as selective as it would be wished. An 
army on active service is not a gun with sights”524, remarks Mack.  Recalling the words of 
General Sherman, a military professional, Bailey suggests that “war was hell for the boys who 
had to do the fighting. Today we would have to say that war can be an even greater hell for 
non-combatants.”525 Quoting a discussion he had in the early 1990s with a senior UK military 
lawyer, Anderson writes the gruesome phrase that “Nuremberg was a lovely hood ornament on 
the ungainly vehicle that liberated Western Europe, but it was not a substitute for D-Day.”526 
He continues by interpreting this sentence to mean that “a military victory is ‘not simply a 
practical prerequisite to a trial…but a moral necessity.”527 
 
The rhetoric that parties should observe international humanitarian law while continuing to 
fight is very disappointing.  The mandate of the Security Council is clearly enshrined in article 
1 of the UN Charter which spells out the purposes of the organisation. The first purpose is:   
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To maintain international peace and security, and to that end:  
to take effective collective measures
528
 for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the 
suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, 
and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of 
international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace 
 
Respect for human rights appears in principle 3 of the Charter, as follows:  
To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, 
or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for 
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion. 
 
There is no way to confuse by inclusion or exclusion the mandate of the UNSC. On first sight, 
the Security Council is basically and principally the world security agent’s organ, and does not 
have any legislative
529
 or judicial powers. This assertion flows from the Preamble to the 
Charter of the UN that reads that its objective is “to save succeeding generations from the 
scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind.” The 
component of human rights and justice come second and third in the hierarchy.  To this point of 
view, Österdahl notes  
as to the question of the relative importance of the goal of maintaining or restoring international peace 
and security (Article 1(1) and the goal of encouraging respect for human rights (Article 1(3) respectively, 
to the extent that the two can be separated, there is no doubt that the former was considered to be superior 
to the latter when the Charter was drafted. This concerns the UN as a whole, as well as the function of the 
Security Council more specifically. Everything seems to indicate that the balance has swung towards 
human rights, though it is difficult to say how far.
530
 
 
Bailey finds however that the Security Council may consider the issue of human rights in 
exceptional circumstances, for example when  ‘the denial of rights creates a situation in which 
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international peace and security are threatened or breached or aggression occurs, and the 
Counsel applies enforcement measures under Chapter VII of the Charter.”531 
 
An illustration of a prompt and effective intervention of the UNSC is its action in restoring 
legitimacy in Kuwait after the Iraq invasion of 2 August 1990 which “seems to have revived 
the text of the UN Charter which are pertinent to restoring international peace and security in 
their correct form under Chapter VII of the Charter.”532 The UN action in the Kuwait-Iraq crisis 
was one of a kind because of the pressure the U.S exercised to “a number of member states, 
including the ones that enjoy permanent membership in the Security Council and which control 
the process of passing its resolutions.”533 This was not only unique but it was also selective. 
This may lead to and revive the conclusion reached by the Center for Research and Studies on 
Kuwait that: 
Upholding international legitimacy in the Kuwait-Iraq case and discarding it in other cases, casts heavy 
doubt on the independence of the UNO, and transforms it into an additional diplomatic tool in the hands 
of those states that have the actual power to direct its activities in a way that serves their interests.
534
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This conclusion applies mutatis mutandis to the attitude that the Council adopted with regard to 
the establishment and work of the ad hoc tribunals. 
Coming back to Yugoslavia, when Resolution 780(1992) was adopted on 6 October 1992, Mr. 
Arria, the then representative of Venezuela to the UN, made the deliberate following statement:  
The draft resolution before us today is a specific reflection of the will and determination of the Security 
Council, as expressed in the preamble to the Charter of the United Nations, which begins, ‘We, the people 
of the [World], determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war […] and to reaffirm 
faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of 
men and women and of nations large and small.
535
  
 
This statement, which Mr. Arria shared with his peers at the UNSC, contributed, one may 
assume, to entertaining the confusion about the appropriate, effective and most urgent action by 
the Council in situations of war accompanied by violations of international humanitarian law. 
Manusama argues however that the Council’s action is an innovative step to combat “threats to 
the peace by establishing two ad hoc tribunals.”536 According to Kerr the mandate of the ICTY 
“was the restoration and maintenance of peace and security.”537  This mandate was “to be 
achieved through the prosecution of individuals for serious violations of international 
humanitarian law.”538 Kerr maintains that “there was no change in the legal framework. The 
change was in the interpretation of the powers and responsibilities of the Security Council 
under the Charter, and was a product of political will.”539 
 
When investigated more carefully however there is still a dilemma. To arrive at an answer to 
this dilemma, there is a needed to look into the concrete objectives assigned to those tribunals 
and possibly also find out whether it was most probable that those objectives could reasonably 
and genuinely justify the UNSC Council’s action in fulfilling its primary mandate. These 
objectives will have to pass the test of sincerity on the part of the UNSC as one proper, efficient 
and convenient action, among others.  
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Manusama sequenced this dilemma in three aspects. Firstly, he questions the appropriateness of 
judicial prosecution as a means of enforcement under Article 41 [of the UN Charter].  
Secondly, he interrogates the competence of the Security Council to establish judicial organs. 
Thirdly, he inquires [into] the principles and rules of international law to be applied by these 
organs.
540
 The author considers and identifies different views behind the establishment of the 
two ad hoc tribunals and concludes that the difference is more apparent.
541
  
 
A progressive reading and understanding of Resolution 808(1993) demonstrates that there were 
other options that could better justify the establishment of an international Criminal tribunal.  
Paragraph 19 of the Secretary General report provides that “the approach which, in the normal 
course of events, would be followed in establishing an international tribunal would be the 
conclusion of a treaty by which the States parties would establish a tribunal and approve its 
statute.”542 This option was bypassed because as the situation stood, such an option would 
require time, a number of ratification of a negotiated treaty and that there was no guarantee that 
necessary ratification could be attained. The Counsel than moved ahead, ignored and violated 
the principle of sovereignty of member states as a matter of principle enshrined in article 2(1) 
of the Charter. It invoked article 24 (1) of the UN Charter which provides that: 
In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security 
Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in 
carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf. 
 
In addition to the disadvantages posed by time concerns and uncertainty as to ratification of a 
treaty based tribunal, the “Secretary General believes that the International Tribunal should be 
established by a decision of the Security Council on the basis of Chapter VII of the Charter of 
the United Nations.” According to the Report of the Secretary General, the decision “would 
constitute a measure to maintain or restore international peace and security, following the 
requisite determination of the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or an act of 
aggression.”543 This is an aim of a binding action but it does not justify its foundational legality. 
Again it is pure rhetoric because Resolution 808(1993) does not establish any link between the 
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atrocities committed against the civilian population in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina that 
can be relied on to arrive at a conclusion that those violations alone constituted a threat to the 
peace, a breach of the peace or an act of aggression altogether or individually. Maogoto also 
observes again that the tribunal:  
was born out of a political desire to redeem the international community’s conscience rather than the 
primary commitment of the international community to guarantee international justice. The ICTY was not 
established because of the intrinsic value of punishing war criminals or of upholding the rule of law; 
rather, it came about as a result of the mobilization of NGO.
544
 
 
Article 39 of the United Nations Charter states that the UNSC “shall determine the existence of 
any threat to peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendation, 
or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with article 41 and 42.” The assumption 
here is that the establishment of the ICTY and ICTR may better fit in article 41 as “measures 
not involving the use of armed force to give effect to its decision.”545 This provision must be 
read together with article 29 of the Charter of the United Nations that “the Security Council 
may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its 
functions.”  
 
Therefore it is correct to say that the creation of the two ad hoc tribunals was a UNSC’s 
binding decision, not a simple recommendation. Article 41 of the Charter goes on to say that 
those measures may “include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, 
sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of 
diplomatic relations.”  
 
The word ‘may include’ obviously sets no limitation to the measures that the UNSC can rely on 
or take. “While the list of Article 41 responses is not exhaustive, establishing international 
tribunals to prosecute crimes does not automatically resonate as a method for maintaining or 
restoring peace and security under Chapter VII.”546  
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Article 41 must be read with article 42 as they are complementary.  The latter provision comes 
into play “should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would 
be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate […].” In fact, article 42 of the Charter is a 
prelude to the use of force. Properly construed, articles 39 through 45 are resorted to in a 
grading
547
 manner taking into account the evolution of the situation on the ground.   
 
The establishment of ad hoc criminal tribunals in this regard derived from the implied 
powers
548
 of the Security Council. However, it poses some conceptual problems if attention is 
given to the broad understanding of article 41 of the Charter.  When closely analysed, this 
provision relates to a sort of isolation of a state which may be engaged in hostilities bringing 
about a threat to peace, a breach of peace or an act of aggression, and it must be read in context.  
 
3.4.1. The Security Council’s misconception of appropriate actions by establishing ad hoc 
international criminal tribunals 
 
The UNSC decision of establishing ad hoc tribunals in the belief that, by apprehending some 
perpetrators could contribute to the restoration and maintenance of peace was inappropriate and 
misplaced in the particular circumstances of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. According to 
Fatic the establishment of ICTY was driven by a dual motive.
549
 There was a desire to deter 
further killing and torture, along with putting a lid on the conquering aspirations of the sides in 
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conflict.
550
 The tribunal was to respond to a frustration brought by the “inability of international 
players to contain the war in the former Yugoslavia, and a corresponding desire to restore trust 
in the international community.”551 Yet, despite the existence of the tribunal, none of those 
aspirations was fulfilled. The killing continued and in fact, “some of the worst atrocities 
occurred between the establishment of the tribunal in 1993 and the conclusion of the Dayton 
Peace Accords in 1995.”552 Having realised that the establishment of the ICTY did not bring a 
halt to the atrocities, the UNSC undertook no further actions to stop them. The reality is that the 
UNSC’s effort to bring about an end to gross human rights abuses in the former Yugoslavia 
have been rhetorical rather than real
553
, to concur with Laber and Nizich. This desperation 
transpires also in the case of Rwanda.  
 
3.4.2. The UNSC neglected the war in Rwanda  
 
The Rwandan situation presented two aspects. There was a war between two belligerents. That 
war facilitated the commission of the violations of international humanitarian law. The solution 
brought about by the establishment of an international criminal tribunal for Rwanda was 
inadequate to equally respond to both concerns. The establishment of the tribunal responded to 
the second leg of the problem but neglected the first leg, which, in many respects, was the real 
cause that needed to be addressed as a matter of urgency.
554
 
 
The UNSC’s action here seems to be a “cheap alternative”555 to its failures to adequately and 
timely address the problem that the Rwandan crisis posed at that particular time. The conflict 
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was an invasion of Rwanda from October 1990 that constituted a violation of peace and which 
was not justified by objective criteria (jus ad bellum). Though making war is not a war crime as 
such, “waging an aggressive war is certainly recognized as a crime by international law.”556 
War has always been considered as “the most serious violations of international law […] the 
pillar of the UN Charter.”557 It must be addressed as such. Moreover, all violations of 
international humanitarian law committed in war must be dealt with at the appropriate time. 
Anderson suggests that “international criminal law focuses on criminal liability of individuals. 
War crimes, we say and following the teaching of Nuremberg, are committed by individuals. 
Wars, however, are fought between political communities and groups.”558 More generally, 
Anderson raises an issue which is often overlooked when the focus is only directed to 
individual responsibility and not to the effects of war as such. He argues that: 
[…] the attention focused by international criminal law on individual criminal liability has the unintended 
consequence of reducing attention to the rest of the laws of war – the corpus of the laws of war not 
devoted to liability at all, let alone criminal liability for individuals. Indeed, to those of us who came to 
the laws of armed conflict not from a background in criminal law, the gradual emergence of international 
criminal law seems a little bit as though the individual penal liability aspects of the law have swallowed 
the laws of war whole.
559
 
 
The UNSC had all the powers to address the war in Rwanda. Focusing attention on individual 
criminal liability as the mechanism of enforcement, “risks losing the connection to legitimacy 
upon which the law of armed conflict, and adherence to it, perhaps mostly rests.”560 This does 
not mean that individuals alleged to be responsible for crimes will remain unpunished. Yet, 
punishing individuals should not be the priority. Properly and timely addressing the war in 
Rwanda could have eliminated the threat to peace and security. It could have saved lives. The 
inadequate solution adopted or the inaction facilitated the outbreak of violence in the form of 
serious violations of international humanitarian law.  The UN as a whole and the UNSC in 
particular were aware of this situation.  The armed conflict was fueling violence that did not 
exist before. There was no active violation of international humanitarian law. A clear 
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distinction at this stage could have been made between actions that violated peace and security 
in the region and actions that violated humanitarian law in Rwanda.  
 
The UNSC is empowered under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to investigate any “dispute, or 
any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to 
determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the 
maintenance of international peace and security.”561 This is its primary responsibility at least 
when the council is aware of a breach of peace or a threat thereof. It may be argued that this 
responsibility arises when two or more states engage in a situation that likely leads to dispute. 
For instance the UN in general and the UNSC in particular was aware of a breach of peace in 
Rwanda.
562
 They were aware of a misunderstanding between Rwanda and Uganda as far as 
their common border was concerned.
563
 In this regard, the UN deployed in June 1993 a mission 
“intended to monitor the border between Uganda and Rwanda in order to verify that no military 
supplies were being transported across it.”564 However, it is unclear what was done with the 
findings of this mission or if any findings were obtained. 
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The resolutions adopted by the Council during this period also indicate that it knew about the 
war but chose to do nothing to stop it. In resolution 812(1993), the UNSC was “gravely 
concerned by the fighting in Rwanda and its consequences regarding international peace and 
security.” It called “upon the Government of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front to 
respect the cease-fire which took effect on 9 March 1993[…].”565 At the same time the Council 
invited the Secretary General  
to examine in consultation with the Organization of African Unity the contribution that the United 
Nations could bring to strengthen the peace process in Rwanda, in support of the efforts of the 
Organization of African Unity, in particular through the possible establishment, under the aegis of the 
Organizations of African Unity and the United Nations, of an international force entrusted, inter alia, 
with humanitarian assistance and the protection of the civilian population and support of the Organization 
of African unity force for the monitoring of the cease-fire, and to report to the Council most urgently on 
the matter.
566
 
 
The Secretary General of the African Unity regretted that the SC remained idle to his call.
567
 In 
his proper terms, “the Security Council did not prescribe a time frame for implementing the 
resolution. It rather confined the matter to our two organizations to consult upon and see how 
best we can advance the cause of peace in Rwanda.”568 This was reiterated in resolution 
846(1993) in which the UNSC referred to the adverse consequences the fighting could have on 
international peace and security.
569
 The rhetoric of the UNSC continued when violence had 
already erupted in Rwanda. In resolution 918(1994), the council “strongly condemned the 
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ongoing violence in Rwanda, and in particular the very numerous killings of civilians which 
have taken place in Rwanda and the impunity with which armed individuals have been able to 
operate and continue to operating therein.”570 One may only concur with Yarwood who 
suggests that:  
regardless of the intention in its undertaking, an ex post facto international intervention [as was the 
establishment of the ad hoc tribunals] will fail to compensate for the consequences of delay and the 
degree to which the deficit in assistance facilitated or acquiesced in the crimes. Distrust, due to the 
perceived hypocrisy in a subsequent but paternalistic determination of the justice process, may even pre-
empty its success from the outset.
571
 
 
The Security Council should review its intervention strategies and priorities to ensure 
effectiveness and consistency. 
 
3.4.3. Toward an easy but ineffective approach to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia 
and Rwanda 
 
In both Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, the conflict was ravaging and there was also a 
massive violation of international humanitarian law. Much emphasis was placed on violations 
of international humanitarian law and the issue of war was set aside or diluted while one would 
expect that both aspects be addressed altogether.  In fact, the ICTY “had been set up as a 
substitute, an alternative, to the kind of tough political action which would put an end to the 
ethnic cleansing that was taking place and the horrors that were being perpetrated by the Serbs. 
It wasn’t serious.”572 
 
While the UNSC was of the view that the cease-fire was a precondition to halt atrocities, it did 
nothing to persuade or force the RPF to cease the hostilities in Rwanda. In the former 
Yugoslavia, there was no determined action by the Counsel aimed at ending the war as well. 
Major Smidt, a military expert and legal scholar puts this argument right in the following: 
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In reality, both the law enforcement and the military responses add to the concept of system-wide 
deterrence. However, each modality plays a distinct role, and neither should be permitted to negatively 
impact the other. […] the present theory, which assumes that the answers for world peace derive 
primarily from judicial sources, is being overemphasized to the detriment of the potential ability, and 
occasional requirement, to use military force. First, over-reliance on justice ignores the obvious fact that 
potential victims are best served if they are not allowed to become victims in the first place. Courts may 
be effective in handling situations after the facts, but until they possess the deterrent capabilities needed 
to control rogue regimes, they should not be permitted to displace or weaken the military option. Second, 
if a court lacks the ability to actually enforce its pronouncements, rogue regimes will simply ignore the 
court and will not be deterred.
573
 
 
In resolution 918(1994) for example, the Council expressed “deep disturbance at the magnitude 
of the human suffering caused by the conflict.”574 The Council eventually imposed an arm 
embargo on the Government of Rwanda.
575
 But again, it was a short view in imposing 
sanctions to one belligerent perpetrator and not to the other as well.  This would mean that what 
has now become most urgent was the scale of the massacres not the war that was igniting them. 
The Council also determined that “the situation in Rwanda constitutes a threat to peace and 
security in the region.”576 
 
Any action at this stage could have showed where the intervention of the UNSC was most 
appropriate.  Orakhelashvili argues that “according to the widespread doctrinal approach, the 
concept of a threat to the peace is subjective and depends on discretionary determinations of the 
Security Council.”577 Yet, he concludes: 
The process of determining threats to the peace and ensuring measures of response includes some 
logically indispensable elements. Even if the Council possesses discretion in determinations under Article 
39 in using such discretion, it must clearly identify a threat to the peace in its resolution as an objective 
fact. If that fact is targeted with enforcement measures, the Council has to demonstrate that it is of 
sufficient gravity and the use of enforcement powers to tackle it is both necessary and adequate. In 
deciding on the measures to be applied in response to the identified threat, the Council should direct the 
measures to eliminate this threat in the objective sense. In other words, the measures applied by the 
Council should be directed to eliminate or reduce the identified threat, they should be logically required 
for countering the identified threat and be proportional.
578
  
 
It is therefore correct to say that rather than taking a military action to stop the war, the UNSC 
ordered the UNAMIR to keep “the force firmly based on traditional peacekeeping methods. 
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Even in the face of direct attacks on UN personnel and the systematic killing of Rwandan 
civilians, the members of the UNSC were initially unwilling to authorize the use of force under 
Chapter VII to counter the violence.”579  
 
A firm threat to use force under Chapter VII of the Charter could eventually have prevented the 
tragedy in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. Such action was provided for in Resolution 
812(1993), particularly where it refers to the protection of the civilian population by the 
international force which was present when the massacre began in April 1994 in Rwanda.  
“Though the chaos in Rwanda began on the 7th April [1994], the UNSC did not take action in 
response to the situation until 20 April [1994]. Immediate international efforts were focused on 
the evacuation of expatriates from Kigali.”580 The UNSC did not even attempt to lobby the use 
of the various international forces that came for the evacuation of foreign nationals to restore 
peace and secure the civilian population of Rwanda.
581
 The UN Secretariat and the SC were 
fully aware of the magnitude and scale of war and violence and adopted a quite surprising 
attitude.
582
 
 
This seems to be a selective legendary, but regrettable UNSC approach in conflict situations. It 
is not a legal issue here. In the case of Somalia, for illustration: 
When the civil war swept into Mogadishu in December 1990 – January 1991, the United Nations closed 
its offices in Somalia and, along with most diplomatic missions and international organizations, 
evacuated its personnel from the country. The office in Mogadishu was closed again in November 1991 
when fighting broke out in the city between the rival factions of the USC.
583
  
 
Yet there is no international criminal tribunal created for Somalia despite the violations 
committed during the conflict. In the Balkans, however: 
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most observers believe that the Security Council could have put an early halt to the Balkan conflict, but 
that at the time the members of the council lacked the political will to take the necessary measures, such 
as committing troops to a combat situation. Some commentators even argue that the war could have been 
avoided had the international community committed to recognizing the Yugoslav republics and the 
dissolution in the summer of 1991 and thereby a clear signal that the use of force to maintain Yugoslavia 
would be unacceptable.
584
  
 
In Cambodia “the deteriorating security situation and the continuing refusal of the PDK to 
participate in the demobilization of forces made it necessary to redeploy UNTAC’s military 
component.”585Although UNITAC comprised 15,500 troops586 compared to UNAMIR’s 2,500 
or so, if the same political will had prevailed, the tragedy in Rwanda could have been avoided. 
Likewise in the former Yugoslavia, the UNSC was “unwilling to take strong military action to 
control the bitter conflict then tearing Bosnia apart.”587 Laber and Nizich remark that in the 
former Yugoslavia “inter-ethnic conflict was the result of the war, not its cause.”588 So the most 
urgent issue was to stop the war with a strong and determined military action. In White’s 
opinion, “military enforcement has the purpose of coercing a resisting state or party to accept 
UN policy.”589 Smidt concurs that military action “remains the most credible and effective form 
of deterrence in the international arsenal of weapons to prevent war and massive human rights 
abuses.”590 This does not mean that crimes committed must go unpunished, but it is a matter of 
priority and effectiveness. Unfortunately, the United Nations, particularly the SC was unable to 
act effectively and contented instead to utter pious words.
591
 Anderson finds that the UNSC 
lacks such a moral stand.
592
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The following case study will demonstrate how lawyers understand the action of the Security 
Council. It is however regrettable that the ICTR and ICTY Chambers aligned their actions to 
that of the UNSC and avoided invading its province. Yet the legal arguments the judges 
advanced are not convincing, neither are they conclusive. 
 
3.5. Case study questioning the jurisdiction of the tribunals based on their creation 
by the UNSC: ICTR’ Tadic and Milosevic; and ICTR Kanyabashi, Nzirorera et al.   
 
3.5.1. Tadic challenge on the illegal establishment of the ICTY 
 
Dusko Tadic is a Bosnian Serb who was the first indictee of the ICTY. In a preliminary 
motion
593
, he challenged the jurisdiction of the ICTY based, among others, on its establishment 
by the UNSC. His argument was that the establishment of the tribunal by the Security Council 
was unlawful.
594
 Because the decision of the Trial Chamber has been appealed against by the 
defendant, reliance will be had on the decision of the Appeals Chamber. It set a precedent for 
subsequent challenges on jurisdiction before the ICTY and the ICTR. 
 
In adjudicating the point raised, the Appeals Chamber first assessed its own competence before 
assessing the lawfulness of the Security Council’s actions. Having passed the test, the Appeals 
Chamber “found that the Security Council’s decision to establish the Tribunal was a legitimate 
measure aimed at the restoration of peace and security authorized under the United Nations 
Charter.”595The Appeals Chamber based its finding on Articles 25, 29, 39 and 41 of the UN 
Charter.  
 
3.5.2. Milosevic preliminary motion on jurisdiction 
 
Slobodan Milosevic also challenged the legitimacy of the ICTY. He contended that the tribunal 
should have been established by the UN General Assembly and not by the Security Council. On 
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this contention, “the Trial Chamber ruled that although its creation was without precedent, it 
was a valid product of the SC in the exercise of its broader powers to maintain international 
peace and security.”596 Milosevic, through his counsel, also submitted that the court needed an 
advisory opinion on its legitimacy from the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Likewise, this 
contention was rejected by the ICTY on the grounds that the tribunal had no power to seek such 
an advisory opinion and that the matter may be better settled by the SC or the General 
Assembly. It is also a fact that in another unrelated issue the ICJ has endorsed the legitimacy of 
the ICTY.
597
 
 
3.5.3. Kanyabashi objections on the legal foundations of the ICTR 
 
Kanyabashi was a mayor in Rwanda indicted by the ICTR. In a preliminary motion contesting 
the jurisdiction of the ICTR, Kanyabashi raised a number of objections.  Among them, the main 
was that “the Security Council lacked competence to establish an ad hoc tribunal under Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter.”598This objection, on its own comprised five meritorious sub-
objections.
599
 The first sub-objection was that “the conflict in Rwanda did not pose any threat 
to international peace and security.”600 The Trial Chamber decided that the question of whether 
a threat to international peace and security exists is a matter to be decided exclusively by the 
UNSC. The Chamber argued further that: “in Congo, Somalia and Liberia, the Security Council 
has established that such a sudden migration of refugees across the border to neighboring 
countries and extension or diffusion of an internal armed conflict into foreign territory may 
constitute a threat to international peace and security.”601  
 
The second sub-objection was that “there was no international conflict to warrant any action by 
the UN Security Council.”602 The Trial Chamber replied that:  
the decisive pre-requisite for the UN Security Council’s prerogative under Article 39 and 41 of the UN 
Charter is not whether there exists an international conflict, but whether the conflict at hands entails a 
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threat to international peace and security. Internal conflict, too, may well have international implications 
which can justify Security Council action.
603
 
 
The third sub-objection reflects that the UNSC could not act within Chapter VII as international 
peace and security had already been re-established by the time it decided to create the ICTR.
604
 
The Trial Chamber’s response was that, this again, was something within the exclusive domain 
of the UNSC. Particularly to note, is the Chamber’s ruling that:  
The Trial Chamber observes, once again, that this argument entails a finding of fact based on evidence 
and that in any case, the question of whether or not the Security Council was justified in taking actions 
under Chapter VII when it did, is a matter to be determined by the Security Council itself.
605
  
 
The Chamber added that just because atrocities have ceased, it does not mean that international 
peace and security have been restored, “because peace and security cannot be said to be re-
established adequately without justice being done.”606 
 
The fourth sub-objection was that the establishment of an ad hoc tribunal was never a measure 
contemplated by Article 41 of the UN Charter.
607
 The Trial Chamber ruled that while it was not 
expressly mentioned in the actions mentioned in Article 41 of the Charter, the establishment of 
such tribunals’ falls within the ambit of measures to satisfy the goal of restoration and 
maintenance of peace. Moreover, the list of Article 41 was not limited. 
 
The last contention by the defense was that the UNSC had no authority to deal with human 
rights.
608
 The Chamber ruled that though there existed specialised institutions to deal with 
human rights, this did not preclude the UNSC to also get involved, nor did it exclude any other 
UN organs. 
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3.5.4. Nzirorera et al. case 
 
In Nzirorera et al.
609
, the defence submitted that the ICTR lacked jurisdiction in 2004 to bring 
new charges relating to the events that took place in Rwanda in 1994.
610
 The defence contended 
that the powers of the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter apply only to 
situations constituting a threat to peace, breach of the peace or acts of aggression and are 
limited to measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.
611
 The defense 
requested the Trial Chamber to dismiss new charges contained in the amended indictment.
612
 
The defence further suggested that to prosecute persons responsible for crimes committed in 
Rwanda in 1994 was no longer necessary, since there was  no threat to the peace in that 
country.
613
 In its reply, the Prosecution contended among other arguments, that it is not for the 
Chamber but for the Security Council to determine whether in 2004, there exists a threat to 
peace, a breach of the peace, or act of aggression.
614
 The prosecution also added the argument 
that the cessation of atrocities does not necessarily imply that peace had been restored, since 
peace and security imply that justice has been done.
615
 
 
The chamber, after recalling how resolution 955(1994) of 8 November 1994 was arrived at, 
ruled that “the organ which determined the existence of the threats to the peace has exclusive 
power to decide, still pursuant to Chapter VII, if and when the measures taken in 1994 – 
without stating when such measures would no longer be in force, insofar as their outcome is 
unpredictable, will have attained the set goals, namely to restore and ensure the stability 
necessary for the maintenance of such peace.”616  
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Lastly, the Chamber ruled that it was “in the exercise of its absolute jurisdiction that [it] 
granted the Prosecutor leave to amend the indictment in February 2004[…].”617 On 13 and 16 
May 2005, the Defence for Joseph Nzirora, joined by that of Mathieu Ngirumpatse filed a 
“renewed motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction: United Nations Charter, Chapter VII 
Powers” under Rule 73 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICTR. The defence 
teams challenged “the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to bring and confirm new charges against the 
accused, as well as the continued exercise of criminal jurisdiction over crimes committed in 
1994, because there is no longer a ‘threat to peace’ that continues to exist in Rwanda.”618 The 
defence contended also that “Chapter VII measures must be proportionate in relation to the 
threat of peace concerned and must stop when the threat has ended.”619  
 
Before ruling on the motion, again the Trial Chamber referred to reports and documents that 
were used by the UNSC to establish the Tribunal. The Chamber decided that “the functions and 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal are not related to the continued existence of a threat to international 
peace and security in Rwanda.”620 On the proportionality of measures under Chapter VII, the 
Chamber adopted the reasoning and findings in the decisions in Tadic and Kanyabashi
621
 and 
dismissed the motion.  
 
Though the Chamber did not refer to any paragraph(s) of the decision in Tadic, one may easily 
believe that it was a confirmation that the tribunal was legally established by the UNSC under 
its power pursuant to Article 41 of the Charter. In regard to the decision in Kanyabashi, it is 
also apparent that the Chamber was referring to paragraph 26 of the Kanyabashi decision. This 
paragraph sits on two major ideas. The first idea being that it is up to the UNSC to determine 
when there is a threat to peace and security and when such a threat ends. The second idea is that 
peace could not be said to have been restored until justice is done. 
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It is quite clear that the Chamber was very cautious in not touching on a domain reserved to the 
UNSC. Namely, the Chamber avoided ruling on whether peace and security had been re-
established in Rwanda. The Chamber only followed the UNSC‘s decision as it was on 8 
November 1994. The Chamber further said that its functions and jurisdiction were not related 
to the continued existence of a threat to international peace and security in Rwanda.  
This statement poses problems if it is read together with paragraph 28 of the Secretary 
General’s Report622 on the establishment of the ICTY. This paragraph provides that “the life-
span of the international tribunal would be linked to the restoration and maintenance of 
international peace and security in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, and Security Council 
decisions related thereto.”623 The decision of the Trial Chamber lacks objectivity and sincerity. 
The reality is that peace and security were restored in the former Yugoslavia after the 
declaration of independence of the Republics, who were previously members of the SFRY. 
Rwanda was also at peace since the RPF assumed power in July 1994.  
  
3.5.5. Assessment on the merit of the Chambers’ ruling on jurisdiction 
 
The Appeals Chamber decision in Tadic may be characterized as a petitio principi.  The judges 
undertook to legally find reasons that could justify the existence of the tribunal, its jurisdictions 
and the continuation of its work. It may further be suggested that the decision was aimed at not 
embarrassing the powerful UN organ.  In Milosevic case the ICTY acknowledged that 
establishing a criminal tribunal was not expressly provided for in the UN Charter. However, the 
Chamber made a wide interpretation of what the mandate of the UNSC could be, including 
establishing an international criminal tribunal for the purpose of discharging its mandate of 
maintaining international peace and security.   
 
The preliminary contentious issue in Kanyabashi was the introduction of facts that were not 
pleaded by either the Prosecution or the Defense. The issue of refugees’ influx in neighboring 
countries was brought in without apparent basis. There were no contentions that the influxes of 
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Rwandan refugees, let alone in other referred to situations, constituted a threat to international 
peace and security. This argument tended to justify why the UNSC determined that there was a 
threat to peace in the region.  Even in the cited cases of Congo, Somalia and Liberia, the UNSC 
had established that the influxes of refugees may constitute a threat to international peace and 
security. It did not establish whether it actually did in those three referenced cases. It is true that 
the Council relied on the report of the Special Rapporteur on Rwanda of the United Nations 
Commission for Human Rights (S/1994/1157) and on the Preliminary Report on violation of 
international humanitarian law in Rwanda transmitted by the Secretary General in his letter of 
1 October 1994 (S/1994/1125). But none of these two reports refer to “refugees” in 
neighbouring states or to the eventual insecurity they might have caused.  
 
There was no allegation that the crimes falling in the tribunal’s mandate were being committed 
in the refugees’ camps:  
The report of the UN Secretary General of November 18, 1994, expressed concerns at the plight of the 
millions of Rwandan Refugees and displaced persons and deplored the continuing acts of intimidation 
and violence within the refugees’ camps, which were designed to prevent the refugee population there 
from returning to Rwanda.
624
 
 
The decision of the Chamber was quite surprising because there was no “finding of fact” as it 
suggested, warranting a determination that there was a threat to international peace and security 
demanding the establishment of the Tribunal. At the UN Headquarters the contrary position 
was that:  
as a practical matter and quite apart from the question of whether the establishment of a Tribunal by 
means of a Chapter VII resolution was the most appropriate mode of establishing an international 
jurisdiction, at issue was whether in the circumstances of Rwanda, there were any other viable 
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alternatives which could offer an expeditious mode of establishment and powers to enforce compliance. 
The answer clearly was no.
625
  
 
This was echoing the report of the Secretary General that:  
The establishment of the International Tribunal under Chapter VII, notwithstanding the request received 
from the Government of Rwanda, was necessary to ensure not only the cooperation of Rwanda 
throughout the life-span of the Tribunal, but the cooperation of all States in whose territory persons 
alleged to have committed serious violations of international humanitarian law and acts of genocide in 
Rwanda might be situated. A Tribunal based on a Chapter VII resolution was also necessary to ensure a 
speedy and expeditious method of establishing the Tribunal.
626
 
 
It is clear that sometimes judges declined, without giving reasons, to intervene in very sensitive 
matters like the one in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia to avoid confronting powerful 
individuals’ decisions whether those decisions were legally justified or not.  The judges may 
also wish to not get very involved in highly complex political matters. This suggestion 
transpires quite clearly in the Nzirorera et al. case in which the Chamber failed to acknowledge 
that in 2004 peace had been restored in Rwanda, and that an amendment of the indictment was 
not warranted.  The judicial intervention however is seen, and obviously must be, one of the 
solutions to at least some of the problems it is seized with. 
 
Another point to emphasise is that whereas the UNSC established the ICTY in 1993 and the 
ICTR a year later, it did not expressly explain the legal basis upon which it did so.  In most 
instances, the Security Council generally refrains from specifying the exact legal basis for its 
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actions
627
 because the determination that a situation constitutes a threat to international peace 
and security seems to be enough grounding for adopting enforcing measures under Chapter VII. 
 
In the report of the Secretary General establishing the ICTY
628
, he explained the reasons why 
traditional modes of establishing institutions of the tribunal’s caliber were not considered at the 
appropriate time. The Secretary General was of the view that in the normal course of events, 
the conclusion of a treaty would be the approach to follow. In the case of the ICTR, in addition 
to the precedent set by the establishment of the ICTY, the expressed request of the Republic of 
Rwanda was added.
629
Yet, the question of legality was not resolved. 
 
As a matter of fact, it is self-evident that were the Security Council willing to rely on Article 41 
of the Charter as a means of enforcement, not involving the use of force, this could have 
transpired in the Secretary General’s Report. As a more detailed instrument for the 
understanding of all legal tenets aimed at establishing the ICTY, the Report could not have 
missed such an opportunity. Moreover, delegates at the Security Council could not have 
emphasised strong concerns about the legal difficulties that the resolutions raised.  
 
In fact, there are no clauses in the UN Charter providing for the establishment of an 
international criminal tribunal. In the words of Emeritus Distinguished Professor of 
International Law, Rubin, “nothing in the Charter gives the Security Council the authority to 
erect a tribunal at all.”630 Establishing such tribunals was, in the opinion of Anderson, “a policy 
alternative to direct intervention – so that an intended consequence (for some, anyway) of this 
                                                          
627
 Schweigman D., The authority of the Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter…, op. cit.,  p. 111 
628
 Ibiden 
629
 Desforges argues that the fact that the ICTYalready existed made a very easy route for the Security Council, and 
they adopted exactly the same procedures as the ICTY”, Desforges Alison, Remarks at the Berkeley Human Rights 
Center Conference Justice in the Balance: Military Commissions and International Criminal Tribunals (Mar. 16, 
2002), http://www.hrwberkeley.org/download/justice_alisondesforges.pdf, accessed on 21 december  2005), cited in 
Bingham Laura, Strategy or Process? Closing the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda, Berkeley Journal of International Law, Vol. 24, No. 2, pp. 687 – 717, p. 694 
630
 Rubin P. Alfred, Milosevic on Trial”, International Journal for the Semiotics of Law, Vol. 19, Iss.4, 2006, pp. 
347 – 354, pp. 350 - 351 
136 
 
new activity was to reduce the pressure to intervene.”631 It is therefore modest and humble to 
say that the establishment of ad hoc tribunals was a sui generis and exceptional undertaking. As 
such, it falls out of the ambit of Chapter VII, particularly of Article 41 of the Charter. Mr. 
Barnuevo, who represented Spain at the time, clearly indicated the rationale of the UNSC 
decision. He stated:  
We understand that some harbour certain doubts about the competence of the Council to take this step, 
for it is a novel one. However, we do not share these doubts. We understand that this is a limited and 
precise action with the clear objective of restoring peace, which is perfectly in keeping with the 
competence of the Council.
632
 
Were there any specific and precise provision in the Charter, these legal difficulties could not 
have been raised. It is obvious that the representatives at the UNSC debates could not ignore 
that the Charter comprises provisions that allow the Council to set up ad hoc tribunals. In fact 
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the reasons provided in the Secretary General Report are aimed at explaining the ad hoc 
nature
633
 of the tribunals in the absence of clear provisions to that effect.  
 
Zolo argues more generally that: 
the United Nations Charter does not – indeed, cannot – endow the Security Council with the power to set 
up an ad hoc judicial body for the defence of human rights. The ad hoc nature of a criminal court and the 
retroactive character of its sanctions contradict the doctrine of the rights of man and the rule of law. These 
doctrines call first and foremost for respect of the principle nullum crimen sine lege. They prescribe that 
all individuals shall be subjected to the jurisdiction of ordinary courts, according to the rule of the legal 
predetermination of jurisdictional competence.
634
 
 
As has already been shown, the UNSC’s legal bases for establishing the tribunals were very 
problematic. Currently, moreover, there is no consistent practice suggesting that this is a settled 
law. Were it the case, states could not have met to negotiate the Rome Statute of the ICC. It 
also needs to be recalled that most of the representatives at the UNSC frequently referred to the 
treaty mode as the only appropriate, effective and viable recourse to establish an international 
criminal tribunal. No one may forget that Tadic and Kanyabashi were decided at a time when 
the tribunals were battling for their survival
635
, or at least when they were struggling to find 
work.  
 
Where some legalistic arguments facilitated the advancement of the work of the tribunals, such 
arguments were raised. But where they complicated the matter, the tribunals ruled that judges 
did not have power to assess the decision of the Security Council. The judges alleged that such 
decisions were based on political considerations which, by their very nature, are not justiciable.  
This is completely laughable that international judges consider that some issues are not 
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justiciable. The judges’ action is a simple loyalty to the decision of the UNSC; one that puts 
their independence in jeopardy. The judges’ concerns should have gone beyond the concerns of 
the UNSC. In this respect, Reeves argues that “even where the institutional arrangements of a 
polity do warrant deference from judges concerning some matters, a judge must still determine 
whether the regulating institution acted within the scope of its legitimate authority.”636 
 
In Kanyabashi, the Chamber went even further and acted ulta vires. It supported its decision by 
bringing matters of facts which were not at issue and which were neither raised by the defence 
nor by the prosecution (like the influx of refugees, them being armed and some related to 
populations where they took refuge). While a court of law always provides factual findings, it 
only does so at looking to the facts before it as tendered in evidence by the parties. The court, 
cannot, on its own, bring new facts and provide findings regarding them. The parties did not 
have an opportunity to challenge the Chamber on its invocation of the influx of refugees, and 
there was no way that this matter alone could have been appealed against.  
 
It is therefore fair to disagree with Schabas who suggests that because the decision in 
Kanyabashi has not been appealed against,
637
 that the General Assembly backed the tribunal or 
that the Rome Statute recognised the referral role of the Security Council that the UNSC is 
legally and legitimately empowered to establish “international tribunals.”638 Surely, Schabas 
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has learned and may be preaching that “necessarily, every legal system which is in force 
anywhere [...] either claims that it possesses legitimate authority or is held to possess it, or both. 
In other words, a claim – rather than the reality – of legitimate authority is necessarily a part of 
the social practice of law.”639 It will therefore be very simplistic to say that the question is 
beyond doubt as Schabas suggests. In his opinion “it seems now to be beyond any doubt that 
the Security Council is empowered to establish an international criminal tribunal.”640 It is 
candid to suggest, as Rabkin did, that “each tribunal risks becoming a precedent to the next”641 
because of frequent inconsistencies in the actions of the Security Council and of the respective 
tribunals.
642
  
 
3.6. Summary  
 
This chapter has highlighted the armed conflicts that took place in the former Yugoslavia and 
caused the breakdown of the federation in independent States. The wars were accompanied by 
serious violations of international humanitarian law. In Rwanda likewise, a war was initiated 
from Uganda in October 1990. It brought about crimes of unimaginable cruelty, culminating in 
the 1994 genocide. Whether in the former Yugoslavia or Rwanda, the crimes committed were a 
result of the war, not its causes. The UNSC was aware of the magnitude of the war and the 
human sufferings, destruction of properties and all other damages that came with any armed 
conflict.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
something that confirms the interpretation by which criminal prosecution belongs within the scope of 
Chapter VII. 
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The UNSC did not address those wars in a resolute manner aimed at halting them, and by the 
same token it did not address their effects and consequences. By establishing the ad hoc 
tribunals, the UNSC imposed an easy way, yet the least effective to maintain and restore 
international peace and security. The establishment of ad hoc tribunals lacked genuineness and 
sincerity. The establishment of ad hoc tribunals could not be read in Article 41 of the United 
Nations Charter. The cases studied attempted to challenge the power of the UNSC to establish 
judicial institutions. The scholarship and judicial rulings that support that the UNSC is 
empowered to set up criminal tribunals under Chapter VII of the UN Charter as an enforcement 
measure are not convincing or conclusive. Treaty based tribunals, like the ICC enjoy, at least, 
more legality and legitimacy. The UNSC should revisit its mandate and mission of maintaining 
international peace and security and adopt proper, effective and efficient mechanisms to respond 
to a situation that requires immediate action. Judicial institutions cannot respond to the urgency 
that war situations necessitate. The judicial route is ineffective, and becomes very weak if it is 
frustrated by political calculations. 
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CHAPTER 4: OBJECTIVES OF THE AD HOC INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS  
 
 
4.1. Introduction  
 
The objectives of the ad hoc tribunals appear in the constitutive UNSC resolutions. For the 
ICTY it is Resolution 827(1993) of 25 May 1993 which stipulates that the Council was 
determined to put an end to the crimes, take effective measures to bring perpetrators to justice, 
and end the impunity that prevailed thereby contributing to the restoration and maintenance of 
peace.
643
 Council’s Resolution 955(1994) of 8 November 1994 pertaining to Rwanda is 
similarly worded but adds that the prosecution of genocide and other violations of international 
humanitarian law “would contribute to the process of national reconciliation.”644  
 
To be consistent and effective in their work, as Scully argues, the goals and purposes which 
underlie international tribunals ground the understanding of a tribunal’s success or failure.645 
Therefore, those tribunals should only consider objectives that are achievable and normal 
functions of a criminal tribunal irrespective of the expectations of the mother body. In the case 
under consideration, it is the UNSC. There is also a need to understand which objectives may 
call for the UNSC’s action and meet or contribute to its mandate of maintaining international 
peace and security. In addition to the lack of clear definitions, the objectives assigned to ad hoc 
tribunals were unnecessarily overabundant. Such overabundance, according to Scully, may 
undermine the tribunals’ broader attempt to address violations of international humanitarian 
law.
646
 For example, “terms like ‘justice’, ‘effective redress’, and ‘ending impunity’ – though 
popular rhetorical devices – are too vague to guide the appropriate selection of institutions of 
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accountability.”647 Reisman concurs with the idea of clarifying goals when particularly “our 
passions are engaged, as indeed they should be, upon encountering atrocities such as those of 
Rwanda.”648 Shany649 groups the goals of international prosecution into four categories. The 
first category is punishment, deterrence, and crime prevention to end impunity.
650
 The second 
category consists of political goals such as the promotion of peace, stability and 
reconciliation.
651
 Conveying a message of international condemnation as a symbolic goal 
652
 
makes the third category, while the fourth is about “developing international criminal law and 
other branches of international law.”653 Shany also highlights “some additional goals, which 
influence the operations of the ICTs, such as offering a role model for local courts, encouraging 
capacity building at the national level, encouraging local trials, and developing a long-term 
legacy.”654 The list is already too long for a criminal court to operate effectively. Can a criminal 
tribunal follow Shany’s categorisation and still be effective? The answer will flow from the 
analysis of the objectives assigned to the ad hoc tribunals.  
 
The UN as a system is built on a legal order, which strives to achieve justice, among other 
values. Justice is not only a legal aspiration, but it is also a moral one. Law and justice go hand 
in hand. However, justice remains superior to law; that is in fact why the Council believed that 
it was appropriate to bring perpetrators to the might of justice. A proper understanding of the 
meaning of “justice” is therefore warranted as will be the other key objectives that were 
expected to be achieved by the ad hoc tribunals. 
 
                                                          
647
 Ibiden, p. 1960 
648
 Reisman W. Michael, Institutions and Practices and Maintaining Public order, 6 Duke J. Comp. & INT’L. L. 
175(1995), cited in Smidt  L. Michael, The International Criminal Court: An effective means of deterrence?, 
Military Law Review, Vol. 167, 2001, pp. 156 – 240, p. 182 
649
 Shany Yuval, “The Role of National Courts in advancing the goals of International Criminal Tribunals, 
Symposium on The impact of International Criminal proceedings on national prosecutions in mass atrocity cases”, 
American Society of International Law Proceedings, Vol. 103, 2009, pp. 210 - 215 
650
 Ibiden, p. 212 
651
 Idem, p. 212 
652
 Id. 
653
 Id. 
654
 Id. 
143 
 
4.2. Justice  
 
It is often heard that a court judgment, ruling or any other court decision was made “in the 
interest of justice”. Justice appears in most social events. People talk of social justice, 
distributive justice, commutative justice, and many other qualifications of justice. Yet few are 
familiar with the meaning of ‘justice’ alone.  Explaining what justice means in international 
prosecution is of utmost importance to measure the effectiveness of the ad hoc tribunals. 
 
4.2.1. The concept of justice in international crimes prosecutions 
 
In its Policy Paper on the interest of justice, the Prosecutor of the (ICC) notes, commenting on 
Article 53 of the Rome Statute, that the interests of justice represents the most complex aspects 
of the Treaty. Moreover the prosecutor acknowledges the lack of a clear guidance on what the 
content of the idea is. The phrase “in the interests of justice” appears in several places in the 
ICC Statute and Rules of Procedure and Evidence but it is never defined.
655
 In addition to the 
lack of a clear guidance and definition, Singh finds that “we usually talk about justice but we 
don’t practice it all the time.”656 Souryal instead suggests that “in contemporary literature, 
justice has been defined in numerous ways as  ‘fairness’, ‘due process’, ‘equal protection’, 
‘impartial treatment’, ‘assignment of merited rewards or punishments’, among others.”657 
Delsol even believes that “only the existence of multiple definitions of justice can allow us to 
escape the dictatorship of a single one.”658  Dubber opines, however, that “the sense of justice 
is as ubiquitous as it is ill-defined.  
 
Without a clearer understanding of its operation and function, the sense of justice is easily 
misunderstood as a vague reference to the unsettling role of emotions, or even of 
sentimentality, in law, and thus may be used to subvert justice rather than do justice.”659 
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Souryal also remarks that not enough effort has been given to clarifying the meaning of justice 
itself. According to him, there is more interest in the criminal than in criminal justice 
research.
660
 For example, in America, “criminal justice education has been increasingly 
scientific, methods-driven, technologically preoccupied, and pragmatic in focus.”661 Such a 
reform was not accompanied by a clear ethical position and a principled purpose oriented 
towards justice.662 According to Souryal, “the better we understand justice, the better able we 
are to cope with crime […]. Only through the light of justice can we distinguish between what 
is right and wrong, ideal and barbaric and of course criminal and non-criminal.”663  
 
Souryal talks about the American domestic criminal justice system. What he says pertaining to 
America, is, however, of universal application. This origin does not therefore matter. The 
search for justice is still lacking in international criminal prosecution, which is a still-born 
system. It is even inappropriate to say that there exists a system of international criminal 
justice.
664
 Fichtelberg posits that “international criminal justice as a system is not as neatly or 
clearly defined as domestic criminal justice.”665 The rationale behind this statement is that 
“systems of criminal justice are designed to do more than merely punish violators of the 
law.”666 The aspiration to justice is everyone’s concern. So everyone must work to ensure that 
justice materialises. For Singh, justice:  
can be understood, realized and materialized in a particular situation. It can be appreciated of its 
parameters in a situation with its own specific circumstances. When justice is done or achieved in a 
certain situation, it is really something else, concrete or abstract in form, which is realized or achieved but 
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which reflects justice or lies in the interest of justice. It demands that one must get what one is entitled 
to.
667
 
 
Bassiouni overemphasises this aspiration to justice by arguing that:  
The exigency of justice is part of humankind’s social values, and its course is inexorable. How far and 
fast we progress on this journey will depend on individual and collective commitments to attain this 
laudable goal in which we all have a stake, and in which we all have a role to play. Everyone of us can 
bring a grain of sand to the hill and can thus contribute to the overall result.
668
 
 
This encompasses many factors such as “historical, political, socio-economic, and even military 
[…]. The solution must take into account both the nature of [a society’s] past illness as well as 
the present and future needs of such a society.”669 It is true that one cannot expect too much 
from justice. Moreover, what justice is for me might not be justice for someone else. Yet, the 
“merit in securing justice… is that it provides a procedure for exposing the truth and it matters 
not whether this procedure is by way of war crimes trial or a truth commission. Such an 
exposure of the truth […] enables a society to move beyond the pain and horror of the past.”670 
In this understanding, justice has one sense whether universal or particular.
671
 According to 
Singh, “justice inheres everyone in the sense that every normal human being which can 
distinguish between right and wrong has at least some sense of justice.”672 
  
Delivering justice through ad hoc international tribunals is no different from justice as 
commonly understood in its virtuous meaning. Singh maintains that “justice is justice, 
immaterial of the level at which it is operating or is being administered.”673 If understood in 
this manner, justice becomes a combination of two worlds: the world of ideas and the world of 
objects. Chaturvedi explains that “the world of ideas is an extension of the entity known as 
mind whereas the world of objects is an extension of one single substance known as matter.”674  
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The philosophical concept of justice is also one, though Yarwood believes that “to expect all 
communities to share a common perception of justice is in polite terms utopian and in realistic 
terms naïve.”675 In Plato’s Republic, Plato defines the principle of justice as “the proper, the 
correct, or the most rational response to a given situation.”676 Plato’s sense of justice is “one’s 
capacity to think rationally and to be able to follow proper reasoning based on superior 
knowledge.”677 
 
According to Souryal and in line with Plato’s thinking, criminal justice would mean:  
a robust rule of principles by which we can arrest the suspect, try the accused, punish the guilty, and 
compensate the victims, without ill-will, prejudice, or offering an apology. In a civilized society, crime 
can increase or decrease, and criminals may be of higher or lower status, yet the foundation of justice 
must remain constant – even if we lose individually.678 
 
Souryal further advises that “in the conduct of criminal justice, professional workers must 
realize that it is not the ‘principle of power’ that matters, but the ‘power of principle’.”679 This 
has been demonstrated above when the UNSC utilized its powers to establish ad hoc tribunals 
without considering appropriate procedures; and the tribunals followed suit. The criterion here, 
as Barry suggests, is to ask oneself “what reasonable persons would agree to under conditions 
of equality and the absence of coercion.”680 This is about an even justice. In international 
criminal justice, Malekian understands “those principles of the system of criminal law that must 
be respected in the examination of a given case and should not be selected or ignored by the 
tribunal.”681 
This is a theoretical and conceptual framework of ‘justice’. But:  
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from a practical standpoint, advances in the legal and technological aspects of criminal justice today, 
practitioners continue to face difficult moral choices. These include whether to arrest, use deadly force, 
prosecute, participate in plea bargaining, impose punishment and, from an organizational standpoint, 
whether to adhere to policy, support corrupt supervisors, or treat the public equitably.
682
 
 
The call for the prosecution of perpetrators by ad hoc tribunals focuses on justice, “in its legal 
sense.”683 Those demands are “for accountability through the trial process. Justice is equated 
with retribution that is the punishment of wrongdoers in direct proportion to the harm inflicted. 
Omitted from this image of justice are its philosophical (or moral) and political dimensions.”684 
This transpires from the statutes of ad hoc tribunals which do not explain what justice entails. 
This narrow understanding of justice is premised on the concept of justice as impartiality. It 
“does not, therefore, have a substantive answer to every question: in many cases it endorses 
whatever outcome emerges from a fair procedure.”685 
 
In a comprehensible sequence, Braswell and his colleagues
686
 propose that “a way of 
understanding the idea of justice in human experience is to think of it as a process that moves 
within three contexts or concentric circles.”687 In their view the innermost circle is the personal 
understanding of the sense of justice which examines right and wrong, good and evil; while the 
second circle represents the social context of justice. The third context looks at the criminal 
justice process
688
 itself. 
  
To sum up their idea of justice, Braswell and his colleagues are of the view that acting as 
ethical persons of integrity will increase the sense of responsible and caring communities where 
the chance for justice will be greater for all who live there.
689
 Without ignoring their specificity 
and complexity, international crimes occur in a similar fashion as they occur in domestic 
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arenas. Those crimes may be distinct in their magnitude and reach as argued by Osuji, a former 
ICTR prosecutor.
690
 The legal reasoning however, for anyone who searches the truth of these 
crimes, is the same. Any international or domestic lawyer begins his or her reasoning “with a 
factual situation, and through some process, arriving at a conclusion about the rights and duties 
of the persons or entities involved in the situation.”691  
  
Like in domestic criminal courts, the international ad hoc tribunals have the same duty of 
deciding “precisely what the facts were, that gave rise to the dispute; second, what laws govern 
those facts; and thirdly, how the law applies to the facts.”692 It is a simple exercise that only 
needs to be principled. The whole problem with international criminal prosecutions is their 
forceful creation of situational facts and events which in reality did not happen and are simply 
assumed or arrived at through linkages. International criminal justice may be blamed for 
attempting to go the easy way and by doing so it lost its way. 
  
Fatic
693
 proposes an international criminal justice of a deontic type. It is a kind of justice “based 
on certain substantive moral principles that must be applied regardless of their practical 
consequences, for the sake of the moral values inherent in them. Deontic justice is usually 
discussed as the antipode of consequentialist justice, which discriminates between morally 
justified and unjustified actions on the basis of the actions’ consequences.”694 
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Before the ad hoc tribunals, individuals stand accused of serious violations of international 
humanitarian law. In addition to that, there are State interests that come into play in the 
background.  But justice will still play its role if in this system justice is understood as, no more 
and no less, “the contour between the actual acts of a person on one side and the understanding 
of the act by the international legal community on the other side.”695 To borrow from Fatic 
again;  
allowing consequentialism into the picture of justice here would inevitably lead the individual being 
subjected to a web of state interests in the international arena, and thus sacrificed, or – probably more 
rarely – privileged and excused from responsibility, according to political considerations and state 
interests that have little or nothing to do with one’s actual actions and intentions, and thus with one’s 
actual guilt and responsibility according to accepted moral standards.
696
 
 
This practice deeply offends the common sense of morality and individual rights, and erodes 
the practical pillars of feasibility and compliance whereupon the system of international justice 
is supposed to stand.
697
 Justice then, becomes a casualty of a political calculation.
698
 Fatic 
finally argues that:  
it goes without saying, of course, that for international justice to be a true justice, to be morally justified, 
the real motives, should be right, namely charges should be brought up out of a sincere desire to fulfil 
moral justice and effect a true reconciliation between the peoples by assigning the blame for atrocities to 
those who are really guilty, thereby releasing from collective guilt those who are not guilty.
699
  
 
Against this conclusion full of reason, realism and practicability, Fatic disappointedly remarks 
that in contemporary international politics such sincerity is scarce.  The major actors at the 
international scene are acting much more out of particular political interests of their ruling 
elites, than on the basis of any authentic moral motives.
700
  
 
Out of the pursuit of justice comes injustice in the philosophical thought of Aristotle. As far as 
the virtue of justice is concerned, the ‘mean’ virtue is the middle ground between two extreme 
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“injustices”: the “injustice” of insufficiency and the “injustice” of excessiveness. Aristotle 
advises that in making moral judgment, one should choose the middle ground value.
701
  
 
Some international practitioners will rhetorically argue that they are guided by codes of 
professional ethics.  But when it comes to implement those codes, it appears that they have no 
value beyond being instruments of social and political propaganda.
702
 Others do not comply 
with their oath of office, even though it is considered as sacred – presumably because it solicits 
God’s help, it becomes an insignificant formality.703 Finally, some practitioners are rewarded 
primarily for their loyalty to superiors and mentors, or financiers. Souryal offers a concluding 
remark to such behaviour by saying that “such observations, if true, are troubling because they 
are “inconsistent (if not outright contradictory) with the basic tenets of truth, professionalism, 
and moral responsibility.”704 
 
4.2.2. Justice delivered at the ICTR 
 
Choosing the ICTR to illustrate the issue of justice is not creating an imbalance between the 
two cases studied in this research. It is also not suggesting that the ICTY has been perfect in 
delivering justice for the former Yugoslavia in a consistent and sustainable manner. It is only 
an approach among others. Suffice to say, as remarks Peskin, that “the crimes committed in the 
Balkan and Rwandan conflicts have been overshadowed by the enormity of the crimes 
committed by the losers. Especially in the Rwandan context, the Tutsi are viewed 
internationally as victim, because they were the target of the genocide.”705 For the former 
Yugoslavia however, the message that a crime is a crime irrespective of who committed it has 
reached Muslims, Croats as well as Serbs.  The tribunal took no sides.
706
 At the ICTR no such a 
thing happened. 
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In 1994 and even before, the conflicting parties in Rwanda undisputedly committed serious 
violations of international humanitarian law punishable under the ICTR Statute. The ICTR 
delivered a partial justice because it failed to investigate and prosecute the crimes committed by 
the RPF. There is no acceptable reason why this happened. Even the Rwandan Government 
never denied that RPA soldiers committed serious human rights abuses in 1994.
707
 The 
violations have been widely documented by commissioned UN inquiries, governmental and 
nongovernmental organisations and other non-interested parties. According to Peskin:  
in the common narratives of the genocide, there is relative silence about the extent of Hutu suffering and 
the role of the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front army (RPF) in atrocities against Hutu civilians. The lack 
of international scrutiny of RPF war crimes has prevented a clear understanding of the extent of the 
killings and the possible role of the RPF leadership, including the current Rwandan President, Paul 
Kagame. In a real sense, therefore, the history of the 1994 conflict – as well as the role the RPF in 
Rwanda and neighbouring Congo since then – has not been written.708 
 
The UNSC established the ICTR to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of 
international humanitarian law committed in Rwanda or by Rwandan citizens committed 
outside Rwanda from 1
st
 January 1994 until 31 December 1994. Nowhere in the Statute of the 
ICTR does the UNSC clearly indicate that the tribunal was specifically created for the only and 
sole purpose of prosecuting perpetrators of genocide. Making such a statement does not 
demean the seriousness and gravity of genocide as a crime of crimes that necessitated particular 
attention. The Statute provides for the prosecution of genocide, crimes against humanity and 
war crimes. Moreover, the persons who have been prosecuted by the Arusha-based tribunal 
were charged and answered to those three categories of crimes. Chief Prosecutor Jallow stated 
at a Geneva Symposium that: “We are mandated to prosecute on the three specific offences: 
genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.”709  
 
Some people have blindly insisted that there exists no evidence or that such evidence was 
insufficient to conclude that the RPF committed genocide against the Hutu population of 
Rwanda. Such an argument is regrettably founded on the unwillingness or partial investigations 
                                                          
707
 Eltringham Nigel, Accounting for horror: Post-Genocide Debates in Rwanda, op. cit., p. 144 
708
 Peskin Victor, “beyond Victor’s Justice? Op. cit., p. 216 
709
 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: Model or counter model for  International Criminal Justice?: The 
perspectives of the Stakeholders, International Symposium, Geneva, 9 – 11 July 2009, Session Six, Intervention by 
Prosecutor Hassan B. Jallow, p. 12 
152 
 
of those crimes.
710
 Investigators have acknowledged that they could not thoroughly gain access 
to RPF controlled zones for investigations. What they say is that crimes have been committed. 
What they do not know is the extent to which a proper legal characterisation was possible. 
There is therefore no sound base for ruling out that such crimes could, if properly investigated, 
be characterised as genocide. In this regard, Burke suggests that in social sciences it is common 
that:  
people are incapable of evaluating the strength of evidence independent of their prior beliefs. People not 
only demonstrate search and recall preferences for information that tends to confirm their pre-existing 
theories, they also tend to devalue disconfirming evidence, even when presented with it. As a result of 
selective information processing, people weigh evidence that support their prior beliefs more heavily than 
that contradicts their beliefs.
711
 
 
On one hand, the abundant evidence was collected to confirm and comfort the Tutsi genocide 
theory. On the other hand, the collection of evidence tending to prove that there could have 
been a genocide directed against the Hutu population was either frustrated or, where such 
evidence was available, it was not provided with thorough attention. 
 
In any event, however, and only considering the situation as it now stands, the crimes 
committed can be characterised as crimes against humanity or war crimes. In addition, the 
practice of the diverse Trial and the Appeals Chambers of the ICTR is consistently that factual 
findings for the crime of genocide are almost the same as the ones for crimes against humanity 
and war crimes. The only difference being the special intention required for the crime of 
genocide. 
 
The ICTR has been, on many occasions, reminded of its obligation under the Statute. For 
example, Nyemera complained that six years after the creation of the ICTR, it has only 
prosecuted those who lost power in Rwanda in 1994 and no one from the victorious RPF who 
continued to enjoy impunity for crimes committed in Rwanda and those being committed in the 
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DRC since 1996.
712
  In 2007, Amnesty International reiterated the call for justice for all parties. 
Amnesty observed that for any justice system to operate effectively, it must be impartial. 
Amnesty was however deeply concerned that no crimes committed by members of the 
Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPA) during 1994 have been adequately investigated and prosecuted 
by national authorities.
713
 The ICTR has also failed to investigate these crimes promptly, 
thoroughly, independently and impartially.
714
 No prosecution has so far taken place which 
undermines the credibility of the ICTR and its effectiveness. 
 
One meritorious explanation, among others, of all ICTR successive prosecutors’ failure “to 
indict any RPF members for atrocities against Hutu” is the “fear that they will lose the much-
needed cooperation of Paul Kagame’s government, a circumstance that may in fact have 
emboldened the Rwandan government to use the judicial process to eliminate political 
opponents by implicating them in the genocide.”715 Inside the Office of the Prosecutor, it will 
never transpire that fearing Rwandan refusal of cooperation is the sole reason of the ICTR 
inertia to prosecute RPF.  Though the prosecution acknowledges that it falls in its mandate to 
investigate and prosecute crimes committed by the RPF
716
, nothing visible has been done until 
the tribunal closed its doors.  
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It is one possibility that the prosecution may have done nothing to investigate and prosecute 
any member of the RPF. It is not that evidence was lacking or that raising this issue bears any 
indication whatsoever that anyone was attempting to improperly influence the prosecutor. Had 
the prosecution wished to investigate and prosecute RPF crimes, it could not have lacked 
evidence. Another possibility is that the prosecutor had enough evidence to proceed; but chose 
not to prosecute on grounds alien to normal prosecution functions. Considering the 
interconnection between the OTP and the judges at the ICTR, particularly through the President 
of the Tribunal, the judges could not ignore that the tribunal’s mandate includes the prosecution 
of crimes committed by the RPF. Yet they remained silent in the face of this revolting 
prosecution’s tactics. Pursuant to this reality, it is really difficult to say that the ICTR, as an 
UNSC judicial institution, delivered justice effectively. This inaction has impact on other goals 
of criminal prosecution. 
 
4.3. Traditional objectives of criminal prosecution attainable through ad hoc 
tribunals: crime deterrence, the fight against impunity, retribution and 
incapacitation  
 
In domestic jurisdictions, “there exist several ideological bases which serve to justify the 
institutionalization of punishment, including justice, retribution, and deterrence.”717 These 
theories and others have been tested in those same jurisdictions. It is a fact that on the 
international level, the meaning and quality of these theories are still poorly reflected. This, 
according to Zolo, “risks leading to an insufficient or even inconsistent elaboration on the 
general principles of international criminal law.”718 Some of these theories may even be 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
predecessor's time, the investigations have resumed, and several matters have been looked at, and they are 
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unnecessary in international criminal prosecutions. The inquiry here therefore, is to find out 
how they can serve as a basis of any discussion toward the goal of punishment in international 
criminal law.
719
 
 
One of the objectives the UNSC intended to achieve by prosecuting the perpetrators of crimes 
in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda was to put an end to such crimes. The means to that end 
consisted in taking effective measures to bring to justice the persons who were responsible. 
This judicial approach, in the belief of the UNSC, could deter potential criminals from 
committing acts of aggression or massive human rights violations if they realise they cannot act 
with impunity.
720
 The assumption is that prosecution becomes a deterrent of crimes in 
situations of armed conflict. This section analyses what deterrence and the fight against 
impunity entail before exploring the contours of retribution and incapacitation in the 
perspectives of the ad hoc tribunals. 
 
4.3.1. Crime deterrence and the fight against impunity 
 
Deterrence and the fight against impunity go hand in hand, especially in the field of 
international criminal law. If deterrence succeeds, impunity may be eradicated. According to 
Farooq deterrence serves as a preventive measure for future mischief.
721
 This is not absolutely 
granted. The reason is that even in domestic jurisdictions “punishment does not deter those 
whose lives are already no better than any punishment that society can devise: it does not 
improve the morals of those who are closed to change.”722 Conversely, if the tiny effect of 
deterrence fails, impunity is cultivated and entertained. Theoretically, deterrence reminds us 
that “international law does not allow its most flagrant violators impunity.”723  
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By deterrence, criminal prosecutions seek to send a message that those who commit any 
crimes, especially serious crimes, will not go unpunished. Deterrence is also believed to be the 
widely advocated justification for punishment pursuant to a comparative analysis of different 
legal systems.
724
 Some literature suggests that “deterrence is the real motive behind the 
infliction of punishment.”725 On face value, the theory of deterrence goes as follows: “if one 
wrongdoer can be made uncomfortable with the infliction of evil or unpleasant consequences, it 
will deter others and thus keep the order of the society intact.”726 Deterrence is therefore aimed 
at maintaining social control. It is a utilitarian concept of punishment, though its shortcomings 
need to always be borne in mind. 
 
The role of the criminal law is generally “to protect the public and to deter crime.”727 This is a 
positivist approach of criminal law legislators. There is, however, a moral assumption which is 
more hypothetical than real, which is that “the basis of deterrence has been considered to be 
fear of the severity of the sanctions”728 or the sanctions themselves.  In fact, deterrence is most 
successful when the actual use of the force of law is not required.
729
 This means that any person 
who commits a particular serious crime resulting in extensive harm or damage calls for an 
action to deter a reoccurrence of such a crime to protect the public against him.
730
  Whether this 
sends a moral message to individuals or remains a positive assumption of the legislator, still 
remains to be tested.  
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Wippman suggests that prosecuting international crimes “can serve to deter the commission of 
future atrocities”731 or as a means for the prevention of future atrocities.732 According to 
Bassiouni, “for many, deterrence is the most important justification and the most important 
goal.”733 Deterrence is also the argument most often advanced by supporters of the ICC.734 
However, Wippman dismisses this view because experience has proven that “the connection of 
international prosecutions and the actual deterrence of future atrocities is at best a plausible but 
largely untested assumption. Actual experience with efforts at deterrence is not 
encouraging.”735 Moreover, “in practice, the tribunals seem ill-equipped to satisfy this 
ambition.”736 Bassiouni believes that this “is based on the general assumptions of deterrence 
that exists in domestic criminal justice system.”737 What discourages is the lack of international 
prosecutions that have a deterrent goal in mind.  Prosecution did not deter the commission of 
crimes either in the former Yugoslavia or in Rwanda. 
 
As Bassiouni puts it, “the assumptions about deterrence and enforcement are substantially 
different, as are other factors regarding capacity. International prosecutions and their numbers 
will always be more restricted than their counterparts in national contexts”.738 Bassiouni does 
not say, however, why this must always be so, as if it was a matter of principle.  One may 
nevertheless agree with him regarding the fact that all the international crimes perpetrators 
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cannot be prosecuted due to capacity constraints. Said differently, deterrence is more uncertain 
in international prosecutions. The reason may be that, according to Ku and Nzelibe, 
“international tribunals are not likely to have independent police powers in the foreseeable 
future” and that “the actors most likely to face prosecution are individuals in weak states who 
have failed politically. In other words, the likely pool will be composed of individuals in weak 
states who have been forced from political power by foreign forces.”739 Ku and Nzelibe’s 
opinion adds to the many other factors that bar the deterrent effects of international 
prosecutions. International prosecution lacks the will to deter; it lacks manpower capacity to 
enforce compliance. It cannot realise the full effects of deterrence. 
  
To the extent that the deterrence goal is a key issue, there needs be an effort to remove other 
impediments not related to capacity. For instance, Sudhakar places such impediments at the 
very foundation, namely that deterrence may be secured when appropriate attention is equally 
given to particular situations by the Security Council. Sudhakar recognises, however, that “if 
the Council members, or their allies, or their interest is involved in those situations the Council 
may or may not take any concrete action in establishing”740 or supporting ad hoc tribunals. This 
is the crucial knot that needs to be undone, and the Council has all the possibilities to this end. 
What lacks is the willingness because the so-called interests are not always legally and morally 
justified. Sudhakar pinpoints where the problem lies. According to him “the selective 
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application of international law by the UNSC is a cause for grave concern to the international 
community. It also undermines the quest for international justice.”741  
 
Optimistically, Groome suggests that, for international prosecutions to have or achieve their 
deterrent effect, “they must be conducted in a way that can leave no doubt that the international 
community’s resolve to end impunity is not larger than its capacity to do so.”742 Such a resolve 
is still piecemeal. Groome additionally contends that ‘any consideration of trial methods must 
look further than the immediate considerations of individual trials incorporating larger strategic 
considerations of ensuring predictable accountability for all senior political, military or police 
officials likely to commit crimes.”743 The attitude of the UNSC unfortunately perpetuates the 
culture of impunity and does not facilitate the deterrent goal of criminal prosecution, to say the 
least. 
 
The fight against impunity has also featured in the literature of international criminal 
prosecutions.  The Preamble to the Rome Statute of the ICC recalls the determination “to put an 
end to impunity” for the perpetrators of “the most serious crimes of concern to the community 
as a whole.” It also states that those crimes must not go unpunished. Despite this firm 
determination, no attempt has been made to define the term “impunity.” The statutes of the ad 
hoc tribunals have also failed to provide a common understanding of this term. The lack of a 
definition creates unnecessary misunderstanding, controversy and confusion in implementation.  
Zolo stresses that “international criminal justice has not yet proven to be capable of remedying 
widespread impunity, except to a minor degree and with normative ambiguities.”744 A 
definition of this term is therefore warranted following the one of deterrence.  
 
Impunity is the situation in which a person who has committed violations of international 
humanitarian law sheds himself or herself from being investigated, charged, prosecuted and 
punished to the extent of the crimes he or she has committed. In avoiding prosecution the 
person may be assisted by others or take advantage of the position of authority he or she holds 
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at the time he or she commits the crime or thereafter. Harper adds that impunity can be 
achieved through amnesty laws or presidential pardons passed or decreed by governments 
under whose authority the crimes were committed or by a successive government. Impunity can 
also occur by default – the deliberate lack of any action.745 
 
Joinet, a French expert, in his draft of the UN Project of a Set of Principles on Impunity
746
 
suggests that:  
Impunity means the impossibility, de jure or de facto, of bringing the perpetrators of human rights 
violations to account whether in criminal, civil, administrative or disciplinary proceedings since they are 
not subjects to any inquiry with a view to their inculpation, detention, indictment and, if found guilty, 
conviction, including their obligation of compensation to their victims for the damages caused.
747
   
 
Crimes have been committed and authors have not been identified and/or punished. 
Perpetrators may have been identified, yet no actions have been taken against them. But 
impunity may also be the “de facto or de jure absence of criminal, administrative, disciplinary 
or civil responsibility and the ability to avoid investigation and punishment.”748 It is obvious 
that an individual cannot, by himself or herself avoid criminal accountability in a normally 
functioning democratic state. He or she must be covered under the umbrella of a system in 
which he or she has authority, influence or strong connections. It is an institutional failure to 
uphold the rights of the victims.   
 
According to Harper, “the reasons for this failure may be a lack of political will or insufficient 
power to impose the rule of law upon powerful offending sectors of society, like the armed 
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forces.”749 Impunity may concern an individual, a group of people, or a system in a given 
timeframe. Eltringham is of the opinion that:  
Ending impunity should not be confused with simply finding people guilty. Rather, it entails a consistent 
and coherent effort to respond to all allegations of human rights abuses in a dogmatic and transparent 
way. Demonstrating that allegations are untrue is as much a part of demonstrating that impunity has 
ended as convicting those found responsible.
750
  
 
Penrose schematises impunity as “the torturer’s most relished tool. It is the dictator’s most 
potent weapon. It is the victim’s ultimate injury. And, it is the international community’s most 
conspicuous failure. Impunity continues to be one of the most prevalent causes of human rights 
violations in the world.”751 Ideally, “holding perpetrators fully accountable would entail 
appropriate trial and punishment of each responsible individual for the actual crimes 
committed.”752 This is when impunity may be said to be curbed.  Unfortunately, as Morris 
observes “national and international efforts at achieving accountability for such offences 
typically resort to means designed to render fault without full accountability.”753  
 
Morris points to three categories of constraints that jeopardize full accountability, then 
cultivating impunity. She cites political constraints, resources that are required and lack of will 
at national and international levels.
754
 Each of these constraints alone or altogether may be 
enough to facilitate impunity. However, globally what does impunity entail? Simply defined 
therefore, and as a principle, impunity is the opposite of accountability for serious violations of 
international humanitarian law. Ad hoc tribunals have been at odds to combat impunity in their 
areas of jurisdiction. Territorially, materially, personally and temporary, the tribunals have 
failed. 
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4.3.2. Retribution and incapacitation 
 
Besides deterrence and the fight against impunity, retribution is the other justification of 
punishment, though it is no longer considered as its main purpose.”755 De Blois suggests that “a 
human being should receive what he or she deserves. This can be termed as retribution or 
reciprocity. This idea is firmly established in the theory of the law since antiquity and in the 
practice of the law today.
756
 This is true not only for criminal law, but also for private law and 
other sectors of law.
757
 Haque calls it a “proportionality principle.”758 In John Rawls’ theory, 
“the retributive view is that punishment is justified on the ground that wrongdoing merits 
punishment.”759Retributive justice would be the proportional punishment of criminals 
according to the seriousness and gravity of their crimes. Justice ensures that everyone receives 
what he or she deserves.
760
 Zolo posits that this “afflictive punitive justice sees deviant 
behaviour as a breach of an objective order – a violation of the universal harmony of the 
cosmos. To punish, and to pay for, is to restore the ontological equilibrium undermined by 
illegal or immoral behaviour.”761  
 
Basing his argument in Grotius’ theory of criminal law, De Blois considers punishment as “an 
evil of suffering which is inflicted because of an evil in action. It is, in other words, evil for 
evil.”762  When a person undertakes to do wrong, he or she must expect a punishment 
commensurate to the wrong he or she has done. Such a punishment is justified. Haque 
emphasizes that:  
the offender’s violation of the victim’s right gives rise to a duty of the punishing agent, owed to the 
victim, to punish the offender. The legitimate authority of the punishing agent derives from its reciprocal 
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relations with the victim to whom the duty to punish is owed and with the offender from whose wrong the 
right to punish derives.
763
  
 
Van den Haag maintains moreover that “according to just deserts theory, the seriousness of the 
crime alone should determine the punishment deserved. Seriousness, in turn, depends on the 
harm done and on the culpability of the offender. Surely both are relevant.”764 Be this as it may, 
Van den Haag questions what “just desert may be.”765 For him, “just desert fails even more 
fundamentally to tell us what is deserved for any crime. […] just deserts seems to be a question 
masquerading as the answer. The question seems quite justified. Unfortunately no answer can 
be.”766 Van den Haag proposes a simple answer to the question he poses. He suggests that “to 
the extent to which a sentence is based on predicted recidivism, the sentence may not be what 
the crime deserves, if desert refers to the past, as it must.”767 This answer fails to cover the so-
called just desert. 
 
Just desert is probably covered by the suggestion that “retribution, like the associated concepts 
of retaliation, reprisal, reciprocation, and revenge, involves the idea of a victim whose rights 
the legal system seeks to vindicate.”768 This is a partial understanding, because “the just deserts 
theory tries to answer a moral question: what punishments are morally deserved?”769 
Punishments are morally justified if they are proportional to the wrong done. But, Wootton 
rejects this idea of proportionality. His reason is that proportionality is premised on criminality 
as a “disease requiring treatment or as a condition requiring isolation”770 if it serves 
rehabilitation.   
 
By analogy, Van den Haag argues that “diseases do not deserve blame; and treatments are 
neither just nor unjust, only effective or ineffective. Criminal behaviour obviously lacks the 
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characteristics usually associated with disease, such as involuntariness and undesiredness.”771 
Zolo supports this view by suggesting that criminal punishment must neutralize dangerous 
deviant individuals and bring them back into society after disciplining and making them 
harmless.
772
 Zolo dismisses however any suggestion that the retributive conception of criminal 
punishment may be reconciled with any project of social peace making.
773
  
 
In the opinion of De Blois “retribution remains, however, a vital element, as long as only 
criminals are punished for their own faults and the seriousness of the crime is reflected in the 
nature and weight of the penalty.”774 In the view of Van den Haag “incapacitation here is not a 
punishment but a means of social protection. Although we cannot punish him or her for what 
he or she has not, as yet, done, we can incapacitate someone we know to be about to commit a 
murder.”775 There emerge therefore two ideas or aims of punishment, one aimed at the 
wrongdoer, and the other one aimed at protecting the society by the removal or confinement of 
the offender. But society still has other avenues to deal with the wrongdoer because 
“punishment is only one of several possible purposes of incapacitation, which can be imposed 
independently, as is done with the insane.”776  
 
Cassese, once a judge at the ICTY, suggests that when the fighting and bloodshed have finally 
been brought to a close, one needs, among others, “to isolate those who have planed, ordered, 
or executed atrocities and to remove them from society so that they no longer exercise their 
pernicious influence.”777 But the enormity of crimes committed during the fighting engenders 
many offenders. Distinguishing those who bear the greatest responsibility becomes a difficult 
exercise. Which offenders must be dealt with first and to what extent should that be done? How 
to screen and be able to remove those most blameworthy?  Selecting those to go after may miss 
the point.  
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Analyzing retribution through the prism of international criminal law, Farooq finds that 
retribution is not a significant part of the evolutionary trends of international criminal law. He 
nevertheless agrees that it was a definite component of at least the punishment awarded by the 
IMT of Nuremberg.
778
 Even if retribution could be justified in this context, it “does not appear 
to be the predominantly theory on the other post- World War II developments in this 
area.”779This is probably the reason why “retributivist approaches to international criminal law 
are often dismissed for lack of fit with current practice.”780 This is more specifically so, 
because “international criminal prosecution seems too selective to satisfy the demands of 
retributive justice.”781 Too many wrongdoers go unpunished; too many victims are forgotten or 
simply ignored, to borrow again from Haque. 
 
Incapacitation likewise is “mitigated by the nature of the ICTY and ICTR’s political context. 
Prosecution is an inherently slow process.”782 The design and practice of the ad hoc tribunals 
are also imperfectly suited to retributive ends.
783
 
 
It is a fair assumption that the ICTR granted impunity for the crimes committed by the RPF in 
Rwanda to secure its cooperation in prosecuting genocide. This argument however falls short of 
balance if compared to the practice of the sister tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. The issue of 
state cooperation has been one of the most troublesome problems encountered by the 
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Prosecutor of the ICTY. Despite this problem however, “the ICTY managed to issue 161 
indictments against all factions in the Croatian, Bosnian and Kosovo wars.”784 The ICTY went 
as far as indicting highly placed individuals involved in the crimes, including President 
Slobodan Milosevic, Radovan Karadzic, General Ratko Mladic and Milan Milutinovic. Yet 
none of the highly placed criminals of the RPF in Rwanda has been indicted by the ICTR. 
   
The ICTR’s failure to prosecute RPF crimes defeated the ends of deterrence, the fight against 
impunity, retribution and incapacitation. The consequences of this impunity did not take long to 
manifest.  It proved that through the prosecution of crimes by the ICTR, the tribunal did not 
manage to deter future crimes. Renowned Yash
785
, appointed to look into the suitability of 
Rwanda to be admitted in the Commonwealth Community, reported that:  
The RPF has used an extraordinary amount of violence, domestically and internationally. It has killed 
several thousand Hutus, citizens and others, and is responsible for the deaths of even more through 
displacement, malnutrition and hunger. It has denied hundreds of thousands of children the opportunity of 
education, and deprived millions of family and community life. It has conscripted child soldiers. The UN 
has voluminously documented these practices and repeatedly chastised Rwanda for its irresponsible 
behaviour in the DRC.
786
 
 
The ICTR did not manage to deter RPF from expanding crimes to the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC) where its army massacred tens and possibly hundreds of thousands of fugitive 
civilians from Rwanda.
787
 During those armed incursions, the RPA massacred Congolese 
civilians as well because of that sense of impunity. So the way in which justice has been 
miscarried in the ICTR has not contributed to peace in Rwanda and in the region.
788
 This is 
another UNSC objective that was hampered by the deliberate policy of the Rwanda Tribunal. 
The invasion of the DRC is a clear violation of international peace and security in the region of 
the Great Lakes of Africa. This, unfortunately, was a strategic objective that the tribunal was 
designed to achieve. 
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4.4. Contribution to the restoration and maintenance of peace and security 
 
 4.4.1. Meaning of the terms “restoration” and “maintenance” of peace and security 
 
As already seen in the introduction to this chapter, it was the UNSC’s conviction that the 
establishment of the ad hoc tribunals and their subsequent prosecution of “persons responsible 
for serious violations of international humanitarian law” would have an impact on the restoration 
and maintenance of peace and security.  For the ICTY, such an impact was the tribunal’s 
intended contribution to the restoration of peace and security. The ICTR would contribute to 
such a process. The contention in this study is that ad hoc tribunals can hardly have such an 
impact.  Indeed the ICTY and the ICTR did not contribute to the restoration and maintenance of 
peace or to the process thereof.  The reasons for such a position follow. 
 
Article 39 of the UN Charter empowers the UNSC to determine situations that constitute threats 
to peace and security. The Council may also decide measures in accordance with Articles 41 and 
42 of the Charter to restore and maintain international peace and security. Yet, no clear 
definition is readily available for an understanding of the meaning of “restoration” and 
“maintenance” of peace and security. Without such a definition, it is impossible to assess the 
effectiveness of the ICTY and ICTR in this endevour. What is peace? How does a process 
leading to peace look like? What role, if any, can an international criminal tribunal play in such a 
process? These are questions that are relevant to assess whether an international criminal 
tribunal can be effective in the process.  
 
The word “peace” is “very simple and attractive.”789 Peace is not the antithesis of war. There are 
some legal ingredients that come into play to characterise a situation as “war.” However, 
“peace” becomes complicated somehow “as it involves many implications, actions, reactions 
and especially obligations.”790 Peace is therefore “to be thought of as a condition of absence of 
hostilities or the exercise of force, irrespective of the question whether a legal status of war 
prevails as between States and/ or other parties concerned.”791 It will be correct to say that peace 
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is the “absence of disputes and conflicts.”792 In more philosophical terms peace is the 
“imperative of reason.”793  
 
Practically, and to the extent that the UNSC is concerned, the definition that pertains to peace 
may be the one given by Boutros Boutros Ghali, the former UN Secretary General. He regarded 
“peace as a responsibility of the UN to take action to prevent war and to use its peaceful means 
to stop international conflicts which endanger peace to ask the parties to resort to peaceful 
means to regulate their differences.”794 The Former Secretary General also suggests that 
“armed conflicts today, as they have throughout, continue to bring fear and horror to humanity, 
requiring our urgent involvement to try to prevent, contain and bring them to an end.”795 This 
definition appears to be the opposite of a state of war, but it is not enough.  
 
This leads to secondly consider Syring’s proposition that, peace, in a broader sense, indicates a 
state of harmony between people or groups; or law and order between states.
796
 Moreover, 
“peace alludes to the absence of anxiety, or even pure personal tranquillity, the feeling that 
everything is in its proper place.”797 This is not straightforward, “since ‘peace between man and 
man consists in regulated fellowship”798, therefore “true peace will require a peace of mind 
which is not attainable, so long as injustices continue.”799 Pennys envisages a peace that refers 
to the cessation of overt hostilities, widespread violence and international humanitarian law 
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violations, and the prevention of their re-emergence at a later date through the peaceful 
consolidation of post-conflict societies.
800
 
 
Proponents of international prosecutions may argue that through international criminal 
adjudications, peace can be maintained, restored and consolidated.  The invocation of peace has 
in fact become the key argument put forward by the UNSC to enable it to resort to Chapter VII 
to establish ad hoc tribunals. Was it really a genuine approach or was it instead a way of 
covering up its failure in using force to restore and maintain peace and security? International 
prosecution has in fact been used as a tool for the restoration and maintenance of peace. How 
does it work? Kofi Annan, former UN Secretary General attempted to provide an answer. He 
stated:  
there are times when we are told that justice must be set aside in the interests of peace. It is true that 
justice can only be dispensed when the peaceful order of society is secure. But we have come to 
understand that the reverse is also true: without justice, there can be no lasting peace.
801
 
 
Annan’s formula is that when prosecution is realised, justice is attained. In the same logic, when 
justice is attained peace is restored and maintained. Buchanan is of the other view that  
It is wrong to assume that justice and peace are somehow essentially in conflict. On the contrary, justice 
subsumes peace. Justice requires the prohibition of wars of aggression (understood as morally 
unjustifiable attacks as opposed to justified wars of self-defence or of humanitarian intervention) because 
wars of aggression inherently violate human rights. To that extent the pursuit of justice is the pursuit of 
peace.
802
 
 
This has not always been the case in the circles of the UN. The search for peace has in most 
cases, been a concern of warring parties and intervening negotiators. There is no set of 
international conventions and treaties regulating how peace negotiations must be conducted. 
There is however a set of international law that regulate armed conflicts, be they international 
or internal. Those laws compose the body of international humanitarian law and others are 
contained in human rights laws. In the latter two sets of laws, non-negotiable criminal clauses 
are provided as far as humanitarian law has been violated, namely when genocide, crimes 
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against humanity or war crimes have been committed. The peace process is quite different from 
the justice process and both must not be confused with each other.  
 
The terms “restoration” and “maintenance” of peace and security, are also two terminologies 
which are quite distinct. According to Starke: 
The expression ‘restoration of peace’ necessarily signifies that there has been a prior breach or rupture of 
the peace, while by contrast the expression ‘maintenance of peace’ implies that peace is subsisting, but 
that some action is requisite to ensure that it is not disturbed, the possibility of such disturbance may be 
due to the prevalence of tension between States, or to some threat to the peace, or other circumstances in 
danger of being aggravated, or it may be felt that, on a long-term view, the possibility of peace being 
disturbed ought to be anticipated some time beforehand, and steps taken to promote general conditions 
for its preservation.
803
 
 
Starke notes moreover that:  
the phrase ‘restoration of peace may be used (1) to denote the cessation of hostilities or the exercise of 
armed force, coupled with the consequent re-establishment of a peaceful equilibrium between the 
contesting parties; (2) [or] as meaning the termination, by treaty of peace or other legal act, of a technical 
status of war between the contestants, which status may have continued for quite some time after the 
cessation of hostilities or of the exercise of armed force, and after the re-establishment of a peaceful 
equilibrium.
804
 
 
In both case studies of the ICTY and in line with these definitions, a question arises about 
whether the establishment of a criminal tribunal is the appropriate step to restore peace and 
security. The answer to this question will depend on all other available means at the disposal of 
the UNSC to fulfil its main mandate of maintaining or restoring peace and security. 
 
Before answering the question however, it is necessary to better comprehend the issue raised 
here. This can be done through an illustration:  
In 1998 and 1999, despite fifty-nine pending ICTY indictments, two well-publicised convictions, and 
explicit warning against further wrongdoing, both Serbian and Kosovar forces within the ICTY’s 
jurisdiction allegedly violated international humanitarian law. Though the U. N. Security Council 
established the ICTY as an immediate measure to restore and maintain the peace, it is clear that the 
establishment of the Tribunal has not prevented further atrocities in the region.
805
  
 
The Rwandan case falls outside of Starke’s second leg of definition even if it may partially cover 
some aspects of the situation. This may be the case only if justice sought is to serve the peaceful 
equilibrium between the former conflicting parties or is simply that other “legal act.” If it is still 
difficult to discern the difference, it may be assumed that the UNSC relied on “a general 
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conception of conflicts, as including not only those in which armed force has actually been used, 
but also those in which the parties in conflict have stopped short of recourse to hostilities, thus 
focusing on the central aspect of peace itself than upon the problem of the resolution of 
conflicts.”806 The question here is whether the UNSC could establish a tribunal with other 
objectives instead of maintenance and restoration of peace.
807
 The failure to attain even the 
objective of maintenance of peace may result from this conceptual error.  
 
4.4.2. The UNSC expectations by establishing the ICTY and ICTR as instruments 
contributing to the restoration and maintenance of peace and security 
 
The powers of the Security Council to restore and maintain international peace and security 
stream from the UN Charter as earlier discussed. The Preamble of the Charter aims “to save 
succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold 
sorrow to mankind.”  This citation refers to the experience of World War I and II.  
The aims of the ad hoc tribunals are a consequence of the Security Council’s determination that 
the situations in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda continued “to constitute a threat to 
international peace and security.”808 Therefore “the prosecution of persons responsible for 
serious violations of international humanitarian law (…) would contribute “to the restoration and 
maintenance of peace.”809  
 
Futamora identifies
810
 and characterises the objectives of restoration and maintenance of peace 
as strategic, which he qualifies as “enforcement measures.” By their nature, these objectives are 
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political though they may be explained legally. Futamora is moreover of the opinion that “the 
legal basis for invoking Chapter VII to establish an international criminal tribunal was that the 
serious and widespread violence occurring […] was regarded as ‘threat to international peace 
and security.”811 
 
Article 41 of the UN Charter contains an unlimited list of enforcement measures that the UNSC 
may resort to.  Those measures involve traditionally “the economic and military arms blockade 
and sanctions which affect the ability of the State concerned to resist the implementation of the 
SC resolutions on the dispute and may finally accept the implementations of the resolutions 
without the need to use military force.”812 Also in the ICTY’s Tadic decision on jurisdiction, the 
Appeals Chamber held that “the establishment of the International Tribunal falls squarely within 
the powers of the Security Council under Article 41.”813 This is hardly a convincing argument 
unless the powers of the UNSC are unlimited. It is fair to argue that the establishment of an 
international criminal tribunal is not one of these measures. It is a by-product of fishing in 
troubled waters, or an easy but binding solution to a very complex situation. 
  
What is even more striking is Manusama’s view that “prosecution per se was not the aim for 
which the tribunal was established; it was a means to achieve broader aims. The creation of the 
ICTY was a measure taken by the Security Council to fulfil its ‘primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security;”814  
Manusama goes further by arguing that:        
Resolution 955, establishing the ICTR, echoed this by also declaring that the tribunal would contribute to 
‘the restoration and maintenance of peace’. The key to assessing the work of the ICTs, therefore, is 
whether the creation and operation of the tribunal are ‘appropriate and effective for the purpose of the 
restoration and maintenance of international peace and security. […] what is furthermore necessary is a 
theoretical and conceptual framework within which to assess the effectiveness of international war crimes 
prosecution based on their strategic purposes.
815
 
                                                          
811
 Futamora Madoka, op. cit., p 3 
812
 Skubiszweski (K), Use of Force by States: Collective Security and Law of War and Neutrality, Article in 
Sorensen (max), Manual of Public International Law, Macmillan, 1968, cited in Jalil Kasto, op. cit., p. 34 
813
 The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, op. 
cit., para. 36 
814
 Idem; see also Kerr Rachel and Mobekk Eirin, Peace and Justice: Seeking Accountability After War, Polity Press, 
2007, p 31. These authors are of the opinion that the establishment under Chapter VII of the UN Charter “as a 
measure for international peace and security was truly innovative and had a number of implications for its mandate 
and operation.” 
815
 Id. 
173 
 
 
In Resolution 929 of 22 June 1994, the UNSC stated that “the magnitude of the humanitarian 
crisis in Rwanda constitutes a threat to peace and security in the region.”816 The Council also 
expressed “grave concern at the reports indicating that genocide and other systematic, 
widespread and flagrant violations of international humanitarian law have been committed in 
Rwanda.”817 The Council therefore determined that such a situation “continues to constitute a 
threat to international peace and security.”818 At the same time the UNSC claimed that it was 
“deeply concerned by the continuation of systematic and widespread killings of civilian 
population in Rwanda.”819   
 
Apart from the killings that were taking place in Rwanda, some also believed that the UNSC’s 
action was due to the massive influx of refugees in neighbouring States.
820
 Österdahl, for 
example, remarks that “the Security Council again did not specify, in the context of 
determining that the crisis in Rwanda constituted a threat to peace and security, exactly what it 
was in the incontestably true humanitarian crisis that constituted a threat to international peace 
and security in the region.”821 
 
This is quite troubling. The ambiguity is created by the fact that the UNSC did not clearly say 
which situation constituted a threat to international peace and security.  Was it the continuation 
of killings in Rwanda or the massive influx of refugees in neighbouring States or both? There 
was a diverse situation. First there was a destructive war with its adverse consequences. There 
was a situation of killings that clearly violated international humanitarian law. There was the 
massive influx of refugees, which was in fact the consequence of both previous situations. 
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What could then have been the priority to address? Was the war the priority? Was it the 
violations of international humanitarian law or the influx of refugees? What were the causes 
and consequences of the whole situation? 
 
The action of the Security Council should have clearly been based on a distinction between two 
traditional concepts of “jus ad bellum” and “jus in bello.” Lemennicier distinguishes the              
"just" war which deals with the justification of the war (jus ad bellum) and how it must be 
fought (jus in bello). Jus in bello enjoins parties to “respect the moral principles which govern 
our individual or collective actions. It is thus about a moral reflection on the goals and the 
means of the war starting from an ethical vision of the human interactions.”822 Anderson823 also 
considers these two matters traditionally separated. The reason for such a separation is:  
Because they have been regarded as separate legal and moral judgment, in which a determination that the 
resort to force is illegal aggression is independent of whether the conduct of hostilities violates 
international humanitarian law, and vice versa. Although in theory a single adjudicator could hear both 
the resort to force and conduct questions, and simply maintain perfect independence, in reality the same 
tribunal – even with separate panels – would tend to conflicts of interest, path dependence between the 
two supposedly independence areas. Many questions are raised about the legal propriety of the same 
forum hearing both kinds of substantive questions.
824
 
 
In accordance with this distinction, it may be argued that to achieve the goal of maintaining or 
restoring peace and security, the UNSC must first and foremost conduct an objective, sincere 
and truthful assessment of the root causes of the conflict to be able to put an end to it. Those 
may include the different claims of the belligerents.  The UNSC may also assist the parties to 
arrive at a peaceful resolution of their difference without resorting to armed conflict; or 
enjoining them to halt the conflict when it has started. Urquhart speaks of “a benevolent 
international framework to assist combatants to resolve their differences and to provide the 
necessary protective apparatus.”825 The parties cannot, by themselves, in a violent situation 
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they have created, resolve to face each other and solve their differences. They prefer the 
continuation of fighting.  Coming together may even be extremely dangerous and destructive. 
So the UNSC can come in-between and force the parties to stop fighting. It can neutralise them 
all or neutralise the party that is unjustly attacking the other. The UNSC may suggest the kind 
of concessions each party must make.  The Council may also adopt preventive measures. These 
measures should however be used at an early stage and firmly address the causes that lie at the 
root of the conflict. Defining a conflict in general terms but having in mind the Rwandan 
conflict, Shyaka suggests that:  
The existence of a conflict reflects the presence of antagonisms which, by and large, originate from a 
difference of interests between two or among several parties. For the conflict to outbreak, the parties 
should not only have or pursue incompatible interests, but, they should also more importantly become 
aware of that situation. Consequently, the building process of sustainable peace [...] should consider as 
vital the knowledge of the conflict, its nature and its causes- direct or indirect- and the challenges and 
opportunities.
826
 
 
There is no escalation of violence that is not preceded by a perceived incompatibility of 
interests between groups, asymmetric intergroup power relationships, as well as triggers that 
serve to mobilise or rally a group around its grievances.
827
 These are the effective processes the 
UNSC should undertake.  
 
There is no doubt that the Security Council has prime responsibility to determine which 
measures are most appropriate
828
 for the restoration and/or maintenance of peace. It is also true 
that the Council cannot always, under the guise of discretion and wielding uncontrolled 
enormous powers, resort to means quite alien to the subject at hand and convince others that the 
measure taken was the most effective and appropriate. It is moreover unacceptable that the 
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Council, instead of taking a timely military or diplomatic action, resorts to judicial means to 
cover up its weaknesses and cowardice under the pretence of protecting human rights. A 
distinction must be clearly made between war criminals who violate the “jus in bello” from the 
criminals who are fuelling the war in the pursuit of “jus ad bellum.” Once the distinction is 
made, each kind of criminal must be dealt with separately and not in a confused manner. 
  
The approach the UNSC adopted for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda is exemplified by the 
New Zealand representative to the Security Council when resolution 827(1993) on Yugoslavia 
was adopted. Mr. O’Brien argued that:  
As noted in the resolution and in the Secretary – General’s report, the establishment of the Tribunal and 
the prosecution of persons suspected of crimes against international humanitarian law [are] closely related 
to the wider efforts to restore peace and security in the former Yugoslavia. This is an important point. We 
recall that in the Secretary General’s report of 2 February, the Co-Chairman of the International 
Conference specifically state that human rights and humanitarian issues are the core elements of the 
peacemaking process in the former Yugoslavia. In restating then their advocacy of the creation of the 
Tribunal, Messrs. Vance and Owen stated that the situation on the ground was not acceptable. Since 
February, of course, that situation has not improved; quite the contrary. It is important here to underline 
this, because our decision tonight, and indeed the tribunal itself, do have a context. The co-Chairman set 
it explicitly within the peacemaking process. Implementation of that process and the work of the Tribunal 
must mutually reinforce one another.
829
 
 
This suggests that had the co-Chairman not included the component of the human rights and 
humanitarian law in his report, even as contributing to the peace process, this could not have 
been the concern of the Security Council.  It is a quite interesting, but at the same time an 
embarrassing and shameful situation.  Were the Council to be realistic and pragmatic at the 
time the Resolution 827(1993) was passed, it would have followed the perspective of Mr. 
Barbosa, the then representative of Cape Verde who substantially stated that: 
[…] my delegation considers that the establishment of the Tribunal will be a positive step only if it is 
viewed as closely connected to a suitably comprehensive peace plan capable of preserving international 
peace and security throughout the territory of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Needless to 
say, this will be impossible unless an end is put to the aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, unless the freedom of its people is fully achieved, and unless its sovereignty and territorial 
integrity are respected.
830
 As we see it, the establishment of this Tribunal to judge and punish war crimes 
is an instrument for the promotion of international peace and security. That was the basis of the Council’s 
recourse to this procedure to establish it. We therefore hope that approval of this step will encourage us to 
act in our search for effective solutions to the problems that we confront in that part of Europe, in keeping 
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with the peace plan regarded by all members of the Council as the only realistic framework for providing 
a solution giving lasting peace for the territory of the former Yugoslavia.
831
 [emphasis added] 
 
This was also the Pakistan delegation position.
832
 The Djibouti representative highlighted the 
crucial mandate that the Council could have performed. He said: 
That country will have its peace and its unity restored once the guns have been silenced, the militias have 
been dissolved, the causes of the conflict have been rooted out, the barriers between the regions have 
fallen, when all citizens have rallied round their State, the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
833
  
 
Mr. Olhaye consistently maintained the same position when resolution 925(1994) concerning 
Rwanda was voted on. His statement reflects in clear terms the mandate of the Security Council 
in times of war accompanied with violations of international humanitarian law. The relevant 
part of his argument needs to be strongly overstated here: 
We cannot escape the fact that what is required is a firm and unequivocal demand by the Council to the 
parties that fighting must be stopped forthwith, coupled with measures which clearly show the Council’s 
determination to back up this demand. We cannot continue to push the issues of security and peace into 
the background of human rights headlines, however well it may play at home for some of us. The reason 
we have this tragic human rights situation, with human beings dying every day in unacceptable numbers, 
is precisely that the fighting has been allowed to continue, and, with possible counter-offensive looming, 
it could grow even worse.  […] If there is a lesson to be learned from this incredibly violent episode, it 
may be that, as has been noted many times by a distinguished former senior official of the United Nations 
Secretariat, the United Nations must have a force not defined by national politics, a standing 
multinational force at the disposal of the Security Council. It is an unbelievable travesty for Rwanda to 
burn while the United Nations fiddles. The crime may lie, in fact, not in the violation of human rights and 
the killings, but in the fact that this can and perhaps will happen again, and we will be just as ill-equipped 
to deal with it as we are now.
834
 
 
To conclude this point from a theoretical perspective, Hazan remarks that “a political body [the 
Security Council] has created a legal organ to take action it is unable or unwilling to take 
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itself.”835 The tribunal also reverted to the same observation in its 1995’ Annual Report 
recalling that it was in:  
stark contrast to the usual situation. Usually, legal norms and institutions come ‘after the event’, in 
recognition of a new state of affairs. Judicial institutions dealing with crimes committed in the course of 
hostilities are therefore usually only convened at war’s end. This is what occurred at Nuremberg and 
Tokyo, when Germany and Japan were occupied and many of their leaders captured by allied forces. 
By contrast, the Tribunal has been called upon to dispense justice while warfare, very often pursued by 
illegal means and methods, continues. High-ranking planners and perpetrators of war crimes are still able 
to take shelter from prosecution under the protective umbrella of military or political power. The Tribunal 
clearly can expect no cooperation from those authorities who may have been complicit, or at least 
negligent, in preventing serious violations of international humanitarian law, and it does not anticipate 
that they will surrender any suspects, or themselves, to the tribunal.
836
  
 
The Council relied on Chapter VII solely because it knew its decision would be unquestionably 
binding.
837
 This is a positivist approach deprived of ethical and moral consideration in the 
Kantian categorical imperatives. This diversion also appears in other objectives that the 
Council purported to achieve by establishing ad hoc tribunals, including clearly political ones.  
National reconciliation is one such objective. These unfortunately are unachievable through 
judicial institutions. 
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4.5. The objective of contribution to the process of national reconciliation  
 
 
4.5.1. Defining “reconciliation” 
 
It is not easy to immediately or ever understand how the UNSC intended to attain the objective 
of national reconciliation through international ad hoc criminal tribunals. Etymologically, 
reconciliation is, according to Nebojsa, “about re-conciliation or re-establishing peaceful 
relationships after they were disrupted by quarrels, misunderstanding, insults, injuries and other 
negative situations.”838 With this definition in mind, Rosenberg observes that “the belief that 
international justice serves national reconciliation […] is replete in the constitutive documents 
of the ad hoc tribunals”839 on the one hand. On the other hand, however, Groome supports the 
suggestion that reconciliation may be an important reason to engage in international criminal 
justice.
840
 Yet, Haskell and Waldorf argue to the contrary or question these assumptions. 
According to them, “to date, there is little evidence that international tribunals promote 
reconciliation.”841  
 
Traditionally, criminal tribunals are intended to deliver retributive justice in terms of 
prosecuting through fair procedures and punishing the guilty or acquitting the innocent. 
Reconciliation may demand more than retribution, as it also encompass restoration and 
reparation. How this second function may fit in the work of a criminal tribunal is where the 
inefficiency of ad hoc tribunals lies. It has been demonstrated that criminal justice delivered by 
the ad hoc tribunals has been too selective, indeed too limited and sometimes too biased to a 
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certain extent. From this posture, it cannot be said that justice will be, on its own, an instrument 
of reconciliation. Reconciliation requires more than prosecution. According to Archbishop 
Tutu: 
There is no handy roadmap for reconciliation. There is no short cut or simple prescription for healing the 
wounds and divisions of a society in the aftermath of sustained violence. Creating trust and understanding 
between former enemies is a supremely difficult challenge. It is, however, an essential one to address in 
the process of building a lasting peace. Examining the painful past, acknowledging it and understanding 
it, and above all transcending it together, is the best way to guarantee that it does not – and cannot – 
happen again.
842
 
 
We must remember the multiplicity of offenders and victims, the complexities of the situation 
born out of extremely cruel conflicts; the perceptions and realities of that whole environment 
and context, and so on and so forth. So, more is needed. Before even questioning whether 
international ad hoc tribunals can serve reconciliation, it is necessary to understand what this 
term means. This term is complex, and there is little agreement on its definition.
843
 The term is 
“often used, yet rarely defined.”844 It is “so vague [but] often employed by public 
policymakers, academics, and [the] NGO community.”845 It is Syring’ s opinion that “whether 
reconciliation is best accomplished by truth or justice, the former is generally considered to be 
the strength of truth commissions, and the latter to be the primary attribute of war tribunals and 
courts of law.”846 Reconciliation has its own process, and justice has its own. Criminal tribunals 
may therefore be at odds to perform reconciliation. 
 
There is already a dichotomy around the word “reconciliation” and what it requires to be 
achieved. There is an additional question about its achievement through the prosecution of a 
token of individual violators selectively. Osiel writes that “reconciliation cannot occur, to be 
sure, if the questionable basis of prosecutorial selectivity itself calls the legitimacy of pending 
trials into wide doubt.”847 Yet the concept of reconciliation remains too misunderstood, 
misused, manipulated at will and used with deliberate ambiguity. Groome has eventually been 
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modest in recognising that international criminal justice can only contribute partially
848
 to the 
process of reconciliation.  
 
From the different opinions expressed, two situations arise. On the one hand, there is a work 
that must be devoted to truth commissions that can go deeper and address the ills within a 
society. On the other hand, there is a work of criminal tribunals, which has been found to aim at 
the determination of guilt or innocence of handful individuals. The question remains, however, 
to know to what extent, if any, reconciliation can be achieved through criminal adjudication. 
What does reconciliation mean to start with? 
 
Simply defined, “reconciliation” is the settling of secular disputes between individuals who, in 
the past, lived under temporal or perpetual confrontation, and are now resolved or brought 
together and wish to live side by side peacefully with one another in the same space.  
Unfortunately, “it is not even clear whether scholars and practitioners refer to reconciliation as a 
process, a goal, or both.”849  It is important to understand reconciliation as a process whereby 
reconciliation cannot be solely the work of criminal tribunals. To work, reconciliation must be a 
forum where former antagonists meet and engage.  According to the International Institute for 
Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA):  
Reconciliation is an over-arching process which includes the search for truth, justice, forgiveness, healing 
and so on. At its simplest, it means finding a way to live alongside former enemies – not necessarily to love 
them, or forgive them, or forget the past in any way, but to coexist with them, to develop the degree of 
cooperation necessary to share our society with them, so that we all have better lives together than we have 
had separately.
850
 
 
If those adversaries cannot meet because of the fracture that exists between them, then a third 
party intervenes to assist in the process. This, again, is not a work of a criminal tribunal.  
Reconciliation is not about satisfying only the victims’ claims without considering also the 
perpetrators’ views. Reconciliation “involves the creation of the social space where both truth 
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and forgiveness are validated and joined together, rather than being forced into an encounter in 
which one must win out over the other or envisioned as fragmented and separated parts.”851 It is  
Daly and Sarkin’s view that: 
Generally speaking, reconciliation describes coming together; it is the antithesis of falling or growing 
apart. Reconciliation has a normative – almost a moral – aspect as well. It is the coming together (or re-
coming together) of things that should be together. […] for many, it is encompassed in the question as to 
how a society ravaged by war returns to some kind or normality when neighbours living side by side have 
endured some and perpetrated against one another crimes of unimaginable horror.
852
 
 
The process involves mutual acknowledgment of past suffering and the changing of destructive 
attitudes and behaviour into constructive relationships towards sustainable peace.
853
Ackerman 
concurs with this suggestion. He says: “like most journeys, the process of national 
reconciliation begins with a single step. Divided factions literally meet and sit together for the 
first time in an effort to begin an exchange of views and initiate a process of accommodation on 
past differences. This historic moment acts as a frame for the style, content and outcome of 
further actions.”854 This coming-together, according to Rosenberg “simply requires that former 
enemies hear each other out, enter into give-and-take about public policy, and forge consensus 
where possible on matters of common concern.”855Rosenberg further suggests that: “a 
successful outcome requires all parties to agree that there is a greater advantage in uniting the 
nation than in continuing to be divided.”856 Archbishop Tutu, Former Chairman and leading 
figure of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) defines reconciliation 
as:  
a way to transform individuals, and the whole of society. It is a way to look at perpetrators of human 
rights abuses and see brothers and sisters. A way to look at the victims in oneself and see survivors. 
Through reconciliation, we can see the fluidity of everything in the universe: how the past influences the 
present and the future; how punishment is just the flip side of redemption, how the religious and the 
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political are inseparable, how we are all victims, perpetrators, bystanders, everyone part of the same 
family of humanity. Reconciliation embodies the idea of oneness and everything.
857
 
 
Understood in this sense, reconciliation becomes a process that accommodates everyone 
involved in it. Such accommodation may take diverse forms, including accepting someone 
else’s views and rights; welcoming a person where he could not belong, yet where he is needed. 
It requires personal effort and commitment to start with.  
 
These definitions bring many questions to the table. What role, if any, can an ad hoc criminal 
tribunal play in the process? How and to what extent can it play such a role? How effective 
would it be? Even if reconciliation was a goal to achieve, the work of the criminal tribunal 
towards this end will not necessarily be of assistance. The ad hoc tribunals’ approach, and 
particularly the ICTR’s ambiguous position to reconciliation may better illustrate how difficult 
and complex the situation is to fit in the work of a criminal tribunal.  
  
 
4.5.2. The ICTY and ICTR’s ambivalent, inconsistent and misguided approach to national 
reconciliation  
 
Resolution 955(1994) establishing the ICTR provides that it was the conviction of the UNSC 
that the tribunal would contribute to the process of national reconciliation in Rwanda. Quite 
surprisingly this aim does not appear in Resolution 827(1993) establishing the ICTY.  
However, the ICTY was established following the breakdown and secession of the republics’ 
constituting the FRY. In addition to a tumultuous history that characterised the various 
populations of the federation, the bloody war of the 1990s “stole the lives of thousands, 
damaged infrastructures, destroyed social trust, eroded human decency, and compromised the 
futures of generations to come.”858 In this amalgamation of problems, reconciliation was highly 
needed; even not expressly provided for in the UNSC resolution.  Even then, the ICTY could 
only do little to this complex situation. Citing Hayden, Natalya suggests pessimistically that 
“the ICTY’s work has fundamentally contributed to the problem of competing truths within the 
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former Yugoslavia. Far from helping to establish a broad-based consensus on the basic facts of 
what happened during the wars, the tribunal’s judgments have merely served to entrench 
conflicting and selective ethnic narratives that critically ignore ‘inconvenient facts’ about the 
war.”859  
 
It will therefore be adventurous to indulge in discussing reconciliation in the former 
Yugoslavia, as it then was; and what it has became after the demise of the federation. Bryan 
partly attempted the exercise
860
; yet only focusing on Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and 
Serbia. The current research will not attempt to deal with this wide and complex issue. On 
Rwanda, this section will show, as an illustration from the ICTR experience, that criminal 
tribunals are not proper conduits for reconciliation. It is therefore a futile exercise to undertake 
and apply within and beyond each independent republic born out of the Yugoslavia breakdown, 
the concept of reconciliation.  
 
It may sound too critical when one talks of ICTR’s misguided approach to national 
reconciliation in Rwanda. There is however no other terminologies that can better describe how 
inappropriate this approach has been. According to Wambui, “the record of the Tribunal in 
fulfilling its mandate to contribute to the reconciliation process in Rwanda is notably poor.”861 
The ICTR was solely an attempt to explain to the Rwandan population and to the world what it 
was doing in the remote town of Arusha in Northern Tanzania. The tribunal was prosecuting. 
That was its mandate. Prosecution has nothing to do with the process of national reconciliation 
as defined.  
 
Evaluating the ICTR contribution to reconciliation in Rwanda, Othman, a former ICTR’ Chief 
of prosecution and senior prosecution counsel posits that the aim of reconciliation “remains 
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controversial and debatable and to a large measure still quantifiably unfulfilled.”862The 
prosecution’ official has it right because even the founding fathers of the Statute establishing 
the ICTR were very hesitant as to whether the tribunal will contribute to the process of national 
reconciliation. This was clearly expressed by the representative of the Czech Republic during 
the debates at the UN Security Council when Resolution 955(1994) was passed. He said: 
“justice is one thing, reconciliation is another. The Tribunal might become a vehicle for justice, 
but it is hardly designed as a vehicle for reconciliation.”863  
 
 The manipulation and misrepresentation of the term “reconciliation” by the ICTR officials are 
also demonstrated through their contradictory positions when they address this issue. The 
prosecution’s position is that targeting people to arrest and prosecute from every corner of 
Rwanda may contribute to the process of national reconciliation.
864
 Being aware that the ICTR 
was pursuing a one-sided justice
865
 and could not reach the objective of reconciliation, the 
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spokesperson of the court held in a symposium that the ICTR was “an indispensable forum for 
the search of justice for the crimes of 1994.”866 The prosecutor knew quite well that the crimes 
were committed by both sides; there is no doubt about this. The ICTR was prosecuting only 
one part of the conflict. The Tribunal did not offer the opportunity for those two sides to meet. 
The Tribunal also did not attempt to prosecute the people [at least a few of them] from the other 
side.  This is injustice if reliance is made to the dictum of Aristotle that “injustice arises when 
equal[s] are treated unequally and also when [the] unequal are treated equally.”867 Cultivating 
injustice cannot be part of the process of reconciliation. 
  
The spokesperson states furthermore that “the ICTR has contributed to the reconciliation 
process by establishing an indispensable historical record of the planning and direction of the 
genocide at the highest level of the Rwandan State.” 868 This statement aligns with Schabas’ 
argument that “while theoretical exceptions cannot be ruled out, it is nearly impossible to 
imagine genocide that is not planned and organized either by the State itself or a State-like 
entity, or by some clique associated with it.”869  
 
 The statement as it stands is as speculative as it is biased and disingenuous. It lacks factual 
basis and remains simplistic and meaningless rhetoric. For instance Desforges, more 
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knowledgeable of Rwanda
870
 than Schabas, called to testify as an expert witness in the Military 
Two case, was of the opinion that:  
From April 1992 until the beginning of the genocide in April 1994, the government in charge in Rwanda 
was a multiparty government, including Tutsi representatives, and it is for that reason alone that it is 
impossible to conclude that there was planning of a genocide by the government.  Rather, it is a more 
subtle analysis which has to lead to the conclusion that members of the government in their individual 
capacities made use of their official powers to create a system which could be turned to the use of 
violence, but it was not the government as such, simply because it was a government that included 
Habyarimana's opponents from April 1992 on, and it would simply not have been possible for them as a 
group to have agreed to such a policy.
871
 
 
Whether establishing a historical record is a proper function of a court of law, is still 
disputable.
872
 Assuming that historical recording fits in the functions of the ICTR, it will still be 
“difficult to escape from the conclusion that truth requires total disclosure [because] an ailing 
country needs to know the truth about its past as one of the conditions for its recovery”873, as 
Beigbeder
 
suggests.  
  
Prosecutions at the international tribunals offer at best an imperfectly “truthful record.”874 In 
reality, a criminal tribunal seeks to assess the individual responsibility of a few perpetrators. It 
does not attend to the entire root and spectrum of all circumstances surrounding the 
commission of crimes, especially crimes committed in times of war. A criminal tribunal deals 
with a limited number of cases which it attempts to individualise. This does not allow the 
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discovery of the whole truth about an event. “Despite the tribunals’ efforts to recount the 
historical context for the crimes they allege, emphasising certain legal claims may still preserve 
only a partial record of other aspects of the conflicts.”875 
 
The history that will transpire from the judgments of the ICTR will be a partial account of what 
happened. It will most reflect the prosecution theory of the case, namely that of a genocide 
against the Tutsi, and not the root causes of conflicts among different actors of the Rwandan 
society. Burke explains much better how this approach works. According to him:  
Once people form theories, they fail to adjust the strength of their beliefs when confronted with evidence 
that challenges the accuracy of those theories. Indeed, theory maintenance will often hold when people 
learn that the evidence that originally justified the theory is inaccurate. At the same time that people fail to 
consider information that disconfirms a theory, they tend both to seek out and to overvalue information that 
confirms it.
876
 
 
This is the whole danger of adjudicating events like the ones that unfolded in Rwanda by only 
looking at one side in an international ad hoc tribunal. It perverts history, and does not 
accurately reflect what happened. This perception of events goes contrary to the objective 
scientific approach that “proper scientific method requires researchers to seek to disprove their 
working hypothesis.”877 
 
The ICTR historic record will be that of an African genocide of the end of the twentieth 
century, and nothing more.
878
 Unfortunately, and in accordance with Chuter, “experience 
suggests that people find it difficult to modify their views [in circumstances] when they have 
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made a moral and political commitment to one particular hypothesis in the past.”879 Genocide 
in Rwanda is the conventional wisdom and none is allowed to depart from it. Authorities of the 
tribunal had already laid strong foundations in this purview. For instance, Odora, Former 
Senior aide in the immediate Office of the Prosecutor in Arusha remarks that “the Rwanda[n] 
genocide ended the twentieth century on a note of unimaginable evil.”880 Once again Chuter 
observes that the result is likely “to be an expanding reality gap, as the years pass, between 
what is shown in court and what is believed outside.”881 
 
Moghalu, another ICTR Official also maintains that “the judgments of the ICTR have 
contributed to the individualization of guilt, a necessary element in reconciliation processes as 
opposed to collective guilt that blocks avenues for reconciling fractured societies.”882 Again 
this alone, is not an element of reconciliation as defined. Moghalu’s opinion is based only on 
the prosecution of one part in a conflict that involved two distinct parties with far reaching 
impacts on the society. Moghalu purports moreover that the “ICTR has had the obvious effect 
of largely banishing extremists and extremist political philosophies from Rwanda’s political 
space.”883 First of all the “extremist” terminology was tailored from nowhere. The existence of 
“extremists” in Rwanda has not been proven but appears only in political speeches. It is a more 
divisive than a reconciling concept.  
 
Moghalu advances furthermore that the ICTR has tried highly placed individuals like the Prime 
Minister.
884
 This does not, on its own, constitute an element of national reconciliation. The 
guilty plea of the Prime Minister will be revisited later to show how it was truncated. 
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The ICTR President in turn argues that “the Tribunal is not an enquiry commission. Judges are 
not historians. The purpose of a criminal trial is to establish individual guilt, not to establish the 
historical truth about the conflict.”885 Cassese, who from 1993 to 2000 was also a judge and 
President of the ICTY, shares the same view that “criminal trials […] do not reconcile people. 
On the contrary, they may act as powerful incentives to rekindle past animosities and 
hatred.”886The prosecution has its own view on how the ICTR has contributed to national 
reconciliation in Rwanda. The spokesperson advances another view quite different from the 
prosecution’s one. The judges dismiss any contribution to national reconciliation the ICTR 
might have achieved.  
 
Faced with these multifaceted and contradictory statements from the spokesperson, the 
prosecutor and the president of the Tribunal, nothing consistent is left. The ICTR official 
position with respect to national reconciliation in Rwanda is still unknown. The ICTR’s 
approach to reconciliation has been as ambivalent as it has been contradictory. Those who 
believe that reconciliation has been attained ignore the content of the word “reconciliation” or 
divert its meaning.  It is instead true to agree with Haskell and Waldorf that “the ICTR’s failure 
to prosecute RPF crimes has not promoted reconciliation in Rwanda, as impunity for these 
crimes remains a divisive issue.”887  
 
Reconciliation is not about establishing outreach programs; it is not about creating information 
centres, broadcasting judgments in national languages or creating awareness campaigns as 
sustained by Judge Byron, once President of the ICTR.
888
 Reconciliation does not mean 
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facilitating training sessions of Rwandan judges and students, as it transpires from various 
ICTR annual reports.
889
  
  
An international criminal tribunal can attain the aim of creating an historical account record and 
thereby contribute to the process of reconciliation if and only if it responds to “challenges of 
impartiality and judicial consistency.”890 Judicial consistency is the resultant of a true and 
accurate historical account. This is only possible if the judicial adjudication of past human 
rights violations are fully addressed.  It does not mean that every single violation has to be 
prosecuted. This is indeed impossible. It means that for a conflict involving more than one 
actor, specimen or tokens of every part to the conflict must answer to its humanitarian law 
violations.  
 
Criminal tribunals can moreover contribute to the process of reconciliation when everyone 
finds their place in the tribunal’s process. It is not the case in the Rwandan ICTR perspective 
because what is done is only the continuation of explanations of what the genocide was, how 
the victims feel about it and how they perceive the judgments rendered. The tribunal also 
publicises its work up to the hills in Rwanda, but it does not go outside its confines of 
understanding its mandate as one of only judging “genocide.” ICTR Annual Reports frequently 
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repeat a phrase allegedly to show that the tribunal worked for reconciliation in Rwanda.  The 
phrase reads as follows:  
In order for the prosecution of the persons responsible for the 1994 genocide to contribute to national 
reconciliation in Rwanda it is essential that the Rwandan people have an understanding of and confidence 
in the work of the Tribunal. To achieve this, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) has 
established an outreach programme designed to reach, first and foremost, all sectors of Rwanda society 
and, second the rest of the world.
891
 
 
It has been demonstrated that none of the ideas put forth in this paragraph facilitate 
reconciliation in Rwanda. The question will remain pending after the ICTR closes its doors, 
and Bernard Muna’s, formerly ICTR Deputy Prosecutor, disappointment will increase in that 
his questions were not answered. He stated in a symposium that:  
I am only disappointed to say that we have not talked about reconciliation. How much has the Tribunal 
achieved on the way of reconciliation? Has this Tribunal achieved the aims which were stated in the 
statute of setting up to have reconciliation? Can we really say that the Tribunal has any reconciliation? I 
think this is something we can go into.
892
 
 
Reconciliation is not a function of a criminal tribunal. As a transitional process that brings 
together former antagonists, it better fits in the work of truth-telling commissions. These 
commissions facilitate people to share the blame of the past and offer them the opportunity to 
design the future together.  
 
4.6. Summary 
 
This chapter was aimed at defining the objectives for which the ad hoc tribunals were 
established. The text of the statutes of each tribunal does not clearly elucidate the aims, goals 
and objectives of the tribunals. Objectives appear, however, from the reading of the preambles 
of the resolutions establishing the tribunals. They are an integral part of the resolutions 
establishing the ICTY and ICTR. Justice has been shown to constitute the ultimate objective of 
any litigation in a court of law. The ad hoc tribunals, particularly the ICTR, failed to meet the 
imperatives of justice. There are also many interrogations regarding whether ad hoc tribunals 
are a proper forum for deterrence, retribution and incapacitation.  
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Beyond the traditional expectations from criminal adjudications of offences, the ad hoc 
tribunals were overburdened with the strategic objectives of restoration and maintenance of 
international peace and security which are political objectives. The ad hoc tribunals 
unequivocally failed this mission, which improperly befalls on them. Reconciliation falls 
outside the ambit of a criminal tribunal.  
 
Against the background of objectives which were either overestimated or unrealistic, the 
prosecutor undertook an uneasy task of determining his targets. In particular, the prosecutor 
was not, all the times, guided by his dual role of fighting crimes and doing justice. This 
practice, once again, defeated the ends for which the tribunals were established. In many 
instances, investigations of the serious crimes were flawed targeting some individuals believed 
to be the most responsible for the crimes. The judges did not intervene to redress the situation, 
even where misconduct transpired. This also contributed to the ineffectiveness of the ad hoc 
tribunals. The next chapter analyses how the ad hoc tribunals’ prosecutor investigated the 
crimes, and how he/she behaved in the prosecution process in front of the judges’ passive eyes. 
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CHAPTER 5: THE ROLE OF THE PROSECUTOR UNDER THE 
STATUTES OF AD HOC TRIBUNALS 
 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
Article 16 and 15 of the ICTY
893
 and ICTR respective Statutes vest the prosecutor with the 
power to independently investigate and prosecute the crimes that are material to the mandate of 
the ad hoc tribunals. Article 18 of the ICTY Statute, using the same wording as Article 17 of the 
ICTR Statute, provides that: “The prosecutor shall initiate investigations ex officio or on the basis 
of information obtained from any source […]. The Prosecutor shall assess the information 
received or obtained and decide whether there is sufficient basis to proceed.”  
 
The express provision of the prosecutor’s status as an independent organ, his/her functions and 
the way he/she assumes his/her role, are clear indications of the importance of this office in the 
work of the tribunals. Indeed the prosecutor plays a crucial role with far reaching impact on the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the international tribunals. Without this portfolio, the ad hoc 
tribunals could not have functioned.   
 
This chapter contends that the prosecutor is in charge of defending the public interest and not 
merely an advocate looking at only winning a particular case. This double role requires that the 
person performing these duties be sufficiently trained for the job, but most importantly takes into 
account the ethical and moral requirements of the office. Like prosecutors in domestic systems, 
the international prosecutor is vested with an enormous amount of discretion in the exercise of 
the functions.  The statutes do not provide for any mechanisms of oversight on the work of the 
prosecutor. It is unclear whether the prosecutor assumes his/her office guided by the dual role or 
whether he/she prefers one over the other. 
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violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1 January 
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2. The Prosecutor shall act independently as a separate organ of the International Tribunal. He or she shall not 
seek or receive instructions from any Government or from any other source. 
195 
 
 
In domestic jurisdictions the criminal justice machinery is set in motion by law enforcement 
agencies before the prosecutor can take over. The prosecutor may also act directly from the 
investigation phase through prosecution and appeal. The ad hoc international prosecutor is in a 
privileged position because he heads the investigation as well as the prosecution units. According 
to Boas “in the adversarial structure of international criminal law, it is the prosecution that 
conducts investigations, makes decisions about who to indict, and prepares the indictments 
which determine the nature, scope, and structure of the case.”894 Understanding how the 
prosecutor discharges these functions is fundamental to assessing the effectiveness of the ad hoc 
tribunals. Despite the hierarchical organisation, abuses have been deliberately and maliciously 
committed. Judges have been passive bystanders even though they were aware of the abuses.    
 
In the investigative role, the first duty of the prosecutor is, according to Wouters et al., “to 
research the objective truth. Subsequently, the prosecutor has to extend the investigation to cover 
all the facts and evidence, provided that they are relevant to the case and investigate 
incriminating and exonerating circumstances on equal footing.”895 As will be demonstrated in 
some cases adjudicated before the ad hoc tribunals, the prosecutor failed to thoroughly 
investigate what the accused have done wrong, investigating instead the people and the positions 
they occupied. This is not what investigations are about.  
 
5.2. The prosecutor’s central role and attributes in the administration of criminal 
justice 
 
In most, if not all of domestic jurisdictions “the prosecutor plays a special and unique role in the criminal 
justice process”896though its role may “vary considerably among legal systems.”897 A prosecutor is an 
                                                          
894
 Boas Gideon, The Milosevic trial: Lessons for the conduct of complex international criminal proceedings, op. 
cit., p. 6 
895
 Idem, pp. 377 - 378 
896
 Layton David, “The Prosecutorial Charging Decision”, Criminal Law Quarterly, Vol. 46, Iss. 3&4, 2002, pp. 446 
– 482, p. 449; see also Bubany P. Charles & Skillern F. Frank, “Taming the dragon: An administrative law for 
prosecutorial decision making”, American Criminal Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss.3, 1976, pp. 473 – 506 ( both authors 
equate the prosecutor to a dragon and argue that enforcement of criminal law depends in the final analysis on the 
sole judgment of one person – the prosecutor); Van Patten likewise taints the prosecutor with the capacity to do 
great good, which is unfortunately accompanied by a corresponding one to do great evil,  Patten Van K. Jonathan, 
“Suing the Prosecutor”, South Dakota Law Review, Vol. 55, Iss.2, 2010, pp. 214 – 252; seeing it under another angle 
is Gourlie who compares the prosecution to an atomic energy capable of promoting justice or injustice whatever the 
196 
 
“essential agent of the administration of justice.”898 The prosecutor serves to uphold the rule of 
law and the respect of human rights more generally. In domestic systems, the lack of these two 
attributes may bring the criminal justice system and governing institutions into disrepute and lose 
all credibility and moral authority
899
 over the public. This is derived from the fact that the 
prosecutor’s notional client is a public that seeks the attainment of justice as opposed to victory 
in court.
900
  
 
According to Terzano:   
The role of the prosecutor is not just one of an advocate, but rather an ‘administrator of justice’ whose 
ultimate goal is to protect the innocent, convict the guilty, and guard the rights of the accused. 
Prosecutors—unlike defence attorneys—do not advocate for a single individual; they advocate for a just 
outcome.
901
 
 
Gourlie emphasizes this double role by suggesting that: 
If the prosecutor’s duty to seek justice results in his acting as time-keepers or bloodhound, then his role in 
the administration of justice is clothed in hypocrisy. Prosecution thereby runs the risk of becoming a 
weapon of injustice instead of remaining an instrument for justice. What the prosecutor must guard against 
is the tendency to become too conviction-minded, and the inclination to lose sight of his role as a fair 
minister of justice.
902
 
 
The American Bar Association’ Standards for Criminal Justice (ABA Standards) stresses the 
duty of the prosecutor as one of seeking justice, not merely one of convicting.
903
 These standards 
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and rules provide a duality of functions. According to Caves, this reflects “the prosecutor’s role 
in common law.”904 Groome, both a former Manhattan District Prosecutor and ICTY Lead 
Prosecutor in the Milosevic case underscores that “the prosecutor is not a partisan adversary but a 
judicial officer charged foremost with determining the truth.”905  
 
Describing an American public prosecutor more generally, Gershman posits that “whether rural 
or urban, local or federal, elected or appointed, this official is glamorized by the media and 
diabolized by his foes. […] he has the power to make decisions that control and even destroy 
people’s careers, reputations and lives.”906 Gifford reinforces this idea when he suggests that 
“being charged with a crime jeopardizes employment, reputation, and social standing.”907 It is 
the decision to charge that ultimately shapes and impacts on the criminal justice system at large 
in terms of efficiency, character, and the quality of the criminal justice system.
908
  
 
These two precepts about the status of a public prosecutor apply mutatis mutandis to the 
international prosecutor as well. The international prosecutor is situated at the intersection of 
justice as a basic human right value enshrined in purposes of the UN and equality before the law, 
the presumption of innocence and the right to a fair public hearing.
909
 To be able to equally 
perform these roles, the prosecutor must have special attributes that distinguish him/her from 
ordinary lawyers, even from the judges. 
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5.3. The attributes of a prosecutor 
 
The prosecutor’s specific attributes are threefold, namely independence, accountability and 
professionalism. McKechnie finds a strong relationship between independence and 
accountability. The “independence can only be assured if there is appropriate accountability.”910 
According to the International Commission of Jurists, “prosecutors play a crucial role in the 
administration of justice. Respect for human rights and the rule of law presuppose a strong 
prosecutorial authority in charge of investigating and prosecuting criminal offences with 
independence and impartiality.”911 This is valid whether in domestic or international 
prosecutions. So to say, any successful and unsuspected prosecution needs to be conducted by a 
“counsel of ability, independence, moderation, firmness and restraint.”912 What do these three 
pillars encompass then? 
 
5.3.1. Independence  
 
It is not an easy exercise to calibrate and frame the independence of the international prosecutor 
beyond the common understanding of what the term “independence” means more generally. In 
general terms, the prosecutor’s independence would mean the prosecutor’s ability to apply the 
law to the facts at hand without any other extraneous consideration. How this works practically is 
a matter of further debate.  
 
According to Tak “the topic of dependence or independence of the prosecution service can be 
dealt with from various angles since the level of (in-) dependence is the result of the interaction 
of various elements.”913 Tak identifies and distinguishes between the external and internal (in-
)dependence and the institutional and functional aspects of the (in-)dependence.
914
 “External (in-
)dependence deals with the question to what state power the prosecution service is subordinated 
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or related.”915 Internal dependence “refers to the internal structure of the prosecution service – a 
centralized or decentralized structure – and its hierarchical links.”916  
 
The external (in-)dependence is institutional. It relates to the relationship between the 
prosecution service and the three traditional powers within a democratic government, namely the 
legislative, the executive and the judiciary. The second leg of (in-)dependence, concerns more 
the internal organisation of the office of the prosecutor. 
  
It is crucial therefore to understand the scope of the institutional independence and how it 
transpires in practice. According to Brubacher, this prosecutorial independence refers to “the 
institutional division of power, including the independence of the prosecutor from other bodies 
within the tribunal and the independence from the executive, which, in the international system, 
is considered to be the function of states and some international organisations such as the 
Security Council.”917 There is an issue of administration where the prosecution is part of a 
hierarchical structure. Important, however, is to understand how the prosecution at its own level 
assumes its functions. Is the prosecution executing instruction from above...instructions that may 
indicate what to do and how to do it? It is only when this question is answered in the negative 
that the prosecution is independent. 
 
The International Commission of Jurists remarks that “unlike with judges and lawyers, 
international law does not contain a provision that guarantees the institutional independence of 
prosecutors.”918 Even in the absence of such provision, prosecution independence means making 
a personal best informed and objective opinion on a case without extraneous influence from any 
corner and to take a firm stand. It is a situation where a prosecutor decides, not because someone 
else enjoined or otherwise pressurised him/her to decide in a way rather than in another. The 
decision must be made freely without any influence or not under duress caused by people within 
or outside of the tribunal.  
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Understood in this sense, the independence of a prosecutor may not be different from the one 
enjoyed by a judge. Shetreet argues that “principles of independence in the judiciary are essential 
for ensuring the rule of law, protecting human rights, and securing the continued preservation 
and development of democratic societies.”919 This comprises the personal and institutional 
independence. Personal independence, according to Rugege “refers to the impartiality of a judge; 
that is, the judge’s ability to make a decision without fear, favour, or prejudice with regard to the 
parties irrespective of their position in society – it means the absence of bias.”920  
 
Citing the Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, Rugege argues that “the judge 
should be able to resist intimidation or influence, whether pressure stems from governmental 
power, politics, religion, money, friendship, prejudice or other inducements. Decisions should 
only be based on the facts and the law.”921 Jipping agrees that such independence “is not an end 
in itself but merely a means to the end of a proper exercise of judicial power; conversely, an 
improper exercise of judicial power destroys judicial independence.”922 
 
Briefly, the independence of a judge or a prosecutor is not designed to promote the personal 
upliftment of the individual who enjoys it. It is a tool that the community of rulers and ruled 
recognise in the person of the judge or the prosecutor to properly exercise the function entrusted 
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to him or her. The independence of a prosecutor must be understood in a way, according to 
Gourlie, that:  
political, personal, and private considerations must be set aside so far as the exercise of discretionary power 
is inherent in the office of the prosecutor. No matter how much pressure is put on him due to the heinous 
nature of an offence, the surrounding publicity, or the parties involved, the prosecutor must retain an 
inward sense of impartiality and display outward objectivity.
923
  
 
Hammergren gives a broader picture regarding why independence is so important in the exercise 
of judicial functions which can also extend to prosecutorial functions. He suggests: 
independence serves important social needs: it is not, properly speaking, an end in itself or a way to secure 
the professional position of judges for their own benefit, but rather a means to achieve the goals of a just 
and prosperous society. For this reason, independence needs to be complemented with means to ensure that 
judges and the judiciary as a whole comport with society’s democratic principles and legitimate interests: 
even as they are independent, in other words, judges need to be accountable.
924
 
 
Nevertheless, one thing needs to be borne in mind: “independence without accountability poses 
an obvious danger to the public interest which requires the fair and just administration of the 
criminal justice system.”925 Coldrey926, a former Australian Director of Public Prosecution 
cautioning against independence without accountability, posits that:  
Whilst it is argued that prosecutorial independence is an essential element in the proper administration of 
criminal justice it must be equally recognised that inherent in independence without accountability is the 
potential for making arbitrary, capricious, and unjust decisions.
927
 
 
Greenawalt remarks that the question of prosecutorial authority proved a major point of 
dispute
928
 throughout the negotiation of the Rome treaty. The matter was so important to the 
point that “no aspect of the Court’s institutional architecture has provoked more controversy – or 
proven more central to the United States’ opposition – than has the provision for a standing 
independent prosecutor authorized to initiate investigations and indictments subject primarily to 
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judicial, rather than political, constraints.”929 It is therefore quite surprising that no one has as yet 
questioned the independence of the ad hoc international prosecutor as a matter of principle.  
 
The barometer to measure the prosecution’s independence is not easily available. Would it be 
through accountability eventually?  
 
 
5.3.2. Accountability 
 
Prosecutors should be able to explain what they legitimately and legally do and why they behave 
in a certain way rather than in another.  Bellemare suggests that “accountability has always been 
a key component of the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.”930 McKechnie agrees that “the 
accountability of a prosecuting service is one of the bastions of its independence.”931 This is not 
much demanding from a prosecutor given the special duties and the broader power he/she 
exercises in the criminal justice system, for the benefit and interest of the society. It is critical 
that those duties are discharged responsibly and ethically.
932
 Prosecutors must do their work 
rightly, not necessarily to please everyone, but by offering the best they can offer in the eyes of 
the reasonable man. But what is accountability? Accountability may be defined in simple words 
as the readiness to respond to any legitimate question about one’s behaviour, conduit and action. 
 
Normatively, a point of distinction needs to be made between the Common Law system and the 
Civil Law or prosecutorial system. In the latter system, the Prosecutor General is accountable to 
the Minister of justice, who in turn, accounts to Parliament. This kind of accountability is of a 
disciplinary nature and does not concern prosecutorial decisions.
933
 It is administrative. 
Professional bodies play little role in controlling prosecutors. Common to Civil Law or the 
prosecutorial system is a hierarchic oversight.  
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The Common Law system whose application prevails in international prosecution needs more 
details.  The prosecutor may be accountable or otherwise subjected to control in many ways: 
there are the “normal mechanisms of the court system” and through “internal review 
mechanism.”934 However, Bibas dismisses the courts’ control over the actions of prosecutors. In 
his opinion:  
Individual trial judges are limited by the confines of particular cases and controversies. They are not well-
suited to take the synoptic, bird’s-eye view needed to police systemic concerns about equality, arbitrariness, 
leniency, and overcharging. They lack statistical training and expertise, as well as detailed information 
from prosecutors’ files.
935
 
 
It is even true that there is a little judicial oversight of the prosecution’s power and this oversight 
occurs in very limited and circumscribed cases. In the words of Gifford, few existing “procedural 
protections deal exclusively with questions of guilt or innocence; they do not address whether a 
prosecutor’s decision to charge was made in a fair and impartial way.”936 In respect of the 
supervisory power of the courts, Saylor and Wilson
937
 recall the United States Supreme Court 
position in United States v. Hasting holding that:  
there are only three legitimate bases for the exercise of supervisory power; to implement a remedy for the 
violation of a recognized statutory or constitutional right; to preserve judicial integrity by ensuring that a 
conviction rests on appropriate considerations validly before a jury; and to deter future illegal conduct.
938
  
 
These criteria set a threshold rigidly difficult to meet and convince the court. Bronitt and 
McSherry are also of the view that: 
 the judicial duty is not to ensure fairness in the criminal process, but rather to prevent the accused being 
subjected to an unfair trial and the risk of wrongful conviction. Limiting this duty in this way means that 
judges do not have the responsibility for ensuing fairness during investigation. That said, what happens 
before a trial may hamper the ability of the court to conduct a fair trial.
939
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This inability of the court to control all the action of the prosecutor was expressed by Lord 
Scarman in R v Sang that: “the judge’s control of the criminal process begins and ends with the 
trial, though his influence may extend beyond its beginning and conclusion.”940 In Canada, for 
instance, “judges have steadfastly refused to review [the] discretionary decisions [of the 
prosecutor], even in the face of apparent quasi-constitutional and constitutional limitations laid 
down in the Bill of Rights and the Charter of Rights respectively.”941 The courts only intervene 
when there is an overt abuse of the process “where the court feels that the exercise of a 
prosecutorial power has resulted in an unacceptable degree of unfairness to an accused.”942 But, 
it is also worthy to note that the acceptance of the doctrine of “abuse of process has been slow 
and uneven.”943  
 
The prosecutor may also be accountable to his administrative hierarchy like in the British system 
where there exists “a certain parliamentary control.”944 This is so construed because the [Director 
of Public Prosecution] or DPP “is accountable to the Attorney-General and he or she is a 
Member of Parliament.”945  
 
In domestic systems, the prosecutor’s powers may also be regulated by the Constitution and 
other laws. But the prosecutor’s accountability is not easily achieved. The reason for this is that 
“legislatures have strong incentives to give prosecutors freedom and tools to maximize 
convictions and minimize costs.”946 Constitutions and laws are therefore not sufficient to hold 
prosecutors accountable as a matter of the broader policy of combating crimes at lower costs.  It 
is also worth noting that this kind of accountability varies from State to State.
947
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The last way of controlling the prosecutor’s action is the reliance on ethics as prosecutors 
exercise their function as normal legal professionals. Gershman realises however that 
“prosecutors are increasingly immune to ethical restraints.”948 This observation is quite true 
because “prosecution is a low-visibility process about which the public has poor information and 
little right to participate.”949 Bibas argues furthermore that “prosecutors have great leeway to 
abuse their powers and indulge their self-interests, biases, or arbitrariness.”950 He suggests 
moreover that prosecutors “are tempted to try a few strong or high-profile cases to gain 
marketable experience, while striking hurried plea bargains in most other cases.”951  
 
These observations from knowledgeable scholars and practitioners counter the sustained belief 
that in most instances, prosecutors exercise their discretion in good faith. They support instead 
the idea that discretion is unchecked, unstructured, and largely hidden from the public’s view952, 
criticism and scrutiny.  Gifford goes even further in suggesting that “to argue that all 
prosecutorial discretion is exercised in good faith and that controls are therefore unnecessary is 
to deny reality.”953 
 
Both Gershman and Bibas refer to the American domestic system where at least there exists 
professional bodies that are entitled to take disciplinary action against misbehaving prosecutors. 
Even in this case, Gershman observes that “there has been for some time a sense of frustration at 
the failure of professional disciplinary organizations to deal with such misconduct.”954 The 
reason may be the ineffectiveness of bar authorities.  In Gershman’s opinion, “the failure to 
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discipline prosecutors contrasts sharply with the fairly common use of disciplinary sanctions 
against private attorneys in civil and criminal matter.”955  
 
Bibas enumerates a list of non-exhaustive misconducts and misbehaviours that prosecutors 
commit which go unpunished and undisciplined. He says:  
Many of the cases involved prosecutors who committed crimes, such as bribery, extortion, embezzlement, 
and conversion. Many others involved presenting false evidence, withholding exculpatory evidence, or 
lying to or deceiving the court. The only other significant categories of cases involved criticizing judges, 
neglecting duty, fixing traffic tickets, contacting represented defendants ex parte, and having conflicts of 
interest as a part time prosecutor. In short, prosecutors are disciplined rarely, both in the abstract and 
relative to private lawyers. And when they are disciplined, they usually have committed multiple violations, 
at least one of which falls within the serious categories listed above.
956
  
  
This may be due to practical and institutional reasons that shape the position of a prosecutor. 
Bibas finally advocates for an internal self-regulation within an office of the prosecutor, what he 
calls creating a prosecutorial office culture.
957
 He suggests that this culture must start in law 
schools and continues at work where head prosecutors would “formulate clear policies, follow 
them consistently, ferret out and penalize violations, and reward compliance.”958 There is 
however strong doubt that this can work within an office of an international prosecutor where the 
work is done on an ad hoc basis. Prosecutors also come from diverse backgrounds with varied 
experiences, and without a common office culture. 
 
The question is therefore whether this must go unchallenged, especially when one is dealing with 
international prosecutors. There are no international disciplinary organisations to look into the 
prosecutor’s accountability and discipline. How to design mechanisms and institutions to 
regulate and control the international prosecutor in the exercise of discretion in the event of 
abuse is the crucial issue. The statutes establishing ad hoc tribunals and the Rome Statute of the 
ICC set up prosecution powers but do not provide for the regulation and control of their exercise.  
 
The Trials and Appeals Chamber are also not very clear in holding prosecutors accountable. In 
extreme cases, can professional bodies to which prosecutors belong intervene? Internal 
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regulations within the OTP are likewise designed to facilitate the work of the international 
prosecutor rather than regulate its conduct. Most of the time such regulations are legislated by 
the Chief Prosecutor and aimed at the subordinates.
959
 Turner advises for a balanced approach to 
remedies that are available to curb prosecutorial misconduct, like excluding evidence, staying the 
proceedings, dismissing the case, policing prosecutors through sentence reductions, dismissals of 
select counts, fines, and referrals for discipline.
960
 Yet, this approach does not solve the problem 
of misconduct and accountability. The approach has a negative impact on the normal course of a 
case while the misconduct is the act of an individual prosecutor. It is a sort of court contempt. 
 
Maybe a combination of the domestic mechanisms can help to regulate the international 
prosecutor’s exercise of power. Additionally, an external oversight body completely detached 
from the ad hoc tribunals to oversee the misuse and abuse of the prosecution powers can be 
imagined. The UN Department of Legal Affairs can establish such a body on a non-permanent 
basis. The ICC may also institute an oversight body specifically designed to deal with issues of 
prosecution misconduct on a case by case basis. Those bodies may be modelled to what Terzano 
calls “separate prosecutorial review boards responsible for investigating allegations of 
misconduct and sanctioning prosecutors when necessary.”961 He also suggests  that such a 
“review board should be comprised of individuals within the criminal justice system who present 
a broad range of interests and an understanding of the unique responsibilities of prosecutors, 
including judges, prosecutors, and criminal defence attorneys.”962 
 
Terzano finally recommends that the review board:  
should be unlike bar disciplinary boards in that it would conduct periodic, random, and unannounced 
reviews of closed cases. Its audits would help deter misconduct as well as gauge its prevalence and suggest 
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how it might best be addressed. Additionally, the review board should serve as an information-providing 
entity by making its operations transparent, and its findings publicly available.
963
 
 
How this body can perform its function without interfering in the work of the prosecutor more 
specifically and the work of the tribunal more generally remains to be tested. Yet it is a feasible 
idea which may focus on the failures of individual prosecutors who have deliberately engaged in 
unacceptable behaviour. The normal process of a case should not suffer or be impacted by 
disciplinary or criminal sanctions imposed upon an individual prosecutor. Such an action will 
make international tribunals more effective and improve the prosecutor’s professionalism. 
 
5.3.3. Professionalism  
 
Professionalism in legal practices is better understood when one talks of defence lawyers more 
generally.
964
 The literature on professionalism overuses the semi-phrase “service to client”,965 
“paying client”, 966“keeping cost down for clients who pay more […]”967or even “income of 
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lawyers”968, and so on and so forth.  Professionalism may therefore be perceived as a private 
defence lawyers’ empire that excludes lawyers acting as prosecutors. This understanding is too 
narrow and not justified. According to Terrell, an outstanding scholar who wrote extensively
969
 
on the topic, “being a lawyer, particularly one engaged in private practice seems suddenly an 
embarrassment rather than a source of pride.”970 This statement suggests that professionalism 
goes beyond the private legal practice and encompasses the work of prosecutors as well.
971
 
Prosecutors are lawyers first and foremost. Other practices also have a professional tradition.  
 
Professionalism is therefore a behavioural attribute of people who work in a definite area of life. 
Nothing prevents a prosecutor from shifting from his position as a prosecutor to one of a private 
lawyer or a judge. Professionalism applies equally to all lawyers, including prosecutors. 
 Terrell argues that:  
everyone agrees that professionalism consists of something more than the ordinary rules of legal ethics that 
simply prohibit the worst sorts of behaviour by lawyers. Professionalism is loftier – an attitude, manifest in 
actions, demonstrating that the lawyer holds to fundamental principles that transcend any immediate 
project. Professionalism makes one’s vocation an aspiration. While ordinary lawyering can bring success, 
professionalism evokes praise.
972
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Terrell and Wildman suggest that professionalism is the accepted allusion to the Bar’s ambitious 
struggle to reverse a troubling decline in the esteem in which lawyer’s are held – not only by the 
public but also, ironically by lawyers themselves.
973
 Terrell envisages professionalism as the 
right way of doing a thing worthy to be done,
974
 consciously and out of personal conviction. 
Terrell gives a detailed definition of professionalism as follows:  
Thus, we will assume from the beginning that appropriate lawyering reflects, at the very least, the basic 
qualities of competence, diligence, informational responsibilities, confidentiality, loyalty, honesty, and 
independence of professional judgment that any code of professional duty would demand. All lawyers 
should manifest those characteristics when they engage in their profession. The question here is more 
ambitious: What qualities beyond these expected minima define the best lawyering that one encounters? 
What are the qualities of the lawyers we respect most – the ones typically held up as ‘role models’ for the 
rest of us, the ones whose life story ennoble the profession and thereby inspire us?
975
 
 
To any lawyer “professionalism is no great mystery. It is the expectation among the members of 
the profession that all of them are dedicated to, and respect, the basic value and social function of 
their occupation.”976 According to Lex Mundi, an international body of independent law firms, 
the concept of professionalism must be distinguished “from the more familiar topic of legal 
‘ethics.”977 Lex Mundi further states that:  
Over time, the latter [ethics] has become synonymous with efforts in every jurisdiction to establish the 
minimum standards to which all members of a profession must adhere simply to maintain their licenses to 
practice. Professionalism, on the other hand, is aspirational in character. It is about lawyers at their best, 
rather than their acceptable least.”
978
 
 
It is Lex Mundi’s principle that [the] “demanding values are ‘beyond’ the requirements of the 
rules of legal ethics.”979 
 
Terrell synthesises those qualities in a diagram that combines the ethic of excellence, the respect 
of the legal system, the commitment to accountability, the ethics of integrity, the responsibility 
for adequate distribution of legal services, and the respect for other lawyers.
980
 All these 
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characteristics combined bring to the highest practical value, a principled enthusiasm and an 
engaged citizenship.
981
 
 
It has now been established how the term “professionalism” applies to the work and person of a 
prosecutor. What needs to follow is an exploration for how general professional attributes merge 
in shaping an international professional prosecutor. 
 
Rule 1.1 of the American Bar Association Standards (the ABA Standards), titled ‘Primary 
Responsibility’ provides that ‘the primary responsibility of the prosecution is to see that justice is 
accomplished.”982 This may be so if justice is attained, and it must be, “in a fair and impartial 
manner, within a system that both searches for truth and values the protection of individual 
rights.”983 The ICTR Statute envisages a prosecutor of high moral character, who “possesses the 
highest level of competence and experience in the conduct of investigations and prosecutions of 
criminal cases.”984 The prosecution counsels are furthermore required to “adopt the highest 
standards of professional conduct”, particularly in assisting “the tribunal to arrive at the truth and 
to do justice for the international community, victims and the accused.”985  
 
Chief Prosecutor Louise Arbour pioneered the prosecutors’ regulations specifically emphasising 
that “the duties and responsibilities of the Prosecutor differ from, and are broader than, those of 
the defence counsel.”986 This is so because public prosecutors, and not judges, are “primarily 
responsible for the overall effectiveness of the criminal justice system.”987 In the words of Côté, 
prosecutors are “the public face of this new international criminal justice system.”988 Moreover, 
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and “generally speaking, except in a few specific areas, the functions of the prosecutor in war 
crimes trials do not differ greatly from the functions of the prosecutor in any other area of 
criminal law although they will, of course, differ in details and, frequently, in magnitude.”989 The 
emphasis is put more on the first part of the prosecution’s function, that of doing justice. Doing 
justice starts with a fair assessment of what happened. This warrants the prosecutor’s 
intervention through thorough investigation and prosecution. 
 
 
5.4. The roles of investigation and prosecution 
 
5.4.1. Investigation 
 
Alifano defines an investigation as:   
an examination, a study, a survey and a research of facts and/or circumstances, situations, incidents and 
scenarios, either related or not, for the purpose of rendering a conclusion of proof. When one investigates, 
he/she makes a systematic inquiry, closely analyzes and inspects while dissecting and scrutinizing 
information. An investigation, therefore, is based upon a complete and whole evaluation and not 
conjecture, speculation or supposition.
990
 
 
To this definition, Hogan adds that it is: “an observation or inquiry into allegations, 
circumstances, or relationship in order to obtain factual information.”991 Criminal investigations, 
according to Rod are:  
the systematic search and collection and analysis of information with the aim of identifying perpetrators of 
crime (s); the bringing of those before Courts to answer charges, the compilation of the brief of evidence. It 
involves crime and problem analysis, the interviewing of witnesses, victims and suspects, and intelligence 
and information gathering analysis processes, preparation of the brief of evidence and Court 
appearances.
992
 
 
The investigative process must be distinguished from its finality, which is obtaining evidence. 
The investigator collects information that assists to answer these questions: when, where, who, 
what, how and why.
993
 This means that all information collected is not necessarily going to be 
used as evidence. All evidence will not be presented in court; and some evidence presented may 
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not be acceptable. Such evidence may not be admissible or relevant. The job of the investigator 
consists in collecting all information and screening it, having in mind what is needed to prove a 
specific case, and what will be acceptable by the court. Why are criminal investigations so 
important? To quote from Mattarollo, “the obligation to investigate and prosecute forms part of 
current international and domestic law.”994 According to Human Rights Watch: 
investigations are essential to justice. Their quality and impartiality affect almost every aspect of 
disciplinary or judicial proceedings, from identification of the perpetrator to the strength of the evidence 
and the decision to indict or dismiss. Efficient investigative procedures and resort to an impartial process 
are essential safeguards against abuse and impunity – and against the pain, terror, and suffering that they 
cause.
995
  
 
Though the statutes of the ad hoc tribunals do not provide for a definition of the term 
“investigation” or at least what needs to be done in the course of an investigation, Article 54(1) 
of the Rome Statute of the ICC “contains and extensively describes the duties of the Prosecutor 
while investigating.”996 One such duty, according to Wouters at al. “is to research the objective 
truth. Subsequently, the Prosecutor has to extend the investigation to cover all the facts and 
evidence, provided that they are relevant to the case and investigate incriminating and 
exonerating circumstances on equal footing.”997 In this perspective, a crime investigator must 
remain objective and open to different avenues. Alifano emphasises that an investigator should 
follow the facts wherever they may lead and not attempt to fit certain facts to the exclusion of 
others into a pre-determined conclusion. He must always look beyond the obvious and seek the 
truth.
998
 One may assume that this guidance also applies to the ad hoc tribunals’ prosecutor.  
 
With respect to crimes subject matter of the ad hoc international tribunals, Bang-Jensen et al. 
argue that:  
prior to the commencement of investigations of the type of crimes with which the two tribunals are 
concerned, a comprehensive review of what actually happened during the wars needs to be conducted. A 
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general factual overview of the crimes perpetrated by all sides will determine the investigative strategy a 
tribunal adopts and will influence who ultimately is indicted and prosecuted.
999
 
 
The aim of any investigation is to come out with evidence that is relevant and material to the 
matter being investigated and admissible in a criminal court. “Evidence is the essential work 
product of any investigation and the raw material that judges will work with in their quest to 
ascertain the truth. Obtaining the best and most reliable evidence in a balanced and fair manner is 
the objective of every investigation.”1000  
 
The general definition and the one particular to international crimes investigations emphasises 
the pressing need of thorough, objective and accurate investigations. This work requires that 
some principled guidelines be set up and adhered to. Investigating a crime presupposes first of all 
that a crime has been committed. To this end, an investigator must ascertain the veracity or 
falsity of an allegation that a crime has been committed. The second step is to respond to the 
crime with the necessary energy and resources it so requires. Horgan once again suggests that 
“successful results are proportionate to efforts expended.”1001  
 
Unlike in domestic jurisdictions where investigations are conducted by the police which might 
be a separate entity from the prosecution, in the ad hoc tribunals, the investigation unit is part 
and parcel of the international prosecutor’s office and functions under his full control. It is 
therefore the international prosecutor who oversees the way investigations are conducted. It is 
then fair to conclude that the international prosecutor is in a better position than his domestic 
counterpart as far as investigations are concerned. The corollary of this privilege must also be an 
expectation of a better outcome. The practice reveals however that this has not always been the 
case. Some international investigators go on the job without a clear understanding of what their 
duties entail.  They go into the field with preconceived conclusions about the gravest crimes 
committed and attempt to find evidence to prove them. By doing so however the investigator 
forgets that all the results of his/her action will be challenged in court. 
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In Horgan’s words “an investigation should be designed to accomplish justice by determining the 
accurate detection of the offender and by making it possible in the trial of that defendant to 
sustain the [prosecution] burden of criminal proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”1002 This is to 
suggest that there must be first and foremost a clear understanding of the reasons why such 
accuracy is so warranted. 
 
5.4.2. The need for investigations of international crimes 
 
Human Rights Watch argues that “an effective remedy for serious human rights violation 
requires a prompt, thorough, and effective investigation capable of determining whether criminal 
wrongdoing has occurred and if so, identifying the person(s) responsible.”1003 This is very 
important because the tendency in current international prosecutions is to forge the offender 
rather than investigating him. More precisely:  
Investigating serious violations of international humanitarian law requires a multi-disciplinary approach, 
and requires operational teams of specialists who bring together a range of skills and capabilities. 
Experience has shown that in addition to investigators with a traditional police background, teams require 
the services of military, criminal and political analysts, historians, demographers, forensic specialists and 
linguistics. All groups of investigators can learn from each other, and it is essential that all understand the 
legal structure of the cases and the legal requirements for gathering evidence.
1004
 
 
A professional investigator “must carefully and methodically gather as much relevant evidence 
as possible in the hope that it will be sufficient to reliably determine the truth about the event 
being investigated.”1005 The difficulty with international investigations is the mindset of the 
investigator who goes into the field with some preconceived ideas about the offenders. The 
investigator will go into the field with the gravity and seriousness of the crime in his mind and 
with a so-called prosecution policy.  He will attempt to gather evidence that only advances the 
prosecution theory of the case. Once in the field, the investigator will only look for the 
confirmation evidence; and by doing so he will miss the real evidence. He/she will short-cut the 
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process. One must however not lose sight of the fact that “the media tends to aggressively 
exaggerate and sensationalize criminal activity,”1006 misrepresenting facts, sometimes purposely.  
 
Once one knows clearly the importance of his work, he will look at other advantages of 
investigation in order to avoid bias or side-taking. The investigations must therefore permit the 
individualization of the cases, avoiding discrediting the whole system, organisation or 
individuals. Investigations are also essential as a legal obligation to uphold the rule of law and 
preserve rights, “prevent crimes, punish perpetrators, and ensure that victims have access to an 
effective remedy.”1007  
 
If investigations are to promote accountability “they must meet international standards of 
thoroughness, timeliness, and impartiality.”1008 For a category of serious human rights violations 
like cases in which the death of people is concerned, the only remedy available is judicial in 
nature. This must also be the case when faced with extrajudicial executions, enforced 
disappearance and torture.
1009
 Preparing a court case necessitates investigations of “the most 
careful scrutiny.”1010  
 
Investigation is set in motion “based upon an unfounded allegation that a crime occurred.”1011 It 
is based upon the discovery of few elements that tend to prove that a crime was actually 
committed and that an investigator frames what he is looking for and how far he can go. The 
Institute for International Criminal Investigators’ Manual emphasises that “at the outset and 
during the early stages of an investigation, evidence serves to objectively orient the investigator 
about the case, what investigative problems will be encountered, and what investigative avenues 
should be part of an investigation plan.”1012 It is only upon complete investigations that a 
prosecutor may be able to categorise, target and profile potential suspects. A check list of a 
complete investigation may comprise the following: 
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- Assess what evidence has been obtained; 
- Identify any gaps, ambiguities or inconsistencies in the available evidence; 
- Identify details that need to be established or corroborated; 
- Identify where you may have to go, or who to speak to in order to obtain those details; 
- Determine what defences the suspect may have open to him/her, and 
- Obtain any evidence available to rebut or limit possible defence.1013 
 
Though it would seem impracticable, but the suggestion is that this check list needs to be met 
before initially charging a person.  
 
What is striking however is a perception tending to be a reality that the international prosecutor 
and his team target before investigating. They assume that certain categories of persons are 
necessarily guilty of crimes. For instance, Othman, a former Chief of Prosecution at the ICTR 
writes on “considerations that ought to be taken into account in holding answerable those 
suspected of having committed serious international humanitarian law violations: the ‘big, 
medium and small fish.”1014 If this consideration is arrived at after investigation, it is sound. But 
if it constitutes the criteria to initiate investigations, it is very wrong.  So the three attributes 
should instead read “big, medium and small suspect criminal fish.” It was observed in the report 
of the Commission of Responsibility that “in the hierarchy of persons in authority, there is no 
reason why rank, however exalted, should in any circumstances protect the holder of it from 
responsibility when that responsibility has been established before a constituted tribunal.”1015 
Conversely, it is also true that the responsibility of being in a position should not be a 
determining factor to orient investigation. Only alleged criminal responsibility should, especially 
when profiling and categorising potential targets. It is obvious that the purpose of successful 
investigation is the subsequent prosecution of the suspect.  
 
5.4.3. Prosecution  
 
In simple words the prosecutor’s function is to fight crime. By doing so, the prosecutor redresses 
or attempts to redress the wrong done by an offender. It is quite clear that such a duty is not done 
in the sole interest of the individual who acts as a prosecutor. Somebody else and the society at 
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large benefit from the prosecutor’s job.  The crime does not offend only the victim. It offends the 
society at large. It even embarrasses the offender as well.  Therefore, the prosecutor does not act 
for his own benefit or interest. He acts in the interest of the society. He must therefore meet the 
expectation of the society. Green summarises the true prosecution’s role by recalling the 
Michigan Court opinion in 1872 as follows:  
The prosecuting officer represents the public interest, which can never be promoted by the conviction of the 
innocent. His object like that of the court should be simply justice; and he has no right to sacrifice this to 
any pride of professional success. And however strong may be his belief of the prisoner’s guilt, he must  
remember that, though unfair means may happen to result in doing justice to the prisoner in the particular 
case, yet, justice so attained, is unjust and dangerous to the whole community.
1016
 
 
The prosecutor’s function hangs on a balance between two imperatives, namely that of a zealous 
advocate who seeks to win a case, and that of an officer of the court, seeking justice. In legal 
technicalities, likewise, the prosecutor fights or controls crimes by being efficient. But once he is 
dealing with a particular defendant, the prosecutor needs to adhere to the due process 
requirements.  This is called fairness. The defendant must be given the opportunity to put his 
case before the judges who will decide it impartially. He must have access to means that allow 
him to be familiar with the court processes and culture. He must be given time to prepare for his 
defence.  
 
The corollary of the prosecutors’ twin obligation is about balancing between a career and the 
obligation to serve justice as a moral imperative.  In international prosecutions, specifically with 
the ICC, this antinomy becomes a quest between “the legal duty to give effect to the rule of law 
and the political exigencies of acquiring the support needed to give effect”1017 to the decisions of 
the prosecutor. A good and professional prosecutor will therefore be one who arrives at 
satisfying these equally demanding duties. 
Fisher argues, however, that: 
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Observers have complained about a tendency on the part of prosecutors to prefer the former of these 
‘schizophrenic’ obligations to the later. This is commonly described as a tendency to behave overzealously 
or according to a ‘conviction psychology.
1018
 
 
Fisher’s arguments describe better the ad hoc tribunals’ prosecutors. They prefer 
overzealousness over and above anything else, including fairness. According to Terzano et al., 
overzealouness in the pursuit of convictions can and has led to wrongful convictions.”1019 These 
authors further maintain, in explaining this tendency, that:  
When prosecutors form a theory of guilt for a defendant, confirmation bias and belief perseverance 
can threaten their ability to adjust their thinking, even when confronted with evidence strongly 
challenging the accuracy of their theory. Psychological biases can lead prosecutors to favour evidence 
which confirms their theory, while ignoring or discrediting contradictory information. This 
phenomenon often leads to a “tunnel vision” mentality, where prosecutors and law enforcement focus 
all of their attention and efforts on building a case against a single suspect, often overlooking 
weaknesses in their case or leads pointing to other suspects. Tunnel vision is particularly dangerous 
when the prosecution’s theory is wrong, and the defendant is in fact innocent.
1020
 
 
International prosecutors forget that they are also in charge of ensuring fairness to defendants. 
Carter says it much better by suggesting that: 
we value highly the qualities of playing the game by its stated rules – of convicting the guilty only within 
the boundaries of law – because regardless of how undeserving any given defendant may be of how he or 
she reacts to the disposition of the case, we feel the good society does not wield unlimited power over its 
subjects.
1021
 
  
In domestic jurisdictions to a large extent, prosecutors exhibit a one-sided vision of their role. 
Yet in national systems prosecutors may be wary of the public outcry about their behaviour. On 
an international level, it looks like this concern has not, as yet, alarmed anyone while prosecutors 
perform the same role as in domestic jurisdictions. The international prosecutors are by the same 
token, out of reach of any form of oversight. It will then be very naïve to believe that the way 
prosecutors behave in domestic jurisdictions can suddenly change by a magic move at the 
international level.   
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5.5. Illustration of the international prosecutor’s abuse of power  
 
5.5.1. Commonalties of the prosecutor’s abuse of investigative and prosecutorial powers 
 
As already indicated, at the domestic or international level the prosecutor exhibits a great 
tendency to depart from seeking justice. According to Davis, “if prosecutors always made 
decisions that were legal, fair, and equitable, their power and discretion would be less 
problematic.”1022 However, as Gershman notes, such discretion has become “lawless”1023, 
‘tyrannical’1024 and ‘most dangerous.”1025 In addition to this, some prosecutors do not always 
even follow the rules.
1026
 They assumed that their role is lead evidence aimed at only convicting 
an accused person. 
According to Chuter:  
the mechanics of mounting a trial often militate against attempts to find the full truth of everything. 
Prosecutors will often choose to present only that set of facts that will lead to a conviction. The full story of 
what happened in a particular village at a given time may never be known, because it does not form part of 
the prosecution case, and it is not examined in court. Often, in turn, this is because the truth of what 
happened is probably unknownable, and so the court could not be expected to reach a verdict on the 
evidence available.
1027
 
 
The assumption may be that the international prosecutor is less interested in the discovery of 
truth, than in securing conviction. This tendency leads directly to Chuter’s disappointing 
conclusion about the outcome of international prosecutions. He observes that: 
the contribution of war crimes trials to the establishment of the truth about large and complex episodes of 
violence is likely to be limited and patchy, because trials are actually intended for other purposes than the 
writing of history. But there are also important limits to what trials can discover, even about the incidents 
they address, because of how they are conducted. […] By definition, what is proved cannot be more than 
what is alleged, and what is alleged will often be what prosecutors think can be proved.
1028
 
 
Askin even believes that investigation and prosecution cause insecurity and stress to the 
perpetrators
1029
 or become a tool of intimidation and harassment, as Nemeth suggests.
1030
  
                                                          
1022
 Davis J.Angela, Arbitrary Jusice: The powers of the American Prosecutor, Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 8 
1023
 Herbert L. Packer, The limits of the Criminal sanction 290(1968), cited in Gershman B. L., “The New 
Prosecutor”, op. cit., p. 407 
1024
 Henderson v. United States, 349 F.2d 712, 714 (DC. Cir.1965) (Brazelon, C.J., dissenting); idem. 
1025
 Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 31 J. Crim. & Criminology 3, 5(1940), id.  
1026
 Davis J.A, Arbitrary Justice: The powers of the American Prosecutor, op. cit., p. 13 
1027
 Chuter David, War Crimes: Confronting atrocity in the modern world, Lynne Rienner Publisher, Boulder, 
London, 2003, p. 226 - 227 
1028
 Ibiden, p. 226 
1029
 Askin D. Kelly, “Reflections on some of the most significant achievements of the ICTY”, New England Law 
Review, Vol. 37, Iss.4, 2002 – 2003, pp. 903 – 914, p. 903. 
221 
 
  
Before the ad hoc tribunals, Katz remarked that “there has been relatively little interest in the 
rights of the accused.”1031 In other words, the international prosecutor has acted without restraint, 
investigating whom he wished, charging his target as abundantly as he deemed fit; without any 
kind of accountability, oversight or judicial review. In addition to being a professional as 
defined, the international prosecutor is moreover expected to be a person of high morality and 
expertise. The Chief Prosecutor occupies a high rank in the UN system.
1032
 The Office of the 
Prosecutor forms a compact body composed of qualified lawyers. Altogether they form what is 
called the OTP. But misconduct still prevails. Judges do little if anything to redress the situation.  
 
The arguments are taken from the lack of thorough and consistent investigation and the 
prosecutor’s conviction inclination can be better exemplified by the case of Minister Ntagerura 
and General Kabiligi who appeared before the ICTR. At the ICTY reference will be made to the 
overcharging shown in the case of Milan Milutinovic, Slobodan Milosevic and Radovan 
Karadzic.  These are cases that are used in this research because instances of abuse of power 
have been decried in many other cases not mentioned here. 
 
5.5.2. The Prosecutor versus André Ntagerura and the Prosecutor v. Gratien Kabiligi: an 
alleged meeting and delivery of weapons at the Bugarama football pitch on 28 
January 1994  
 
5.5.2.1. The facts 
 
André Ntagerura served as minister in Rwanda for almost 14 years, until 1994. His last 
appointment was that of Minister of Transport and Communications in the interim 
government.
1033
 He was arrested in Cameroon on 27 March 1996. On 17 May 1996, the ICTR 
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issued an order for provisional detention and of transfer to the tribunal detention facilities in 
Arusha, in Tanzania. He was indicted by the ICTR prosecutor on 9 August 1996.
1034
 His 
indictment was subsequently amended on 28 November 1998. The Trial Chamber unanimously 
acquitted him on all charges on 24 February 2004. The Appeals Chamber confirmed his acquittal 
on 7 July 2006.
1035
 Ntagerura’s trial was a joinder between him and two other accused, 
Emmanuel Bagambiki and Samuel Imanishimwe.
1036
 
  
After a successful senior officers’ training in Rwanda and abroad, Brigadier General Gratien 
Kabiligi served as the Director of Studies at the ESM (Ecole Supérieure Militaire, Military 
academy) in Kigali from 1988 until 1991. He subsequently commanded a battalion on the 
frontline in Mutara sector. He was later appointed as a commander of the Byumba military 
operations sector from 1992 until 1993. Afterwards, he was appointed as the Head of training 
and operations at the Army Headquarters in Kigali (G3); where he remained until July 1994 
when the Rwandan Army was defeated. After the defeat, Kabiligi went into exile.   
 
He was arrested in Nairobi on 18 July 1997 and transferred the same day to the UNDF in 
Tanzania. Like his co-accused, General Gratien Kabiligi was charged “ with conspiracy to 
commit genocide, genocide, crimes against humanity (murder, extermination, rape, persecution 
and other inhumane acts) and serious violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions 
and Additional Protocol II (violence to life and outrages upon personal dignity).”1037 On 18 
December 2008, the Trial Chamber acquitted him on all charges, while sentencing his co-
accused to life imprisonment. The Appeals Chamber reduced Kabiligi’s coaccused sentence in 
its judgment of 14 December 2011.
1038
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What is particularly important for this research is therefore the prosecutor’s allegation that “on 
28 January 1994, Kabiligi participated in a meeting in Cyangugu prefecture involving the 
distribution of weapons”1039 along with Ntagerura and others. 
 
Andre Ntagerura was charged with genocide
1040
, extermination as a crime against humanity
1041
 
and serious violations of Article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol 
II.
1042
 It is interesting to read from the Trial Chamber judgment that the prosecutor offered to 
“plead all material facts underpinning the charges against an accused in the indictment with 
sufficient details.”1043 The prosecutor also acknowledges that “the mode and extent of an 
accused’s participation in alleged crime are always material facts that must be clearly set forth in 
the indictment.”1044 
 
In dismissing the charge of genocide (deliberately inflicting on members of the Tutsi ethnic 
group conditions of life calculated to bring about their destruction in terms of Article 2(2)(c) of 
the Statute), the Trial Chamber argued that the allegation was not charged in the indictment. It 
only appeared in the prosecutor’s Closing Brief.1045 Other paragraphs tending to plead genocide 
were also dismissed. The various reasons were that “the supporting allegations, even if proven, 
could not constitute the material elements of the crimes of conspiracy”1046 to commit genocide. 
Other paragraphs in this respect were “impermissibly vague and fail to plead any identifiable 
criminal conduct on the part of the accused.”1047 Moreover, the prosecutor conceded that it had 
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not offered proof in respect of some allegations. Other allegations were not proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt.
1048
 
 
Andre Ntagerura was also charged with extermination as a crime against humanity under Article 
3(b) of the ICTR Statute. This charge was dismissed because the allegations that supported this 
charge were vague and did not plead any criminal conduct of Ntagerura. The prosecution also 
conceded that it failed to prove those allegations beyond reasonable doubt.
1049
  
 
The charge of serious violations of Article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions and Additional 
Protocol II did not succeed because of the same reasons of vagueness
1050
 or because the 
prosecution conceded it did not lead to any related evidence. The prosecution also failed to meet 
its burden of proof beyond reasonable doubt. 
 
5.5.2.3. Aspects of prosecutor’s abuse of power in these cases 
 
The crucial question is not whether the allegations in the indictment were impermissibly vague, 
that the evidence did not attain the acceptable threshold of proof beyond reasonable doubt or that 
the prosecution conceded it did not lead to enough evidence to sustain a conviction. The problem 
lies elsewhere, namely in the prosecution’s attempt to mislead the Trial Chamber on facts it 
tendered. The Chamber, on its side, did not remedy the situation. 
 
In the Ntagerura case, evidence was actually provided, but the prosecution knew that some of 
that evidence was false or otherwise fabricated. It was not evidence that resulted from an 
investigation as defined in this chapter. The prosecutor also hid evidence favourable to Mr. 
Ntagerura and Kabiligi. Unfortunately, the Trial Chamber did not allude to these forms of 
misconduct. By not doing so, it is suggested that the Chambers, in these cases, and the Trial 
Chambers in general, deliberately encouraged prosecution misconduct in these two cases. 
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For instance in the Ntagerura case, the prosecution knowingly provided evidence through 
witness LAI that “on 5 January 1994, at around 5:00 PM, he was present when Bagambiki and 
Commander Bavugamenshi met at Munyakazi’s home [in Bugarama, South Western Rwanda], 
where they discussed an upcoming visit by Ntagerura planned for Democracy Day on 28 January 
1994.”1051LAI testified that “on the morning of 28 January 1994, Ntagerura, Bagambiki, 
Kabiligi, and another soldier arrived at the Bugarama football field in a helicopter to deliver 
weapons to Munyakazi.”1052  
 
To corroborate this incident, the prosecution also led witness LAJ who alleged that he was 
present on the site on 28 January 1994
1053
 and heard Ntagerura delivering a speech that “the 
situation has become increasingly serious and that they had to be extremely vigilant at all times 
because, the enemy, the Tutsis who were killing Hutus, could attack at any time […].1054 The 
prosecutor moreover called witness LAP, who alleged that he was in Bigogwe camp in North 
Western Rwanda where he saw Ntagerura, Kabiligi and the helicopter from which he personally 
offloaded firearms, grenades and ammunitions, on the same day at around 09:30 AM. He alleged 
that “he heard both Ntagerura and Kabiligi say that they were heading to Cyangugu.”1055 
 
Ntagerura denied the allegations in testifying that he did not go to Bugarama as alleged. General 
Kabiligi testified that:  
he did not visit the Bigogwe camp or Bugarama in a helicopter with Ntagerura to supply arms to 
Interahamwe. Kabiligi testified that, between 27 January and 8 February 1994, he was in Cairo, Egypt, on a 
government mission concerning officers’ training which was approved by an order signed by the President 
on 19 January 1994. On his return to Kigali, he submitted a report addressed to the President of Rwanda 
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concerning the mission. Kabiligi testified that he travelled to Egypt on a diplomatic passport, which he 
returned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Rwanda.
1056
  
 
Upon examination of the testimonies of prosecution witnesses LAI, LAJ and LAP, the Trial 
Chamber concluded that there was an inconsistency which “draws the credibility and reliability 
of their evidence into question.”1057  
 
The prosecution appealed against the Trial Chamber’s finding. It alleged that “ the Trial 
Chamber did not apply any caution to his [Kabiligi’s testimony] that he was out of the country 
on 28 January 1994, but accepted it and used it to discredit the evidence of Witnesses LAI, LAJ 
and LAP, who had claimed to have seen him on this date.”1058 The Chamber also found that the 
“prosecution failed to prove Ntagerura’s participation in these events beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”1059 
  
The Trial Chamber however failed to indicate that this was a prosecutor’s misconduct, and not 
simply an inconsistency between the prosecution’s witness account. One may even say that it 
was a pure fabrication of a seemingly corroborative evidence of an event which did not take 
place. This is so because as earlier as 22 September 1997, namely one month and 4 days after 
Kabiligi’s arrest, the prosecutor knew that Kabiligi did not deliver weapons at the Bugarama 
football pitch. Therefore he could not be in Bugarama on that day with Ntagerura. In Kabiligi’s 
own trial ( Military One Case), the prosecution herself tendered into evidence a letter dated 17 
January 1994, in which the Rwandan Ambassador to Egypt informed the Defence Ministry of 
Egypt on the arrival of Kabiligi (then a colonel) with another Rwandan officer. The letter 
substantially read that:  
the delegation will be composed of two people, namely colonel Gratien Kabiligi, head of the delegation and 
officer in charge of operations of the Rwandan Army General Staff, and Lt-Colonel Cyprien Kayumba, 
Director of Finances at the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Rwanda.[…].
1060
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On 22 September 1997, the then Deputy Prosecutor of the ICTR, Mr. Bernard Muna received 
another letter from the Egyptian Embassy in Kigali. This letter referred to a previous one 
eventually from the OTP dated 18 September 1997 in which “you [the prosecutor] seek 
assistance and cooperation for the investigation concerning colonel Kabiligi, a Citizen of 
Rwanda, under the Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda.” The Embassy wrote:  
Upon receipt of your note, I contacted the concerned authorities in Egypt who informed me of the 
following: 
1. Colonel Kabiligi arrived in Cairo on 28/03/94 
2. He joined the seminar organized by the Nasser High Military Academy on   29/03/94 
3. On 07/04/94 the Academy received a note from the Embassy of Rwanda in Cairo asking to cancel 
colonel Kabiligi’s participation in the seminar due to the development taking place in his country 
and that he will be leaving Cairo the same day 07/04/94.
1061
 
 
Probably due to mismanagement or disorganisation within the OTP, another letter was addressed 
to the Egyptian Embassy in Kigali by Laurent Walpen, Chief of Investigations and Deputy 
Prosecutor on 12 March 2002. It was a request for information concerning travels of Colonel 
Gratien Kabiligi to Egypt during the months of January to April 1994. The letter said 
substantially that:  
the Office of the Prosecutor has in its possession information to the effect that colonel Gratien Kabiligi 
visited Egypt from January to February 1994 and March to April 1994 for official business with the 
Egyptian Ministry of Defence and a Seminar at the Nasser High Military Academy respectively. We are 
trying to establish the exact dates on which colonel Gratien Kabiligi entered and left Egypt on those 
occasions […].
1062
  
 
On 28 May 2002, the Embassy answered once again that it was closely following up on the 
subject with the Egyptian authorities.
1063
  On 20 June 2002, the Embassy posted the following:  
I have the pleasure to inform you that the competent Egyptian authorities have focused aggressively on that 
matter giving it the attention it deserves and that the registers thoroughly consulted show the following 
information: 
1. Arrival of the suspect to Cairo from Ethiopia on January 27th, 1994 
2. Departure to Rwanda on February 8th, 1994 
3. Arrival from Kenya on March 28th, 1994 
4. Departure to Saudi Arabia on April 8th, 1994.
1064
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Davis
1065
 identifies some of prosecutorial misconducts. Among those are the failure to disclose 
exculpatory evidence and the use of false or misleading evidence.
1066
 It is crystal clear that the 
prosecutor in Ntagerura and Kabiligi case hid evidence, or did not disclose evidence that 
Kabiligi and Ntagerura were not in Bugarama on 28 January 1994. This is the first misconduct. 
The second misconduct is that the prosecutor deliberately and knowingly led evidence 
particularly through its witnesses LAI, LAJ and LAP tending to prove that Kabiligi was in 
Bugarama on that date. The prosecutor had information that this was not the case as Kabiligi was 
in Egypt. Witness LAI testified in the Ntagerura case from 17 September 2001. LAJ testified in 
the same case from 23 October 2001 as did witness LAP.
1067
 Witness LAI was called again to 
testify on the same false fact of 28 January 1994 in the Military II case from 31 May 2004. It is 
likely that this witness was also to be used in Munyakazi’s case in regards to the disclosed 
material, particularly transcripts in Ntagerura case.  
 
With regard to the organisational structure of the OTP, the prosecutor could not ignore that the 
event of 28 January 1994 did not take place.  Calling witnesses to testify to a false event without 
taking time to check on their veracity is first of all disingenuous and unprofessional. The 
prosecutor misused the funds it could have used for a proper case. The Trial Chamber judges 
likewise did not apply their mind to this particular despite the information on its falsity that was 
availed to it. This is an instance where one may assume that judges encourage prosecution 
misconduct. Davis writes again that: “when misconduct is neither acknowledged nor punished, 
the line between acceptable behaviour and misconduct begins to blur. […] When the law is 
broken by the very people the public trusts to enforce the law, meaningful action must be 
taken.”1068 Nothing was done in this case. 
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5.6. Accused charged and prosecuted, not because of what they have done, but 
because of who they were and the position they occupied: lack of thorough 
investigation 
 
The analysis of some ad hoc tribunals’ cases reveals that the prosecution charged and prosecuted 
the accused, not pursuant to evidence of their involvement in the commission of the crimes 
alleged; but because of the position of authority the person occupied. The prosecutor did not play 
by the rules. The judges also complacently worked in the same purview. According to Judge 
Møse:
1069
  
From the outset, the Prosecutor focused on investigating and prosecuting individuals who had held 
important positions in Rwanda in 1994. This policy has been maintained over the years, and has since 
become an explicit part of the Completion Strategy for both tribunals, as expressed in Resolution 
1503(2003). The Tribunal’s focus on leadership is illustrated by the fact that the accused who have been 
apprehended include one prime minister, 14 ministers, six prefect, 11 bourgmestres (mayors), high-ranking 
political, military and media personalities, as well as members of the clergy.”1070 
 
Judge Møse’s remarks are in contrast with the view of Taylor, an American senior prosecutor 
at Nuremberg. He was wondering what to do of an arrested person. According to Taylor, 
 the first question a prosecuting attorney asks in such a situation is ‘Where’s the evidence?.’ The blunt 
fact was that despite what everybody knew about the Nazi leaders, virtually no judicially admissible 
evidence was at hand. Unless it could be found, all the care put into drafting agreements and 
organisation plans would be wasted efforts.
1071
  
 
The ad hoc tribunals have, overtime, developed practical considerations upon which they base 
their decisions for investigation and prosecution.  Yet there still is an unexplored grey area of 
discretion which raises many unanswered questions. In deciding what and who should be 
investigated, investigators must make choices. These choices must be justified by objective 
criteria. The ICTY Prosecutor Office’s investigative guidelines regarding the commencement of 
investigations and the selection of targets of investigations placed emphasis inter alia on the 
following factors: (1) the seriousness of the crimes, the number of victims, the duration of the 
offences and the scope of destruction; (2) the role of the person under investigation, especially 
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his position in the political or military hierarchy, the extent of his authority, and his alleged 
participation in the crimes under investigation; and (3) whether the persons and the crimes to be 
investigated were exceptionally notorious, even though the person did not hold a formal 
hierarchical position.
1072
  
 
The worry here is that the primarily criterion is number 2 regarding the position of the suspect in 
the political and military hierarchy and the extent of the accused authority. The participation in 
the crimes can only be established after a thorough investigation. The prosecutors have, at many 
occasions, acknowledged that evidence of such participation was not easily obtainable. They 
therefore resort to a bottom-up construction of the case in view to catching the leaders.  
Prosecutors are not alone in such a construction enterprise.  Rather, they are assisted by 
anticipated research by academics, but most importantly by politicians whose aims are more or 
less getting rid of the person they believe to be most responsible, not necessarily of the crimes, 
but of the overall political mess. In the case of Milosevic, as depicted by one Cigar of the U.S 
Marine Corps School of Advanced War fighting, tells it all.  Cigar painted Milosevic’s picture in 
1996, years before Milosevic was eventually arrested. There is little doubt that Cigar’s analysis 
was not considered and even used by those who mounted the indictment against Slobodan 
Milosevic. He suggests that: 
In fact, a colleague of mine and I are putting together a study on responsibility, the issue of responsibility. 
He [Milosevic] has both command responsibility, which is an indirect form, and also more direct 
responsibility. He had authority, both legal and factual, over many of the forces and agencies which were 
directly engaged in these acts. He had the power and the knowledge, both constructive knowledge and 
actual knowledge of what was going on and without his involvement or the involvement of agencies 
subordinate to him much of this would not have happened. I think that he bears a very great proportion of 
the responsibility for that. He certainly is the prime mover and has been until very recently. […] But even 
with the Army, Milosevic is one of the three people on the Supreme Defense Council which really 
regulates Army policy. It’s an interlocking system. He is the head of the government. He is also the head of 
the ruling party. All of these people, if you want, in Serbia are part of the party. They are all subordinate to 
him. It is still an ideological political party. He has multiple channels for information, multiple channels of 
authority, and multiple channels for control. You can’t abdicate command either. So these agencies, when 
they act, eventually ultimate responsibility for them has to go back to one individual.
1073
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Prosecutors do not need to construct a case in this way. What needs to be done is to appropriately 
investigate the person whatsoever her previous position might have been, and prove a case 
against him if any. But the position a person occupied should not be an ultimate criterion to focus 
on. What needs more focus is the crime and its gravity irrespective of who committed it. Sistare 
concurs with this position in arguing that “liability based on personal characteristics represents a 
more serious violation of the act doctrine than does vicarious liability. As there are other means 
for dealing with significant criminal conduct related to personal characteristics.”1074  
 
The position a person occupied in the administrative, political or military hierarchy is a personal 
circumstance which has nothing to do with his criminal propensity. This becomes clear when one 
looks at the investigation and prosecution phases. In the Blaskic case, the Trial Chamber held 
that: 
Keeping in mind the mission of the Tribunal, it is appropriate to attribute a lesser significance to the 
specific personal circumstances. Although they help to explain why the accused committed the crimes they 
do not in any event mitigate the seriousness of the offence. Furthermore, these circumstances may 
aggravate the responsibility of an accused depending on the position he held at the time of the acts and on 
his authority to prevent the commission of crimes.
1075
 
 
At the ICTR, according to Othman, considerations are (1) the nature and seriousness of the 
crimes, (2) the military or paramilitary rank or government position of an alleged perpetrator, (3) 
the significance of legal issues involved in the case, (4) the prospect of arresting the suspect, and 
the impact of the case on the resources of the office.
1076
 It has been demonstrated how 
disingenuous some of these criteria are which fail to meet the criminal goals. 
 
5.6.1. Milan Milutinovic case 
 
Milan Milutinovic
1077
 was an elected President of the Republic of Serbia from December 1997 to 
December 2002.
1078
 He was arrested, detained and prosecuted, not because of what he has done, 
but because of what he was and the position he occupied. The prosecution alleged that 
“Milutinović, having been elected by the people as the President of Serbia, and enjoying an 
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effective security of tenure during his term, was one of the most prominent and powerful 
political figures of the FRY and Serbia.”1079 Were the prosecutors to arrive at such a 
classification after thorough investigations once again, this would make sense. The indictment 
against him further states that:  
being the President of Serbia during the times relevant to the Indictment, [Milan] represented Serbia 
and conducted its relations with foreign states and international organisations; (b) was a member of the 
supreme Defence Council (“SDC”) of the FRY, and thereby participated in decisions regarding the use 
of the VJ and exercised command authority over the MUP units subordinated to the VJ during the state 
of war; (c) had the authority, in conjunction with the Assembly of the Republic of Serbia  […], to 
request reports from the Serbian Government, concerning matters under its jurisdiction, and from 
the MUP, concerning its activities and the security situation in Serbia; (d) had the authority to 
dissolve the National Assembly and with it the Serbian Government; and (e) had the power, during a 
state of war, to enact measures normally under the competence of the National Assembly, including 
the passage of law.
1080
 
 
According to the prosecution, the accused “planned, instigated, ordered, committed, or otherwise 
aided and abetted in the planning, preparation, or execution of these crimes. Within the scope of 
“committing”, he allegedly participated in the joint criminal enterprise […]. He allegedly 
contributed to the joint criminal enterprise using the de jure and de facto powers available to 
him.”1081 Milutinovic was charged personally under Article 7(1) and as a superior under Article 
7(3). His mens rea, according to the Indictment, may be inferred from a number of factors, 
“namely his knowledge of the likelihood that forces of the FRY and Serbia would commit crimes 
in Kosovo.”1082  
 
The indictment alleged that he participated at many meetings with other senior governmental 
officials including President Slobodan Milosevic. During these meetings, important decisions 
would be taken, some of which favoured criminal activities for which other individuals were 
found guilty.  He also had access to various information related to crimes committed in Kosovo.  
 
A primary observation is, however, that most of the alleged conducts fall into the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia’s constitution, and could therefore be considered a legitimate exercise of 
power in a sovereign State. For example, the Trial Chamber found that “the SDC retained de jure 
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command over the VJ during wartime, in accordance with the FRY Constitution”1083 as were 
“decisions on appointments of VJ Generals.”1084 However a review of all prosecution’s 
allegations in this case may assist to comprehend the overall confusion that the prosecution 
entertains in indicting high profile personalities. 
 
As President of Serbia, the prosecution argues that Milutinovic, “wielded a significant degree of 
de facto power and influence over various bodies, since he was a close political confidante of 
Milosevic, and had even exerted a degree of influence over him.”1085Looking at how the 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was drafted, the Trial Chamber concluded 
that “Milutinovic had no direct control over the VJ, nor could he issue orders to its units. Indeed, 
[…], his only formal connection with the VJ was by virtue of his ex officio membership in the 
SDC.”1086 In fact, those powers were vested in Milosevic.  
 
Concerning his participation in the deliberations and decisions of the SDC, the Trial Chamber 
reviewed a number of such meetings at which Milutinovic participated, and concluded that “none 
of the SDC records indicate formulation or implementation of the common purpose articulated in 
the Indictment.”1087  
 
It was also alleged that Milutinovic participated in meetings of the Supreme Command in 
wartime. Though he actually did not participate during the NATO bombing over Kosovo and 
was seen less than two times in the building of the Supreme Command Staff
1088
, the Trial 
Chamber was of the view that “Even though in theory Milutinovic still had a formal role in the 
command structure of the VJ, the real commanding at that point was done by the Supreme 
Commander, Slobodan Milosevic, using the decision of the SDC issued on 4 October and 
approving for defence of the country in case of an attack by NATO.”1089 
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Here the Trial Chamber could have emphasised that rather than being criminal activities, these 
duties fall legitimately in the job description of any one assuming the office of the President. 
They need not be confused with criminal activities unless proof that they were could be shown. 
The chamber acknowledged that those meetings fall within the ambit of the Constitution of the 
FRY. But the Trial Chamber did not say anything as to whether these meetings were part and 
parcel of a sovereign state. Had the Trial Chamber said that, this could have discouraged the 
prosecution’s further attempts to mount unnecessary indictments based on legitimate powers.  
 
 The prosecution moreover contends that “Milutinovic attended numerous meetings with the 
highest political, military, and police leadership where information on Kosovo was exchanged, 
plans for future actions were discussed, and decisions were made.”1090 Some of those meetings 
“related to the political and security situation in Serbia and how it was reflected in the situation 
in Kosovo.”1091 Milutinovic’s participation in some miscellaneous meetings “shows that his 
contributions were either related to the Holbrooke – Milosevic Agreement or were general 
morale-boosting speeches, designed to ameliorate concerns of the officials working in 
Kosovo.”1092 
 
It was also alleged that as the President of Serbia, Milutinovic  
had several powers available to him that he could have used to make it ‘significantly more difficult for the 
crimes charged’ to occur. In deliberately omitting to do so, in spite of his knowledge of the crimes 
committed by the VJ and the MUP, he contributed to the plan to modify the ethnic balance of the province 
in order to ensure control over it.
1093
 
 
Against this allegation, “the Chamber is of the view that the prosecution failed to explain and 
show how the ID Decree actually worked in practice in order to achieve the aim of the joint 
criminal enterprise.”1094 
The Trial Chamber articulated that:  
the purpose behind all four decrees described in detail above, is open to an interpretation other than the one 
suggested by the Prosecution, namely that, rather than encouraging expulsion they appeared to have been 
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ensuring increased police control over the whereabouts of the population within Kosovo, as well as 
increased control over the younger members of that population.
1095
 
 
This was quite an easy inference that the prosecution could have drawn itself rather than making 
it a chargeable offence. The Trial Chamber declared itself “unable to draw an inference adverse 
to Milutinovic from the evidence surrounding the decrees.”1096 
 
As far as Milutinovic’s efforts to negotiate a peaceful settlement with Kosovo Albanians, the 
prosecution alleged that “these meetings obstructed any real efforts at reaching an agreement 
with credible Kosovo Albanian representatives, since they were attended only by 
unrepresentative Kosovo Albanians. They also served to divert attention away from the crimes 
being committed by the forces of the FRY and Serbia.”1097 On reasonable grounds and in an 
articulated charging strategy, the prosecution could have arrived, even before charging, at a 
conclusion that Milutinovic was not the one choosing his adversaries in negotiations. 
 
The Trial Chamber held that “against that background, particularly in light of the refusal of the 
Kosovo Albanians to negotiate and the evidence of Petritsch, it cannot be concluded that 
Milutinovic, who participated so actively in the negotiation process and appeared to be willing to 
meet the leading representatives of the Kosovo Albanians, was obstructing any genuine attempt 
at a solution.”1098 
 
The prosecution contended moreover that “Milutinovic exhibited an obstructive attitude during 
his interactions with international representatives. Furthermore, even when agreements were 
reached, he continued to obstruct their implementation.”1099 The prosecution knew and had at its 
disposal evidence that “during all three meetings described above, Milosevic was the one making 
decisions and was the final authority in the country.”1100 Yet the prosecution did not disclose that 
information in favour of Milutinovic. The prosecution was further aware of the fact that 
“Milosevic was responsible for making security force decisions, which then Sainovic was then to 
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implement in Kosovo.”1101 But the witness who testified on these last two meetings could not 
leverage certainty prompting the Trial Chamber to be “unable to rely on his evidence that 
Milutinovic participated in any meeting with Phillips. Indeed, this uncertainty on behalf of 
Phillips would suggest that he was not concerned with what Milutinovic was doing at the 
time.”1102  
 
The evidence summarised above shows that in those meetings with international actors, namely 
with NATO officials and the KVM, Milutinovic “did not take an active role during the same and 
never stood out as somebody who had much influence or involvement in the discussions.”1103 
 
On Milutinovic’s attitude towards implementation, the Trial Chamber found that it was “not 
satisfied that the purpose of Milutinovic’s visit to the MUP Staff in Kosovo was to encourage 
MUP officials to breach the October Agreements as alleged by the Prosecution.”1104 For his 
alleged obstructionist attitude in the Rambouillet negotiations
1105
, the Trial Chamber found that 
“all sides were ultimately to blame for the failure of the negotiations at Rambouillet.”1106 It was 
also the Chamber’s view that “the evidence of Milutinovic’s criticisms of the process in the later 
stage of the negotiations does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that he did not want to 
achieve an agreement and avoid the NATO threat.”1107 The evidence furthermore shows that “the 
decision on whether to accept the agreement was ultimately in Milosevic’s hands, and that, 
therefore, neither Milutinovic nor Sainovic had the power to make [a] decision to the 
contrary.”1108 The Trial Chamber was therefore not satisfied that “Militinovic personally 
exhibited an obstructive attitude aimed at ensuring their failure. The evidence is equally open to 
the interpretation that he was endevouring to secure a deal that would be accepted by the 
FRY/Serbian authorities.”1109 
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It was also contended that Milutinovic met with Ibrahim Rugova, the leader of the LDK. 
According to the prosecution this proves that Milutinovic knew of the crimes that were being 
committed in Kosovo.
1110
 It was the prosecution’s case that those meetings, “rather than being 
genuine attempts to reach an agreement, were ‘part of a propaganda campaign to divert attention 
from crimes being committed’ and to discredit Rugova in the eyes of the Kosovo Albanian 
population.”1111 According to the Chamber, these meetings amounted to propaganda to induce 
NATO to cease its bombardment.
1112
 The chamber dismissed allegation of Milutinovic influence 
within the SPS party because it had “very little evidence” of such alleged influence, and that  he 
was not always in good terms with SPS members in Kosovo.
1113
 
 
There were many other issues raised by the prosecution, including his personal and professional 
relationships and dealings between Milutinovic and Milosevic.
1114
In the lengthy indictment, the 
prosecution argued that “Milutinovic shared the intent to further the common purpose of 
modifying the ethnic balance in Kosovo through criminal means and that he made statements to 
that effect.”1115 Against the prosecution’s contention, the Trial Chamber held that “much of the 
evidence outlined above and used by the Prosecution to prove Milutinovic’s state of mind has 
been deemed insufficiently reliable.”1116  
 
The prosecution has moreover argued that Milutinovic was present when Milosevic uttered some 
words which, on face value, may be construed as expressing criminal intent. The prosecution’s 
contention was that Milutinovic did not distance himself from those utterances. The Trial 
Chamber held that “it is not appropriate to attribute any intent to Milutinovic on the strength of 
his presence when Milosevic made these remarks, which may or may not have included a 
reference to the ‘final solution’, since, having regard to the whole circumstances, it cannot be 
said that Milutinovic’s inaction in the face of such remarks would be indicative of approval.”1117 
The Trial Chamber found moreover that Milutinovic was put on notice of crimes being 
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committed in Kosovo and “use of excessive force by the FRY/Serbian authorities” through 
various national and international sources.
1118
 
  
The Trial Chamber had to decide on Milutinovic’s criminal responsibility under both Article 7(1) 
and 7(3) of the ICTY Statute. The Chamber evaluated the overall prosecution’s contention with 
respect to allegations that Milutinovic participated in a joint criminal enterprise. The Trial 
chamber was then “of the view that a number of examples of Milutinovic’s participation in the 
joint criminal enterprise alleged by the prosecution have not been proved beyond reasonable 
doubt.”1119 Though the Trial Chamber found that Milutinovic participated in some activities of 
the joint criminal enterprise, it also showed that such participation was not “a significant 
contribution to the joint criminal enterprise.”1120  
 
As to intent, the Chamber found that it “has not been provided with sufficient evidence to show 
beyond reasonable doubt that he intended to retain [the control by the FRY and Serbian 
authorities over Kosovo] through criminal means, such as the crimes of displacement.”1121 The 
Chamber therefore rejected the claim that Milutnovic was criminally responsible by commission 
through participation in a joint criminal enterprise.
1122
 
 
On other forms of liability, namely planning, instigating and ordering, it was the prosecution’s 
contention that the totality of the evidence establishes that Milutinovic was responsible pursuant 
to these modes of responsibility. The Chamber based its holding on the fact that there was 
insufficient evidence “that Milutinovic possessed the intent to commit crimes of displacement; 
the Chamber is also not convinced beyond reasonable doubt that Milutinovic designed an act or 
omission with the intent that an underlying offence of forcible displacements be committed.”1123 
Milutinovic did not issue any order either. Therefore, in the absence of sufficient evidence and 
lack of intent, “the Chamber finds that Milutinovic cannot be found responsible under the 
categories of planning, instigating or ordering.” 
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On aiding and abetting the commission of the crimes of displacement, the Chamber posed that 
“the evidence must show that Milutinovic provided practical assistance, encouragement, or 
moral support to the perpetration of a crime, whether by positive action or omission, and that this 
had a substantial effect on the commission of the crime.”1124 The Chamber noted two incidents in 
which Milutinovic’s actions could be interpreted as aiding and abetting, but emphasised that 
“these two factors on their own, however, in the context of such a large case with a multiplicity 
of players, cannot be said to have had a substantial effect on the commission of the crimes of 
displacement which were committed from late March 1999 onwards.”1125 He also lacked the 
required intent. 
 
The Chamber turned to address Milutinovic’s responsibility under Article 7(3) of the ICTY 
Statute. It was the Chamber’s view that the totality of the evidence relating to Milutinovic 
powers over the MUP, was insufficient to show that he had effective control over the forces of 
the FRY and Serbia.
1126
 Thus he cannot be held responsible as a superior of those forces. The 
Trial Chamber acquitted Milan Milutinovic of all charges against him. 
 
5.6.2. Slobodan Milosevic case 
 
As discussed above, already in 1996, American scholars and politicians finished building a case 
against Slobodan Milosevic. What they attempted to achieve by conducting private 
investigations against Milosevic is not quite clear. They did not undertake disinterested academic 
research. They tended to advance and anticipate the U.S position vis-à-vis Milosevic and the 
eventual outcome of his case. The following quote tells the whole story: 
I want to draw some attention to the fact that there seems to be a consensus that the crunch in Bosnian 
policy is upon us, that the next few weeks will determine not only Bosnia’s future, but, in a small way, 
perhaps that of the upcoming Presidential election.
1127
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William and Cigar’s study concluded that there was “a compelling legal and factual case that 
Slobodan Milosevic, through forces and agencies under his control, is responsible for directing 
and aiding and abetting war crimes on an extensive scale.”1128 They intended their study to be a 
construction of a prima facie case for the indictment of Milosevic for the commission of war 
crimes in the former Yugoslavia.
1129
  The study responded to basically three questions: 
First of all, how can the war criminals from the Yugoslav conflict be held personally and individually 
accountable for their actions? Second, what role should the United States play in achieving that goal? 
Finally, if we fail to achieve this goal, what will be the ultimate cost?
1130
 
 
Against this approach, Miller concludes that “clearly, international politics play a significant role 
in Milosevic’s prosecution.”1131 But where the irony of these international prosecutions rests is 
the way they are manipulated by political players, to only further their own interests. For 
instance, and assuming that the studies and such other research around Milosevic were 
disinterested, and could only show an eventual prima facie case against Milosevic as early as 
1996, the first indictment issued against him concerned events in Kosovo.
1132
 That indictment 
was confirmed on 24 May 1999, three years after Williams and Cigar concluded the possible 
culpability of Milosevic on crimes he allegedly committed in Bosnia and Croatia.  
 
Williams and Cigar’s research did not address Milosevic’s alleged criminal conduct in Kosovo. 
Surprisingly, the comfirmed indictment concerned “crimes alleged to have been committed from 
March to June 1999 in Kosovo by the forces of the FRY and Serbia.”1133 Explaining these timely 
and untimely political calculations is really beyond the reach of law. The Croatia and Bosnia 
indictments were confirmed on 8 October 2001.
1134
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The consolidated Indictment against Milosevic alleged that he: 
  
was criminally responsible for crimes against humanity, war crimes and violations of the laws or customs 
of war, in that he [together with named and unnamed others] planed, instigated, ordered, committed or 
otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution’ of the crimes. The indictment 
asserted that the reference to ‘committing’ referred to participation in a joint criminal enterprise as a co-
perpetrator, the purpose of the criminal enterprise being to expel a substantial proportion of the Kosovo 
Albanian population from the province.
1135
  
 
The choice of the charges is also problematic. Kelly points out that:  
while charged with three sets of crimes (genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity) occurring in 
three distinct military campaigns (Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo), Milosevic is undergoing prosecution for 
genocide in the Bosnian campaign only. Although genocide was clearly implicated in the ethnic cleansing 
of Kosovo, Milosevic is not charged with it – rather, he faces charges of crimes against humanity for that 
brutality.
1136
 
 
The indictment goes on stating that:  
Slobodan MILOSEVIC was elected President of the Presidency of the then Socialist Republic of Serbia on 
8 May 1989 and re-elected on 5 December 1989. After the adoption of a new Constitution, on 28 
September 1990, the Socialist Republic of Serbia became the Republic of Serbia, and Slobodan 
MILOSEVIC was elected to the newly established office of President of the Republic of Serbia in multi-
party elections, held in December 1990. He was re-elected to this office in elections held on 20 December 
1992.
1137
 
 
The indictment further alleges that: 
After serving two terms as President of the Republic of Serbia, Slobodan MILOSEVIC was elected 
President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on 15 July 1997, beginning his official duties on 23 July 
1997. Following his defeat in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s presidential election of September 
2000, Slobodan MILOSEVIC relinquished his position on 6 October 2000.
1138
 
 
The substance of the charges are however that:  
Acting alone or in concert with other members of the joint criminal enterprise, he participated in the joint 
criminal enterprise in the following way: 
(a) exerted effective control over elements of the JNA and VJ which participated in the planning, 
preparation, facilitation and execution of the forcible removal of the majority of non-Serbs 
(b) provided financial, logistical and political support to the VRS 
(c) exercised substantial influence over, and assisted, the political leadership of Republika Srpska in the 
planning, preparation, facilitation and execution of the take-over of municipalities in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and the subsequent forcible removal of the majority of non-Serbs 
(d) participated in the planning and preparation of the take-over of municipalities in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and the subsequent forcible removal of the majority of non-Serbs. […].provided the financial, 
material and logistical support necessary for such take-over 
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(e) participated in the formation, financing, supply, support and direction of special forces of the 
Republic of Serbia Ministry of Internal Affairs 
(f) participated in providing financial, logistical and political support and direction to Serbian irregular 
forces or paramilitaries 
(g) controlled, manipulated or otherwise utilized Serbian state-run media to spread exaggerated and false 
messages of ethnically based attacks by Bosnian Muslims and Croats against Serb people intended to create 
an atmosphere of fear and hatred among Serbs living in Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina which 
contributed to the forcible removal of the majority of non-Serbs.
1139
 
 
Milosevic was therefore charged of genocide (count 1) for a series of actions, including the 
following: 
widespread killing of thousands of Bosnian Muslims during and after the take-over of territories within 
Bosnia and Herzegovina
1140
,  
killing of thousands of Bosnian Muslims in detention facilities within Bosnia and Herzegovina
1141
,  
causing of serious bodily and mental harm to thousands of Bosnian Muslims during their confinement in 
detention facilities within Bosnia and Herzegovina.
1142
 
 
The big and unresolved question was however for the prosecution to prove all the allegations 
levelled against the accused in the absence of evidence that Milosevic physically committed 
those crimes. For the prosecution, the strategy was to allege a joint criminal enterprise between 
Milosevic and his other senior aides and associates. 
 
Laughland notes that the joint criminal enterprise was mounted in a way that Milosevic “was 
accused of participating in three massive ‘joint criminal enterprises’, which were themselves said 
to have all formed part of ‘one transaction’, a single plan to expel non-Serbs from territory in 
order to consolidate Serb control over it.”1143 
 
Boas who was actively involved in the Milosevic case reveals that despite this ingenious 
prosecution charging strategy, the prosecution case in Milosevic was far from the best practice, 
and seriously threatened the fair and expeditious trial framework within which international 
criminal trials are conducted.
1144
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The case against Milosevic went ahead on trial until his death in custody on 11 March 2006. 
Boas summarises that at the time of Milosevic’s death “he had been on trial for 66 count of 
genocide, crimes against humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and violations of 
the laws and customs of war. The alleged conduct encompassed more than 7,000 allegations of 
wrongdoing over eight years of conflict in the former Yugoslavia.”1145 It is however regrettable 
that Milosevic died without his judgment being delivered though one may say, for sure, that he 
was to be found guilty. Other senior leaders’ indictments and prosecutions are insufficent in 
terms of meeting the standards of a proper criminal investigation and indictments drafting and 
proceeding at trial. 
 
5.6.3. Radovan Karadzic case 
 
Like Milosevic, two other prominent Serb leaders were targeted by international prosecutions. 
They eventually remained at large for some time until their arrest. The calling and instructing of 
the prosecution of the former president of the Republika Srpska and the former Serb General was 
also live in the State Department in Washington before being on the table of the ICTY 
prosecution in The Hague. In a briefing before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe, a member stated that: “Now, in addressing the issue of war criminals today, I am going 
to focus on Karadzic and Mladic.”1146  
 
Another member also placed the U.S intervention in perspective by clearly saying that:   
apprehending and bringing to justice Karadzic and Mladic is declared U. S. policy. It’s an objective which 
has been articulated and revalidated frequently. In fact, a failure to cooperate with the International 
Criminal Tribunal places all signatories in violation of what is a contractual  obligation binding them to 
comply with Article IX(1) in the Dayton agreement.
1147
 
 
Radovan Karadzic was “President of the Serbian Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
from July 1990 until his resignation on 19 July 1996.”1148 He was the “sole president of the RS 
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(Republika Srpska) and Supreme Commander of the RS armed forces from 17 December 1992 
until about 19 July 1996.”1149 
 
The third amended indictment against Karadzic charged him with genocide, crimes against 
humanity and violations of the laws and customs of war.
1150
 The indictment alleges Karadic’s 
individual criminal responsibility under Article 7(1) of the Statute for planning, instigating, 
ordering, committing and/or aiding and abetting the crimes charged through the acts and 
omissions described in paragraph 14 therein.
1151
 It specifies that “committing”, in the context of 
Karadic’s liability under Article 7(1), refers to his participation in a joint criminal enterprise.1152 
 
The prosecution case was that Karadzic participated in several joint criminal enterprises. His 
principal associate was General Ratko Mladic. The objective of the joint criminal enterprise was 
the permanent removal of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from Bosnian Serb-claimed 
territory in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
1153
 
 
Karadzic and Ratko Mladic participated “in three additional joint criminal enterprises, the 
objectives of which were (1) to spread terror among the civilian population of Sarajevo through a 
campaign of sniping and shelling, (2) to eliminate the Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica, and (3) to 
take United Nations personnel as hostages.”1154  
 
On paragraph 9 of the indictment, the prosecution alleges that the umbrella joint criminal 
enterprise intended to permanently remove the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats inhabitants.  
This was realized by the commission of Genocide (count 1), persecution, extermination, murder, 
deportation, and inhumane acts (forcible transfer). Why not simply charge them for genocide, 
persecution, murder, deportation and inhumane acts as crimes against humanity and show how 
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they personally committed those crimes? There is a point to make between the language of the 
law and the actual facts of the individual accused.  
 
The concise statement of facts is divided in four categories, namely the crimes committed to 
permanently remove Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from Bosnian-claimed territory
1155
; 
the crimes committed to spread terror among the civilian population of Sarajevo through a 
campaign of snipping and shelling
1156
; the crimes committed to eliminate the Bosnian Muslims 
in Srebrenica
1157
, and finally the crime of taking hostages.
1158
 In many instances, the indictment 
alleges that Karadzic shared the intent for the commission of the crimes with other members of 
the joint criminal enterprise.  Being accused of involvement in almost all the same incidents, 
Karadzic was charged as a superior under Article 7(3) of the ICTY Statute.  
 
It is a fact that the prosecution always claims that it has difficulties uncovering evidence that 
links an accused of high profile to crimes committed by subordinates or others. Sometimes the 
prosecution fails to even establish the required elements of holding a superior responsible of acts 
committed by subordinates. It is in this instance that the prosecution relies on a hierarchical 
pyramid.  
 
In Dr. Karadzic’s case, the premises are for the prosecutor to state that Radovan Karadzic was 
“the highest civilian and military authority in the RS”1159 and then to go on to cite all that his 
functions and prerogatives entail in terms of responsibility. Yet, it is a mere quotation which has 
nothing to do with a criminal conduct or propensity. One should note that functions and 
prerogatives of a Republic President are determined by the constitution and other laws. It is 
treacherous to use those functions and prerogatives to establish that the superior was also a 
criminal by the same token. It is another issue when the prosecutor can establish that the 
superior-suspect used or abused his power to commit crimes.  
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If it is proven that the accused is guilty of the allegations, then the indictment must clearly state 
what they actually did rather than becoming a wrap of what the existence of the accused has been 
in his public life. Stating that they participated in an enterprise, yet that they did not physically 
commit any of the crimes charged, misses the point. 
 
 
5.7. Summary  
 
The central role that the prosecutor plays in criminal proceedings influences the effectiveness of 
the criminal justice system in general. Such a role as it transpires from the Statutes of the ICTY 
and ICTR remains of paramount importance. Drawing from the status of a prosecutor in 
domestic jurisdictions, it was shown how the ad hoc tribunals’ prosecutor is comfortable as one 
body that investigates and prosecutes. The United States Supreme Court in Berger v. United 
States explained how the prosecutor must undertake his or herdouble role. In this case, it was 
held that the prosecutor: 
is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to 
govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and those interest, therefore, in a 
criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar 
and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or 
innocence suffers. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigour – indeed, he should so. But, while he may 
strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper 
methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a 
just one.
1160
 
 
The prosecutor wields enormous power and discretion. Yet, few or no checks and balance exist 
to limit and guide the international prosecutor. Most of the time, the prosecutor abuses them. The 
prosecution of André Ntagerura, a former cabinet minister in Rwanda and General Gratian 
Kabiligi, the former head of operations and trainings at the Rwandan Army Headquarters 
illustrated how abusive the prosecution’s powers can be. The international prosecutor is not 
totally independent even though he or she may deny or always denies this fact. He or she is 
unaccountable to anyone. There is no oversight system to regulate how the prosecutor utilises his 
or her power or how he or she behaves. Ntagerura and Kabiligi cases illustrate this assertion:  
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The chapter also clarifies what investigations are and to what extent they should go; and why 
they are necessary. When an atrocious international crime is committed, prosecutors should 
attempt to thoroughly investigate the crime itself and find out who the perpetrators are, and what 
exact role a particular suspect has played. Building a case from the accused position in 
government, army or political institutions is a genuinely incorrect premise. There is an 
assumption that crimes of a certain magnitude cannot be committed unless the high echelons in 
the polity and military hierarchy gave consent, were involved or otherwise condoned such 
crimes. This may or may not be true. Prosecutors should not be impressed by the gravity and 
extensive nature of the crime. They should be guided by the evidence available that implicates a 
particular suspect; evidence that is sufficient enough to charge a person; evidence that is 
sufficient enough to secure conviction. Such evidence should allow uncovering all the contours 
of the crimes for, at least, future prevention.  
 
The indictments levelled against Milan Milutinovic, Solobodan Milosevic and Radovan Karadzic 
were examples of the prosecutor’s ambitious charging strategy; yet not sufficiently supported by 
available evidence. From a defective indictment, the prosecutor led the case at trial using legal 
technicalities not properly commensurate with international crimes.  Two of those techniques 
normally used to dispose of petty crimes are the plea bargain and judicial notice. 
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CHAPTER 6: THE OVERRELIANCE ON GUILTY PLEAS AND 
JUDICIAL NOTICE TO DISPOSE OF 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMES  
 
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
Guilty pleas and judicial notice are procedures and doctrines which are not uncommon in 
criminal matters. They are even legitimate in jurisdictions that use them most. In international 
crimes prosecutions, however, these techniques do not allow the uncovering of the true nature, 
the gravity and seriousness of the crimes as well as the extent of the participation of perpetrators. 
From the experience of the ad hoc tribunals, the arguments in support of this assertion are 
discussed below. 
 
Guilty plea and judicial notice are procedural techniques that allow a speedy disposition of a 
criminal case. Both can have a great impact on the substance of a case. For example, a person 
who is sentenced after pleading guilty to crimes he or others believe they did not commit, will 
always feel that the law has been too unfair and too harsh, or that they had been manipulated by 
unscrupulous court officials. The same feeling will likewise be borne by objective and 
independent researchers, who may, at the end of the day, discover that a person was condemned 
for crimes he or she did not actually commit or has been condemned leniently while he or she 
committed egregious crimes. The loser is of course the person who is condemned for what he or 
she did not do. The overall casualty remains the truth. Without the truth of the facts, society 
suffers; the objectives assigned to ad hoc tribunals may be defeated. The work done through the 
use of plea bargaining and judicial notice would have been in vain. Two “interlocking” purposes 
of criminal law may have been frustrated. According to Sistare, criminal law serves the goal of 
securing conformity to standards of conduct and thus the goal of public safety; one of 
development and recognition of personal freedom and responsible agency and thus the goal of 
justice to individuals.
1161
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Sistare argues further that “a liberal society must, therefore, be committed to recognizing and 
respecting the individual qua individual. This is an essential element of its legitimacy as well as 
a characteristic social feature. This characteristic perspective and this claim to legitimacy affect 
the nature of criminal law in a liberal society.”1162 It is therefore counterproductive to build a 
body of laws that does not develop the freedom of the individual at the same time alleviating the 
ills of the society.  Overusing guilty pleas and judicial notice in international prosecutions has the 
potential to frustrate the balance between these two imperatives. If this becomes the case, 
especially when the individual qua individual is for example overcharged, then there is no point 
being made. Society and the individual must be served equally because the ultimate goal is the 
betterment of humanity, which is composed of individuals. Quoting lastly from Sistare, he 
suggests that:  
The freedom of self-determination is not possible in a society without constraints on conduct. But freedom 
from the harmful actions of other persons is not an end in itself in a society which values personal 
development. We desire stable social relations in order that we have a free society. If the ultimate purpose 
of a liberal society is the promotion of personal freedom, then the criminal law must acknowledge the 
individuality of each citizen.
1163
 
 
Common law systems heavily rely on guilty plea and judicial notice to dispose of the majority of 
criminal cases. Likewise, in international crimes prosecutions, these two have overridden 
traditional investigative and procedural rules usually used in Roman-Dutch law.  Looking at 
both, they leave a huge gap between the aims and the methods used in international crimes 
adjudication. This chapter concentrates on judicial notice and plea bargaining showing how they 
are inappropriate techniques to adjudicate serious crimes. 
 
6.2. Plea bargaining 
 
The plea bargain is one of the procedures used in international prosecutions to basically secure 
conviction, and eventually secure a lenient sentence. It involves a prosecutor inducing a 
defendant to waive his rights to trial. The plea bargain is often used in domestic common law 
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jurisdictions. It has now been transposed to the international arena of prosecution. It is more of 
an “administrative policy”1164 than a substantive concern of criminal law: 
Such a policy depicts a model of trial justice that is essentially pragmatic and morally relative; where 
system objectives are given undue prominence over the search for truth and closure for the victims of mass 
atrocity. According to this model, the ideology of international trial justice is conveyed by judges through 
symbolism and rhetoric. Procedural devices such as plea agreements are employed to achieve the prized 
bureaucratic goals of speed, efficiency and the maximization of resources.
1165
 
 
Generally, criminal defendants in countries that practice plea bargaining face a dilemma. Such a 
dilemma, according to Lippke, is that, “if they waive their right to trial and plead guilty, they 
typically receive charge or sentence reductions in exchange for having done so. If they exercise 
their right to trial and are found guilty, they often receive stiffer sanctions than if they had 
pleaded guilty.”1166 Lippke calls those two categories “waiver reward” for those who choose to 
plead guilty, and “non-waiver penalties”, for those who do not.1167 Such a statement is centred on 
the advantages and disadvantages of the defendant but does not say anything about what is 
pursued in international prosecutions, let alone in domestic ones. Lippke remains of the view that 
“it is not obvious why either is appropriate, since whether or not criminal defendants waive their 
right to a trial would seem to have little to do with the seriousness of their offenses or the 
appropriate sanctions that they should suffer for having committed them.”1168 
 
In international prosecutions, more is at stake. The events that brought about the criminality of 
the culprit need to be uncovered in view to avoiding their repeat. There are issues of deterrence, 
retribution, fighting impunity, and above all, justice.  If attention is directed at the individual 
offender per se, there is a difference that needs to be made between the Common Law legal 
systems and the Roman-Dutch law system. In common law systems, the practice is often applied 
while in the Roman-Dutch Law system, there is reluctance, or at least a tendency to resort to plea 
bargain. This is due to, according to Harmon, “the role of judges in the civil law legal systems, 
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the practice of plea bargain with an accused is unacceptable or is severely restricted.”1169 
Contrary to the practice in Common Law systems:  
a defendant’s admission of guilt in civil law jurisdictions is not determinative on the issue of criminal 
culpability but merely part of evidence that will be considered by the court in its ultimate determination of 
the case. Even with an admission of guilt, the prosecution is still obliged to present its case to the court and 
the court may absolve an accused of criminal responsibility notwithstanding his/her admission of guilt.”
1170
 
 
Having stated this distinction; how does plea bargaining work? Is it a useful and commendable 
tool to prosecute international crimes?  Henham criticises plea bargaining “as lacking in moral 
legitimacy in the context of trial justice because [it does] not serve rationalizations for 
punishment which resonate with the needs of victims and victim communities.”1171 It is  
therefore more useful to militate for “a moral right to trial.”1172 
 
6.2.1. Meaning and contents 
 
Feeley observes that “while no single definition of the term is universally accepted, the practice 
may encompass negotiation over reduction of sentence, dropping some or all of the charges or 
reducing the charges in return for admitting guilt, conceding certain facts, foregoing an appeal or 
providing cooperation in another criminal case.”1173 Fisher thinks that plea bargaining has 
evolved, which later aided in better comprehending the different stages at which it may be 
resorted to. According to him, the plea may consist in charge bargaining. The prosecutor drops 
some charges; from a serious to a lesser offence. It may also be a sentence bargaining: rather 
than asking a heavy penalty, the prosecutor undertakes to require a reduced one
1174
 for the 
accused who decides to plead guilty. 
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Parties to a criminal case may bargain over the charges themselves in terms of the number, 
naming and qualification. Instead of bringing charges of murder, the prosecutor charges for 
manslaughter. Within a charge, parties may also agree on facts to retain and ones to dismiss.  It is 
fact bargaining.
1175
 The prosecution agrees to present a particular (usually less serious) version of 
the facts in return for a guilty plea.
1176
 Parties can even agree that the accused will provide 
cooperation in pursuing other cases.  
 
Whereas the prosecutor and the accused may bargain at will if the case has not yet been brought 
to trial or in any event if the case has not yet involved a judge, the situation changes when the 
judge has been seized. The judge has a determinative say when the parties agree on the reduction 
of the sentence to enter after conviction. It is the judge only who is vested with the right and 
discretion to impose a sentence, not the parties. This reasoning may not apply in the case of an 
appeal as it is upon the parties to decide whether to appeal or not to appeal.   
 
But normally “the plea bargaining process is mostly carried on between the defence and the 
prosecution with little judge judicial review.”1177 In fact, except in a few instances, judges only 
proceed to a formalistic exercise that goes not deeper into the matter, leaving again leeway to the 
prosecutor’s offer. Whether with the judge’s intervention or not, a defendant who pleads guilty is 
not so sure of the full impact of his plea. All depends on prosecutor’s sincerity and judges’ 
discretion. Plea has its rationale. 
 
6.2.2. Reasons for plea bargaining 
 
Why bargain a plea instead of facing or conducting a full trial? Is plea-bargaining really an 
appropriate method of adjudicating crimes of serious concern to humanity like genocide, war 
crimes and crimes against humanity? Is there a way of leaving the individuals accused to opt for 
a confession rather than through manufactured pleas? These are important questions one needs to 
pose before resorting to plea bargaining. It is not easy to immediately know the motives of each 
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party in resorting to plea bargaining.  The commonalties are that the parties to a plea bargain 
envision an advantage. According to Fisher, there are: 
those defendants who pled guilty out of remorse for their crimes or to shorten their engagements in court 
from those who did so as part of a plea bargain, expecting to win some concession in exchange. We must 
employ still other devices to distinguish explicit plea bargains, in which the parties spoke out loud the 
terms of their exchange, from implicit bargains, in which the defendant pled guilty for an un-promised but 
hoped-for reward.
1178
 
 
For the prosecutor, engaging in plea bargaining does more to serve the professional upbringing 
or to hide political advantages. Fisher refers to Raymond Moley’s original plea bargaining 
exposé in 1928 where he suggested that a plea is part of the prosecutor’s work record, and counts 
as a conviction. The prosecutor brandished such records before the voters for re-election when, 
in reality, these ‘convictions’ included all sorts of compromises.1179 
 
Previously, plea bargains were unwelcome to the judges because their concern differed slightly 
from the incentives of the prosecutors. Pleas “served judges’ needs less well than those of 
prosecutors; it confronted judges’ principled aversion to discharging their awesome duty to 
sentence without full information; and it wounded some judges’ pride of power.”1180 Later on, 
however, judges became more and more interested in plea bargains. Fisher cites an exploding 
civil caseload brought about by business diversity resulting in a great number of civil cases in 
addition to criminal cases. “The crucial caseload pressure came not from criminal courtrooms but 
from their civil counterparts.”1181 Thus, the 
judges’ principled objections gave way as newly commissioned probation officers investigated defendants’ 
crimes and backgrounds and gave judges enough information to make reasoned sentencing decisions after a 
plea – and as newly appointed parole boards’ relieved judges of the responsibility of setting defendants’ 
sentences with precision. Judicial pride found refuge in the development of sentencing mechanisms that let 
prosecutors make promises during plea bargaining without taking sentencing power (or at least without 
taking it overtly) from judicial hands.
1182
 
 
The international criminal judges do not have civil cases to deal with. If there are such flaws in 
domestic jurisdictions, it is hard to believe that they will be cured before an international 
criminal tribunal where matters are even more complex. Moreover, plea bargains counter-
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advance the mandate for which ad hoc tribunals have been established. In this respect Scharf 
observes that ad hoc tribunals themselves:  
declared that plea-bargaining was inconsistent with [their] unique purpose and functions. The crimes within 
the jurisdiction of the Tribunal [ICTY] were simply seen as reprehensible to be bargained over. Its sister ad 
hoc tribunal, the Rwanda Tribunal (ICTR), followed suit, sentencing Jean Kambanda, former prime 
minister of Rwanda, to life imprisonment despite the fact he pled guilty to genocide, enabling the Tribunal 
to forego a lengthy and uncertain trial.
1183
 
 
Two factors may be taken into account when deciding on the appropriate mode of disposing of 
international crimes, namely the seriousness of the crimes, and the strength of the prosecution 
case. Mather is of the view that “the seriousness of a case refers to a prediction by attorneys of 
the severity of the sentence to be imposed upon conviction.”1184 A prosecutor entering a plea 
agreement negotiation must first of all evaluate the case and be convinced that it warrants a plea 
negotiation or not.  
 
Proponents of plea bargaining, like Maynard, argue that plea bargaining as a major means by 
which cases are funnelled through the criminal justice process, is not a new practice. Plea 
bargaining was predominantly used in the USA before the Civil War as a means to administer 
criminal justice. What is new is the amount of attention it received afterwards.
1185
 Judge 
Rothwax
1186
 concurs with the idea that plea bargaining has been a dominant factor in the U.S. 
administration of criminal justice. 
 
Maynard and Judge Rothwax discuss the usage of plea bargaining over time, particularly in the 
common law jurisdictions, and most specifically in the USA. Their argument does not say 
anything about the usefulness of plea bargaining in furthering criminal justice goals and 
objectives. Judge Rothwax posits that plea bargaining requires “the defendant to plead guilty to 
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at least some of the charges and that it is close to a truth-finding process.
1187
 Yet, the judge 
misses the point where through criminal prosecution; truth finding should be an imperative.  The 
real motive around the guilty plea is that, according to Fisher, “obtaining a guilty plea as the 
result of a plea bargain is the most common method of securing a conviction. The overwhelming 
majority – 90 percent, by some estimates – of criminal convictions in the United States result 
from guilty pleas, rather than trials.”1188 
 
Fisher praises the triumph of plea bargains. He observes that:  
though its victory merits no fanfare, plea bargaining has triumphed. Bloodlessly and clandestinely, it has 
swept across the penal landscape and driven our vanquished jury into small pockets of resistance. Plea 
bargaining may be, as some chroniclers claim, the invading barbarian. But it has won all the same.
1189
 
  
The appraisal of plea bargaining revolves around its effectiveness in speeding up criminal 
proceedings. It leaves unanswered questions about its moral outcome and ethical reliance 
thereon. Once parties to a criminal litigation agree to a plea, they secure big amounts of financial 
means that could have been spent to argue a case much deeper. They also secure time that would 
normally be required to dispose of criminal cases. Victims and other unavailable witnesses are 
spared of the hardship of trials. If plea bargains are consistently applied, they reduce case logs 
and eventually reduce crimes in a given society or jurisdiction.  
 
One may however wonder whose interests these are. Does plea bargaining serve the interests of 
the prosecutor or those of the offender or both? Does it secure the interests of the victims or 
those of the society? As an outgrowth of negotiations between two parties, the temptation would 
obviously be to say that it serves both the interests of the prosecution and those of the offender. 
Plea bargaining is arrived at after intense and secret negotiations between the prosecution 
represented by legal experts and the offender represented by professional counsels. Maynard 
unveils plea bargains’ other untold reality by stating that it is the practice that “usually escapes 
scrutiny because it is carried on by professionals in their offices, in hallways, over the telephone, 
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or, […] in open courtroom conferences that are ritually protected from intrusion.”1190 Anyone not 
privy to the negotiations may not know what actually transpired in the process. 
 
On the secrecy surrounding plea bargains, Fisher writes that “as clear as their interest in plea 
bargaining may have been, prosecutors’ power to bargain was well hidden. Tracking it has 
absorbed a good many pages.”1191 Though the prosecutor gains a lot from the practice, he/she is 
not the only one who hides the steps leading to the deal. The defendant has vested interests as 
well, even though he is not in full control of the process. Such interests “lay in the difference 
between the severe sentence that loomed should the jury convict at trial and the more lenient 
sentence promised by the prosecutor or judge in exchange for a plea.”1192 
 
In the adjudication of international crimes, plea bargaining may be justified by many factors. 
Factors that are specific to international prosecutions may, for example, be the inability to gather 
as much evidence as necessary required for a successful prosecution. According to Harmon, a 
former prosecution counsel at the ICTY, “convicting persons responsible for the serious crimes 
[...] can only succeed if credible evidence, admissible in a court of law, is at the disposal of the 
prosecutor.  At the end of the day, no matter how much public sentiment is aroused against an 
accused, prosecutions fail without evidence.
1193
  
 
The guilty plea may therefore help where such evidence is lacking and where the prospects for 
conviction are too scarce. For example, on 5 March 2007 during the trial of Ramush Haradinaj, 
Chief Prosecutor Del Ponte stated that “we will not be able to bring before this Court evidence of 
all the crimes that were committed in this part of Kosovo. That would be impossible.”1194 The 
Chief Prosecutor also writes that “during the summer of 2002, the Office of the Prosecutor 
continued to have trouble amassing evidence of sufficient quality to submit indictments. The 
investigators continued to have trouble finding evidence linking ranking officers with episodes of 
                                                          
1190
 Ibiden, pp. 1 - 2 
1191
 Fisher George, Plea Bargaining’ Triumph…, op. cit.,  p. 91 
1192
 Ibiden 
1193
 Harmon Mark, “ Plea Bargaining…, op. cit.,  p. 171 
1194
 Del Ponte Carla, Madame Prosecutor: Confrontation with Humanity’s Worst Criminal and the culture of 
impunity, Feltrinelli Editore, Milan, 2008, p. 302 
257 
 
criminal behaviour.”1195 To camouflage these difficulties, international prosecutors resort to plea 
bargaining with those suspects who have been arrested in view to secure their cooperation in the 
investigation and arrest of other more powerful suspects.  
 
Harmon gives another example of the advantages of guilty pleas: 
in July of 1995, the OTP opened an investigation into the Srebrenica crimes. We were aware of reports that 
thousands of Bosnian Muslim men had disappeared and presumably had been killed, but the details about 
how, where and by whom they had been killed were unknown to the OTP. Severely complicating the 
investigation was the fact that investigators did not have access to the terrain where the massacres had 
occurred as it was controlled by the Bosnian Serb authorities who asserted that such allegations were the 
result of “violent Muslim propaganda.
1196
 
 
Harmon advances other reasons hampering the proper conduct of investigations. He suggests 
that:  
the work of investigating crimes in far off lands against political, military, police and paramilitary leaders, 
many of whom remain powerful figures in their countries and continue to exert considerable influence, 
directly or through their followers, is a daunting task that had been  made more difficult  by the Tribunal’s 
structural infirmities: the lack of a police force, the lack of judicial powers to compel the production of 
evidence, and the absence of immediate and credible sanctions for recalcitrant States that fail to comply 
with their international obligations to cooperate  with the Tribunal or that actively obstruct the work of the 
Tribunal.
1197
 
 
These are of course easy reasons aimed at justifying why the prosecutor should be permitted to 
resort to less demanding methods of securing custody and conviction of the suspect, including 
plea bargaining. It may however be argued that in plea-bargaining, instead of doing its job, the 
prosecution behaves like a spoiled child believing that the accused has a duty to admit guilt. 
 
Moreover, Alschuler, an outstanding critic of plea bargaining maintains that these procedures 
“remain an inherently unfair and irrational process, one that turns major treatment consequences 
upon a single tactical decision irrelevant to any proper objective of criminal proceedings.”1198  
Other factors that are put forward for plea-bargaining are financial gains and court time. 
According to the Kambanda case,
1199
 guilty plea occasions judiciary economy, save victims the 
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trauma of a trial and enhance the administration of justice.
1200
 Fisher also lists efficiency as a 
factor that lead to plea bargaining.
1201
 Plea bargaining moreover helps prosecutors to secure 
convictions and thereby “victory in the case.”1202 Fisher argues however that “what is less 
obvious is that plea bargaining confers almost the same advantage on judges.”1203 Whether 
judges reap such benefit as well is an untested assumption. Professional upbringing of 
prosecutors and judges may also be another incentive that encourages plea bargaining.  
 
The other reason is caseloads. In jurisdictions where the plea bargain is mostly used, particularly 
in the USA, the “case load grew because more defendants exercised their right to appeal from 
lower tribunals to the Court of Common Pleas. More defendants were coming to court with 
lawyers, perhaps explaining why more were so bold as to claim an appeal.”1204 Caseloads hide 
many other expectations from guilty pleas or reliance thereon. Fisher uncovers those other 
motivations that increase caseload, and therefore lead the accused to resort to plea bargaining.  
Once prosecutors felt a general incentive to lighten their workload, they struck plea bargains 
whenever they had the power to do so – that is, whenever rigid penalty schemes permitted them 
to manipulate sentences by manipulating charges.
1205
 In the opinion of Langbein, from whom 
Fisher quotes, “plea bargaining arose because trial rules had grown so complex as to make the 
jury trial an ‘absolutely unworkable’ way to resolve most criminal disputes.”1206 It is in fact an 
attempt to avoid the application of complex procedural rules..  
 
McConville and Mirsky think that:  
Complexity itself motivated lawyers to avoid trials and to move to instead to a simplified proceeding 
which, while unencumbered by rules of procedure and evidence, regarded those rules as the basis upon 
which negotiated justice could be achieved efficiently. This lawyer’s dichotomy, which on the one hand, 
commentators contend, resulted in the strengthening of trials and improving upon the reliability of 
outcomes, became, on the other hand, a reason to avoid trial altogether.
1207
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Caseloads and the complexity of cases are not only the prosecutor’s panacea. It is also the 
concern of judges, and the general justice administration of a country. Choosing the guilty plea 
as one way of offloading the criminal court or avoiding complex procedural rules is a short 
vision approach to the problem. In fact it is such an increasing caseload that obviously put 
pressure on prosecutors to plea bargain.
1208
 Judge Rothwax synthesises the recourse to the 
practice in suggesting that “we go to plea bargaining out of necessity, not out of desire. It is 
inescapable.”1209 
 
As far as necessity itself is concerned, Judge Rothwax offers an argument in disfavour of plea 
bargaining. He suggests that: 
No one likes the necessity of plea bargaining. It is a simple fact that plea bargaining sacrifices those values 
that the unworkable system of adversary jury trial is meant to serve: lay participation in criminal 
adjudication, proof beyond a reasonable doubt by the prosecutor, the right to confront and cross-examine 
witnesses, and the privilege against self-incrimination.
1210
 
 
Moreover Fisher dismisses the claim that guilty pleas lower the caseloads. He argues that: 
The sheer efficiency of plea bargaining as a means of clearing cases to some extent has frozen it in place. 
When prosecutors and judges manage to keep pace with fast-growing workloads either with no increase in 
staffing or with increases that lag behind the growth in case numbers, any appeal they might make to the 
legislature for more personnel will fall short. And as staffing fails to keep pace with mounting loads, any 
hope of easing reliance on plea bargaining fades.
1211
 
 
Neither reason satisfactorily justifies plea bargaining either in domestic jurisdictions or in 
international crimes generally speaking, especially when balanced towards the goals and 
objectives of international prosecutions. International prosecutions consume time because they 
intend to set acceptable standards of justice. They deal with very grave offenses
1212
 which, in 
domestic jurisdictions, would also consume money. As to the cost of these trials, it is obvious 
that a trial setting up acceptable standards of justice comes with a high price. The UN must 
finance those trials, and it has also been remarked that external contributions are likewise relied 
upon. Accountability for serious international crimes requires going an extra mile. One such cost 
is a regular trial not through an abridged procedure like a plea bargain. However, Combs 
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observes that “although the international community has of late manifested a firm rhetorical 
commitment to the cause of criminal accountability, its financial commitment to that end has 
been less than steadfast.”1213 Lack of finances should therefore be dismissed as one justification 
for guilty pleas. 
 
Caseloads in international prosecution are also relatively insignificant. As seen earlier, not all 
international criminals can be investigated and prosecuted. The tendency is moreover to 
prosecute those ‘senior leaders most responsible’ for the gravest crimes. The targets are few, and 
they are accused of the most serious crimes of international law. So, why is plea bargaining 
necessary? Justifying such pleas with traditional domestic reasons of financial gains, court time 
or caseloads management is not enough.  
 
6.2.3. Plea bargaining’s legal requirements 
 
To be acceptable, a guilty plea must meet at least four legal requirements. Namely, it must be 
voluntary, informed, unequivocal, and establish sufficient facts pointing to the accused’s 
responsibility for the crime or crimes he is charged with. Any court dealing with plea bargaining 
ordinarily goes through this checklist before accepting the plea. In domestic jurisdictions it is not 
quite clear whether judges insist in meeting these four conditions to accept a plea.  For example, 
in Alford’s case:  
the U.S. Supreme Court […] reversed the court of appeals and upheld the defendant’s plea of guilty. The 
Court stated that the standard should be whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice 
among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant. That Alford would have pleaded except to 
eliminate the death penalty did not necessarily demonstrate that the plea of guilty was not the product of a 
free and rational choice.
1214
  
 
In this case, it appears that the court looked at only two conditions: that the plea was voluntary 
and informed. The ICTY may therefore be credited to have established and explained the four 
requirements in more detail. This groundbreaking intervention was set in the case of Drazen 
Erdemovic.
1215
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6.2.4. The ICTY groundbreaking in the Erdemovic case 
 
Drazen Erdemovic was a foot soldier in the 10
th
 Sabotage Detachment of the Bosnian Serb army 
that was operating in a farm near Pilica, northwest of Zvornik in the Zvornik Municipality. The 
ICTY prosecutor indicted Erdemovic on one count of a crime against humanity and on an 
alternative count of a violation of the laws of war.
1216
 The facts of the case were that:  
on or about 16 July 1995, Drazen Erdemovic did shoot and kill and did participate with other members of 
his unit and soldiers from other brigade in the shooting and killing of unarmed Bosnian Muslim men at the 
Pilica collective farm. These summary executions resulted in the deaths of hundreds of Bosnian Muslim 
male civilians.
1217
 
 
This defendant was “the first person to plead guilty before an international tribunal. […]. He told 
the court that he was forced to shoot the civilians at a collection site outside of Srebrenica. It was 
shoot or be shot, he said.”1218 Erdemovic admitted “to machine-gunning seventy unarmed 
Muslim civilians at Srebrenica”1219 following its fall.1220 He claimed that he received orders from 
his commander to prepare himself along with seven members of his unit for a mission the 
purpose of which they had absolutely no knowledge. It was only when they arrived on-site that 
the members of the unit were informed that they were to massacre hundreds of Muslims.
1221
 At 
the time of the massacre, Erdemovic was 23 years old
1222
, had a wife and a nine months old son. 
In his plea, he asserted that he immediately refused to execute the orders but added:   
I had to do this. If I had refused, I would have been killed together with the victims. When I refused, they 
told me: “If you are sorry for them, stand up, line up with them and we will kill you too.” I am not sorry for 
myself but for my family, my wife and son who then had nine months, and I could not refuse because then 
they would have killed me. That is all I wish to add.
1223
 
 
After the plea Erdemovic was found guilty on one count of a crime against humanity for his 
participation in the execution of approximately 1,200 unarmed civilian Muslim men and 
sentenced to 10 years imprisonment.
1224
 He appealed the sentence, basically, on the grounds that 
“the offenses were committed under duress and without the possibility of another moral choice, 
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which is, in extreme necessity, and on the grounds that he was not accountable for his acts at the 
time of the offense, nor was the offense premeditated.”1225 He also advanced some other minor 
arguments.  
 
Proprio motu and in limine litis, the Appeals Chamber raised the issue concerning the validity of 
the guilty plea. The first question was whether duress “affords a complete defence to a charge of 
crimes against humanity and/or war crimes.  The second question was that, if the first question is 
answered in the affirmative, “was the plea entered by the accused at his initial appearance 
equivocal in that the accused, while pleading guilty, invoked duress.”1226 Finally, was such a plea 
valid “in view of the mental condition of the accused at the time the plea was entered.  If not, 
was this defect cured by statements made by the accused in subsequent proceedings?”1227 In 
answering these questions, members of the Appeals’ Chamber were too divided as they had 
different opinions regarding the matter.
1228
 Some found that the plea was valid
1229
, while others 
found that “duress does not afford complete defence to a soldier charged with a crime against 
humanity and/or a war crime involving the killing of innocent human beings.”1230 Some judges 
were of the opinion that the plea was equivocal; others found that it was not informed.
1231
 
 
The case was remitted to a new Trial Chamber for re-trial. The trial chamber took a fresh plea 
from Erdemovic on 14 January 1998.
1232
 The accused was “allowed to re-plead with full 
knowledge of both the nature of the charges against him and the consequences of his plea.”1233 
On 5 March 1998, he was sentenced to five years imprisonment. This judgment was also 
appealable, though Erdemovic did not appeal. 
 
                                                          
1225
 The Prosecutor v. Drazen Erdemovic, Judgment, para. 11 
1226
 Ibiden, para. 16(2) 
1227
 Idem, para. 16(3) 
1228
 Idem, para 17. It is quite surprising when one considers the length of the majority judgment compared to 
separate opinions. The Majority Judgment, titled “Prosecutor v. Drazen Erdemovic, Judgment, Case No IT-96-22-A, 
7 October 1997” totalizes 18 pages; while the Joint Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah 
delivered the same day as usual amounts to 52 pages with a six pages corrigendum; the Separate and Dissenting 
Opinion of Judge Stephen totals 31 pages; the Separate Opinion of Judge Li amounts to 10 pages. 
1229
 The Prosecutor v. Drazen Erdemovic, Judgment, para. 18 
1230
 Ibiden, para. 19 
1231
 Idem, para. 20 
1232
 The Prosecutor v. Drazen Erdemovic, Sentencing Judgment, Case No IT-96-22-T bis, 5 March 1998, para. 8 
1233
 Ibiden, para. 7 
263 
 
 It is pursuant to the Appeals’ Chamber judges separate opinions that legal requirements were set 
as authorities to subsequent cases heard by the ICTY and the ICTR.
1234
 Judge McDonald and 
Vohrah directed their separate opinion on two main issues, namely whether the plea was 
equivocal and whether duress offers a defence for a soldier who has committed a crime against 
humanity or a war crime. Judge Stephen in his separate and dissenting opinion expressed that 
“while the requirement of voluntariness was satisfied in the present case, the requirement that the 
plea be an informed plea was not satisfied.”1235 Judge Stephen also argued that the plea was 
ambiguous. In his suggestion, “its ambiguity arises from the view [of] the possible availability to 
the Appellant of a defence of duress, in light of his repeated statements which presented 
circumstances which could found such a defence.”1236 The separate and dissenting opinions 
registered demonstrate how plea bargaining is such a problematic and at the very least an 
undesirable procedure before the ad hoc tribunals.  
 
6.2.4.1. A plea must be made freely and voluntary 
 
In ensuring that the Erdemovic plea was made freely and voluntarily, the first Trial Chamber did 
not set forthwith details of such a condition.  The Chamber was only of the view that:  
The choice of pleading guilty relates not only to the fact that the accused was conscious of having 
committed a crime and admitted it, but also to his right, as formally acknowledged in the procedures of the 
International Tribunal and as established in common law legal systems, to adopt his own defence strategy. 
The plea is one of the elements which constitute such a defence strategy.
1237
 
 
The Chamber’s holding did not differentiate between international and domestic practices of plea 
bargaining. In Kambanda case, an ICTR trial chamber was of the opinion that a voluntary plea is 
one where the appellant is “mentally competent to understand the consequences of his actions 
when pleading guilty.”1238 In addition, such a plea must not have been the result of any threat, 
inducement or promises other than the expectation of receiving credit for a guilty plea by way of 
                                                          
1234
 Judge McDonald and Vohrah stated that there was “no international jurisprudence or authority to lend us further 
assistance in the interpretation of the guilty plea as it exists in the Statute and the Rules., we are of the opinion that 
we may have regard to national common law authorities for guidance as to the true meaning of the guilty plea and as 
to the safeguards for its acceptance.” The Prosecutor v. Drazen Erdemovic, Joint Separate Opinion of Judge 
McDonald and Judge Vohrah, Case No IT-96-22-A, 7 October 1997, para. 6 in fine 
1235
 The prosecutor v. Drazen Erdemovic, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Stephen, Case No It96-22-A, 7 
October 1997, para. 5 
1236
 Ibiden, para. 5 in fine 
1237
 The Prosecutor v. Drazen Erdemovic, Judgment, Case No IT-96-22-A, 7 October 1997, para. 13 
1238
 The prosecutor versus Jean Kambanda, Judgment, ICTR – 97 – 23 – A, 19 October 2000, para. 61 
264 
 
some reduction of sentence.
1239
 This means that the plea must not be the result of an improper 
solicitation. The concept of improper solicitation or undue influence must be understood in a 
wider sense than “free and voluntary” seems to suggest. In R v. Zwane, Judge De Beer put it that 
“the fact that a statement is free and voluntary does not necessarily exclude the possibility that 
influence may have been applied to its maker. Where the voluntariness of a confession is 
impaired by undue influence it may obviously be impugned on both grounds.”1240 
  
As set out in the separate opinion of Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah in Erdemovic, the 
accused must be able to understand the immediate consequences which befall him. He must be 
aware that he is forfeiting his “entitlement to be tried, to be considered innocent until proven 
guilty, to test the prosecution case by cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses and to 
present his own case.”1241 
 
The time the accused has spent in detention and his familiarity with the crimes underlying his 
charges should be considered as well. An objective test, among many others factors, may for 
instance be to ask the accused whether he actually initiated the process of plea bargaining. For 
example, an accused who voluntarily surrenders, and who subsequently pleads guilty, is 
commendable. As was held in the Ruggiu case, a plea should reflect the accused’s “genuine 
awareness of his guilt”1242 which can only be arrived at after the accused had undergone deep 
personal reflection.
1243
 Moreover, the accused must reveal “a desire to assume responsibility for 
his acts”1244 and be “fully aware of the real and direct threat to his personal safety that a guilty 
plea would cause.”1245 This is quite contrary to a marathon prosecution calculation aimed at 
striking a deal with an accused in order to secure a conviction. 
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The practice before the ad hoc tribunals has proved that prosecutors, in most cases, initiate the 
process. The accused is only offered the opportunity to accept or decline the offer, in which case 
the prosecutor adopts a vindictive attitude. Enabling judges to ask preliminary questions, though 
commendable, is not enough for anyone privy to the practice of tribunals where formalism 
overrides substance. In the Erdemovic case, for instance, apart from this formalism, no legal 
details were provided for a plea made freely and voluntarily. In fact by pleading guilty, 
Erdemovic offered a defence of “moral duress” that led him to commit illegal acts. He indeed 
presented a defence instead of pleading guilty entirely. 
 
6.2.4.2. A plea must be informed  
 
An informed plea comprises two distinct things. First it is whether the accused understands the 
nature and consequences of pleading guilty. Second, it is whether the accused understands the 
nature of the charges in the indictment, though not in their legal detailed technicalities. In 
Erdemovic, the first Trial Chamber did not make such a distinction to enable the accused to 
understand both legs. The defendant was found guilty of a crime against humanity while he 
could have pleaded for a war crime which is lighter than a crime against humanity. The Appeals 
Chamber found that,  at Trial, the exchange between the presiding judge with Erdemovic and his 
counsel was no more than establishing that the: 
Appellant was advised by his counsel regarding the Indictment before he entered a plea, that the indictment 
was available to the Appellant in a language he understood, and that the Appellant understood that the 
Indictment charged him with two offenses. There is no indication that the Appellant understood the nature 
of the charges. Indeed, there is every indication that the Appellant had no idea what a war crime or a crime 
against humanity was in terms of the legal requirements of either of these two offenses.
1246
 
 
Even the defence counsel did not understand such a distinction. The Appeals judges concluded 
that, in their view: 
the Appellant did not understand the nature of the charges he was facing nor the charges to which he 
pleaded guilty. Although the Appellant did repeat his plea of guilty on several occasions, he remained on 
each of these occasions, and probably even to this day, ignorant of the true nature of each of the two 
charges against him, as it was never adequately explained to him either by the Trial Chamber or by defence 
counsel.
1247
 
 
It was incumbent upon the Trial chamber to explain the charges to the accused until he 
understood. 
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On appeal, judges underscored that “the accused must understand the nature of the charges 
against him and the consequences of pleading guilty to them. The accused must know to what he 
is pleading guilty.”1248 Having looked at the formal explanation of the presiding judge during the 
initial appearance, the Appeals’ judges opined that they felt “unable to hold with any confidence 
that the Appellant was adequately informed of the consequences of pleading guilty.”1249 They 
further emphasised that “the defence counsel consistently advanced arguments contradicting the 
admission of guilt and criminal responsibility implicit in guilty plea.”1250According to Judge 
McDonald and Judge Vohrah, “if the defence had truly understood the nature of guilty plea, it 
would not have persisted in its arguments which were obviously at odds with such a plea.”1251  
 
Despite this quite clear position of the appeals’ judges, one judge of the second Trial Chamber 
registered a separate opinion.
1252
 Judge Shahabuddeen posed a question as follows: “To ensure 
that the accused understands the nature of the charges, must this Trial Chamber, before which the 
matter has now come, explain them element by element? Or, is it sufficient if, without doing that, 
the Trial Chamber satisfies itself by reasonable inquiries that the accused understands the nature 
of the charges?”1253 
 
The opinion of judge Shahabuddeen clearly reflects the formalistic approach which unfortunately 
misses the substance of the matter. Judge Shahabuddeen also revolted against the findings of the 
appeals’ judges. Nevertheless he was of the view that, after recalling the provisions of Article 20 
of the Statute and Article 62(ii) of the Rules, “neither the Statute nor the Rules, however, 
elaborate how the statutory duty to ‘confirm that the accused understands the indictment’ is to be 
discharged.”1254 It is arguable that this duty falls squarely in the functions of any court through 
an objective inquiry rather than through “reasonable inquiries.” There is nothing offensive or 
inappropriate when a court does so; and this does not amount to requiring a Trial Chamber “to 
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advise the accused of the legal ingredients of the crime with which he is charged”1255 as Judge 
Shahabuddeen suggests in his separate opinion. Judge Shahabuddeen’s opinion is strikingly self-
destructive and contradictory as he also held that “naturally, the graver the charge, the more 
onerous is the responsibility of the trial judge.”1256 This was in fact the case in Erdemovic where 
both the accused’s counsel and the Trial Chamber failed to explain the distinction between a 
crime against humanity and a war crime.  
 
The standard for an informed plea must reflect that the accused understands not only the nature 
of the guilty plea and the consequences of pleading guilty in general, but also “the nature of the 
charges against him, and the distinction between any alternative charges and the consequences of 
pleading guilty to one rather than the other.”1257 In this case, the appeals’ judges remarked that:  
the difference between a crime against humanity and a war crime was not adequately explained to the 
Appellant by the Trial Chamber at the initial hearing nor was there any attempt to explain the difference to 
him at any later occasion when the Appellant reaffirmed his plea. The Presiding Judge appears to assume 
that the Appellant had been advised by his counsel as to the distinction between the charges and that the 
Prosecution ‘will make things very clear.1258   
 
The assumption made does not reflect the reality of a situation. Judges should consider the 
consequences of a guilty plea, especially when a defendant pleads to a more serious offence as 
an alternative to a less serious one. The sentence is not the same.  
 
6.2.4.3. An unequivocal plea 
 
At trial, Erdemovic defended his illegal actions by orders that he allegedly received from a 
superior. According to him, failure to execute those orders could have resulted in his own death. 
Moreover, he was very worried about his young wife and child. The Appeals’ Chamber judges 
stated that a non-equivocal plea “must not be accompanied by words amounting to defence 
contradicting an admission of criminal responsibility.” Judge Shahabuddeen in a subsequent re-
plea before another trial chamber also argued that the “explanation offered by the accused has 
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the effect of contesting the allegations of the prosecution relating to one or more of [the legal] 
ingredient[s].”1259 
 
It was also the position of the first Trial Chamber that “the very contents of a declaration which 
is ambiguous or equivocal might affect the plea’s validity.”1260 Erdemovic was justifying why he 
had committed the crimes for which he was charged. It was a way of inviting the Trial Chamber 
to take his explanation into consideration. In other words, Erdemovic was suggesting that though 
he accepted criminal responsibility, the fact that he was ordered to kill innocent civilians should 
diminish his guilt, either by exonerating him or mitigating his guilt. The Trial Chamber went 
further in holding that: 
In order to explain his conduct, the accused argued both an obligation to obey the orders of his military 
superior and physical and moral duress stemming from his fear for his own life and that of his wife and 
child. In and of themselves, these factors may mitigate the penalty. Depending on the probative value and 
force which may be given to them, they may also be regarded as a defence for the criminal conduct which 
might go so far as to eliminate the mens rea of the offence and therefore the offence itself. In consequence, 
the plea would be invalidated. The Trial Chamber considers that it must examine the possible defence for 
the elements invoked.
1261
 
 
Yet, the first Trial Chamber went ahead and found that the plea was unequivocal. On appeal, two 
judges argued that “the requirement that a plea must be unequivocal is essential to uphold the 
presumption of innocence and to provide protection to an accused against forfeiture of the right 
to a trial where the accused appears to have a defence which he may not realize.”1262At trial, it is 
crystal clear that Erdemovic attempted to explain – in fact to defend himself on an aspect of the 
charges, his behaviour and actions. A court faced with such a situation should not proceed with 
accepting the plea; rather it may dismiss it or give time to the defendant until he sets his mind 
right and straight. The two judges explained that where the accused pleads guilty but persists 
with an explanation of his actions which in law amounts to a defence, the court must reject the 
plea and have the defence tested at trial.”1263 The court should not rush to sentencing the accused 
who persists in offering explanations. It is a consistent practice “in common law jurisdictions all 
over the world, except in the United States.”1264 The exception of the USA is a constitutional 
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one, because, “it would appear that in the United States the constitutional right to plead as one 
chooses outweighs any requirement that a defence be tested on the merits at trial.”1265 In the 
USA, courts only satisfy themselves with three conditions, namely that the plea was voluntary, 
informed and has a factual basis.
1266
 Other common law jurisdictions reject pleas which are 
reserved, qualified or equivocal.
1267
 Even if the two appeals’ judges went further and examined 
whether duress constituted a defence when a crime against humanity was committed; this alone 
does not preclude the trial chamber from rejecting the plea as equivocal. 
  
The question is not whether the accused may succeed in leading this defence as a matter of law, 
but whether he intended to rely on it as a matter of procedure. The two judges erred on a question 
of law in concluding that they did not “consider [that] the plea of the Appellant was equivocal as 
duress does not afford a complete defence in international law to a charge of a crime against 
humanity or a war crime which involves the killing of innocent human beings.”1268 
 
6.2.4.4. The plea must be based on sufficient facts for the crime and the accused’s 
participation 
 
In Erdemovic the trial Chamber did not inquire into the sufficiency of the facts of the matter. The 
Chamber relied only on facts as they transpired in the prosecutor’s indictment without having the 
defendant attest to their validity, reliability and accuracy.  With the first plea of guilty registered 
by the International Tribunal, the factual basis upon which the plea was accepted did not appear 
clearly. It is with subsequent pleas that the matter was resolved.  
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6.2.5. The ad hoc tribunals plea bargain practice after Erdemovic 
 
6.2.5.1. Overview 
 
Before the ICTY, indicted persons “have pleaded guilty to directly committing or being 
responsible for specific crimes during the wars in the former Yugoslavia.”1269 Those pleas, in the 
Henham’s view, favour “a pragmatic model of trial justice.”1270 
The ICTR registered less pleas made under completely different circumstances compared to 
ICTY.
1271
 With this in mind, Jones observes that “the use of a negotiated plea agreement was 
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observed to have been the exception rather than the rule at the ICTR. The lack of plea bargaining 
has been cited as one of the reasons for the slow progress attributed to the work at the ICTR.”1272 
The practice of the ICTR differs substantially with that of the ICTY. The ICTR plea agreements 
are kept confidentially and completely unknown to the general public. It is even questionable 
whether the guilty pleas at the ICTR comply with all the legal requirements as set out in the 
rules.  
 
The ICTR uses a simplistic approach to guilty pleas. For example, in the Rutaganira case, a Trial 
Chamber held that: 
Pursuant to Rule 62(B) (i) to (iii) of the Rules, the Chamber proceeded to satisfy itself of the validity of the 
said guilty plea. In so doing, it asked the Accused if his plea was voluntary, if he had made it freely, 
knowingly and without coercion, threat or promise; if the Accused had understood well the nature of the 
charges and the consequences of his plea; if he was aware that the guilty plea was incompatible with any 
ground of defence; if he had indeed signed the Agreement containing his plea. The Accused having 
responded in the affirmative to all these questions, the Chamber found the guilty plea of Vincent 
Rutaganira to have been done freely and voluntarily, to have been an informed, unequivocal and sincere 
plea.
1273
 
 
Conversely, in Goran Jelisic case, an ICTY Trial Chamber emphasised that: 
A guilty plea is not in itself a sufficient basis for the conviction of an accused. Although the Trial Chamber 
notes that the parties managed to agree on the crime charged, it is still necessary for the judges to find 
something in the elements of the case upon which to base their conviction both in law and in fact that the 
accused is indeed guilty of the crime.
1274
 
 
Before the ICTY, a separate “Factual Basis”1275 document is formally signed between the parties 
despite the existence of a “Plea Agreement.” The ICTR may have registered factual basis; yet 
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those documents have never been disclosed for public scrutiny or research purposes.
1276
 Rather 
than referring to the “Factual Basis”, the ICTR judgments frequently refer to the charges in the 
Indictment. Judges do not require an existing, available and separate “Factual Basis.”  
  
For example, there is no single reference to “Factual Basis” in the whole of the Serugendo 
judgment or in any of the pleas the tribunal registered.
1277
 The Trial chamber obviates this legal 
failure by a formula which states that “on the basis of lack of any material disagreement between 
the parties about the facts presented in support [of the charges], the Chamber found that the 
guilty plea was based on sufficient facts, firstly, for the crimes charged and, secondly, for the 
accused’s participation therein.”1278 The ICTR gives more time to the legal elements of the 
crimes, though not consistently. The cases of Jean Kambanda and Biljana Plavsic are other 
examples pointing to the disparities between ICTR and ICTY practices. 
 
6.2.5.2. Jean Kambanda case 
 
Kambanda was appointed Prime Minister of Rwanda on 9 April 1994; three days after the 
massacres started in that country. At the time of his appointment, it was not yet possible to 
legally characterise the serious crimes that were being committed, either as genocide, war crimes 
or crimes against humanity.  Mr. Kambanda was later arrested in Kenya on 9 July 1997.
1279
 
During his initial appearance on 1 May 1998, Kambanda pleaded guilty to six counts contained 
in the indictment, namely genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide, direct and public incitement 
to commit genocide, complicity in genocide, crimes against humanity (murder and 
extermination).
1280
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First of all, the crimes for which Kambanda pleaded guilty were developed in a way that no other 
accused before the ad hoc tribunals can be found guilty. The ICTR cannot and has not, at the 
same time convicted an accused of both genocide and complicity in genocide. Complicity in 
genocide and genocide can be charged alternatively
1281
, and be based on the same facts.
1282
 But, 
where complicity is charged as an alternative to genocide, if the accused is convicted of genocide 
the complicity charge is generally dismissed.
1283
 It has also become jurisprudence of the tribunal 
that once a person is accused of both murder and extermination, the latter is retained while no 
conviction is entered for murder. This is a legal failure on the party of the Trial and Appeals 
Chambers. Above all, however, Kambanda was forced to plead guilty in very extreme moral 
conditions imposed upon him by the prosecution team and his counsel who, according to 
Kambanda, colluded with the prosecution. The Trial Chamber overlooked those harsh conditions 
likewise. 
 
It is clear that Kambanda’s plea was not informed and unequivocal contrary to the holding of the 
Trial Chamber. The question of whether an accused understands the nature of the charges 
emerged in Erdemovic’s case. In the separate opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen1284, he indicated 
that though he dutifully joined the majority, he also desired to preserve his individual 
professional position “against the risk of inference […] of law by joining” the majority. He based 
his separate opinion on a question posed by Judge Stephen in the course of the appeal 
proceedings. Judge Stephen had asked the prosecution “whether there was an obligation when an 
accused is represented by counsel on the part of the court to state in detail the ingredients of the 
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counts that are alleged. I am not certain of the position (if any) taken in the judgment of the 
Appeals Chamber on that point.”1285 Two important issues must be very clear in the mind of the 
accused. Those relate to the facts of the case, and the legal classification of the facts.
1286
 Judge 
Shahabuddeen emphasises that providing such information does not amount to a Trial Chamber 
giving advises on “legal ingredients of the crime with which he is charged.”1287 It nevertheless 
requires the Trial Chamber “to explain each and every element of the charges to the accused.”1288  
  
The Trial Chamber in Kambanda did not even attempt to ask such a question. The Chamber was 
of the opinion that Kambanda’s guilty plea was entered voluntarily.  In other words, he pleaded 
guilty freely and knowingly, without pressure, threats, or promises. The Chamber was of the 
view that Kambanda clearly understood the charges against him as well as the consequences of 
his guilty plea.  The guilty plea was unequivocal.  Put another way, Kambanda was aware that 
the said plea could not be refuted by any line of defence. Allegedly, the accused replied in the 
affirmative to all these questions.
1289
  
 
But, behind the satisfaction of the chamber that the plea met the legal requirements, Kambanda 
was more or less forced both by the prosecution manoeuvring and by his own counsel. 
Kambanda is not a lawyer and therefore he could not understand the applicable law and the 
magnitude of the facts. Kambanda was only motivated by the expectation of a lenient sentence. 
Had Kambanda been sufficiently informed of the nature of the charges against him, he could not 
have pleaded guilty. He could also have done so but waiving his right to appeal because the 
crimes for which he was charged were very grave and the only possible sentence was life.  
 
The Trial Chamber failed its task of ensuring that a trial is fair […] with full respect for the rights 
of the accused […].”1290 In fact a Trial Chamber must “read the indictment, satisfy itself that the 
rights of the accused are respected, confirm that the accused understands the indictment, and 
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instruct the accused to enter a plea.”1291 Like in Erdemovic, the Trial Chamber in Kambanda “did 
not understand its function in that detailed way.”1292 
 
By all accounts, by pleading guilty after providing the detailed information, Kambanda could not 
expect a lenient sentence. A lenient sentence in circumstances of Kambanda would be 
“misplaced and not […] fitting.”1293 It was “inappropriate to allow plea-bargaining and plea 
agreements for crimes of extreme gravity.”1294 Kambanda could expect more or less “a 
substantial stance of imprisonment”1295 taking all available accounts in addition to the Trial 
Chamber discretion to impose any sentence despite the agreement between the parties. 
Kambanda was charged with genocide, the “crime of crimes”, and related underlying offences. 
 
Having been sentenced to life imprisonment, Kambanda appealed his sentence and recanted his 
guilty plea.  On appeal, in addition to other grounds less poignant, Kambanda challenged the 
validity of his guilty plea.
1296
 He filed a supplementary Notice of Appeal in which he, not only, 
sought revision of the entire sentence “but primarily asks the Appeals Chamber to quash the 
guilty verdict and order a new trial.”1297 Moreover, the appellant sought to adduce new evidence, 
namely “a number of documents relating to the three most recently-added grounds of appeal, 
those seeking to the guilty verdict and to call seven witnesses before the Appeals Chamber.”1298 
 
The Appeals Chamber authorised Kambanda to testify “on the question of whether his guilty 
plea was voluntary, informed, and unequivocal and based on sufficient facts for the crimes and 
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the accused participation in it.”1299 The Appeals Chamber dismissed the motion for new 
evidence. One important ground of appeal raised, though later dismissed by the Appeals 
Chamber, was the:  
acceptance of the validity of the plea agreement without a thorough investigation of whether the plea was 
voluntary and/or informed and/or unequivocal; and [the Trial Chamber] failure to satisfy itself that the 
guilty plea was based on sufficient facts for the crime and the accused’s participation in it, either on the 
basis of independent indicia or of lack of any material disagreement between the parties about the facts of 
the case.
1300
 
 
Reasonably speaking, the acts of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity that were 
committed in Rwanda, at face value, were so grave in their factual complexity and numeracy as 
they were in their legal elements, characterisation and consequences.  
 
Under ground one, the appellant complained about the “failure to consider the denial of the right 
to be defended by a counsel of one’s own choice.”1301 It is true that the issue of counsel was a 
very weak argument if one goes into the surrounding circumstances and facts put before the 
Appeals Chamber. 
 
Under the second ground of appeal on the unlawful detention and when testifying in The Hague, 
Kambanda “introduced the argument that his place of detention contributed to an oppressive 
atmosphere which compelled him to sign the plea agreement.”1302 In dismissing this contention, 
the Appeals Chamber argued that Kambanda waived his right by not raising the issue at trial. 
The Appeals Chamber held that Kambanda appeared “five times before the Tribunal in total, 
[namely] on 14 August 1997; 16 September 1997; 1 May 1998; 3 September 1998 and 4 
September 1998. He pleaded guilty at the initial appearance on 1 May 1998. At no stage did he 
raise any objections to his place or conditions of detention.”1303  
 
The Appeals Chamber advanced many other arguments, none of which, however, responded to 
the crucial question of whether Kambanda had actually been detained in isolation. In the 
affirmative the critical issue was whether or not isolation was a commendable detention practice. 
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It was also important to uncover whether or not the Appellant had deliberately chosen to be 
detained in isolation. In fact the poignant question the Appeals Chamber could have responded to 
at its discretion and as a matter of law and natural justice, was about the motives behind the 
detention in isolation in the remote town of Dodoma in central Tanzania? Normally the UNDF is 
located at the seat of the Tribunal in Arusha. Instead of conducting this inquiry, the Appeals 
Chamber argued that Kambanda presented two contradictory arguments. One possibility is that 
the Appellant was unaware of his rights and therefore he did not raise the alleged violation with 
the Trial Chamber. Kambanda could also have been aware of them but did not have the freedom 
to say what [he] thought because of his oppressive situation.
1304
 The reasoning of the Appeals 
Chamber lacks substance and is only a mechanical reliance on procedure. The Appeals Chamber 
reasoned that:  
The Appeals Chamber takes seriously any allegation of pressure brought to bear upon persons accused 
before the Tribunal. However, the Appellant has not demonstrated that he suffered any such pressure. 
Vague suggestions of lack of ‘freedom to say what I thought’ are inadequate to substantiate a claim that the 
principle of waiver should not apply. In reaching this conclusion the Appeals Chamber is mindful of the 
education and professional experience of the Appellant, culminating in his position as Prime Minister of his 
country.
1305
  
 
The two arguments advanced by the Appeals Chamber do not respond to the merit of the 
questions posed. Though one is mindful of the strictness of motions on appeal, it was not up to 
Kambanda to prove that he suffered from pressure. The mere fact that he was not detained at the 
ordinary detention facility was on its own a violation of Kambanda’s rights. The Appeals’ 
Chamber could have decided on proprio moto as a matter of natural justice using its inherent 
discretion.  As some noted, in this way the Appeals Chamber ignored extensive scientific 
evidence of the mental and psychological effects of such confinement which could affect the 
voluntariness of a detainee’s confession.1306  
 
In its submission to the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), the National 
Association of Democratic Lawyers (NADEL) suggested that “solitary confinement on its own 
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could affect the voluntariness of a statement and render it inadmissible.”1307 NADEL refers to a 
well-known holding of the U.S Chief Justice Warren in Miranda v. Arizona, when he notes that: 
[…] coercion can be mental as well as physical…the blood of the accused is not the only hallmark of an 
unconstitutional inquisition…It is obvious that such an interrogation environment is created for no purpose 
other than to subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner. This atmosphere carries its own badge of 
intimidation. To be sure, this is not physical intimidation, but it is equally destructive of human 
dignity…Unless protective devices are employed to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial 
surroundings, no statement can truly be the product of his free choice.
1308
 
 
According to NADEL, “solitary confinement was in itself a form of stressful, if not cruel 
treatment.”1309For unrelated reasons to the ground of appeal registered by Kambanda, the 
Appeals Chamber considered that “this is the Chamber of last resort for the Appellant facing life 
imprisonment on the basis of his guilty plea, and as the issues raised in this case are of general 
importance to the work of the Tribunal, the Appeals Chamber deems it important to consider the 
question of the validity of the guilty plea.”1310 
 
This position does not adequately respond to the concerns of the Appellant. It may also suggest 
that the Appeals Chamber itself deemed that the plea was not valid. The Appeals Chamber went 
on and held that:  
Although the Appellant claims that the Trial Chamber should have made it ‘clear to the accused that by 
pleading guilty the only possible sentence would be life imprisonment and that a plea agreement would 
never mitigate the penalty seeing the gravity of the offence’, the Appeals Chamber cannot accept this 
argument. The duty of a Trial Chamber to inform an accused person of the possible sentence is not to be 
mechanically discharged. The proceedings have to be read as a whole, inclusive of the submissions of the 
parties. The transcripts show that both parties accepted that the imposition of a sentence of life 
imprisonment was a possibility.
1311
  
 
This argument contradicts the position of Judge McDonald and Vohrah in Erdemovic. Moreover, 
this opinion is very deceptive because the Chamber could not ignore the practice at the ICTY 
where the accused is clearly informed at the outset that the imposition of a life sentence is more 
or less the available sentence for crimes of grave severity like genocide and related crimes. 
 
What is also striking is the interference of the Appeals Chamber in the relationship between 
Kambanda and his counsel. The Chamber held that “the Appellant has failed to identify any 
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specific instances that would support a claim that the Appellant’s counsel was uninformed about 
the nature of the charges and the consequences of pleading guilty, and that counsel had failed to 
inform properly the Appellant.”1312 The Appellant had contended that he had ineffective 
assistance of counsel. Kambanda maintained that the counsel assigned to him did not take 
affirmative action on his behalf. In the space of two years the counsel and the accused had only 
one hour’s consultation. Lastly the counsel could not study the case completely nor did the 
investigations in order to evaluate the file and to inform Kambanda properly. Kambanda argued 
that he did not plead guilty in an informed manner.
1313
  
 
It is quite unreasonable for an Appeals Chamber to consider that an accused of Kambanda’s 
calibre, charged with the most serious crimes, consulted enough with his counsel whom he met 
with for only one hour in the space of two years.  As it did in the Erdemovic case, the Appeals 
Chamber could have directed “that the accused be allowed to re-plead with full knowledge of 
both the nature of the charges against him and the consequences of his plea before another Trial 
Chamber”1314 and be allowed to consult enough with a counsel. There is no difference between a 
Prime Minister and a foot soldier when both are to face a judicial institution to plead to a 
complexity of a matter involving the death of millions of people. The complexity of the matter 
required the careful attention of the Chambers. The developed practices at the ICTY provide that 
“the major developments over time have been in the interest of ensuring that the rights of the 
accused are sufficiently protected. Tribunals must be especially careful when accepting guilty 
pleas since an accused is making a judicial admission of guilt, and is waiving or obviating the 
need for a trial to establish guilt.”1315  
 
The overriding criteria, one may argue; is that in Kambanda, “little effort was made to capitalize 
on the accused’s confessions and admissions of guilt in an attempt to advance the process of 
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reconciliation at the local level.”1316 The practice is slightly different before the ICTY as it 
transpires from the Biljana case.  
 
6.2.5.3. Biljana Plavsic case 
 
Biljana case involved another controversial guilty plea. The case is a telling illustration of the 
lack of genuineness on the side of the accused; and a calculated policy of the prosecution to 
secure rapid conviction and assistance to prosecute complex cases.  
 
Plavsic was born in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1930. She enjoyed an outstanding academic 
career with a distinguished professorship of Natural Sciences and as the Dean of Faculty in the 
University of Sarajevo.
1317
 She later embraced politics rising to a leadership position with the 
Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. At one time, “she was elected as a Serbian 
Representative to the Presidency of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.”1318 She 
occupied many other positions of that level including membership “of the collective and 
expanded Presidency of Republika Srpska.”1319 
 
According to Chief Prosecutor Del Ponte, “the tribunal had indicted Plavsic for genocide, crimes 
against humanity, and war crimes.”1320 On 10 January 2001, Plavsic surrendered voluntarily to 
the ICTY pursuant to a sealed indictment against her.
1321
 At her initial appearance she pleaded 
not guilty to the counts of genocide, complicity in genocide, persecutions, extermination and 
killings, deportation and inhumane acts as crimes against humanity.
1322
 On 30 September 2002, 
the accused concluded a Plea Agreement with the Prosecutor.
1323
 The plea concerned the count 
of persecution; the remaining counts being dismissed by a decision of the Trial Chamber on 20 
December 2002.
1324
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The case also comprised a written and detailed factual basis “for the crime described […] and for 
the participation of Plavsic therein.
1325
 At the hearing of 2 October 2002 she pleaded guilty to 
persecutions, as a crime against humanity. On 9 January 2003, the Trial Chamber issued an order 
that Plavsic should testify in the case of Stakic.
1326
 In addition to the detailed factual basis and a 
statement by Ms Plavsic at the hearing
1327, the court heard evidence “in relation to the gravity of 
the offence.”1328 After a lengthy sentencing hearing, the Trial Chamber sentenced Mrs Biljana 
Plavsic to eleven years’ imprisonment with a “credit of 245 days.”1329 Plavsic did not appeal. 
Commenting the judgment, Scharf writes that: 
Though Mrs Plavsic admitted responsibility for the killing of tens of thousands of civilians and steadfastly 
refused to cooperate in any other way with the tribunal (including turning down a request to testify 
[against] former Yugoslav President, Slobodan Milosevic), the Trial Chamber sentenced her to all of the 11 
years’ imprisonment – with full credit for time already served and the possibility of early release for good 
behaviour. Plavsic was sent to serve her term in a posh Swedish prison that reportedly provides prisoners 
with the use of a sauna, solarium, massage room and horse-riding paddock, among other amenities.
1330
 
 
Whereas Scharf’s observation is full of personal emotion, the gist of his argument shows a clear 
deceptive outcome of guilty pleas. One may believe that, because Plavsic voluntarily 
surrendered, she expressed a profound remorse of the crimes committed. She did not. The 
prosecution was also misdirected in not maintaining the most serious charges against Plavsic and 
requiring a heavy sentence against her. The Prosecutor has calculated that Plavsic would become 
a “key witness against Milosevic, Karadzic, and other accused Serbian and Bosnian Serb 
leaders.”1331 Despite this misguided calculation, the prosecution “wanted to seek life 
imprisonment against her.”1332  
 
Del Ponte also regrets that the prosecution dropped the charges of genocide. She was quoted 
saying “My fundamental error was not obliging her to agree on paper to testify against the other 
accused. I accepted verbal assurances and was deceived.”1333 In fact Plavsic refused to testify 
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against Momcilo Krajisnik
1334
 when called to. The prosecution attempted to re-open the case by 
leading a normal trial.  The Trial Chamber seized of the request declared itself lacking 
jurisdiction to decide the question. Del Ponte appeared but to no avail.
1335
 
 
6.2.6. Observations on guilty pleas registered by the ad hoc tribunals 
 
A comparative review of the plea bargaining practice at the ICTY and the ICTR has 
demonstrated a huge disparity on the facts and the applicable law. It may be argued further that 
plea bargaining at the ad hoc tribunals are far from being consistent in terms of their factual 
basis, and jurisprudential outcomes. The ICTY has registered 19 guilty pleas
1336
, while the ICTR 
registered only 8.
1337
 Apart from legal technicalities, Kambanda case demonstrated that the plea 
was not voluntary. It was also not informed and its factual basis was unclear.  Later on, 
Kambanda rightly contested his plea and claimed his innocence, accepting only political 
responsibility. 
 
The ICTY registered the guilty plea of Biljana Plavsic pursuant to her surrender to the tribunal’s 
authorities. Though she initially believed in her plea, and the prosecution intended to use her as a 
key witness in other high profiles cases, this calculation did not work. She declined cooperation 
with the prosecutor and claimed her innocence as did Kambanda. The prosecutor attempted to 
put her on a new trial without success. This also shows how plea bargaining lacks the 
genuineness of both the prosecutor and the accused. Commenting on the Obrenovic
1338
 and 
Momir Nikolic
1339
, Henham notes that “the rationalizations offered for the explicit 
institutionalization of plea agreements in the ICTY remain unconvincing, and indeed illustrate 
the paradoxical nature of the ideological justification for international penalty.
1340
 
 
Despite the factual and legal flaws highlighted, Kambanda received the heaviest sentence after 
pleading guilty. In fact, he did not benefit from his plea. He was sentenced to life imprisonment.  
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The ICTR has not developed a comprehensive approach to evaluating the facts underpinning 
plea bargaining. The ICTR relies only on facts of the indictment and formal understandings 
between the parties without further inquiry. The tribunal has further surrounded those 
understandings with top secrecy. Persons accused and convicted by the ICTR after plea 
bargaining have received penalties ranging from six to fifteen years
1341
, except Kambanda who 
was sentenced to life. Whether this is due to the fact that he was the first most senior accused 
before the tribunal when it was still establishing itself, is only one explanation among many 
others. At the ICTY, the heaviest penalty was 40 years against Goran Jelisic. Other sentences 
range from five to 20 years.
1342
 
 
Another surprising feature is that at the ICTR, only Kambanda and Serushago lodged appeals; 
Serushagu’s appeal was based on the sentence he received. At the ICTY, appeals were lodged 
mainly on matters of facts and within a legal framework. Appeals permitted the development of 
international law in this area. Plea bargaining still poses problems in the adjudication of grave 
crimes. It should be resorted to only when the defendant expressly confesses, and is not induced 
to do so. Judicial notice is another technique highly used; yet with flawed outcomes. 
 
6.3. Judicial notice 
 
As a general rule in criminal cases, all facts relevant to the issue must be proven by evidence at 
trial.  Keeffe and others realise, however, that “not every fact is proved during the course of a 
law suit – manifesta probatione non indigent (what is known need not be proved).”1343 In fact, 
according to McNaughton:  
proof by formal evidence is dispensed within two situations. First, where the parties in some manner agree 
to the truth of the proposition, thus removing it entirely from controversy, and, second, where the court is 
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justified by general considerations in ascertaining the truth of propositions by methods other than through 
the formal reception of evidence.
1344
 
 
Parties may therefore agree to facts or propositions, and submit their agreement to the approval 
of the court. Likewise, courts may, on their own, take judicial notice. These two scenarios do not 
say why such a path should be taken or whether it is the appropriate one in adjudicating 
international crimes. McNaughton’s point does not either clearly indicate what is to be judicially 
noticed.  Light is then to be found elsewhere. 
 
According to Watt, “judicial notice is a principle or rule of evidence that dispenses with proof of 
matters of fact or law in criminal proceedings. The trial judge accepts the existence of a 
proposition of fact or law, notwithstanding that no party to the proceedings has proven it by 
admissible evidence before the trier of fact.
1345
 A combination of Watt’s definition and the words 
of Keeffe and others shows that “the doctrine divides itself logically into two phases, judicial 
notice of fact and of law.”1346 Nevertheless, Mcnaughton observes that the expression remains of 
“obscure origin.”1347 There is however, no need to discuss the origin of this concept. What 
matters is instead to understand how it works. 
 
So, “when judicial notice involves a matter of fact, it constitutes an exception to the general rule 
that matters of fact are established by the introduction of evidence or by admission.”1348 This 
means that when judicial notice has been taken, no evidence of facts or law is needed anymore. 
According to McConville, “judicial notice is the acceptance by the court of the truth of a matter 
without formal evidentiary proof.”1349This statement is relevant in domestic affairs as it is in 
international criminal law. 
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The agreement in both situations, it may be so suggested, is that this tool is a procedural one
1350
, 
having however a bearing on the substance of a matter. As such, it needs to be explored a bit 
further to find out which kind of truth is being discussed here. Moreover, it is important to 
understand the relevance of this doctrine in international crimes adjudication.  In the opinion of 
Garner, judicial notice is “a court’s acceptance, for purposes of convenience and without 
requiring a party’s proof, of a well-known and indisputable fact.”1351 Something done for 
convenience sake is always questionable, so should be judicial notice.  
 
It is critical to understand the effectiveness of the doctrine as far as the objectives, aims and goals 
of ad hoc tribunals are concerned. Only then can a position be taken as to whether it is a 
commendable, appropriate and useful tool or an unnecessary impediment, unworthy of being 
maintained. 
 
6.3.1. The concept of taking judicial notice 
 
The first question to ask is about the raison d’être of the concept. So, why resort to judicial 
notice? Why not prove a fact by leading evidence at trial? Why take the short-cut? Is it a 
possibility that judicial notice masks the inability of proving all facts pertaining to a violation of 
international criminal law? If it is appropriate in domestic jurisdictions, does that mean that it 
must also have a place in international crimes adjudication? The reason for posing all these 
questions is that crimes that are the subject matter of international concern are so serious and so 
atrocious. To ensure that they are eradicated, they need to be dealt with firmly with rules and 
principles that are proper to their regime. We must get to the bottom of the matter.  
 
The proponents of judicial notice, like Keeffe and others
1352
 advance the raison d’être of judicial 
notice by considering the overcrowding of the court and the time that can be saved if courts and 
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parties find an alternative. Here, the alternative is judicial notice. By avoiding unnecessary proof, 
it helps ease the overcrowding of courts and save time.
1353
 
 
Judicial notice is, according to this opinion, a remedy to the avalanche of cases. Whether 
securing time is a material consideration to attain justice is another inquiry.  Keeffe and others 
maintain nevertheless that “judicial notice is a tool – an aid in shortening and improving trial 
procedure. Failure to use it tends daily to smother trials with technicalities and monstrously 
lengthen them out, and in some cases […] actually denies due process, thus breeding contempt 
for our judicial system.”1354 MacConville concurs with Keeffe and others. According to him, 
taking judicial notice “rests heavily upon the idea that the purpose of judicial notice is to 
expedite the trial of cases, enabling the judge to dispense with time-consuming formal evidence 
when the matter in question is likely to be true.”1355 
 
The concern may however be that justice is sacrificed by securing time or anything of that 
nature. This is one reason why Richardson cautions the courts to be extremely attentive in 
treating a factual conclusion as obvious, even though the man in the street would unhesitatingly 
hold it to be so.
1356
 By securing time for example, it is obvious that resources are likewise 
secured. At which cost should that be? Knowlton suggests that judicial notice may be taken, and 
therefore formal proof dispensed, “under circumstances wherein such proof would add little or 
nothing to the accuracy of the finding [...]. Also, judicial notice is utilized to avoid decisions 
plainly unwarranted in the light of present knowledge.”1357 
 
This passage answers the question regarding why judicial notice should be taken. Simply stated, 
it is to save court time and resources and to ensure consistent court decisions. The next step is to 
know the kind of facts that must be judicially noticed and when judicial notice is appropriately 
taken.  
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6.3.2. Judicial notice of fact 
 
According to Zeffert et al. “a court takes judicial notice of a fact when it accepts it as established, 
although there is no evidence on the point.”1358 A fact to be judicially noticed must qualify as 
“either so notorious as not to be the subject of reasonable dispute, or which are capable of 
immediate and accurate demonstration by resort to sources of indisputable accuracy.”1359 
In the opinion of Richardson: 
 courts may take judicial notice of matters which are so notorious, or clearly established, or susceptible of 
demonstration by reference to a readily obtainable and authoritative source that evidence of their existence 
is unnecessary; and local courts are not merely permitted to use their local knowledge, but to be regarded as 
fulfilling a constitutional function if they do so.
1360
 
 
What is striking is the nuance that surrounds the meaning of the word ‘notorious’. A fact is so 
notorious if it is “generally known and accepted that [it] cannot reasonably be questioned.”1361In 
a jurisdiction, notorious facts may be divided into two categories: “first, there are matters of 
general knowledge, and second, there are specific facts which are notorious within the locality of 
the court.”1362 Common terminologies, international holidays and matters of nature are notorious 
facts.
1363
 The date of Easter in a particular year is an example of the second category.
1364
  
 
The notoriety of the fact does not necessarily mean that everyone is aware of it. According to 
Currie, “the test is not whether everybody knows it, but whether it is knowledge which every 
intelligent or well informed person has.”1365 Even for the judicial officer, “it is not sufficient […] 
to be satisfied in his or her own mind that the fact is correct. It must be so notorious, either 
generally or within his or her particular area, as to be incapable of dispute among reasonably 
informed and educated people.”1366 When a fact passes this test it therefore becomes “a matter of 
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common or general knowledge.”1367 The extent of this knowledge is not defined. How wide 
should this knowledge be? The point of disagreement subsists therefore. MacConville 
underscores this by writing that: 
 a court will more easily take judicial notice of general than of specific facts. If by this is meant that notice 
normally involves matters of a general nature as opposed to matters specifically related to a particular 
party, then, as a matter of practice, this is probably true. Once again, however, it is difficult to see any 
grounding in theory for restricting the doctrine to general matters.
1368
 
 
An ignorant, uneducated or illiterate man may not be aware that Mount Everest is found in 
China. Yet this lack of knowledge on the side of the man and others in the same situation will not 
prevent Mount Everest to be a location of common knowledge to those who know about it. The 
same logic prevails for historic facts. If you do not know of their existence, you cannot blame 
anyone but yourself.  
 
Unfortunately, judicial notice does not stop here because “the tendency is to extend judicial 
notice beyond the field of facts of common knowledge to the sphere of those facts capable of 
immediate and accurate determination by resort to easily accessible sources of indisputable 
accuracy.”1369 Zeffertt et al. call those facts “readily ascertainable.”1370 These are facts “which 
one would hardly expect everyone to have at his or her fingertips but which can easily be 
ascertained from sources of indisputable authority.”1371 People of intellect may however 
legitimately disagree on this category of fact, not because they do not know by ignorance; but 
because the sources are not the same, or that they are questionable, or that their methodologies 
differ. Yet this, according to Morgan, “is the rock of reason and policy upon which judicial 
notice of facts is built.”1372 In both situations however, Knowlton suggests that:  
the propriety of such notice [of fact] does not depend upon the judge’s private knowledge but rather upon 
whether the fact exists or a proposition is true according to common knowledge. Also, it is conceded that 
the existence of the fact or the validity of the proposition must be established as certain in common 
knowledge. Similarly, there is no doubt that there is a second test, which allows judicial notice of facts or 
propositions which, although not common knowledge, are readily ascertainable from accessible sources of 
undisputed accuracy.
1373
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To find common grounds upon which judicial notice of facts may be taken, courts will, firstly, 
“take judicial notice of ‘scientific facts which have been well established by authoritative 
scientists and are generally accepted as irrefutable by living scientists.” For example, “that a 
birth which occurs 270 days after the accidental death of the father falls within the normal 
gestation period”1374 is an uncontested scientific research finding. And of “historical facts […] a 
document ‘worthy of confidence’ may be used by the courts to ascertain historical facts of which 
to take judicial notice.”1375 Secondly, if a party contests the veracity or truth of a fact or 
proposition, he must be entitled to a hearing. Knowlton suggests that “the requirement of a 
hearing is to allow the noticing of a fact or proposition and then to allow rebuttal evidence at the 
trial as to the existence of the fact or the truth of the proposition.”1376  
 
Such an objection is not an easy one, rather it is substantial. This is so because “the proponent 
can utilize all sources of information to achieve notice, while his opponent is limited to formal 
proof subject to all of the applicable exclusionary principles.”1377 After the hearing of all parties 
then the fact or proposition is noticed and will not be subsequently disputed among those parties. 
This means that third parties may dispute the fact or proposition so noticed. McConville 
expresses this view quite well by saying that “if the range of matter noticed is kept within the 
boundaries so fixed, there is no need to avoid utilizing the concept of judicial notice.”1378 This is 
where the trick of the matter lies. Courts may also take judicial notice of law.   
 
6.3.3. Judicial notice of law 
 
Keeffe et al. suggest a general rule justifying the taking of judicial notice of law. Their view is 
that “the very purpose of a judicial system requires that the courts take notice of the law 
prevailing in the forum whether the law is written or unwritten.”1379 Knowlton proposes specific 
laws and courts which are entitled to take judicial notice. According to him, “the common law 
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established an elaborate classification system concerning the law of the jurisdiction of the forum. 
This system distinguished cases on the basis of the type of court making the decision, the source 
or the rule to be applied, and the nature of the law itself.”1380 
 
In domestic jurisdictions, courts have taken notice of pieces of legislation at states and federal 
levels. In Canada, for example, a court held that “judicial notice must be taken of statutory 
instruments, including regulations, published in the Canada Gazette. It is not a pre-condition that 
the Gazette or a consolidation published by the Queen’s Printer be produced prior to notice 
being taken. The fact of publication needs no proof.”1381 
 
In South Africa, for example, “judicial notice is taken of public Acts of the South African 
Parliament and the proclamation by which they are promulgated or brought into force.”1382 
However, Zeffertt et al. note that “at common law the courts do not take judicial notice of 
delegated legislation such as proclamations made under statutory authority, government notices 
or regulations, or municipal or railway by-laws. They must be specifically pleaded and proven by 
the party who seeks to rely upon them.”1383 
 
Customs and foreign law must, as a general rule, be proven.   Zeffertt et al. are of the view that 
“customs which have already been recognized by the courts, […] be judicially noticed.”1384  
They even go as far as to suggest that “judicial notice may be taken of general customs which 
have never been proved by evidence.”1385 
 
Regarding foreign law, Stern raises a series of questions to answer before a determination can be 
made as to whether or not a law may be judicially noticed.  In his view:  
when rules of conflict of laws point to the applicability of the law of a foreign country, the question arises, 
how should the court acquire knowledge of the foreign law involved? May or, indeed, should the court take 
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judicial notice of the foreign law? Or should the foreign law be proved by the parties and be disregarded if 
they fail to comply with their burden of proof?
1386
 
 
Those questions have meanings. Keeffe and others point to the fact that:  
Foreign law presented a question of fact to the courts of the forum. This apparently ridiculous proposition 
seems to have arisen because the foreign law required production of testimony of experts, certifications by 
foreign officials, and sworn translations. Testimonial evidence is necessary because the judge himself could 
hardly be expected to have sufficient knowledge of the foreign law and language to make his own 
investigation and come to a correct conclusion without assistance, and because the arguments of local 
counsel were not likely to enlighten him to any marked extent.
1387
 
  
Foreign law “cannot be proved unless pleaded.  Moreover, neither trial nor appellate courts can 
consider decisions or statutes of the foreign jurisdiction unless they are offered in evidence.”1388 
The reason for pleading a foreign law as any other ordinary fact is, according to Stern, the 
inability for a court to “acquire knowledge of the foreign law involved.”1389 This is obvious for 
all the foreign laws that are unknown or which are to ascertain in a given system of law.  
 
There is an exception to this general rule. In South Africa, for example, the Law of Evidence 
Amendment Act of 1988, provided that “ Any court may take judicial notice of the law of a 
foreign state […] in so far as such law can be ascertained readily and with sufficient 
certainty.”1390 This is predicated on the fact that some foreign laws are known and readily 
accessible to the judge of the forum.  
 
6.3.4. Judicial notice is either inappropriate or should be resorted to cautiously in 
international crimes adjudication 
 
Though taking judicial notice has invaded the empire of international crimes where parties agree 
to some facts, or judges can proprio moto or upon request take judicial notice, the practice may 
seem inappropriate. In domestic systems as well as in international criminal systems, it is a 
principle that “judgments be based on proven facts in accordance with evidentiary rules.”1391 By 
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doing so, this requirement “confers legitimacy on otherwise contested facts. In addition, trials 
may reveal evidence that might not otherwise have seen the light of day.”1392 
 
To this suggestion Keeffe and others add that: “neither a trial court nor an appellate court can 
ever take judicial notice of a fact when there is any doubt about it. The danger of injustice is too 
great. In the case of doubt, the opportunity to establish the truth by hearing witnesses must 
always be afforded.”1393 This suggests that to be fair, a trial must be a result of the views 
expressed by parties that meet the conviction of the court. This does not necessarily mean there 
is truthfulness regarding the proposition or situation.  
 
The other reason is quite simple. Haskell and Waldorf observe that “what is true and what is 
undisputed are two different things.”1394 What is undisputed is what parties agree to, and not 
necessarily what is actually true. According to these writers for example, “prior to 1492, counsel 
would not have disputed that the world was flat. Yet since that date it is equally undisputed that 
the world is round. […] what one generation regards as beyond dispute the next may well laugh 
at.”1395 This relates to the exactitude of a proposition or of a fact. In fact, there is the reality of a 
thing and how accommodative people find the thing. The reality of a thing or a situation is one 
despite what people want the thing to be in order to accommodate themselves. One example is 
found in the United States v. Aluminium Company of America, quoted by Knowlton.  In this 
case:  
the court took notice of facts relating to the remedies which were found in the report of the Truman 
Committee. In so doing, it stated that the facts noticed would not be conclusively established. On closer 
scrutiny, it would appear that the facts contained in the report do not meet the test of common knowledge 
nor is the report necessarily of indisputable accuracy. As a result, the most that should be noticed is that the 
report is an official document and as such, an exception to the hearsay rule. This being true, the report may 
be admitted as evidence of the facts contained therein, but such evidence would, of course, be subject to 
disproof by other stronger evidence if it were available. This case would seem, therefore, to represent a 
failure to determine with precision what is being noticed.
1396
 
 
This example, it may be argued, vests relevance as the taking of judicial notice before the ad hoc 
tribunals are concerned. With due respect to the wisdom of judges and the authoritative standing 
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of courts in any criminal law system, it is true that maintaining the judicial notice is a legal 
shortcut. It serves more or less the speedy administration of justice. Judicial notice, as any other 
shortcuts, aims at narrowing the matter in dispute. There is no problem with facts of common 
knowledge like locations and widely accepted historical facts. However, there is a misuse and 
abuse of facts of “immediate and accurate demonstration by resort to sources of indisputable 
accuracy.” Sources themselves differ. Academics and authorities also disagree on many issues. 
Judicial notice of a substantial matter of a dispute should then be avoided.  
 
Knowlton has therefore proposed ways in which judicial notice may be taken. He suggests for 
instance a balancing of the interests between judicial administration and the rights of the litigants 
which requires that the doctrine be applied strictly.
1397
 For him, “the necessity of a hearing 
wherein each party participates should be most helpful.”1398 As a procedural tool, “it is therefore 
surely pertinent to question how such [a] self-serving device can be morally justified in the case 
of those indicted for the ‘crime of crimes’.”1399 The inappropriateness and inconsistency of 
judicial notice at the ad hoc tribunals may better be explained through an analysis of that 
practice. 
 
6.3.5. The ad hoc Tribunals’ practice in judicial notice 
 
The Rules of Procedure and Evidence of both the ICTR and ICTY provide for taking judicial 
notice of facts of common knowledge and adjudicated facts. According to Rule 94(A) of the 
ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence, which is in fact the same as the ICTY, “in the interest of 
judicial economy, a Trial Chamber will not require proof of facts that involve common 
knowledge, but will instead take judicial notice of such facts.”1400 A trial chamber may do so on 
its own initiative or upon a motion moved by a party. The Chamber must first of all determine 
whether the fact is of common knowledge, and take judicial notice thereafter. This is not a 
discretionary power.  
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It is however worthy to highlight some opposing or misdirected views in this respect where a 
Trial Chamber believed to be vested with discretion to take judicial notice under Rule 94(A). 
According to the Appeals Chamber, “judicial notice under Rule 94(A) is not discretionary.”1401 
In the Semanza Appeal Judgment, however, quoting an initial decision on Judicial Notice, the 
Trial Chamber was of the view that Semanza “having entered a plea of not guilty to all counts in 
the indictment, the Accused has placed even the most patent of facts in dispute. However, this 
alone cannot rob the Chamber of its discretion to take judicial notice of those facts not subject to 
dispute among reasonable persons.”1402 Therefore, those facts were qualified as facts of common 
knowledge. In contrast to the purported discretion in Semanza, the Karemera et al. Appeal 
Decision on Judicial Notice emphasised that the “standard is not discretionary.”1403 Further, the 
Appeals Chamber held that:  
But the general rule that the Trial Chamber has discretion in those areas is superseded by the specific, 
mandatory language of Rule 94(A); as noted above, the Trial Chamber has no discretion to determine that a 
fact, although ‘of common knowledge’, must nonetheless be proven through evidence at trial. For these 
reasons, a Trial Chamber’s decision whether to take judicial notice of a relevant fact under Rule 94(A) is 
subject to de novo review on appeal.
1404
 
  
It is possible that the Trial Chamber in Semanza erred on this point of law. Unfortunately, on 
appeal, though the Appeals Chamber remarked and corrected the error of law, it did not clearly 
indicate that the Trial Chamber committed such an error. Under Rule 94(B), “at the request of a 
party or proprio motu, a Trial Chamber, after hearing the parties, may take judicial notice of 
adjudicated facts or documentary evidence from other proceedings of the Tribunal relating to the 
matter at issue in the current proceedings.”  Taking a judicial notice in this instance remains a 
discretionary power of the court.  
 
In Karemera et al. the Appeals Chamber held that “facts judicially noticed pursuant to Rule 
94(B) of the Rules are merely presumptions that may be rebutted with evidence at trial. The legal 
effect of judicially noticing an adjudicated fact is only to relieve the Prosecution of its initial 
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burden to produce evidence on the point.”1405 The defence may put the adjudicated fact into 
question by introducing reliable and credible evidence to the contrary.
1406
 
 
Having made these distinctions, it is important to also understand how the ad hoc tribunals 
define facts of common knowledge and adjudicated facts. The relevant definitions can be found 
once again in the landmark decision of the Appeals Chamber June 16, 2006 in the Karemera et 
al. case
1407
 referred to above. In this decision, the Appeals Chamber explained in detail how Rule 
94 (A) and (B) of the Rules should be understood.  Subsequent decisions either from the ICTR or 
ICTY heavily relied on this decision; particularly it’s reasoning and legal foundations. 
 
Initially a fact of common knowledge has been defined in the Semanza Appeals judgment, as one 
that “encompasses facts that are not reasonably subject to dispute: in other words, commonly 
accepted or universally known facts, such as general facts of history or geography, or the laws of 
nature. Such facts are not only widely known but also beyond reasonable dispute.”1408 This 
definition differs slightly from the one given by Watt. For him, facts of common knowledge are 
those which are:  
i. so notorious or generally accepted as not to be the subject of debate among reasonable persons; or 
ii. capable of immediate and accurate demonstration by resort to readily accessible sources of indisputable 
accuracy.
1409
 
 
In the Karemera et al. Appeal decision, the Chamber emphasised that “whether a fact qualifies 
as a ‘fact of common knowledge’ is a legal question.”1410 The problem here has to do with 
whether or not reasonable people may always agree on legal questions. The door should be left 
open for some reasonable disagreement on legal questions. The Appeals Chamber defined 
adjudicated facts as: 
facts that have been established in a proceeding between other parties on the basis of the evidence the 
parties to that proceeding chose to introduce, in the particular context of that proceeding. For this reason, 
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they cannot simply be accepted, by mere virtue of their acceptance in the first proceeding, as conclusive in 
proceedings involving different parties who have not had the chance to contest them.
1411
 
 
The Appeals Chamber moreover sorted out the difference between facts of common knowledge 
from adjudicated facts. One such difference is “built into the Rule”1412, while the other is 
“established by the Tribunal’s jurisprudence.”1413  According to the first difference and in the 
opinion of the Appeals Chamber, “whereas judicial notice under Rule 94(A) is mandatory, 
judicial notice under Rule 94(B) is discretionary, allowing the Trial Chamber to determine which 
adjudicated facts to recognize on the basis of a careful consideration of the accused’s right to a 
fair and expeditious trial.”1414 This difference was discussed above. The second difference is 
premised on the consequences of judicial notice. In the opinion of the Appeals Chamber, once 
again, “whereas facts noticed under Rule 94(A) are established conclusively, those established 
under Rule 94(B) are merely presumptions that may be rebutted by the defence with evidence at 
trial.”1415 
 
The ad hoc tribunals also pointed out the aims of judicial notice. According to an ICTY trial 
chamber, “Rule 94(B) aims at achieving judicial economy and harmonizing judgments of the 
Tribunal by conferring on the Trial Chamber discretionary power to take judicial notice of facts 
or documents from other proceedings.”1416 It is “not a mechanism that may be employed to 
circumvent the ordinary requirement of relevance and thereby clutter the record with matters that 
would not otherwise be admitted.”1417 When a Chamber takes judicial notice under Rule 94(B), it 
must ensure that a balance is achieved between “promoting these aims and safeguarding the 
fundamental rights of the accused to a fair trial.”1418 Furthermore, an amendment of Rule 94(B) 
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“only allows a Chamber to take judicial notice of the authenticity of documentary evidence 
which has been admitted in prior proceedings.”1419 
 
In Stanisic and Simatovic
1420, an ICTY Trial Chamber held that a “decision on taking judicial 
notice of an adjudicated fact is a two-step process. Firstly, the Chamber has to consider if a 
purported adjudicated fact fulfils the admissibility requirements as developed by the 
jurisprudence of the Tribunal.”1421 The second step is that “even if the chamber is satisfied that a 
purported adjudicated fact fulfils the […] criteria, it always retains the right to withhold judicial 
notice of a fact when it believes that such notice would not serve the interests of justice.”1422 This 
is a novelty gained from the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals. Yet, it is a dangerous one. 
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Briefly stated, and according to the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, ad hoc tribunals take 
judicial notice of (1) facts of common knowledge and (2) adjudicated facts. The ad hoc tribunals’ 
aims of taking judicial notice do not differ from those at municipal levels. It is to achieve judicial 
economy in terms of time and money as well as harmonising Tribunals’ judgments.  
 
Both the rules of the ICTY and ICTR do not make provisions regarding whether or not the 
judges can take judicial notice of matters of law. In fact the rules are silent on this issue. 
However, a reading of some judgments reveals that these tribunals have frequently resorted to 
pieces of laws and legislations that prevailed in both Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. The 
Trial Chambers have not required proof of those laws, but have instead referred to them as 
proven and acceptable.  
 
A review of the decisions both at trial and appellate levels shows that ad hoc tribunals have in 
the majority taken judicial notice of adjudicated facts under Rule 94(B).
1423
 But judicial notice of 
facts of common knowledge has also been taken, albeit in few instances compared to adjudicated 
facts. Under Rule 73ter (B)(i), at the pre-defence conference, a Trial Chamber or a Judge may 
order that the Defence file “admissions by the parties and a statement of other matters which are 
not in dispute.” Rarely however have parties conceded to any of the facts constituting their 
respective cases.  Where facts have been conceded by a party, they did not constitute a party of 
argument anymore. 
 
Though it is the functions of any court to ensure that the proceedings are not delayed by legal 
technicalities, it is counterproductive to rush a case by judicial notice particularly when the 
                                                          
1423
 See for example The Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupresic et al., Case No. IT-95-16-A, Decision on the Motion of 
Drago Josipovic, Zoran Kupreskic and Vlatko Kupreskic to admit additional evidence pursuant to Rule 115 and for 
judicial notice taken pursuant to Rule 94(B), 8 May 2001; The Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevic, Decision on 
prosecution Motion for Judicial Notice of Adjudicated Facts, Case No.IT-02-54-AR73.5, 28 October 2003; Momir 
Nikolic v. The Prosecutor, Decision on Appellant’s Motion for Judicial Notice, Case No. IT-02-60/1-A, 1 April 
2005; The Prosecutor v. Edouard Karemera, Mathieu Ngirumpatse and Joseph Nzirorera, Decision on Prosecutor’s 
Interlocutory Appeal of Decision on Judicial Notice;  The Prosecutor v. Dragomir Milosevic, Decision on 
Interlocutory Appeals Against Trial Chamber’s Decision on Prosecutor’s Motion for Judicial Notice of Adjudicated 
Facts and Prosecutor’s Catalogue of Agreed facts, Case No.IT-98-29/1-AR73.1, 26 June 2007; The Prosecutor v. 
Momcilo Perisic, Decision on Prosecutor’s Motion for Judicial Notice of Adjudicated Facts Concerning Sarajevo, 
Case No. IT-04-81-PT, 26 June 2008; The Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic, Decision on the Prosecutor’s motion for 
judicial notice of intercepts related to the Sarajevo component and request for leave to add one document to the Rule 
65 ter exhibit list, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, 4 February 2011 
299 
 
parties have not moved any motion in this respect. Judicial notice taken proprio motu fall in this 
category. In Ndindiliyimana et al. the Trial Chamber proprio motu took judicial notice that:  
The tribunal was established in the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide in 1994. Since then the tribunal has 
heard extensive factual and legal analysis of the genocide, the armed conflict between the RPF and the 
Rwandan Armed Forces, and the historical context of the events occurring between April and July 1994. 
Rule 94 permits the Trial Chamber to take judicial notice of “facts of common knowledge” or that “are not 
reasonably subject to dispute.” Given the ICTR’s substantial jurisprudence surrounding the period between 
1990 and July 1994, the Chamber takes judicial notice of the existence of genocide against the Tutsi of 
Rwanda, the widespread and systematic killing of Tutsi and Hutu civilians, and of a non-international 
armed conflict during the period covered by the Indictment against the Accused and, where relevant, during 
the period preceding it.
1424
 
 
This practice lacks rigor and instead portrays a sort of bias in handling complex matters like the 
Rwandan case. If for example, one takes an aspect of these judicial notices about the 
“widespread and systematic killing of Tutsi and Hutu civilians”; another trial chamber has 
initially taken judicial notice that “widespread or systematic attacks against a civilian population 
based on Tutsi ethnic identification occurred during that time.”1425 The key issue here is about 
whether or not the widespread and systematic nature of the attacks was directed only against 
Tutsis or a civilian population composed of both Hutu and Tutsi. Again, these judicial notices 
may be misleading rather than helpful. The reason is that the mandate of the ICTR covers the 
whole year 1994. The period comprised between 6 April 1994 and 14 July 1994 coincides with 
active fighting between RPF and the Rwandan Armed Forces. But there has been ample evidence 
heard by the Chambers pointing to the widespread and systematic nature of the attacks against 
the civilian population going beyond 14 July 1994. 
 
It has been observed that sometimes Trial Chambers take judicial notice of contested or 
contestable matters. In the Akayesu case, for example, the Chamber took judicial notice of a 
number of United Nations reports, which extensively document the massacres which took place 
in Rwanda in 1994.
1426
 Elsewhere in this research it has been demonstrated that those reports 
were not accurate as such, and could only constitute prima facie evidence of the commission of 
                                                          
1424
 Ndindiliyimana et al., para. 105 
1425
 Laurent Semanza v. The Prosecutor, Judgment, para. 192 
1426
 See list in Akayesu, TC, para. 165. Those reports are Final Report of the Commission of Experts established 
pursuant to Security Council Resolution 935(1994), S/1994/1405, U.N. Doc. S/1994/1405 (1994), 9 December 
1994; Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on Extrajudicial, Summary or 
Arbitrary Executions, Bacre Wally Ndiaye, on his mission to Rwanda from 8 – 17 April 1993, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/1994/7/Add.1(1993) 
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crimes in Rwanda. Those reports were incomplete. Even if one could accept the competence, 
expertise and authoritative standing of people who initiated those reports, it is also a fact that 
they were drafted without thorough investigations. They were a result of short term missions 
performed by a limited number of staff in troubled areas. Taking judicial notice of those facts is 
really not serious. 
 
Taking judicial notice has likewise been an uneven practice before the Trial chambers depending 
on the moving party. When moved by the Defence, Trial Chambers were reluctant or unwilling 
to take judicial notice. When it was the prosecution, Trial Chambers were too ready to proceed. 
For example, in Semanza, a Trial Chamber “partially granted a Defence motion filed on 13 
November 2001 and took judicial notice of the following documents: Décret-Loi No. 10/75: 
Organisation et fonctionnement de la prefecture [au Rwanda], and Décret-Loi No. 18/75 du 14 
août 1978, to the extent that it amended or otherwise modified Décret-Loi No. 10/75.”1427 This 
decree was an already uncontested law in Rwanda. It did not need to be judicially noticed.  
  
In Kajelijeli, the Chamber took Judicial Notice of the fact that between 1 January 1994 and 17 
July 1994, Rwanda was a state Party to the Genocide Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.  Rwanda had acceded to the convention on 12 February 
1975. Rwanda was also a Contracting Party to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and 
their Additional Protocol II of 8 June 1977 to which it had acceded on 5 May 1964 and on 19 
November 1984 respectively.
1428
 Neither the prosecutor, nor the defence could, in the presence 
of these instruments with accurate references, contest the fact that Rwanda was bound by these 
conventions. Taking judicial notice of the conventions was an unnecessary exercise.  
 
6.4. Summary on the need and use of guilty plea and judicial notice 
 
This chapter has revealed that guilty plea is used in common law jurisdictions mostly to dispose 
of petty crimes. It is a waiver of one’s right to trial for an expected lenient sentence. It helps the 
court to speed up its work, save time and financial resources; and may therefore be efficient in 
this respect. Its genuineness in domestic jurisdiction is still doubtful.  
                                                          
1427
 The Prosecutor v. Laurent Semanza, Judgment and Sentence, op. cit., para. 28 
1428
 The Prosecutor v. Juvénal Kajelijeli, Judgment and Sentence, op. cit., para. 744 
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Using guilty plea to adjudicate international crimes is counterproductive for many reasons. 
Guilty plea does not respond to the concerns highlighted in domestic jurisdictions. The 
international crimes at issue are of an extreme gravity and seriousness and the guilty plea does 
not assist in resolving them.  
 
The chapter demonstrated moreover that there is no consistency and harmony in the ad hoc 
tribunals’ practice of judicial notice. Knowlton suggests that “the failure to state accurately what 
is noticed and the failure to evaluate correctly the significance of the matter noticed have 
undoubtedly been contributing causes of much of the confusion in the area.”1429 This is the 
situation at both the ICTY and ICTR. What is noticed does not reflect the extent and 
completeness of a situation. It is rather a way of assisting the prosecution in leading its case. 
Judicial notice taken in these circumstances does not really secure court time and resources let 
alone ensuring jurisprudential harmony.  Only facts of common knowledge need to be noticed. 
The rest should be proved by evidence.  
 
These two legal techniques are traded at the beginning or in the course of a criminal case. The 
road leading to inefficiency and ineffectiveness of the ad hoc tribunal does not end here. It 
continues until criminal responsibility is imputed. Joint criminal enterprise and command 
responsibility are the doctrines that are most often used to impute criminal responsibility. The ad 
hoc tribunals have developed these two doctrines exponentially. Yet, the heavy reliance on them 
may in the near future become unbearable with unexpected and uncontrollable outcomes. At the 
least, they may defeat the very ends for which international crimes prosecution is undertaken. 
The next chapter critically analyses these modes of imputing criminal responsibility.  
                                                          
1429
 Ibiden, p. 510 
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CHAPTER 7: JOINT CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE AND COMMAND 
RESPONSIBILITY: PREFERRED MODES OF 
IMPUTING CRIMINAL LIABILITY  
 
 
7.1. Introduction 
  
Joint criminal enterprise and command responsibility have gained excessive importance in the 
judgments of the ad hoc tribunals. Scholars are divided over the concept of joint criminal 
enterprise. Some call joint criminal enterprise a “vague legal construction”1430 or “legal 
fiction.”1431 Others praise the doctrine as a mode of liability that can “be applied judiciously and 
that, in particular, its third, extended form can be defined in a manner that does not infringe on 
the rights of the defendant.”1432 They go as far as suggesting that “liability for participation in 
some form of plan has existed in international law since at least 1945”1433 and that “in some 
national jurisdictions it has existed for many years before the Second World War.”1434 Cassese 
holds that the doctrine crystallised after World War II, and was a customary rule of international 
criminal law since then.
1435
  
 
                                                          
1430
 Chouliaras Athanasios, “ From ‘Conspiracy’ to ‘ Joint Criminal Enterprise’: in search of the organizational 
parameter”, in Stahn Carsten & Van den Herik (eds.), Future Perspectives on International Criminal Justice, 
T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague, 2010, p.547. This author uses also the terms “creative judicial reconstruction of 
reality.” 
1431
 Osiel Mark, “The banality of good: aligning incentives against mass atrocities”, Columbia Law Review, Vol. 
105, Iss.6, 2005, pp. 1751 – 1862, p. 1771 (footnote 92 and accompanying text), p. 1802.  
Osiel Mark, Making Sense of Mass Atrocity, op. cit., p. 6 
1432
 Provost René, Amicus Curia Brief, submitted by the Centre for Human Rights and Legal Pluralism, McGill 
University, Montreal (Québec) Canada, in the Matter of the co-prosecutors’ appeal of the closing order against 
Kaing Guek Eav “Duch” dated 8 August 2008, Case File No. 001/18-07-2007-ECCC/OCIJ(PTC 02), 28 October 
2008. Though this document is an amicus curiae brief, it is useful to highlight the outstanding position of its author, 
Professor René Provost who specialises in this area. 
1433
 Idem, para. 7 
1434
 Id. ; See also Du Toit Peter, “Thebus and Tadic: comparing the application of the doctrine of common purpose 
in South Africa to its application in the Yugoslav tribunal”, South African Journal of Criminal Justice, Vol. 20, 
Iss.3, 2007, pp. 361 – 371. This author suggests that the South African Constitutional Court has held that the 
doctrine of common purpose is constitutionally compliant. 
1435
 Antonio Cassese, Amicus Curiae Brief of Professor Antonio Cassese and Members of the Journal of 
International Criminal Justice on Joint Criminal Enterprise, Criminal Case File No. 001/18/07-2007-ECCC/OCJ 
(PTC 02), 27 October 2008. The authority of Professor Cassese in international criminal law is beyond dispute. So is 
the expertise of the members of the Journal of International Criminal Justice who contributed to the Amicus Brief, 
namely Mary De Ming Fan, Vanessa Thalmann and Salvatore Zappala. 
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Unlike joint criminal enterprise, command responsibility “is more clearly stated than consistently 
applied”1436 by the ad hoc tribunals. According to Williamson, the judgments of the ICTR reveal 
that the application of command responsibility can still give rise to a number of difficulties.
1437
 
In fact, “without command responsibility as a means of holding government officials who 
instigated the violence liable, the ICTR would not have accomplished as much as it has.”1438  
 
Both joint criminal enterprise and command responsibility have been used in a way that tends to 
break the link between criminal law and punishment. Such a link is the actual commission of a 
punishable crime with a required state of mind. It has been argued that “to make a man liable to 
imprisonment for an offense which he does not know he is committing and is unable to prevent 
is repugnant to the ordinary man’s conception of justice and brings the law into contempt.”1439 
Ashworth concurs by suggesting that: “the core conception of the criminal law [is] to punish 
those who have culpably (rather than accidentally) done wrong.”1440 A thorough analysis of joint 
criminal enterprise and command responsibility proves that they do not respond to these 
imperatives. This is another reason why the judgments of the ad hoc tribunals are ineffective. 
 
                                                          
1436
 Peters C. William, “Adjudication Deferred: Command Responsibility for War Crimes and US Military Justice 
from MY Lai to Haditha and Beyond”, Nationalities papers, Vol. 37, No. 6, 2010, pp. 925 – 952, p. 925. Lippman 
believes however that the doctrine’s parameters’ remain imprecise, see Lippman Matthew, “Humanitarian Law; the 
uncertain contours of command responsibility”, Tulsa Journal of Comparative and International Law, Vol. 8, Iss.2,  
2001, pp. 1 – 93, p. 1 
1436
 Williamson A. Jamie, “Command responsibility in the case law of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda”, Criminal Law Forum, Vol. 13, 2002, pp. 365 – 384, p. 366 
1437
 Williamson A. Jamie, “Command responsibility in the case law of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda”, Criminal Law Forum, Vol. 13, Iss.3, 2002, pp. 365 – 384, p. 366. Jamie Williamson is a former Legal 
Officer at the ICTR. 
1438
 Libby Sean, “[D] Effective control: Problems arising from the application of non-military command 
responsibility by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,” Emory International Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss.1, 
2009, pp. 201 – 229, p. 205 
1439
 The Mental Element in Crime (Law Com. Working Paper No. 31), p. 4 cited in Richardson, (ed.), Archibold: 
Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practice, Sweet & Maxwell, Thomson Reuters, 2010, 17-2, p. 1858 
1440
 Ashworth Andrew, “Conceptions of Overcriminalization”, Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law, Vol. 5, Iss.2, 
2008, pp. 407 – 425, p. 411 
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7.2. Joint criminal enterprise doctrine 
 
Osiel calls joint criminal enterprise a “legal fiction” that exemplifies “creative legal theory to 
enable the prosecution of complex crimes.”1441 What do others say about it? Cassese, one 
vehement advocate of joint criminal enterprise, argues that the notion of joint criminal enterprise 
is “more crucial in international criminal law than at the domestic level.”1442 In support of his 
argument, he evokes the concept of the “world community.” He then insists that in the world 
community international crimes such as war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, torture 
and terrorism share the common feature of tending to be the expression of collective criminality, 
in that they are perpetrated by groups of individuals, military details, paramilitary units or 
government officials acting in unison or in pursuance of a policy.
1443
 He suggests that not 
prosecuting those crimes would be contrary to the general purpose of criminal law as well as a 
moral failure.
1444
 In Karemera et al., an ICTR Trial Chamber held; in support of the rationale of 
joint criminal enterprise and referring to the Tadic appeals’ case1445 that: 
To hold criminally liable as a perpetrator only the person who materially performs the criminal act would 
disregard the role as co-perpetrators of all those who in some way made it possible for the perpetrator 
physically to carry out that criminal act. At the same time, depending upon the circumstances, to hold the 
latter liable only as aiders and abettors might understate the degree of their criminal responsibility.
1446
 
 
Both Cassese’s arguments and the ICTR Trial Chamber’s point of view lack vigour. They do not 
explain how and why from “collective criminality”1447, one forges individual criminal liability. 
Suggesting that everyone in a collective criminality must be punished for moral reasons, is either 
                                                          
1441
 Laughland John, Travesty: the trial of Slobodan Milosevic and the corruption of international justice, Pluto 
Press, London, 2007, p. 119; see Chouliaras talking about another mode of imputing responsibility and holding the 
view that it is also a prosecution’s weapon. “Conspiracy is a concept employed mainly in the Anglo-American 
common-law systems, and generally speaking, supplies the prosecution with an effective legal weapon in the fight 
against ‘organized crime,’ however defined. It is a very complex and highly controversial category that ‘became the 
monster it is now’ is by a process of judicial improvisation.” Chouliafras Athanasios, “ From ‘Conspiracy’ to ‘ Joint 
Criminal Enterprise’, op. cit., p. 552  
1442
 Cassese Antonio, “The Proper limits of Individual responsibility …”, op. cit., p. 110; see also Cassese Antonio, 
Amicus Curiae Brief , op. cit., p. 12. He suggests that “The world community must defend itself from this collective 
criminality by holding those responsible for the full extent and reach of their crimes.” 
1443
 Cassese Antonio, “The Proper limits of Individual responsibility…”, op. cit., p. 110  
1444
 Ibiden, p. 110 
1445
 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Judgment, Case No. IT – 94 – 1 – A, 15 July 1999 
1446
 The Prosecutor v. Edouard Karemera, Mathieu Ngirumpatse, Joseph Nzirorera and André Rwamakuba, 
Decision on the preliminary motion by the defence of Joseph Nzirorera, Edouard Karemera, André Rwamakuba and 
Mathieu Ngirumpatse challenging jurisdiction in relation to Joint Criminal Enterprise, Case No. ICTR-98-44-T, 11 
May 2004, para. 36 quoting Tadic, Appeals, para. 192 
1447
 See also Professor Provost writing on the “emergence of international recognition of individual liability for 
collective criminal endevour…”; Provost René, Amicus Curia Brief, op. cit.  
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hypocrisy or a simple expression of intention. It is not legally articulated. The effort should be 
put, as suggested elsewhere, on investigating the role and extent as well as moral presisposition 
of every alleged perpetrator, which seems to have not been the case before the ad hoc tribunals. 
Cassese, as a judge at the ICTs and as a scholar, knew that all associates in violation of 
international crimes in the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda were not punished. There has instead 
been an over-punishment of the few who have been apprehended and prosecuted. It is a fact that 
many culpable individuals escaped prosecution. The reality is also that those who have been 
prosecuted were convicted “in a way that exaggerates the true extent of their 
blameworthiness.”1448 Osiel sums up the situation as one that in which “the law’s reach is thus at 
once too timid and too ambitious, both over-inclusive and under-inclusive vis- à- vis the actual 
distribution of responsibility.”1449 He moreover maintains that:  
Law and evidence permit liability far beyond the few individuals who can practically be prosecuted; yet 
even these few can be convicted only through theories of indirect liability that blame them for wrongs 
beyond their control or contemplation. Since so few can actually be tried, the impulse to blame those 
prosecuted for wrongs beyond their culpability becomes overwhelming.
1450
 
 
There is therefore no point to justify joint criminal enterprise by relying on moral responsibility. 
Besides this, there is a great risk of sacrificing traditional principles of criminal law in favour of 
this new concept. Cassese’s allusion to “world community” is also not persuasive. It is fictitious; 
though, according to Osiel:  
fictions assuredly play an important role in the law – a legitimate role, when acknowledged as such – and 
are justified insofar as they enable law to advance justice by comparing a novel phenomenon with a more 
familiar one that is already well understood. The idea of ‘the international community’ may be just such a 
fiction, insofar as it is generally invoked – despite its lack of sociological substance, in a dense web of 
social ties – to advance the claims of justice by analogy to those that any genuine, nonfictional community 
might make on its members. Implicitly, the speaker is saying the following: if most of humankind truly felt 
itself to be members of a single community, as perhaps it should and eventually it may, then surely they 
would endorse – well, whatever its advocate is advocating. This is the role that fiction often plays in legal 
argument.”1451  
 
So, defending a fictitious entity with fictitious means is, in the view of Ohlin “wrong on a 
philosophical level.”1452A defendant who makes a small contribution is not as guilty as someone 
who makes a large contribution. Evidence is always needed as to whether the contribution is 
                                                          
1448
 Osiel Mark, Making Sense of Mass Atrocity, op. cit., p. 2 
1449
 Ibiden, p. 2 
1450
 Idem, pp. 3-4 
1451
 Osiel Mark, Making Sense of Mass Atrocity, op. cit., p. 76 
1452
 Ohlin Jens David, “Three Conceptual Problems with the Doctrine of Joint Criminal Enterprise”, Journal of 
International Criminal Justice, Vol. 5, Iss.1, 2007, pp. 69 – 90, p. 85 
306 
 
small or large. To hold otherwise is to violate the principle of individual moral responsibility. 
Such a defendant may only happen to be found “in the wrong place, at the wrong time, belonging 
to the wrong ethnic group, doing what is natural for such a person.”1453  
 
7.2.1. The “magic weapon” and its categories 
 
Joint criminal enterprise gained momentum before the ad hoc tribunals because it facilitated the 
prosecution of mass atrocities.  The more proponents of joint criminal enterprise contributed to 
its growth, the more it attracted the attention of its opponents. According to Damgaard, joint 
criminal enterprise is “one of the most extensively used, yet also one of the most controversial 
modes of liability labelled the ‘common purpose doctrine’ or the ‘joint criminal enterprise 
doctrine.’1454 In concurring with this argument, Laughland says that: 
In spite of its highly dubious nature, the concept of ‘joint criminal enterprise’ is used by the ICTY to obtain 
convictions for the most serious crimes, including genocide. Following the formulation of joint criminal 
enterprise in Tadic in 1999 and the conviction of Kristic in 2001, the first indictment, which relied 
explicitly on joint criminal enterprise, was issued on 25 June 2001. Sixty-four per cent of all indictments 
issued between then and 1 January 2004 have relied explicitly on joint criminal enterprise, and Milosevic 
were among them.
1455
 
 
Recalling writings on the matter by Schabas
1456
 and Danner
1457
, Lyons
1458
 worries by suggesting 
that joint criminal enterprise as:  
a judicially interpreted doctrine [which] has become a ‘hallmark’ mode of liability at the international 
tribunals. This concept has been referred to as the ‘magic bullet of the OTP’ and the ‘nuclear bomb of the 
international prosecutor’s arsenal. It is obvious as to why: with these three words, the prosecution has 
charged collective and institutional guilt, in one fell swoop.
1459
 
 
                                                          
1453
 Laughland John, Travesty: The trial of Slobodan Milosevic …, op cit., p. 123. He cites the “Extended Joint 
Criminal Enterprise in International Criminal Law”, Master thesis, Faculty of Law, University of Lund, June 2005, 
p. 60 
1454
 Damgaard Ciara, Individual Criminal Responsibility for Core International Crimes: selected pertinent issues, 
Springer,Verlag Berlin Heidberg, 2008, p. 127 
1455
 Laughland John, Travesty: the trial of Slobodan Milosevic …, op. cit., pp. 122 – 123; see also Haan Verena, 
“The development of the Concept of Joint Criminal Enterprise at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia”, op. cit., pp. 167 – 201. She suggests that this mode of liability has been applied in several cases before 
the ICTY. 
1456
 Schabas A. William, “Mens Rea and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia”, 37 NEW 
ENG. L. REV. 1015, 1032(2003), cited in Lyons S. Beth, Tortured Law/Tortured “Justice”…, op. cit., footnote 2 
1457
 Allison Marston Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations : Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command 
Responsibility and the Development of International Criminal Law, 93 CAL. L. REV. 75, 137(2005), cited in Lyons 
S. Beth, Tortured Law/Tortured “Justice”…, op. cit., footnote 3 
1458
 Lyons S. Beth, “Tortured Law/Tortured “Justice” – Joint Criminal Enterprise in the case of Aloys Simba”, ILSA 
Journal of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 17, No. 2, 2010 – 2011, pp. 459 - 471 
1459
 Lyons S. Beth, Tortured Law/Tortured “Justice”…, op. cit., p. 459 
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Joint criminal enterprise was first used by the ICTY in the Tadic Appeals judgment in 1999.
1460
 
Since then it has quickly emerged as the most important mode of liability in modern international 
criminal law. Indeed, it is charged in almost every indictment at the ICTY.
1461
 This is not due to 
it being the most genuine, “new and autonomous form of criminal imputation”1462 that expresses 
the extent to which an individual accused has been involved in a crime.  Rather it is the most 
convenient tool easy to put forward as a mode of imputation of responsibility. So it is considered 
“to be the most effective tool which can be employed to convict individuals of core international 
crimes, where there is no direct evidence of the actual participation of the accused in the crime in 
question.”1463 It is particularly used where “it may prove even more difficult to collect evidence 
about the exact participation of members of the crowd in the crimes.”1464  
 
Ambos
1465
 argues that “the common ground of joint criminal enterprise and command 
responsibility is the need and desire to overcome evidentiary problems.”1466 This is not a 
rigorous legal argument. According to Stakic’ s case, “joint criminal enterprise is only one of 
several interpretations of the term ‘commission’ under article 7(1) of the Statute and that other 
definitions of co-perpetration must equally be taken into account.”1467 
 To ridicule its overambitious reach, Osiel argues that:  
Enterprise participation does not require prosecutors to delineate specifically even such simple structures as 
wheels and chains; much less the more complex social networks through which mass atrocity generally 
occurs. The weaker the ties necessary to link one person’s contribution to another’s, the easier it becomes 
to define both as participants in each other’s endeavours.1468 
 
According to Cassese, the doctrine must be used “to ensure accountability for the full gravity of 
crimes, where the exact role that each participant in a common purpose may be obscured by the 
                                                          
1460
 Ambos Kai, Amicus Curiae Brief in the matter of the co-prosecutors’ appeal of the closing order against Kaing 
Guek Aav ‘‘Duch’’ dated 8 august 2008. The amicus was published as Ambos Kai, “Amicus Curiae Brief in the 
matter of the co-prosecutors’ appeal of the closing order against Kaing Guek Aav ‘‘Duch’’ dated 8 august 2008”, 
Criminal Law Forum, Vol. 20, No. 3, 2009, pp. 353 – 388, p. 355 
1461
 Ohlin D. Jens, “Joint Criminal Confusion”, New Criminal Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss.3, 2009, pp. 406 – 419, p. 
407 
1462
 Ambos Kai, “Amicus Curiae…”, op. cit., p. 362.   
1463
 Damgaard Ciara, Individual Criminal Responsibility for Core International Crimes:…, op. cit., p. 127 and 235 
1464
 Cassese Antonio, “The Proper limit of individual responsibility …”, op. cit., p. 110. 
1465
 Ambos Kai, “Joint Criminal Enterprise and Command Responsibility…”, op. cit. 
1466
 Idem, p. 181 
1467
 The Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakic, Judgment, Case No IT-97-24-T, 31 July 2003, para. 438 
1468
 Osiel Mark, Making Sense of Mass Atrocity, op. cit., pp. 58 - 59 
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massive scale and complexity of the crime.”1469 Cassese concurs with Ambos on this point. 
Tracing joint criminal enterprise to Tadic appeals’ judgment in 1999, Ambos notes:  
The Chamber looked for a theory of participation in international crimes which takes sufficiently into 
account the collective, widespread and systematic context of the commission of such crimes and, thus, 
helps to overcome the typical problems of proof with regard to the - sometimes hardly visible - 
contributions of individual participants.
1470
 
 
Osiel expresses this idea much better when he states that “the doctrine’s appeal thus lies in its 
‘unique ability to describe criminal arrangements too complex to fit within traditional theories of 
criminal liability.”1471 Idiomatically, he calls it a reductionist approach. He sketches the context 
in which atrocity crimes are committed, and the way responsibility is to be attributed. According 
to Osiel: 
From Dachau to Darfur, it is often surprisingly hard to say precisely who is really responsible for what 
horrors, for which share of a long and tangled episode of mass atrocity. Historians and social scientists 
generally pride themselves on explaining such a large event entirely in collective terms, irreducible to the 
acts or intentions of any participant. […]. But for lawyers – those who must prosecute such wrongs (and 
defend the accused) – the devil necessarily lies in the proverbial details of who did which terrible thing to 
whom, in what manner, at a given time and place, with what purpose in mind. Our approach is thus 
unabashedly “reductionist,” in the sense of reducing all large abstractions to the most concrete particulars. 
Yet can this lawyerly reductionism offer a coherent and defensible account of and response to massive 
genocide?
1472  
 
Here again, the applicable principle when there is difficulty in uncovering evidence of an 
allegation are well established in criminal law. Three outstanding scholars and advocates of joint 
criminal enterprise, namely Ambos
1473
, Cassese
1474
 and Provost
1475
 are in fact suggesting that, 
confronted with the difficulties of uncovering the exact role of every single individual in a crime 
perpetrated by many, the solution is to hold everyone accountable. Whoever is caught must 
respond to the whole extent of the crime. For them in fact, this “collective criminal responsibility 
serves as [a] substitute where individual criminal responsibility cannot be proven.”1476 Yet, this 
collective responsibility runs against the very idea of criminal law, punishment and culpability.  
This is a too light and simplistic approach to the problem.  
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Judge Schomburg
1477
, one of the long-serving judges at both the ICTY and ICTR appeals 
Chamber underscores the principle in dubio pro reo. According to him, this principle 
creates to a certain extent an imbalance in favour of an accused. This, however, is necessary and justified 
because a human being can only be deprived of his or her liberty if the Judges come to the conclusion that 
he or she is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Again, not to be misunderstood, I am fully aware that some 
victims and, in particular, those who have taken the burden to testify before the ICTY, may be disappointed 
with the outcome of a concrete case. But it is mandatory to acquit in whole or in part an accused instead of 
running the risk that, based on the evidence before us, an innocent human being is found guilty and 
deprived of his or her liberty without justification. Any search for truth in international criminal 
proceedings must be adequately balanced against the fundamental rights of the accused. The presumption 
of innocence and the principle of individual guilt are absolute and cannot be disregarded.
1478
 
 
Schomburg is largely supported by Damgaard who acknowledges the concern of punishing 
perpetrators so that “justice can be seen to be done.”1479 Yet, “punishment of the perpetrators of 
core international crimes should not come at any cost to the basic rights of the accused. If this 
were to happen, this would prove more damaging to the legitimacy of the international criminal 
law system in the long run, than any reports of perpetrators evading justice ever would.”1480 The 
principle of doubt is not the only one that joint criminal enterprise infringes. It trashes the 
principle of individual criminal responsibility, which is acclaimed to be the aim of the whole 
project of international criminal prosecutions. For many years, and throughout the world, group 
crimes have been committed. Such being the case, however, Bogdan
1481
 re-emphasises the 
principle of individual criminal responsibility. His view is that:  
contemporary international criminal law refrains from imposing liability on the group as a whole and seeks 
to individualize responsibility associated with the commission of crimes. Adjudication of individual 
responsibility is important specifically because it avoids the stigmatizations associated with the assignment 
of mass guilt. Thus, although individuals often act together in situations of conflict or war, the purpose 
behind international criminal trials remains the equitable allocations or responsibility between the 
individuals who engaged in conduct prohibited by international criminal law.
1482
  
 
The supporters of joint criminal enterprise seem to deliberately ignore these core principles of 
general criminal law by explaining the necessity of joint criminal enterprise with external, yet 
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unpersuasive factors. They recognise that the joint criminal enterprise “would ensure consistency 
in the application of law among international and hybrid tribunals that have historically applied 
joint criminal enterprise liability and that are continuing to apply the doctrine today in contexts 
as diverse as the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Sierra Leon, East Timor, as well as Iraq.”1483 
While no one can reasonably dispute the idea that joint criminal enterprise was to be applied in a 
consistent manner, it is questionable as to whether this is always the case. An analysis of the case 
law regading how this doctrine has been applied before the ad hoc tribunal shows that there is no 
consistent application of joint criminal enterprise.  
 
The scholarship on joint criminal enterprise divides the doctrine into three categories. This 
division is not yet unanimous. According to Ohlin, “the first scenario involves a conspiracy 
where all members carry the intent to commit the crime, although the criminal action is only 
executed by one member of the conspiracy.”1484 Cassese believes that this mode is the “more 
widespread category.” This mode exists where parties to a crime agree to some acts “either when 
making the common plan or design or when such [a] plan materialized extemporaneously.”1485 
Additionally, “all participants shared the intent to commit the concerted crime, regardless of 
whether the accused was the one who actually physically perpetrated the crime.”1486 Cassese’s 
take is that “all are responsible, whatever their role and position in carrying out the common 
criminal plan.”1487 The problem here is one of detaching the act from its perpetrator(s). For a 
crime to be complete there must be an act, a criminal intention and a legal criminalisation of the 
act. People cannot share an intention of something that does not exist yet. Proving that people 
intended to achieve the same result should be approached with necessary caution, not lightly as 
the advocates of joint criminal enterprise purport to suggest. 
 
According to Ohlin, the second scenario involves: 
 concentration camps, where all members have knowledge of the system of mistreatment in the camp and 
carry the intention to further that system of ill-treatment. In that case, each participant in the common 
design is criminally liable for all acts of mistreatment by other members of the concentration camp, even if 
the defendant has no knowledge or intent with regard to the specific crime or action.
1488
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This second variant of joint criminal enterprise is called “systemic.” According to Cassese, it 
“applies to persons carrying out a task within a criminal design implemented in an institutional 
framework such as an internment or a concentration camp.”1489 The reasoning is reduced to the 
fact that: “a person who knowingly and willingly contributes to the functioning of the system 
will be responsible for the offence even if he or she does not immediately participate in the 
commission of the offence, if the offence can be foreseen in the framework of the system.”1490 
The concentration camp example is an unnecessary over-generalization of World War II 
prosecutions to cases before the ad hoc tribunals. The reason is that, according to Krnojelac
1491
 
Trial Chamber, “the only basis for the distinction between these two categories made by the 
Tadic Appeals Chamber is the subject matter with which those cases dealt, namely concentration 
camps during World War II.”1492 This Trial Chamber went ahead in pinpointing the reasons why 
this category was considered. It reasoned that: 
Many of the cases considered by the Tadic Appeals Chamber to establish this second category appear to 
proceed upon the basis that certain organizations in charge of the concentration camps, such as the SS, were 
themselves criminal organizations, so that the participation of an accused in the joint criminal enterprise 
charged would be inferred from his membership of such criminal organization. As such those cases may 
not provide a firm basis for concentration or prison camp cases as a separate category.
1493
 
 
The architects and tenets of this category do not say whether it only applies to a concentration 
camp where prisoners are mistreated, or whether it applies to an institutional framework. If this 
variant concerns only an “internment camp where inmates are severely ill-treated and even 
tortured”1494, what about other situations where people, not necessarily prisoners are ill-treated? 
Why choose concentration camps? What if this happens in a military barracks or in a school or at 
a workplace?  
 
For example, it was revealed that at the Walter Reed Army Medical Centre in the U.S, wounded 
soldiers received ill-treatment.
1495
 On 1 March 2007, Major General George W. Weightman, the 
general in charge of Walter Reed was relieved of his command after it appeared that soldiers 
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being treated as outpatients were living in dilapidated quarters and enduring lengthy waits for 
treatment.
1496
 The following day, “Army Secretary Francis J. Harvey was forced to resign due to 
his handling of information that wounded soldiers were receiving poor treatment.”1497 On 12 
March, Lieutenant General Kevin Kiley, the Army Surgeon General was forced into 
retirement.
1498
 It may be argued that the “bureaucratic bungling”1499 at Walter Reeds does not 
violate any international law. Can it be said, at least, that these three officers were “discharging 
administrative duties indispensable”1500 for the health of American soldiers? All three bear 
responsibility because “they have knowledge of the serious abuses being perpetrated and 
willingly take part in the functioning of the institution?
1501
 Though the measures taken against 
the U.S. officers were disciplinary in nature, they could also be charged criminally pursuant to 
the second mode of joint criminal enterprise liability. Yet, this does not come out of Cassese’s 
analysis of the three categories of joint criminal enterprise. 
 
For the third category of joint criminal enterprise, “the Accused must have intended to 
participate in and further the common criminal activity or plan, design or purpose of the 
individuals concerned, and to contribute to the joint criminal enterprise, or in any event to the 
commission of a crime by the group.”1502 In the course of committing the crime agreed upon, one 
or multiple participants commit an incidental crime not agreed upon by all the participants.  
 
There are in fact two separate crimes, and two separate intentions. According to Cassese, “this 
mode of liability only arises if the participant, who did not have the intent to commit the 
‘incidental’ offence, was nevertheless in a position to foresee its commission and willingly took 
the risk.”1503 Vogel schematizes this mode by stating that “he who runs with the pack is 
responsible for what the pack will do.”1504 Vogel argues, however, that “knowledge and intention 
are not sufficient to make a person individually responsible […] you also need some contribution 
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in form of an act or an omission in breach of legal duty.”1505 Ohlin agrees with this argument. In 
his view:  
to suggest that defendants should be liable for the criminal acts of co-conspirators, even when these actions 
fall outside the scope of the original criminal agreement, is a strong and unwarranted conclusion, especially 
when the statute governing the ICTY restricted liability to planning, instigating, and aiding and abetting.
1506
 
 
Badar expresses this opinion as “a major source of concern with regard to the applicability of 
joint criminal enterprise III in the sphere of international criminal law […] that under the 
objective and subjective standards, the participant is unfairly held liable for criminal conducts 
that he neither intended nor participated in.”1507 In the opinion of Cassese, the “incidental 
criminal liability [is] based on foresight and risk […]. The ‘extra-crime’ is the outgrowth of the 
common criminal purpose for which each participant is already responsible.”1508 Cassese goes 
further and suggests that:  
there is a causation link between the agreed-upon crime, the awareness in the secondary offender that an 
extra offence might be committed, his failure to prevent or stop it, and the occurring of such extra offence. 
The extra offence is predicated upon the agreed upon crime, and is made possible by the fact that the 
participant in the joint criminal enterprise who intends to perpetrate a further crime is not stopped by 
the participant who was cognizant of the likelihood that such further crime would be perpetrated (and did 
not abandon the primary criminal plan for fear that further crime be committed). It follows that the conduct 
of the secondary offender contributed in some significant way to the occurrence of the extra offence.
1509
 
 
It is quite clear that Cassese takes the criminal law far beyond its boundaries. What was a matter 
of “foresight,” “risk” and “likelihood” has been transformed in “awareness” and “cognizance.” 
There is nothing so speculative than assuming that because A has seen B carrying a weapon 
while both are on a robbery expedition; necessarily B, by that mere knowledge, “contributed in 
some significant way to the occurrence of the extra offence.” He might have some knowledge, 
but not so significant to foresee that B would use the weapon for another offence. Again, it is 
arguable if both have actually agreed to commit the offence or whether the agreement has been 
deduced from the concurrence of circumstances.  Cassese himself calls it “a chance of predicting 
the commission of the un-concerted crime.”1510 The true nature of this mode of liability would 
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instead be, according to Ambos
1511
, another staunch advocate of joint criminal enterprise, 
“essentially based on the membership in the group pursuing the joint criminal enterprise and, as 
such, conflicts with the principle of culpability.”1512  
 
Cassese’s construction of this third category of joint criminal enterprise is also founded on 
hypothetical situations taken from “domestic criminal law.”1513 The first such hypothesis is a 
“bank robbery”1514 in which, supposedly, robbers agreed to rob a bank and one of them carrying 
a gun kills a teller. Cassese finds that all are guilty of murder. The second hypothesis is a “gang 
of thugs” 1515 who agrees to rob a bank with fake weapons with one of them carrying a real 
weapon; a fact known by one or some among the group. The third hypothesis is a “paramilitary 
unit”1516 that occupies a village with the purpose of detaining all the women and enslaving 
them.”During the operation one soldier rapes a woman. Cassese says that the rape is “in line with 
enslavement, since treating other human beings as objects may easily lead to raping them.”1517 In 
these situations, the actus reus and mens rea which are necessary elements of any crime, are 
missing. 
 
Cassese’ approach confuses what English Law calls “conduct crimes” and “result crimes.”1518 
Leigh suggests that:  
the general rule, expressed in the maxim, actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea, is that an offence can be 
committed only where criminal conduct accompanied by some element of fault, the precise fault element 
required depending upon the particular offence involved. There are nevertheless many offences of strict 
liability, in which no fault element need be proved.
1519
 
 
Leigh further emphasises that “in theory, there can be no criminal liability based on mens rea 
alone, but if the actus reus element of a crime is defined very widely (as is sometimes the case) a 
‘guilty mind’ may turn an objectively innocent act into the actus reus of that offence.”1520  
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joint criminal enterprise in all its categories does not meet this rule. Under joint criminal 
enterprise category III, the so-called perpetrator has the intention of committing an agreed upon 
crime, but he does not have the intention of committing the foreseeable crime. Wether his 
intention can be deduced from his negligence or recklessness is disputable. He must only have 
acted in the realm of the reasonable man. Where both the actus reus and mens rea of the 
incidental crime are missing altogether, it would be hard to ascribe responsibility. All that is 
present is the so-called enterprise.  To borrow again from Leigh, the matter needs to be clarified 
as follows:  
The general rule is that, to be guilty of a criminal offence requiring mens rea, an accused must possess that 
mens rea when performing the act or omission in question, and it must relate to that particular act or 
omission. If, for example, D accidentally kills his wife in a car crash on Monday, the fact that he was 
planning to cut her throat on Tuesday does not make him guilty of her murder, even if he was thinking 
about the planned murder at the time of the accident, and even if he is subsequently delighted to find that 
his wife has died.
1521
 
 
Cassese ignores this rule and brings more arguments to create more confusion of an already 
artificial and imperfect doctrine. 
 
7.2.2. Joint criminal enterprise is a confusing, imperfect, artificial and fictitious mode of 
imputation of criminal liability 
 
The advocates of joint criminal enterprise disagree among themselves about the concept itself, 
what its elements are and what its purpose is. There is only an apparent argumentative 
competition between them to design and maintain joint criminal enterprise survival. An 
important aspect of criminal law in general is its primary purpose of holding individuals 
accountable for their crimes.
1522
 The other aspect is to preserve “individual autonomy and 
development.”1523 Hannan Arendt, commenting on Eichmann’s trial stated that: “the purpose of a 
criminal trial is to render justice, and nothing else; even the noblest ulterior motives […] can 
only detract from the law’s main business: to weight the charges brought against the accused, to 
render judgment, and to mete out punishment.”1524  
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Joint criminal enterprise in all its categories does not meet these criteria. Joint criminal enterprise 
denies especially the goal of justice and the recognition of personal freedom. To forcefully 
attempt to establish that people have been engaged in a criminal enterprise to be able to impute 
criminal responsibility to each one of them, robs them their freedom. Osiel suggests that those 
people: 
might be ignorant of one’s contributions to the enterprise and of their own role within its functioning, 
which may be entirely dispensable. The notion that such participants subscribe to a common purpose is 
itself often just as fictional, in that parties to it would likely define it differently in scope – temporally and 
spatially, in the reach of its aims or ambitions.
1525
 
 
Even in the real world where people compete by putting forward various ideas to build up a 
project, it is common that those people will not, indeed cannot:  
uniformly share its avowed objectives, but rather employ it to their own ends – frequently at odds with 
official ones. To view their sundry activities – their assorted comings and goings – as reflecting a single, 
shared purpose, plan, or agreement is to miss all that is tragic and comic in the social life of organizations, a 
considerable portion.
1526
 
 
How does it come that people share intent in a fictitious criminal design, sometimes not known 
until it is established? This establishment is only designed to find the people who intend to 
continue further criminal activities. Yet the same people cannot share such intent in a visible and 
structured organization aiming at a good outcome. 
Joint criminal enterprise is also a fictitious concept. It has been demonstrated how joint criminal 
enterprise category III grew up from hypothetical and unproven assumptions. In addition to this 
uncertainty the Trial Chamber in Krnojelac defined the existence of a joint criminal enterprise as 
follows: 
A joint criminal enterprise exists where there is an understanding or arrangement amounting to an 
agreement between two or more persons that they will commit a crime. The understanding or arrangement 
need not be express, and its existence may be inferred from all the circumstances. It need not have been 
reached at any time before the crime is committed. The circumstances in which two or more persons are 
participating together in the commission of a particular crime may themselves establish an unspoken 
understanding or arrangement amounting to an agreement formed between them then and there to commit 
that crime.
1527
 
 
There is nothing so confusing and uncertain than the content of this paragraph. First there is an 
affirmation that the enterprise exists in a form of an agreement though not expressed; this means 
that it is not traceable, especially when the prosecution drafts an indictment. This is the first 
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fiction. The agreement needs not to have been reached at any time before the crime is committed. 
This may suggest that prosecutors and judges evoke the existence of a joint criminal enterprise 
from the moment that a crime has been committed by a plurality of perpetrators.  
 
Frequently international prosecutors have charged crimes and imputed responsibility pursuant to 
joint criminal enterprise. Yet the prosecutor was waiting that such enterprise be inferred from the 
totality of evidence if that was the only reasonable inference available. The courts have reached 
different conclusions. This is the second legal fiction, unsupported by reality. Moreover, the 
existence of “an unspoken understanding” may be inferred from the circumstances of the 
commission of the crime only after having heard the full case, meaning at the close of the 
Prosecution and Defence cases. This is another fictitious situation and a very dangerous setting. 
The Krnojelac judgment states further that: 
Even where a particular crime charged has not been specifically pleaded in the Indictment as part of the 
basic joint criminal enterprise, a case based upon the Accused’s participation in a basic criminal enterprise 
to commit that crime may still be considered by the Trial Chamber if it is one of the crimes charged in the 
Indictment and such a case is included in the Prosecution’s Pre-Trial Brief.1528 
 
This is quite an unreasonable and unsafe approach and development of law whereby every 
loophole is filed in view to get an accused found guilty. The Trial Chamber opened the can of 
worms for abuse of discretion by the Chamber itself, and by the Prosecutor.  In this respect, Osiel 
remarks that “it is also true, as one Trial Chamber has speculated, that the prosecution 
deliberately injects a studied vagueness into the indictment’s delineation of the enterprise, in 
order to mould its case in a substantial way during the trial, according to how its evidence 
actually turns out.”1529 Despite this nebulosity, the ad hoc tribunals apply joint criminal 
enterprise unabatedly. 
  
7.2.3. The ad hoc tribunals’ application of joint criminal enterprise 
 
The ICTY and the ICTR have been caught in a puzzle by the manufacture of the doctrine of joint 
criminal enterprise. At the ICTY, though the notion of common purpose was eventually apparent 
from the prosecution’s submissions at the outset, it was to be understood as nothing more than 
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aiding and abetting. At the ICTR, the prosecution unsuccessfully attempted to prove the crime of 
conspiracy to commit genocide
1530
, but it failed. Proving a crime and a mode of commission of 
the crime are quite different matters. When things did not work out, the prosecution moved to 
rely on the doctrine of joint criminal enterprise as a mode of commission, but the practice 
amounted more or less to an attempt to fit an elephant in a pigeon hole. Some cases decided by 
the ad hoc tribunals reveal that joint criminal enterprise’s application remains practically 
inconsistent and normatively problematic. Haan writes that “the way some Chambers interpret 
joint criminal enterprise seems to fall outside the scope of the Statute.”1531 All the 
misconceptions and misapplications of the doctrine have a source in its origin, namely the Tadic 
Appeals’ case. Some of the scholarships that treated this case did not analyse the facts and the 
law in detail. Some aimed at only praising the concept, while few questioned it seriously.  Those 
who praised the doctrine were only delighted to write and emulate in arguing the new concept 
without questioning its merit. It is therefore imperative to revisit the facts of the case before 
analysing how joint criminal enterprise was forcefully introduced. 
 
7.2.3.1. The facts at the origin of joint criminal enterprise 
 
The indictment against Dusko Tadic
1532
 alleged that on 14 June 1992, armed Serbs including the 
defendant entered the area of Jaskici and Sivci in Opstina Prijedor. They allegedly went house to 
house calling out residents and separating men from women and children.
1533
 Without any 
further indications as to when and who, the indictment only states that the Armed Serbs killed 
five men named in the indictment in front of their homes. They also beat seven others and took 
them from the area to an unknown destination. Tadic was charged with the wilful killing as a 
grave breach of the Geneva Conventions; murder as a violation of the laws of war and as a crime 
against humanity; and wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, cruel 
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treatment and inhumane acts.
1534
 The Chamber heard evidence “regarding those events of 14 
June 1992 coming from 6 witnesses, either surviving former residents of Jaskici and Sivci or who 
had sought refuge there.”1535 
 
Deciding whether Tadic killed or participated in the killing of the five victims, the Trial chamber 
was of the opinion that it cannot “on the evidence before it, be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt 
that the accused had any part in the killing of the five men or any of them. Save that four of them 
were shot in the head, nothing is known as to who shot them or in what circumstances.”1536 
Moreover, the trial Chamber held that:  
the bare possibility that the deaths of the Jaskici villagers were the result of encountering a part of that large 
force would be enough, in the state of the evidence, or rather, the lack of it, relating to their deaths, to 
prevent satisfaction beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was involved in those deaths. […] it is 
accordingly a distinct possibility that it may have been the act of a quite distinct group of armed men, or the 
unauthorized and unforeseen act of one of the force that entered Sivci, for which the accused cannot be held 
responsible, that caused their death.
1537
 
 
It is of particular importance to note that the panel of judges that decided this case was composed 
of Judge Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, of the United States; Judge Ninian Stephen of Australia and 
Judge Lal Chand Vohrah of Malaysia. The Prosecution team was made of Mr. Grant Nieman, 
from Australia, as team leader.
1538
 It also comprised three American prosecutors, namely “Lt. 
Col. Brenda Hollis of the Air Force Judge Advocate General’s Office; Major Michael Keegan of 
the Marine Corps Judge Advocate General’s Office; and Alan Tieger, who had successfully 
prosecuted the four Los Angeles police officers for beating of Rodney King.”1539 There was also 
Commander William Fenrick, Director of Law for Operations and Training in the Canadian 
Department of Defense. The prosecution team consisted of three-fourths Americans.
1540
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Considering that all three judges came from a Common Law tradition as well as the entire 
prosecution team; all were fully familiar with the doctrine of common purpose. Yet, this mode of 
participation was not charged in the indictment…indeed it could not be because it was not 
provided for in the Statute. What had been pleaded was that Tadic was responsible under Article 
7(1) of the Statute without any further clarification as to which mode of responsibility was 
involved.  
 
But the prosecution theory of the case could clearly be read in the Celebici
1541
 case, decided 18 
months later.  In this case, the prosecution expressly relied on the “common purpose” doctrine, 
“the gist of which is said to be that a person who knowingly participates in a criminal venture 
with others may be held criminally liable for illegal acts that are the natural and probable 
consequences of their common purpose.”1542 It was the prosecution case that the accused, 
through his act(s) either aided or abetted in the commission of the unlawful act, or that he 
participated in a common enterprise or transaction which resulted in the death of the victim. The 
prosecution did not go outside of the Statute of the ICTY as did the Appeals’ Chamber in Tadic.  
Rather, they interpreted only one word: “committing."  
 
In Tadic, there was no evidence suggesting “who shot the victims and in what circumstances”1543 
as contended the Defence on appeal. In fact there was doubt that the accused could have 
benefited as a matter of general criminal law. The reasoning of the Trial Chamber was also 
correct on two grounds. First, there was doubt as to who killed and in what circumstances the 
victims died – as indicated above.  Second, the Trial Chamber did not exclude the possibility that 
another group of armed men could have killed the victims. Even without this latter possibility, 
there was nothing whatsoever linking Tadic to the killing of the victims, not even a causal link. 
The circumstances of the case could therefore have involved many inferences. Yet, these 
inferences could only be arrived at after weighing all the evidence available provided that such 
inferences were the only ones possible and reasonable. 
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The Prosecution lodged an appeal. In its submissions, it fully accepted the findings of fact at 
trial. It however contended that, firstly, “the Trial Chamber misdirected itself on the application 
of the law on the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt.”1544Secondly, the Prosecution 
submitted that “the Trial Chamber misdirected itself on the application of the common purpose 
doctrine.”1545 In the absence of precedents in the understanding of the concept of “common 
purpose”, the prosecution was not referring to anything else besides “aiding and abetting” as was 
its previous position in Celebici.
1546
  
 
Even the Appeals Chamber recognised that interpretation in its ruling in Tadic. It held that 
“Article 7(1) also sets out the parameters of personal criminal responsibility under the Statute. 
Any act falling under one of the five categories contained in the provision may entail the 
criminal responsibility of the perpetrator or whoever has participated in the crime in one of the 
ways specified in the same provision of the Statute.”1547 
 
 The Appeals Chambers’ err was rooted in its suggestion that Article 7(1) “covers first and 
foremost the physical perpetration of a crime by the offender himself, or the culpable omission of 
an act that was mandated by a rule of criminal law.”1548 It is also a misconception of Article 7(1) 
that “responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law is not limited to those 
who actually carry out the actus reus of the enumerated crimes but appears to extend also to 
other offenders [….]”1549  
 
The Appeals’ Chamber clearly erred on a point of law when it understood that Article 7(1) read 
in the context of the Statute “does not confine itself to providing for jurisdiction over those 
persons who plan, instigate, order, physically perpetrate a crime or otherwise aid and abet in its 
planning, preparation or execution. The Statute does not stop here.”1550 The Appeals Chamber 
extended the Statute by only interpreting one word, namely “commission.” Why not others? 
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Without further ado, the Chamber concluded that “the only reasonable conclusion the Trial 
Chamber could have drawn is that the armed group to which the Appellant belonged killed the 
five men in Jaskici.”1551 This reasoning is unsupported by the facts of the case. It is only an 
inference drawn by the Appeals’ Chamber.  Yet, it is not the only reasonable one from all the 
circumstances.  
 
It is in fact from this arbitrary conclusion on facts, in the absence of any evidence that Tadic or 
the group to which he belonged actually killed any or all the five men, that the Appeals’ 
Chamber brainstormed the famous doctrine of joint criminal enterprise. From this wrong factual 
conclusion, the Appeals Chamber acknowledged that “there is no evidence”1552 that Tadic 
personally killed any of them. It nevertheless went on to question whether Tadic could be held 
criminally responsible as a member of the group which allegedly killed the five men.
1553
 What 
can be said with respect to the panel of five judges
1554
, who interpreted Article 7(1) of the ICTY, 
is that they went beyond their mandate. They transformed themselves into legislators, not 
interpreters of the law thereby creating a very dangerous precedent in law. They abused their 
powers and to a large extent diluted the law and created more confusion. 
 
7.2.3.2. Inconsistent development of the joint criminal enterprise concept 
 
The issue of concern here was the second leg of the prosecution’s contention in its Tadic appeal 
submissions. The prosecution’s argument was that “the gist of the common purpose doctrine is 
that if a person knowingly participates in a common activity with others, he or she will be liable 
for all illegal acts that are natural and probable consequences of that common purpose.”1555 In 
fact, the prosecution was complaining that the Tadic Trial Chamber could have adopted the same 
reasoning as the Trial Chamber in Celebici. According to Celebici, and this was the only 
available understanding of “common purpose”, it was “a correct statement of the law […] that 
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aiding and abetting includes all acts of assistance that lend encouragement or support to the 
perpetration of an offence and which are accompanied by the requisite mens rea.”1556 The Trial 
Chamber in Celebici remained in the boundaries of the ICTY Statute. At the outset, the Trial 
Chamber had set a modest, but clear and unambiguous understanding of Article 7(1) of the ICTY 
Statute; which goes as follows: 
A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, 
preparation or execution of a crime referred to in Article 2 to 5 of the present Statute, shall be individually 
responsible for the crime. As concluded by Trial Chamber II in the Tadic Judgment, there can further be no 
doubt that this corresponds to the position under international customary law. However, it is incumbent 
upon the Trial Chamber to set out more specifically the degree of participation which is necessary for an 
individual to be considered sufficiently connected with an offence under the Tribunal’s jurisdiction so as to 
be held criminally responsible under the present provision.
1557
 [Emphasis added] 
 
Specifically, the Trial Chamber stated that holding individuals criminally responsible for their 
participation in the commission of offences in any capacity is in clear conformity with general 
principles of criminal law.
1558
 
 
The “several capacities” referred to here are the ones contained in Article 7(1) of the ICTY and 
Article 6(1) of the ICTR Statutes. This was also the understanding of the ICTR in Akayesu, 
which is the first case decided by this tribunal on 2 September 1998. It was the Trial Chamber’s 
view that “in addition to responsibility as principal perpetrator, the Accused can be held 
responsible for the criminal acts of others where he plans with them, instigates them, orders them 
or aids and abets them to commit those acts.”1559 Precisely, the Akayesu Trial Chamber 
emphasised that: “the forms of participation referred to in Article 6(1) cannot render their 
perpetrator criminally liable where he did not act knowingly, and even where he should have had 
such knowledge.”1560 Then the Trial Chamber defined each mode of liability.1561  
 
At least three ICTR judgments, if not more, espoused the reasoning of the Trial Chamber in 
Akayesu. In Musema, which was decided on 27 January 2000, the Trial Chamber concurred with 
those previous rulings. It stated that “in the Akayesu judgment, the Chamber issued an opinion on 
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the principle of individual criminal responsibility under Article 6(1) of the Statute. The reasoning 
of this opinion is similar to that in Tadic, Celebici, Kayishema and Ruzindana, and Rutaganda 
judgments.”1562 The Chamber maintained that “the aforementioned case-law regarding the 
principle of individual criminal responsibility, as articulated in the Akayesu and Rutaganda 
Judgments, is sufficiently established and is applicable in the instant case.”1563 
 
In Rutaganda, the Trial Chamber, after reviewing some ICTR
1564
 and ICTY
1565
 cases, was “of 
the view that the position as derived from the above-mentioned case law, with respect to the 
principle of individual criminal responsibility, and as articulated, notably, in the Akayezu 
Judgment is sufficiently established and is applicable in the instant case.”Particularly, the Trial 
Chamber has held the position that “Article 6(1) of the Statute “sets forth the basic of principles 
of individual criminal liability, which are undoubtedly common to most national criminal 
jurisdictions.”1566 This Trial Chamber emphasised however that “in addition to responsibility as 
principal perpetrator, the accused can be held responsible for the criminal acts of others where he 
plans with them, instigates them, orders them or aids and abets them to commit those acts.”1567 In 
this case, moreover, it was the Trial Chamber’s understanding that “Article 6(1) thus appears to 
be in accord with the Judgments of the Nuremberg Tribunal which held that persons other than 
those who committed the crime, especially those who ordered it, could incur individual criminal 
responsibility.”1568 The Chamber noted however that the elements of the offences “are inherent 
in the forms of participation per se which render the perpetrators thereof individually responsible 
for such crimes.  
 
The moral element is reflected in the desire of the Accused that the crime be in fact 
committed.”1569According to the Chamber, the intention can even “be inferred from a certain 
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number of factors.”1570 Quite clearly stated is the Chamber’s firm opinion that “the forms of 
participation referred to in Article 6(1), cannot render their perpetrator criminally liable where he 
did not act knowingly, and even where he should have had such knowledge.”1571  
 
This moral requirement was further interpreted in the Kayishema and Ruzindana cases as “a clear 
awareness that this participation will lead to the commission of a crime.”1572 In Akayezu, the 
Trial Chamber then elaborated on the meaning of every form of criminal participation under 
Article 6(1) of the ICTR Statute.
1573
 In particular, the Trial Chamber defined “planning”, “as 
implying that one or several persons contemplate designing the commission of a crime at both 
the preparatory and execution phases.”1574 Curiously, the Chamber did not define the term 
“committing.” The term was not defined in the Bagilishema case either. The Trial Chamber was 
content to conclude that “the actual perpetrator may incur responsibility for committing a crime 
under the Statute by means of an unlawful act or omission.”1575 
 
Interpreting Article 6(1), the Trial Chamber in Kayishema and Ruzindana was of the view that “it 
is necessary to consider the degree of participation required in the crimes delineated in Articles 2 
to 4 of the Statute. Only then, and in light of the factual findings set out below, it is possible to 
identify whether either Ruzindana or Kayishema are individually criminally responsible pursuant 
to Article 6(1).”1576 
 
The Trial Chamber, in this case, alluded to a sort of doctrine of joint criminal enterprise without 
clearly stating it was actually one. It held that “the clear objective of the atrocities throughout 
Rwanda and the Kibuye Prefecture, in 1994, was to destroy [the] Tutsi population. The 
perpetrators of these crimes, therefore, were united in this common intention.”1577 Further, the 
Trial Chamber argued that “the members of such a group would be responsible for the result of 
any act done in furtherance of the common design where such furtherance would be probable 
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from those acts.”1578 It however remarked that “the accused need not necessarily have the same 
mens rea as the principal offender.” 1579This holding contradicts the approach taken in Tadic 
where the Appeals Chamber was instead of the view that “it bears emphasizing that by taking the 
approach just summarized, the Prosecutor substantially propounded a doctrine of common 
purpose which presupposes that all the participants in the common purpose shared the same 
criminal intent, namely, to commit murder.”1580 
 
Though Akayezu, Kayishema and Ruzindana as well as Rutaganda are among the very first cases 
decided by the ICTR, it is obvious that judges could have resorted to joint criminal enterprise 
had it really been intended in the definition of “committing” under Article 6(1) of the Statute.  
Judges were also aware of Tadic which was decided on 15 July 1999. In the Gacumbitsi appeal 
case, which was decided on 7 July 2006, a dissenting appeal judge was of the view that:  
For both ad hoc Tribunals, the only authority is their Statute. There can be no interpretation of the Statute 
beyond the wording of its provisions. Even within the scope of the Statute, any interpretation may not 
exceed what is recognized by international law. For a charge of criminal responsibility under the Statute, it 
is therefore necessary to plead a specific crime and a specific mode of participation as expressly contained 
in one of the provisions of the Statute.
1581 
 
The judge went on and held that: 
looking at the wording of Article 6(1) of the ICTR Statute and Article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute, I first wish 
to point out that it would have been possible to interpret these provisions as following a monistic model 
(…) in which each participant in a crime is treated as a perpetrator irrespective of his degree of 
participation. This would have allowed the Prosecution to plead Article 6(1) of the ICTR Statute or Article 
7(1) of the ICTY Statute, respectively, in their entirety without having to choose a particular mode of 
participation. It would have left it to the Judges to assess the significance of an accused’s contribution to a 
crime under the Statutes at the sentencing stage, thereby saving the Tribunal the trouble of developing an 
unnecessary “participation doctrine.  […] I wish to add my regrets that the ad hoc Tribunals have decided 
to not compel the Prosecution as matter of fairness to plead its case based on a specific mode of 
participation or to specify such at least at the end of the presentation of the Prosecution’s case.1582 
 
This suggests that neither the ICTR Statute nor the ICTY Statute allows an interpretation of a 
specific mode of responsibility beyond the general ambit of the Statute. Interpreting 
“committing” as encompassing participation in a joint criminal enterprise goes beyond the ambit 
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of the Statute of both tribunals, and was therefore unwarranted. In support of this argument, 
Ohlin argues furthermore that:  
the ICTY Statute makes explicit reference to planning, instigating, and aiding and abetting – collective 
modes of liability all. […] But there is no warrant for extending liability to a joint criminal enterprise 
simply because the very nature of these crimes is collective. The question is not whether it is collective or 
not, but what kind of collective action is criminal under the ICTY Statute.
1583
 
 
Ohlin arrives at this conclusion after carefully considering all steps the Appeals Chamber took in 
that Tadic case.  In this respect, he is confident, stating that: 
Of course, the court does not rely on any single argument presented in the preceding text, but combines 
them to demonstrate that joint criminal enterprise was included in the ICTY Statute: the object and purpose 
of the statute, the collective nature of war crimes and the long history of conspiracy in international case 
law. However, none of this changes the fact that neither joint criminal enterprise, nor any of its 
predecessors, is mentioned in the ICTY Statute.
1584
 
 
Chouliaras does not even find the necessity of using the Statute as a legal foundation. His 
analysis is that “in the case of Joint Criminal Enterprise (JCE) it is senseless even to look at the 
Statute of the ICTY as this doctrine is the brainchild of some ingenious judges.”1585 Bogdan also 
concurs that joint criminal enterprise “was read into the Statute by the [ICTY] Tribunal 
judges.”1586 
 
Chouliaras disagrees with the Appeals’ chamber reasoning in Tadic. He emphasises that:  
according to the reasoning of the Judgment (Tadic), the combined interpretation of the Statute’s object and 
purpose and of the wording of Article 2 to 5 and 7(1) sustained the conclusion that the Statute does not 
exclude those modes of participation in the commission of crimes which occur where several persons 
having a common purpose embark on criminal activity that is carried out either jointly or by some members 
of this plurality of persons.
1587
  
 
Conversely, Jipping argues against legislating from the bench, which he terms “another name for 
judicial activism.”1588 This is so because in his opinion it “destroys the proper end of judging, 
and therefore, is the greatest threat to judicial independence, the means to that proper end.”1589 
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In Semanza, rendered on 15 May 2003, it became possible to sense an extension of individual 
criminal responsibility. According to the Chamber, “Article 6(1) reflects the principle that 
criminal liability is not incurred solely by individuals who physically commit a crime, but also 
extends to those who participate in and contribute to a crime in other ways, following principles 
of accomplice liability.”1590 Semanza defined not only the objective elements of the modes of 
participation, but also the subjective elements of those modes.
1591
 It has been the consistent 
jurisprudence of the ICTR, at least up until 2004, that “for an accused to incur criminal 
responsibility pursuant to Article 6(1), it must be shown that his or her participation has 
substantially contributed to, or has had a substantial effect on, the completion of a crime under 
the Statute.”1592 
 
Mpambara
1593
 may be among the first ever ICTR cases where an accused was allegedly liable 
under joint criminal enterprise.
1594
 The indictment against him alleged that he “participated in a 
joint criminal enterprise whose object, purpose and foreseeable outcome was the destruction of 
the Tutsi racial or ethnic group throughout Rwanda.”1595 Mpambara was allegedly liable under 
the basic form of joint criminal enterprise.
1596
In addition to defining other modes of liability, the 
Chamber also delineated the difference between joint criminal enterprise and aiding and 
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abetting
1597
 for the first time. The Chamber remarked however that the prosecution was 
confusing joint criminal enterprise and aiding and abetting. It held that:  
The fact that the same material facts may prove both aiding and abetting and participating in a joint 
criminal enterprise does not diminish the importance of distinguishing between the two. To the extent that 
the Prosecution has, on some occasions in its submissions, suggested that the joint criminal enterprise is 
proven by aiding and abetting, the Chamber will ignore this legal characterization and consider whether the 
material facts show either that the accused participated in a joint criminal enterprise, or that the aided and 
abetted others in the commission of crimes.
1598
 
 
All allegations against Mpambara were dismissed and he was acquitted the same day. 
 
Some ICTR cases did not develop a separate section on individual criminal responsibility as was 
initially the practice.
1599
 Very few cases went on appeal with respect to individual criminal 
responsibility
1600
, including under joint criminal enterprise. What the judges did when they 
interpreted “committing” under Article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute, finding that it encompasses 
participation in a joint criminal enterprise, is different from what the interpretation of a Statute 
should normally be. In Celebici, the Trial Chamber was of the opinion that:  
the trial chamber is aware that the meaning of the word ‘interpretation’ in the context of statutes, […] may 
be explained both in broad and in a narrow sense. In its broad sense, it involves the creative activities of the 
judges in extending, restricting or modifying a rule of law contained in its statutory form. In its narrow 
sense, it could be taken to denote the role of a judge in explaining the meaning of words or phrases used in 
a statute.
1601
 
 
The interpretation of “committing” to mean “participation” in joint criminal enterprise falls afoul 
in terms of what is required of a judge. This may bring one to support Jipping’s argument that 
“judges thus threaten, and even reject, their own independence when they legislate from the 
bench, crossing the line of legitimate judicial power and exercising power belonging to other 
branches.”1602 
 
To wrap up with joint criminal enterprise, it is fair to argue that a generation of judges has taken 
the international criminal law far away from its boundaries, on a much unsecured and sliding 
side. More time and research will be needed to get things back on track. It has been shown that 
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all the scholarship referred to indicates that the rationales for including joint criminal enterprise 
are linked to the difficulties encountered in proving each one’s participation in complex criminal 
situations. The contours of command responsibility, though in existence for quite a long time 
before joint criminal enterprise, are still debatable. An attempt in this regard follows. 
 
7.3. Command or superior responsibility doctrine 
 
Command responsibility “is central to the campaign to bring high-ranking civilian and military 
leaders charged with war crimes and crimes against humanity before the bars of justice.”1603 The 
ad hoc tribunals apply a doctrine that evolved selectively and unevenly to impute responsibility 
to fallen enemy superiors, be they military or civilians, without a similar test to such superiors in 
victorious nations. This is particularly where the imbalances and inconsistencies in the 
application of the doctrine could be traced.  
 
The history of the Second World War is replete with cases where Germans and Japanese were 
found guilty for the crimes committed by troops under their command. Most of the cases were 
adjudicated by the Americans applying their own laws. Other trials were held by American 
Allies in protracted international military tribunal fora. Americans and their Allies also 
committed crimes imputable to their commanders. They captured many prisoners of war; whom 
they abused. They killed and mistreated civilians. Yet, there is no record of command 
responsibility in these instances. A huge gap was normatively created and continues to evolve. 
Such a gap brings about a narrow view of the doctrine at the domestic level, while unnecessarily 
extending international prosecutions.  
 
7.3.1. The early initiatives of holding superiors responsible for crimes committed by 
subordinates at domestic and international levels 
 
Holding superiors responsible for the crimes committed by their subordinates goes back to 500 
B.C. “Sun Tzu wrote in Ping Fa - “the Art of War” – about the duty of commanders to ensure 
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that subordinates conduct themselves with a certain level of civility in armed conflict.”1604 In 
1439 King Charles VII of France made a clear statement regarding the doctrine in “the 
Ordinance of Orleans.”1605 In substance, the kings ordered that:  
each captain or lieutenant [to] be held responsible for the abuses, ills, and offences committed by members 
of his company, and that as soon as he receives any complaint concerning any such misdeed or abuse, he 
brings the offender to justice so that the said offender be punished in a manner commensurate with his 
offence, according to these ordinances. If he fails to do so or covers up the misdeed or delays taking action, 
or if, because of his negligence or otherwise, the offender escapes and thus evades punishment, the captain 
shall be deemed responsible for the offense, as if he has committed it himself and shall be punished in the 
same way as the offender would have been.
1606
 
 
This ordinance comprises all the necessary requirements to hold any superior responsible for 
crimes committed by his subordinates. It binds military officers as well as civilian superiors. It 
can apply at domestic and international levels likewise.  
 
 At the end of World War I, a Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and 
on the Enforcement of Penalties was established “to report on the responsibility for World War I 
and the breaches of the laws and customs of war committed by the German Empire and its 
allies.”1607 Though no remarkable prosecutions followed, the commission had “made the 
unprecedented proposal that individuals responsible for these atrocities should be subject to 
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criminal prosecution, regardless of rank and status.”1608 It was also its view that “the immunity 
typically accorded to high-ranking officials under domestic doctrine was an expression of 
political self-interests which had no proper place in international law.”1609 This was a good point 
of departure for a balanced approach domestically and internationally. Unfortunately this early 
attempt of judicial enforcement of the concept was “met with mostly uneven results.”1610 
 
The American representatives opposed “the commission’s initial formulation which posited that 
civilian and military authorities should be liable for a failure to act, regardless of their degree of 
knowledge or capacity to prevent the commission of the crimes.”1611 They insisted that “an 
official must have been aware of the criminal acts and have possessed the authority and power to 
prevent or to repress them; the duty or obligation to act was essential.”1612 Their objection 
revolved around the abrogation of sovereign immunity and the extension of liability to heads of 
states. In their view “the essence of sovereignty was that a head of state was neither subject nor 
subordinate to foreign control.”1613  
 
The American resistance may eventually be explained by either national pride or the assumption 
that “punishing military commanders has always been seen as having adverse consequences on 
the morale and dignity of […] officers.”1614 On one side, Americans have always avoided as 
much as possible to punish their officers. For example, Brigadier-General Jacob Smith who 
commanded the US military campaign in the Philippines during the early 1900s
1615
 “ordered the 
death of any person over the age of 10 and the destruction of every enemy object. The 
subsequent court-martial merely admonished and sent him into early retirement.”1616 His deeds 
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could have attracted command responsibility as Americans championed in the prosecution of 
other nationals using the doctrine.  This attitude can eventually be explained by the 
vindictiveness against captured enemies.  
 
7.3.2. World War II prosecutions marred by vindictiveness 
 
 The vindictiveness characterised the prosecution of World War II crimes. The accused were 
exclusively fallen enemy commanders who were captured and judged by the victorious powers. 
The majority were judged without due consideration of law. Yet the jurisprudence born out of 
those trumpeted judgments imposed itself as precedent. Later when the concept was codified in 
international treaties, like the Genocide Convention of 1948, the Geneva Conventions of 1949, 
the Additional Protocol I of 1977; the idea of vindictiveness and “victors’ justice” did not 
completely disappear in the minds of negotiators.  World War II cases are, to a large extent, 
contestable not only on points of law, but also on facts and procedures in addition to their 
political connotation. The case of Japanese General Yamashita illustrates the tendency of that 
time.  
 
7.3.2.1. The prosecution of General Tomuyuki Yamashita 
 
General Tomuyuki Yamashita was a commanding officer of the Imperial Japanese Fourteenth 
Army in the Philippines from 9 October 1944 to 3 September 1945 when he surrendered to 
American forces. He assumed his command on 7 October 1944.
1617
 He found an already 
disintegrating force which he attempted to re-organise without success. His forces were shortly 
defeated by American troops.
1618
 In the meantime, a part of his forces had committed atrocities 
against civilians while the General was busy with the war.
1619
 On 25 September 1945 Yamashita 
was charged with being a war criminal. Two weeks later he was arraigned and served with a bill 
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of sixty-four particulars. His trial was set for October 29.
1620
 The prosecution and defence teams 
were appointed 1 October 1945, less than a month after his surrender.
1621
 The proceedings went 
ahead uninterruptedly until 7 December 1945 when the Military Commission found Yamashita 
guilty as charged and sentenced him to death by hanging.
1622
  
 
The defence appealed to the United States Supreme Court. From December 29, 1945, the 
defence had “little more than a week in which to prepare a brief and argument for the Supreme 
Court.”1623 The Court heard arguments from the parties on 7 January 19461624 and handed down 
its decision on 4 February 1946
1625
 confirming the Military Commission’s judgment. The 
defence petitioned for clemency to the President of the United States of America. Clemency was 
denied.  On 23 February 1946, at three o’clock in the morning, at Los Banos, General Yamashita 
was hanged.
1626
 
 
Yamashita was charged for failing to prevent, terminate, or punish those of his subordinates who 
were committing war crimes in a widespread manner.
1627
 Those crimes have been committed in a 
sector assigned to one Lieutenant General Yokoyama during the time Yamashita had departed 
Manila to go north.
1628
About 25,000 civilians were murdered pursuant to orders issued by 
Colonel Fujishige, a subordinate of Yokoyama. Yokoyama’s main force was far removed from 
Colonel Fujishige Headquarters. Yokoyama therefore gave “mission-oriented guidance to his 
colonel, but left the details of execution to his discretion.”1629Allegedly, the Filipino resorted to 
guerrilla tactics to attack the Japanese forces. An angered Colonel Fujishige decided, on his own 
authority, to declare war on the civilian population which he believed, had turned into guerrillas. 
They were therefore killed indistinctively. There were other killings of about 8,000 civilians in 
Manila and Luzon.
1630
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The judgment contained no finding of any order to commit, no knowledge of the crimes 
committed, and no condonation on General Yamashita’s part. Crimes had been committed by his 
troops, and he had failed to provide effective control.
1631
His conviction could not be justifiable 
by any provision of law. He was convicted of crimes for which he did not have the requisite 
mens rea and in which he did not participate. 
  
The military commission consisted of three major generals and two brigadier generals; none of 
whom was a lawyer or had legal experience.
1632
 The commission members were bureaucratic 
officers without any combat experience. Therefore no one could understand and be humanely 
sympathetic to General Yamashita’s difficulties with men who might have faced similar 
problems.
1633
 The media reported that “the military commission came into the courtroom the first 
day with the decision already in its collective pocket.”1634 Yamashita’s lawyers:  
were intent on fighting for whatever modicum of justice might be available for their man. They objected to 
evidence that they considered improper; they attempted to invoke the safeguards accorded to an accused by 
congressional statutes, by international treaties, and by Anglo-Saxon judicial tradition. The members of the 
military commission were confused and irked. The only safe thing for the generals to do appeared to be to 
resolve all doubts against the defence.
1635
 
  
On appeal in the Supreme Court of the United States, eight justices studied the commission’s 
judgment and remarked that it had been too unfair. Six of the justices declined competence to 
inquire into the matter. Two dissented; yet they were in the minority. Nothing legal was left in 
the case. It is difficult to conceive of how any principle or doctrine of law could be born out of 
such a case. Nevertheless, some writers have attempted to give credit to the judgment.
1636
 This is 
where the problem lies. 
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7.3.2.2. Prosecutions under Control Council Law No 10 
 
 At the conclusion of the Nuremberg trials, twelve more trials were held under the authority of 
Control Council Law No. 10.
1637
 About 185 Germans who lost the war were prosecuted in each 
of the four zones of occupied Germany.
1638
 Two important cases relied on command 
responsibility: the Hostage and High Command cases. 
 
The “Hostage case”, better known as United States v. Wilhelm List and others1639 grouped 
twelve German military officers. Marshal List was the commander-in-chief of the German 
Twelfth Army during the invasion of Greece and Yugoslavia. He had executive powers in the 
occupied territories. The accused were charged with murdering civilians in Albania, Greece and 
Yugoslavia; committing acts of devastation in Norway and in other countries
1640
; and ordering 
the killing of surrendered combatants while denying basic rights to prisoners of war.
1641
  
 
The factual allegations were that in September 1941, Field Marshal Keitel issued an order for the 
suppression of insurgent activities in the German occupied territories. Field Marshal List 
distributed those orders to his subordinate commanders for execution.
1642
 The Hostage case 
clarified important aspects of command responsibility.  
 
The court established that a “ General who was in command of an occupied territory was 
accountable for the conduct of all of the units within the scope of the territory in question 
regardless of the chain of command.”1643 In addition to military assignments, the commander 
was also entrusted with administrative functions including the safety and security of the civilian 
population.  
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The court held further that “a corps commander must be held responsible for acts of his 
subordinate commanders in carrying out his orders and for acts which the corps commander 
knew or ought to have known about.”1644 The case “established a broader theory of command 
responsibility by adopting an almost pure ‘should have known standard.”1645 The commander in 
this instance may be held responsible for anything that happened in his area of command, 
whether he is absent or present. “Absence and the constraints of time and resources were not 
recognized as defences.”1646 The court accepted only one exception based on decisions that 
require independent decision-making.
1647
 The High Command marks some slight differences. 
 
The High Command Case or the United States v. Wilhelm von Leeb and others
1648
 joined 
fourteen German officers. They were charged with war crimes and crimes against humanity “in 
connection with the ‘Commissar Order’, the ‘Barbarossa Order’, the ‘Jurisdiction Order’, the 
‘Night and Fog Degree’, the ‘Hostages Order’, and the ‘Reprisal Order.”1649 The facts were the 
murder, ill-treatment of prisoners of war and of civilians in the occupied territories; the use of 
civilian and prisoners of war as slave labourers; and the instituting of co-operation between the 
military and SS in connection with the persecution, plunder and execution of Jews and others.
1650
 
 
A United States Military Tribunal held that “in order for a commander to be criminally liable for 
the action of his subordinates ‘there must be a personal dereliction’ which can only occur where 
the act is directly traceable to him or where his failure to properly supervise his subordinates 
constitutes criminal negligence on his part tantamount to a wanton, immoral disregard of the 
action of his subordinates amounting to acquiescence.”1651 The case also comprised aspects of 
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executive commanders as in the Hostage case. It combined matters of personal responsibility for 
ordering criminal activities subsequently carried out by subordinates.  
 
This case espoused a “slightly more restrictive theory of command responsibility than 
Yamashita, where there was less direct evidence that Yamashita knew of the crimes.”1652 The 
tribunal declined “to find a presumption of knowledge on the part of the territorial commander 
based only on the criminal acts themselves.”1653 This was a setback in terms of the position taken 
in the Hostage case. The tribunal applied the standard of actual knowledge rather than 
constructive knowledge. 
 
7.3.2.3. The Far Eastern prosecutions 
 
The prosecution of Japanese suspected of war crimes were conducted by two distinct  
institutions; namely the “International Prosecution Section” and the “War Crimes Branch of the 
Unites States General Headquarters of the Armed forces in the Pacific.” The first took place in 
Tokyo under an international court, composed of career judges. The second were conducted in 
Manila and Yokohama under the auspices of military commissions. There are major differences 
between the two bodies. 
 
The “International Prosecution Section”, similar to the Nuremberg IMT, intended to bring to 
justice the major Japanese war criminals.
1654
 It “consisted of a panel of independent judges from 
eleven Allied nations.
1655
 The Tokyo Tribunal
1656
 lasted from 3 June 1946 until 12 November 
1948 and involved 28 former military and civilian Japanese leaders.
1657
 The international 
prosecution afforded every conceivable procedural safeguard”1658 to the defendants; be they 
political leaders or military commanders. The bench was composed of brilliant and independent 
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minds that strictly adhered to the rules of procedure and evidence.
1659
 The defendants were 
represented by four competent Japanese counsels
1660
, assisted by an Australian barrister
1661
, who 
was conversant with Common Law.  The tribunal inevitably suffered from political pressure 
though in lower intensity. Taylor notes that “aside from establishing the proceedings, MacArthur 
took little part. The charges were specified in detail, and ample time was given [to] the defence 
for preparation of its case. In fact, the trials did not begin until May 3, 1946, and continued on 
for two-and-half years.”1662 The proceedings were a result of discussions between professional 
judges, acting independently, so to say. Nevertheless, legitimate criticisms of the Tokyo trials are 
still flowing. Boas, for example, draws attention to the fact that:  
the findings of guilt at Tokyo relating to the doctrine of command responsibility are highly unsatisfactory. 
In particular, the Charter provides no clear statutory basis to bring such charges, the Tokyo judgment cited 
no authority in support of the its findings under this count, and the Tribunal’s treatment of the element of 
the doctrine – particularly with respect to knowledge and effective control – are sparse and 
contradictory.
1663
  
 
The military commission was a legal disaster in terms of its precedential authority. The 
Commission prosecuted suspects not considered “major” enough for the inclusion in the Tokyo 
trials.
1664
 The judicial body of the latter consisted of U.S Army officers appointed by 
MacArthur.
1665
 The commission was entirely controlled by the United States even though the 
tribunal established was composed of Australia, Canada, China, France, Great Britain, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Russia, United States, India and the Philippines.
1666
 Its headquarters 
was in Washington, with a nominal advisory body sitting in Tokyo. The commission was 
“primarily a political body [with] little or no investigative authority.”1667 Its entire work was 
dictated by General Douglas MacArthur as the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.
1668
 
Its task was to investigate war crimes, collect and analyze evidence and arrange for the 
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apprehension of suspects. It also had the residual authority to determine who would be tried and 
which tribunals would undertake such proceedings.
1669
  
 
7.3.2.4. The legacy of the prosecutions following World War II 
 
The judgments following World War II, especially the military commissions’trials need to be 
viciously criticised, even their legacy abandoned.
1670
 A court’s decision must not necessarily be 
taken as authoritative without in-depth analysis of all the circumstances, particularly the factual 
basis. There is a danger of transmitting a deadly virus with such jurisprudence.  
 
Academics and researchers should be strong enough to name and shame neutrally and 
objectively any malpractices, rather than owing “some debt of gratitude”1671 to contestable 
precedents, as Boas suggests. Truly speaking Yamashita and other Japanese were found guilty by 
forcefully applying the concept of command responsibility. The prosecutions in the Far East 
were, according to Peters, a result of a fashioned “workable legal solution to the problem of 
international crime on a colossal scale.”1672 Enemies have been captured or they had capitulated. 
So the question was, as Taylor rightly puts it: “what was to be done about these men publicly 
regarded as murderous villains, and their terrorist organizations?”1673 No war crimes and 
atrocities committed by the Allied were ever prosecuted, whereas those of the Germans and 
Japanese were heavily punished. Command responsibility was heavily applied to the accused 
with a view to de-legitimise them. Allies also underscored their superiority.
1674
  
 
As Sengheiser notes, “a victor naturally wants to assign liability to the broadest range of 
offenders possible. Thus, as represented in cases such as Yamashita, the doctrine of command 
responsibility has, at times, been stretched beyond what interests of justice allow.”1675 But: 
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when applied to one’s own forces, it would be detrimental to these interests for senior military leaders to be 
criminally charged for allowing their subordinates to commit illegal acts in cases where the senior leaders’ 
responsibilities is too attenuated. Such liability would de-legitimize the entire undertaking of military 
discipline. So when command responsibility is applied to one’s own forces, there is an interest in limiting 
the scope of liability.
1676
 
 
This controversy proved detrimental to the proper evolution of the doctrine of command 
responsibility.  Many crimes have gone unpunished. They include the atomic destruction by the 
USA of the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the mass firebombing of Dresden by Allied 
Forces, the firebomb attacks by Allied Forces on Tokyo and Kobe
1677
, and the 1950 No Gun Ri 
tragedy in which US troops gunned down inhabitants of a village in the early days of the Korean 
War.
1678
 Other examples of double standard are, according to Anderson and cie:
1679
 
The massacre at My Lai of unarmed Vietnamese civilians, mostly women and children, by US soldiers in 
1968; the Bloody Sunday massacre of 1972, in which British soldiers shot down a group of Irish civil rights 
protesters; atrocities committed during the Indonesian occupation of East Timor from 1975 until 1999; and 
the massacres of hundred of Arab refugees at Sabra and Shatila, carried out in September 1982 by 
Lebanese militias, with the support of the Israel forces.
1680
 
 
The list becomes only too troubling with the Israel military killing of civilians at Kafr Qassem in 
1956
1681
, and the ill-treatment of prisoners at Abu Ghraib in Iraq by American occupation forces, 
described as “hell on earth.”1682 The American “record shows that senior US military 
commanders have repeatedly and systematically avoided courts-martial and formal adjudication 
of serious war crime allegations since My Lai and the reawakening of responsibility for these 
international crimes that catastrophe supposedly engendered.”1683  
 
                                                          
1676
 Idem, p. 719 
1677
 For a repertoire of crimes and atrocities committed in history, and particularly during World War II, see 
Anderson Janice, Williams Anne & Head Vivian, War Crimes and atrocities, op. cit. 
1678
 Ibiden, p. 21 
1679
 Idem, p. 21 
1680
 Idem, p. 27; see also Hendin E Stuart, “Command Responsibility and Superior Orders…”, op. cit., paras 122 – 
135 (My Lai); paras 142 – 166 (Shabra and Shatilla). For a detailed analysis of responsibility in the Shatila and 
Sabra massacre, see Burnett D. Weston (Lieutenant Commander), “Command Responsibility and a Case Study…”, 
op. cit. 
1681
 Hendin E. Stuart, “Command Responsibility and Superior Orders…”, op. cit.,  paras 116 - 121 
1682
 For a full account of the inhumane  conditions of detainees at Abu Ghraib detention in Bagdad, see, Mestrovic 
G.  Stjepan, The Trials of Abu Ghraib: an Expert Witness Account of Shame and Honor, Paradigm Publishers, 
Boulder and London, 2007 
1683
 Peters C. William, “Adjudication Deferred:…”, op. cit.,  p. 927 
342 
 
7.3.3. American forces’ massacre at My Lai in South Vietnam on 16 March 1968  
 
The massacre at My Lai in South Vietnam in 1968 is a telling example of the domestic resistance 
to a proper application of the doctrine of command responsibility. It furthermore explains the 
overstating of the doctrine by international criminal courts. Peters recalls the facts surrounding 
this massacre as follows:  
On the morning of 16 March 1968, Task Force Barker of the US Army’s American Division murdered 
approximately 500 unarmed and compliant non-combatant civilians in the village of Son My in the 
Republic of South Vietnam. Victims included numerous women, children, and elderly men. […] along with 
unlawful executions that day, other wanton crimes included ‘group acts of …rape, sodomy, [and] killing of 
detainees. They further included the killing of livestock, destruction of crops, closing of wells, and the 
burning of dwellings within several sub-hamlets.
1684
 
 
The massacre gave rise to four separate criminal prosecutions. First Lieutenant William Calley, a 
platoon leader at My Lai, was charged with participating in the murder and was convicted by an 
American military court-martial.
1685
 In fact, the lieutenant has been actively involved in the 
killings of many unarmed civilians. He was therefore not prosecuted under the doctrine of 
command responsibility. 
 
Captain Ernest Medina was the commander of the company to which Calley’s platoon belonged. 
A day before, he ordered his company to destroy the village by burning the hooches, killing the 
livestock, closing the wells and closing the food crop.
1686
 Medina also instructed his troops to 
“remember all the buddies they had lost. It was time to settle the score with those responsible for 
the misery and death Charlie Company had suffered. For what was left of ‘the best company in 
Hawaii’, it was time for revenge.”1687 Calley testified that his commander told them “to make 
sure there was no one left alive in My Lai.”1688 Medina was charged with five criminal offenses; 
four of which arose out of his own activities and one arising from the activities of his 
                                                          
1684
 Peters C. William, “Adjudication Deferred:…”, op. cit., p. 933; see also Burnett D. Weston ( Lieutenant 
Commander), “Command Responsibility and a Case Study…”, op. cit., pp. 71 – 189, 1985 writing that “on 16 
March 1968, American troops, acting as a unit under orders, engaged in widespread and indiscriminate killing of 
unarmed, unresisting Vietnamese civilians consisting almost exclusively [of] old men, women, and children.” p. 121 
1685
 Burnett D. Weston ( Lieutenant Commander), “Command Responsibility and a Case Study….”, op. cit., p. 121 
1686
 Belknap R. Michael, The Vietnam War on Trial:…, op. cit.,  p. 58 [quoting Medina’s testimony of orders he 
gave his company a day before the massacre] 
1687
 Belknap R. Michael, The Vietnam War on Trial…, op. cit., p. 58  
1688
 Ibiden, p. 58 
343 
 
company.
1689According to Burnett, evidence was available to establish “the illegality of the 
deaths but failed to link Medina to the issuance of illegal orders prior to or during the assault on 
My Lai.”1690 On command responsibility, the trial judge instructed that the jury should consider 
whether Medina has actual knowledge of the crimes allegedly committed or about to be 
committed by his troops, and whether he failed to act.
1691
 Strikingly, the trial judge advised that 
“mere presence at the scene without knowledge will not suffice. That is, the commander-
subordinate relationship alone will not allow the inference of knowledge.”1692 Medina was 
subsequently acquitted of all charges.  
 
In considering the acquittal decision, Green observes, however, that “it is difficult to conceive 
how an officer present at the scene when a breach is being committed could not be aware of that 
fact. It might even be felt that lack of “knowledge” in such circumstances amounts to a criminal 
indifference equivalent to a failure to exercise proper command.”1693 The standard adopted in 
Medina has been severely criticized by many American scholars, among them Clark who 
concluded that “the ‘actual knowledge test’, in a context like My Lai, is an invitation to the 
commander to see and hear no evil. It is not consistent with a serious effort to make the 
commands structure responsive to the humanitarian goals involved.”1694 Clark goes on to 
characterise the standard as “a ‘protective attitude’ adopted in view to exonerate Medina, 
coupled with the failure to prosecute the high-ranking officers responsible for planning, 
supervising and subsequently concealing the My Lai massacre.”1695  
 
Medina’s immediate superior, Colonel Oren Henderson, was also tried and found not guilty of all 
charges.  This is troubling because, “during an aerial reconnaissance of the objective the day 
before the attack, the task force commander informed [Medina] that they had permission to 
destroy villages, burn hooches, kill livestock, close wells, and destroy food crops.”1696 Major 
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General Samuel Koster and Brigadier General George Young, and the unit’s chief of staff, 
Colonel Nels Parson
1697
 avoided prosecution that would have determined whether their actions 
were criminal. Major General Koster, the commanding general of the Infantry Division to which 
Medina’s company was attached was informed of the death of about 128 civilians with only two 
US soldiers killed on the day of the killing or shortly thereafter.
1698
 Among other information at 
his disposal, he also received a report that a helicopter pilot had observed what he considered to 
be indiscriminate firing by troops from Captain Medina’s company.1699 Yet he failed to order a 
proper follow up investigation. In fact when the general received the report, he instructed 
Colonel Henderson to initiate an investigation into the matter. “That inquiry”, according to 
Burnett, “constituted a self-investigation by the commander of the unit involved, an individual 
whose professional career concerns might interfere with his objectivity.”1700 The results of such 
an investigation were made verbally concluding that “the allegations of untoward conduct by 
American troops were unfounded.”1701 Later, after some complaint from the Vietnamese 
authorities, “a brief, undocumented report was submitted which concluded that the allegations in 
the leaflet were without substance.”1702 General William Westmoreland, the American Military 
Commander in Vietnam was charged pursuant to the complaint of a line solder involved in the 
massacre. The charges were also dismissed by the Secretary of the Army. The reason for 
dismissal was that Westmoreland did not know of the events at My Lai until a year after the 
massacre when he initiated an inquiry.
1703
  
 
My Lai massacre clearly shows the American biased approach to command responsibility when 
their own forces are involved. The problem since Vietnam is not, according to Peters, that “legal 
advisors in the armed services do not fully grasp the applicable law. Neither is there a lack of 
genuine concern among some in leadership positions about the importance of adhering to law of 
war principles.”1704 The breakdown is brought by the military institution itself whose legal 
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experts are also officers in the forces. It is quite embarrassing if the situation is to remain as such. 
Senior officers will continue to manipulate the law for their own protection from prosecution. 
The solution to the problem must be a deep institutional reform of the whole system of military 
criminal justice. While military matters may be better addressed by military personnel, cases 
where senior commanders are implicated need to be dealt with by mixed military legal and 
civilian experts. In any case, the system should ensure that anyone involved does not play any 
role in military criminal investigations and prosecutions. 
 
7.3.4. The application of the concept of command responsibility before the ad hoc tribunals 
 
7.3.4.1. ICTY re-confirmation of the concept of command responsibility 
 
Celebici
1705
 is the first ICTY case which examined the concept of command responsibility. There 
were four defendants in this case: Esad Landzo, a guard at the Celebici prison-camp
1706
; Hazim 
Delic and Zidravko Mucic who worked in the camp as its commanders
1707
; Mucic who was the 
the commander; and Delic who was the deputy commander from May to November 1992, when 
he replaced Mucic as commander. The fourth defendant Zejnil Delalic allegedly “exercised 
authority over the Celebici prison-camp in his role, first as coordinator of the Bosnian Muslim 
and Bosnian Croat forces in the area, and later as Commander of the First Tactical Group of the 
Bosnian Army.”1708 The indictment specifically charged Mucic and Delalic for crimes committed 
by their subordinates, including those alleged to have been committed by Landzo and Delic.
1709
 
The last two were charged with individual criminal responsibility pursuant to Article 7(1).
1710
 
Other counts charge Delic as a superior with command responsibility. This case is quite 
important in re-visiting the concept of command responsibility and setting out new criteria for its 
appreciation. 
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Without going into the details of this lengthy case, it suffices to underscore one of the most 
acclaimed rulings of the Trial Chamber which sets the doctrine in motion again. The Chamber 
held that “where the superior either knew or consciously disregarded information which clearly 
indicated that the subordinates were committing or about to commit […] crimes”1711; he may be 
held criminally liable. The Chamber reaffirmed the three elements of command responsibility, 
(1) the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship; (2) the superior knew or had reason to 
know that the criminal act was about to be
1712
 or had been committed; and (3) the superior failed 
to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the criminal act or punish the 
perpetrator thereof.
1713
 
 
Despite the controversial or insufficient approaches adopted by some Trial Chambers 
subsequently, especially before the ICTR, the principle is that military and the superiors’ 
authorities may incur command responsibility. The only question is therefore twofold: who 
exactly is that superior who is sought after for the purpose of ascribing criminal responsibility, 
and what degree of control must he wield in this respect.
1714
 Particularly with the latter concern, 
the ICTY has expressed in Aleksovski that “the level of control required to establish that the 
person against whom command authority is attributed has however been the subject of differing 
interpretations.”1715An ICTR trial Chamber took another approach in the Akayesu case. 
 
The Indictment against Jean-Paul Akayesu states that he was “bourgmestre of [the Taba] 
commune from April 1993 until June 1994.”1716 It further indicates that “as bourgmestre, [he] 
was charged with the performance of executive functions and the maintenance of public order 
within his commune, subject to the authority of the prefect. He had exclusive control over the 
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communal police, as well as any gendarmes put at the disposal of the commune.”1717 At trial, it 
was held that: 
in the case of civilians, the application of the principle of individual criminal responsibility, enshrined in 
article 6(3), remains contentious. Against this background, the Chamber holds that it is appropriate to 
assess on a case by case basis the power of authority actually devolved upon the Accused in order to 
determine whether or not he had the power to take all necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the 
commission of the alleged crimes or to punish the perpetrators thereof.
1718
 
 
The Trial Chamber relied on a dissenting opinion of Judge Röling in the Hirota case. In this 
case, the dissenting judge argued that:  
Generally speaking, a Tribunal should be very careful in holding civil government officials responsible for 
the behavior of the army in the field. Moreover, the Tribunal is here to apply the general principles of law 
as they exist with relation to the responsibility for omissions. Considerations of both law and policy, of 
both justice and expediency, indicate that this responsibility should only be recognized in a very restricted 
sense.
1719
 
 
All that can be said is that Röling’s dissent needs to be placed in the special circumstances of 
Hirota, who, as a Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan had no direct link with the Army that 
misbehaved in the field. He only participated in cabinet meetings, and had even raised the issue 
of atrocities committed. The majority, in seeking to impute responsibility to him extrapolated 
deeper and held that “he was content to rely on assurances which he knew were not being 
implemented while hundreds of murders, violations of women, and other atrocities were being 
committed daily. His inaction amounted to criminal negligence.”1720 While Hirota’s 
responsibility is based on omission, there is nothing available which suggests that those who 
committed atrocities were his subordinates de jure or de facto. This is the problem that has been 
raised throughout with respect to all the prosecutions following World War II where very little or 
insufficient evidence was enough to convict those apprehended.  
 
The Chamber in Akayesu could have approached the issue looking at all available jurisprudence 
that existed at the time of the judgment delivered on 2 September 1998. It is not, as suggests 
Williamson, an “apparent reticence to extend the principle of superior responsibility beyond 
military commanders.”1721 In reality it is a great failure to thoroughly research and consistently 
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apply the doctrine as it stood when Akayesu was decided.  Unfortunately, the same legal error re-
appeared in Musema
1722
 case decided on 27 January 2000. It is worthy to note that the Trial 
Chamber that decided Akayesu was composed of the same judges who decided Musema on 27 
January 2000.
1723
 The Trial Chamber held that “the principle enunciating the responsibility of 
command derives from the principle of individual criminal responsibility as applied by the 
Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals. It was subsequently codified in Article 86 of the Additional 
protocol I of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949.”1724 Without further ado, the Trial 
Chamber then went on to say that “it is significant to note that there are varying views regarding 
the mens rea required for command responsibility.”1725 
 
Out of a dissent of Judge Röling in the Hirota case, without any other authoritative precedent, 
the Trial Chamber crafted a rule of general application. The trial chamber position was wrong in 
theory because, according to Wu and Yong-Sung “there does not seem to be any compelling 
reason why promoting responsible behaviour by civilian leaders is a less important concern than 
with respect to military leaders.”1726 Even though there is no much precedent and treaty 
codification of civilian command responsibility, it does not follow that what constitutes a fair 
duty in the civilian context is less obvious in contrast to the duties of commanders.
1727
 
 
The Trial Chamber could have explored more details regarding how the principle of command 
responsibility was actually applied at Nuremberg and Tokyo. The ad hoc tribunals had also some 
precedents already available that properly interpreted the doctrine, particularly Kayishema and 
Ruzindana
1728
, Mucic et al.
1729
, Aleksovski.
1730
 All were decided before Musema. 
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Firstly, in Mucic et al., which was decided on 16 November 1998, the Chamber recognises, from 
the language of Article 7 (2) and 7(3) of the ICTY Statute
1731
, that the application of the doctrine 
“extends beyond the responsibility of military commanders to also encompass political leaders 
and other civilian superiors in position of authority.”1732 According to the Chamber, such an 
interpretation “of the scope of Article 7(3) is in accordance with the customary law doctrine of 
command responsibility.”1733 The Chamber more specifically referred to the prosecution and 
conviction of civilian leaders by the Tokyo Tribunal under this doctrine, especially Koki Hirota, 
a former Japanese Foreign Minister
1734
; Hideki Tojo, Prime Minister and Mamoru Shigemitsu, 
Foreign Affairs Minister.
1735
 The Trial Chamber relied on other similar cases held in occupied 
Germany, like the Roechling case. But this latter case could have been properly addressed as one 
of aiding and abetting. A passage quoted in Mucic et al. allows such a conclusion. It reads: 
Herman Roechling and the other accused members of the Directorate of the Voelklingen works are not 
accused of having ordered this horrible treatment, but of having permitted it; and indeed supported it, and 
in addition, of not having done their utmost to put an end to these abuse.
1736
 
 
Nothing here suggests whether or not all three elements of command responsibility were met in 
this case even though the defendants were found guilty for their failure to act, as in Hirota. 
The Trial Chamber then concluded that “the applicability of the principle of superior 
responsibility in Article 7(3) extends not only to military commanders but also to individuals in 
non-military positions of superior authority.”1737  
 
It is possible to argue that the doctrine has been taken at the extreme, especially where the Trial 
Chamber relied on precedents in which many legal requirements were disregarded by the Allied 
powers in view to securing conviction of Japanese fallen enemies. Again, there is no suggestion 
that all the three main elements of command responsibility are met in this scenario. This is a 
misleading precedent.  
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Secondly, in Kayishema the Trial Chamber analysed the concept of command responsibility 
from the “construction of the Statute itself”1738 which was a good starting point. Article 6(3) of 
the ICTR “makes no limited reference to the responsibility to be incurred by military 
commanders alone. Rather, the more generic term of ‘superior’ is used.”1739 The Chamber 
moreover reverted to Mucic et al.
1740
 In Bagilishema
1741
 likewise, an otherwise composed Trial 
Chamber clearly based its decision on the existing jurisprudence, but added that “the doctrine of 
command responsibility extends to civilian superiors only to the extent that they exercise a 
degree of control over their subordinates which is similar to that of the military 
commanders.”1742 Once again, this is a commendable step in comprehensively developing the 
principle. Bagilishema further clarifies how, in practical terms, the concept may be applied. The 
Chamber held that:  
According to the Trial Chamber in Celebici, for a civilian superior’s degree of control to be ‘similar to’ that 
of a military commander, the control over subordinates must be ‘effective’, and the superior must, have the 
‘material ability’ to prevent and punish any offences. Furthermore, the exercise of de facto authority must 
be accompanied by ‘the trappings of the exercise of de jure authority.’ The present Chamber concurs. The 
Chamber is of the view that these trappings of authority include, for example, awareness of a chain of 
command, the practice of issuing and obeying orders, and the expectation that insubordination may lead to 
disciplinary action. It is by these trappings that the law distinguishes civilian superiors from mere rabble-
rousers or other persons of influence.
1743
 
 
In summary, before the ad hoc tribunals, following the rulings in Akayesu, Mucic et al. and 
Blaskic, the “judicial developments suggest that the standard of a commander’s knowledge is 
now actual knowledge of the existence of war crimes, which may be proven ‘through either 
direct or circumstantial evidence, as well as an affirmative duty to investigate circumstances of 
subordinates conduct irrespective of specific reports of atrocities.”1744 Yet, the ICTR is far from 
adopting a consistent approach to the doctrine as the analysis of the Karemera and 
Ngirumpatse
1745
 case shows. 
                                                          
1738
 Kayishema and Ruzindana, TC, para. 214 
1739
 Kayishema and Ruzindana, TC, para. 214 
1740
 Kayishema and Ruzindana, TC, para 215; see also The Prosecutor versus Ignace Bagilishema, Judgment, Case 
No. ICTR-95-1A-T, 7 June 2001, para. 40 (though decided after Musema and Akayesu respectively) 
1741
 The Prosecutor versus Ignace Bagilishema, Judgment, Case No. ICTR-95-1A-T, 7 June 2001 
1742
 Bagilishema, TC, para. 42, referring to Mucic et al., TC, para. 378 
1743
 Bagilishema, TC, para. 43 [all footnotes omitted]  
1744
 Peters C. William, “Adjudication Deferred: Command Responsibility for War Crimes and US Military Justice 
from MY Lai to Haditha and Beyond”, op. cit., p. 932 
1745
 Karemera and Ngirumpatse, TC. 
351 
 
 
7.3.4.2. The ICTR Karemera and Ngirumpatse case 
 
Matthieu Ngirumpatse was the Chairman of the MRND (Ruling party) Executive Bureau in 
Rwanda from 1993
1746
 until he eventually left the country towards July 1994. Edouard Karemera 
was the First Vice President of the party’s Executive Bureau from April 1993. He also became 
Minister of the Interior and Communal Development for the Interim Government on 25 May 
1994
1747
, a post he occupied until he took exile. The indictment charges both Karemera and 
Ngirumpatse as superiors, in their capacity as First Vice-Chairman and Chairman of the party 
Executive Bureau for the crimes committed by Interahamwe whom the prosecutor alleges were 
their subordinates.
1748
 Other alleged subordinates were “members of the Civil Defence 
programme”1749, “local government officials in the territorial administration”1750, “and 
administrative personnel in the ministries controlled by MRND.”1751  
 
These charges are already unreasonably broad for any human being to defend himself against 
because no chain of command could be established between Karemera and so-called 
subordinates. Because charges are almost the same albeit for few specificities related to each 
accused, only Karemera’s case will be examined here.1752 However, conclusions which will be 
drawn apply to both. 
 
As a preliminary issue with respect to command responsibility, this case combines Article 6(1) 
and Article 6(3) of the ICTR Statute. The Trial Chamber maintains the provisions of Article 6(3) 
that “a superior can incur criminal responsibility for the acts of his subordinate if he knew or had 
reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts, or had done so, and the 
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superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish 
the perpetrator thereof.”1753 It moreover adds that “superior responsibility encompasses criminal 
conduct by subordinates under all modes of participation pursuant to Article 6(1).”1754 But this 
position is quite tricky as traditionally it is not necessary that a subordinate be prosecuted to 
impute responsibility to the superior. It may then prove impossible to impute a mode of criminal 
responsibility to someone who was not prosecuted in an attempt to impute the same conduct to 
his superior.  The Chamber did not elucidate how then, a superior’s responsibility can be 
engaged under any mode of responsibility under Article 6(1) for a subordinate whose 
responsibility has not been engaged so far. 
 
Karemera contended that interahamwe [in fact of the Kigali and Gisenyi Prefectures] could not 
be his subordinates as they have not been identified. Karemera claimed that he did not have the 
material ability to prevent members of MRND from committing crimes or to punish them for 
those crimes.
1755
 The Trial Chamber dismissed Karemera’s claim arguing that “the prosecution 
must only identify categories of assailants [and that] it has done so by mentioning the 
Interahamwe and members of the Civil Defense Programme.”1756 Yet these categories concerned 
the entire territory of Rwanda though the Interahamwe that are critical here were from the 
Gisenyi and Kigali Prefectures. Even for these Interahamwe, there is nothing suggesting any 
chain of command between them and Karemera. Nothing exists either between Karemera and so-
called members of the Civil Defence. Nothing points to any kind of organisation of the Civil 
Defence apart from a document authored and signed by Karemera which was tendered into 
evidence.  
 
To establish that Karemera was a superior of the Interahamwe, members of the Civil Defence 
Programme, local officials who were part of the territorial administration, the Chamber had first 
to be satisfied that he enjoyed de jure or de facto authority; whichever applies. The Chamber was 
then satisfied that Karemera had de jure authority over the alleged subordinates. Such a holding 
was predicated on the fact that Karemera occupied functions within the party as its First Vice-
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Chairman and that he was a Minister of the Interior. In light of those functions “the chamber 
[was] satisfied that Karemera occupied an important position in the civilian chain of control and 
had substantial de jure authority during the genocide in Rwanda, generally.”1757 The Chamber 
did not bother wondering whether those powers were effectively exercised during the events. 
Eventually the Chamber pointed out that Karemera participated in cabinets meetings and issued 
instructions to local authorities as prefects
1758
, and the like.  
 
The Chamber unreasonably ignored the situation that prevailed and the eventual impact it could 
have on the unfolding of events. It did not examine whether instructions issued were actually 
carried out and that feedback was uninterruptedly forthcoming. The Chamber reasoned as if 
Karemera had acted in normal situations: giving instructions, ensuring compliance and receiving 
feedback continuously. 
 
The Chamber highlighted seven indicia that could indicate that Karemera also had de facto 
powers. Firstly, he was one of the four persons who composed the Executive Bureau of the 
MRND- the ultimate authority over the Interahamwe in Kigali and Gisenyi.
1759
 Secondly, due to 
this position, he was a well-known figure in Rwanda.
1760
 Thirdly, he allegedly agreed to provide 
training and distributed weapons to Interahamwe.
1761
 Fourthly, he intervened to secure Col. 
Théoneste Bagosora’s extension of term of office. The fifth indicium was that Karemera made 
public speeches in the presence of national authorities before and after he became Minister of the 
Interior. He also drafted and signed MRND Communiqués at public meetings and his party 
influenced decisions taken by the Interim Government.
1762
 The sixth indicium was that Karemera 
issued instruction to the Civil Defense one of which concerned the “mopping-up operation 
against Tutsi in Bisesero, which was carried out, resulting in the death of scores of Tutsi 
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civilians.”1763 Lastly he selected people to be appointed in important posts within his 
ministry.
1764
 
 
To establish effective control, the Chamber held that Karemera was one of four members and 
Vice – Chairman of the Executive Bureau of the MRND. He could also have prevented offences 
committed by the Kigali and Gisenyi Interahamwe by speaking out and forbidding them.
1765
 
Without saying how in terms of material and personal means Karemera could have discharged 
that duty, the Chamber contented to mention that:  
it stands to reason that one of the four most respected and powerful leaders of a civilian political 
organisation with a defined hierarchy is capable of wielding such powers to prevent offences by his 
subordinates. Such an individual has the capacity to issue orders from the very top of the organisation, 
which will be followed.”1766 
 
Nothing indicates the “defined hierarchy” the Chamber was talking about. The Chamber held 
that, considering Karemera’s de jure and de facto power, both as First Vice-Chairman of the 
Executive Bureau and as Minister of the Interior and Communal Development,  “[he] could have 
punished offenders among the Kigali and Gisenyi Interahamwe on account of his status and 
authority over those organisations. Moreover, he could have sanctioned offenders politically, 
removed them from the ranks of the organisation, disabled their benefits and privileges, publicly 
humiliated them, or demoted them within the organisation, among other measures.
1767
 The 
Chamber used the same reasoning with respect to halting and punishing crimes committed by 
civilians and local officials who participated in the Civil Defence programme
1768
, as well as 
administrative personnel in the ministries controlled by MRND. Nothing indicates how these 
measures individually or collectively could have been effective to prevent the massacre or punish 
perpetrators thereof. 
 
On the knowledge element of command responsibility, Karemera, as a national leader, knew 
about the crimes that were being committed in Rwanda during that period. Whether Karemera 
had specific knowledge of the occurrence of crimes apart from the general information about the 
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chaos in the country is another inquiry.  No analysis of this element is therefore needed here. The 
question remains however to find out how realistically an individual civilian minister could be a 
superior in effective control of the four groups highlighted above; namely Interahamwe of Kigali 
and Gisenyi, members of the Civil Defence Programme, local officials who were part of the 
territorial administration and administrative personnel in the ministries controlled by the MRND. 
How could this kind of person be in effective control without any indication of a chain of 
command? A reasonable person cannot conclude that Karemera was in effective control of all the 
four groups highlighted.  
 
Karemera raised this issue by submitting that “his material ability to prevent or to punish [was] 
particularly confusing when it comes to civilians because, in their case, the obligation for a 
subordinate to obey an order is not as clearly defined as in military structures.”1769 Karemera also 
complained that neither him, nor Ngirumpatse did have military ability to enforce compliance. 
Rather than looking at the particular circumstances of these two civilian authorities, as a matter 
of factual evidence, the Chamber raised a point of law when it stated that: 
The Aleksovski and Brdjanin Trial chambers of the ICTY have held that civilian superiors, who may lack 
the disciplinary or sanctioning powers of military commanders, may discharge their obligation to punish by 
reporting to the competent authorities whenever a crime has been committed if these reports are likely to 
trigger an investigation or initiate disciplinary or criminal proceedings. Moreover, this approach has been 
upheld by the Appeals Chamber in Boskoski et al. Furthermore, the Chamber notes that Article 60 of the 
MRND Statute clearly states that expulsion is one of the measures envisioned as punishment.
1770
 
 
The Karemera case needs to be distinguished from Aleksovski, Brdjanin and Boskoski cases. The 
Trial Chamber in Aleksovski considered that “on the basis of the evidence tendered at trial, it was 
established that the accused was the superior of prison guards within the meaning of Article 7(3) 
of the Statute for all matters relating to their duties in connection with the organisation and 
functioning of Kaonik prison.”1771 Reporting for him was normal business. In particular, the 
judgment indicates that “the guards acted pursuant to the accused’s orders”1772; and that “he 
could initiate disciplinary or criminal proceedings against guards who committed abuses. This 
would take the form of […] reporting to the military police commander and the president of the 
                                                          
1769
 Karemera and Ngirumpatse, TC, para. 1535 
1770
 Karemera and Ngirumpatse, TC, para. 1536 
1771
 Aleksovski, TC, para. 106 
1772
 Aleksovski, TC, para. 104 
356 
 
Travnik military tribunal, who were competent to take the necessary measures.”1773 No such 
finding exists in Karemera case. 
 
Though in Brdjanin the Trial Chamber stated the applicable law, it however dismissed “superior 
responsibility under Article 7(3) […] as a mode of liability.”1774 Brdjanin is of no help either. 
There are also many features that distinguish the Karemera case and Ljube Boskoski. Because of 
their importance to clearly elucidate the question, particularly pointing to the ICTR sustained 
tendency of relying on insufficient evidence in many respects, they will be looked at in more 
detail. 
 
Ljube Boskoski was the Minister of Interior of the FRY from 2001 until November 2002.
1775
 He 
headed a ministry which was “structured, disciplined and heavily regulated [in] a government 
that was functioning effectively and which had available the full and normal supportive 
structures of government, including judiciary, police and military agencies. There is no doubt he 
was in a position to effectively enforce his ministerial powers to the extent he chose.”1776 Unlike 
the Karemera case that does not allude to the structural organisation either of the MRND party 
from the top down to the persons who committed crimes or the Ministry of Interior and 
Communal Development, the Boskoski judgment offers more details. They include the structural 
organisation of the Ministry of the Interior
1777
, which may amount to a chain of command in the 
civilian hierarchy. The judgment relies on the Rule Book of the organisation and work of the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs which sets out its internal organisation.
1778
 Every dependency of the 
Ministry at regional and local level is also well described. 
 
Despite this detailed description, the Trial Chamber was candid and un-ambitious to 
acknowledge that Ljube Boskoski “had no function or capacity in respect of the army and its 
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personnel.”1779 He did not have either “ministerial functions or capacity in respect of the 
judiciary, the public prosecutor or the judicial police.”1780 In considering the necessary and 
reasonable measures Boskoski could have taken, the Trial Chamber dismissed disciplinary ones. 
It was the Chamber’s opinion that “to deal with criminal conduct of this nature as an internal 
disciplinary breach would be an entirely inadequate measure for the punishment of any police 
who might have perpetrated the alleged offences.”1781 The Chamber was very concerned as to 
whether or not the accused “took adequate measures to ensure that the alleged criminal conduct 
by police was brought to the attention of the appropriate authority so that it would be 
investigated with a view to criminal charges and appropriate punishment. That being so the 
matters raised concerning internal disciplinary procedures need not be further considered.”1782 
 
The competent authority refers to state institutions in charges of criminal or disciplinary 
proceedings de jure, namely the Ministry of Justice and the Public Prosecution office. Were all 
these institutions working in Rwanda according to the judgment against Karemera and 
Ngirumpatse? This question is very important because it is of no use if international prosecutions 
continue to overlook the reality of the facts or to ignore factors such as war, and its impact on the 
human capability to prevent or repress violations of international humanitarian law. This does in 
no way suggest that a person should not do all that they are capable of doing to prevent and 
punish violations of international humanitarian law even in times of war. Karemera could also 
have done something, but to a limited extent, not as wide as the Trial Chamber led people to 
believe in its ruling. 
 
Without suggesting that the following facts were litigated in the Karemera case, it is necessary to 
note that most of them were of common knowledge when the case was decided. Elsewhere in 
this research, the death of the president of Rwanda and his counterparty of Burundi in a plane 
that was brought down over Kigali on April 6, 1994 was extensively referred to. The death of the 
President set off widespread violence, including the murder the following day of Rwanda’s 
Prime Minister and prominent opposition leaders - some of whom were ministers in the 
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government.
1783
 In a letter the UN Secretary General wrote to the President of the Security 
Council on 8 April 1994 long before Karemera became Minister of the Interior, he recognised 
the tragic situation that prevailed in Rwanda.
1784
 The situation continued to deteriorate drastically 
and had been becoming rapidly worse.
1785
The UN Secretary General Special report of 20 April 
1994 describes better the prevailing situation in Rwanda at the time.
1786
 A reasonable trial of fact 
could not even attempt to hold that a civilian Minister of the Interior was in effective control of 
subordinates and failed to take necessary and reasonable actions to prevent or punish the 
perpetrators of crimes. 
  
The Trial Chamber in Karemera also shyly recognised that after the death of the President, the 
atmosphere between the parties deteriorated. The chamber acknowledged that in these 
circumstances, the conflicting parties could not have been expected to agree on the 
implementation of the Broad-Based Transitional Government before the situation stabilised.
1787
 
These incidents largely diminish the capability of a minister of interior to act; in any event, to 
have effective control over the four groups alluded to above. 
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7.4. Summary  
 
This chapter has demonstrated how joint criminal enterprise and command responsibility have 
become the prosecution darling modes of imputing criminal responsibility. These are however 
not the only modes of imputing criminal responsibility pursuant to article 7(1) and 7(3) of the 
ICTY Statute or article 6(1) and 6(3) of the ICTR Statute. Joint criminal enterprise was imagined 
as a mode of commission, which was implied to have been read under article 7(1) of the ICTY 
Statute and article 6(1) of the ICTR Statute. It fills the loopholes where evidence is non-existent 
or insufficient to impute responsibility to participants in group criminality. Scholarship tends to 
be divided between its staunch supporters and its vehement opponents. Its application and 
interpretation have varied and are far from being consistent before the ICTY and ICTR. This 
inconsistency has also largely contributed to the ineffectiveness of the ad hoc tribunals in 
developing this new concept.  
 
There is no doubt that international criminal law must utilise all available tools to punish 
perpetrators of crimes of concern to humanity. Refining the existing modes of imputation of 
criminal responsibility and even inventing new ones that are most appropriate to deal with 
international crimes should be every legal mind’s responsibility. Such an undertaking may 
however not come at any cost. It must be based on palpable evidence, rather than unsubstantiated 
assumptions, speculations or statements of intentions. Deep investigation, once again, must be 
able to pinpoint the extent of every contributor to crimes and eventually show the exact role each 
played rather than stop at the extreme difficulties encountered. If this fails, then the judges must 
discharge. Doing otherwise would be creating more uncertainty and unpredictability.  
 
There have been varying interpretations of the doctrine of command responsibility; some 
extending the reach of its constitutive elements, others restricting it. It is undisputed that the 
doctrine has now acquired the status of customary international law. Whether it had attained that 
status before the prosecutions following World War II is not quite clear from the scholarship 
analysed so far.  Thereafter, a long period of stagnation followed during which the doctrine did 
not feature a lot in international treaties and conventions. It was not forgotten however. At a 
domestic level it subsisted but its application was frustrated by attempts to protect own forces 
commanders while its elements were present.  Most of them were similar to those relied on when 
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prosecuting World War II criminals. My Lai was a focal point of concern where visibly Captain 
Ernest Medina, Colonel Oren Henderson, Major general Samuel Koster and General William 
Westmoreland could have been held criminally liable as superiors, if one applies the Yamashita 
standard. Medina and Henderson in particular knew of the crimes committed by their troops. 
They could have prevented them. Yet, such a protective tendency subsists. Americans and their 
allies still shed their officers from command responsibility. This is however a particular issue 
that may be redressed by an act of parliament in concerned jurisdictions.  
 
At an international level however, command responsibility is still unclearly and not consistently 
applied. According to the recorded ad hoc tribunals jurisprudence anyone can be a superior, a 
commander, and can have a broad range of subordinates if the circumstances so require, 
especially for the purposes of enforcing international humanitarian law provisions. Confusion is 
still deliberately entertained for a doctrine that otherwise seeks to protect humanity. Command 
responsibility as it is nowadays applied misses the balance between the interests of individual 
liberty and society’s interest in enforcing the laws of war and protecting victims. The doctrine 
has shifted towards the interests of society to the detriment of the individual rights of the 
defendants.
1788
 Redressing the imbalance should be a primary responsibility of the courts called 
to hear cases involving command responsibility.  
 
From the arguments developed in the six chapters, time is now ripe to draw some conclusions 
about the effectiveness of the ad hoc tribunals. The general contention is that, faced with a 
mountain of allegations of violations of international humanitarian law, the UNSC established 
the ad hoc tribunals.  This study has been successful to demonstrate how, gradually; under the 
pretence of establishing individual criminal responsibility the ad hoc tribunals have 
progressively diluted their mandate of its substance. As the French adage puts it, “la montagne a 
accouché d’une souris”; meaning the mountain has given birth to a rat. Are ad hoc tribunals still 
needed?   
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CHAPTER 8: DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
The effectiveness of the ad hoc tribunals cannot be assessed by only looking at the number of 
people who were judged and sentenced to heavy penalties, or those who were acquitted; neither 
can it be measured by considering suspects who have not been apprehended.
1789
 Assessing the 
effectiveness of the tribunals is not a narrative report on the amount of money spent to run them 
or the mismanagement of offices within the tribunals. These matters, like many others, were not 
even raised in the research. Measuring effectiveness is rather a value, quality and impact-based 
exercise that looks into the work that has already been done, and how it has been performed in 
relation to the stated objectives and the means available for the few cases adjudicated. Measuring 
the effectiveness, for the purposes of this research, is a holistic approach that pinpoints some 
important aspects that could have contributed positively to the achievement of a good job, but 
which have been purposefully overlooked. Not everything affecting the effectiveness of the ad 
hoc tribunals can be covered in a single doctoral research project. There are many areas that still 
need attention.  
 
The thesis posed questions on the legality and legitimacy of the ad hoc tribunals, their 
appropriateness for the situations that prevailed in the former FSRY and in Rwanda. It 
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underscored the mandate assigned to the tribunals and the objectives set to be achieved. It 
examined the investigation and prosecution processes, questioned the practice of guilty plea and 
judicial notice. It also looked into the doctrines of joint criminal enterprise and command 
responsibility. The aim was to find out how the combination of these items could respond to the 
question of whether the ad hoc tribunals have been effective or not. This conclusion offers an 
answer to all these questions. The current research argued for the prosecution of international 
crimes by a legally and legitimately created judicial institution, not through ad hoc tribunals 
established by the UNSC. Even though they were established under questionable circumstances, 
ad hoc tribunals could have done much better had they been guided primarily by the search for 
justice. They were overburdened and did not acknowledge that fact. They navigated a 
tumultuous sea of problems which finally jeopardised their effectiveness.  
 
 The media, the humanitarian community, non-governmental organisations and many other 
human rights organisations and governmental agencies reported on the crimes committed in the 
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The UN mandated investigative commissions to inquire about 
the nature, extent, character and legal qualifications of those atrocities. The question was 
primarily about what could be done to effectively halt those crimes and redress the situation; 
restore peace and security in these countries and bring them back to normality. Rather than 
taking a resolute and timely military action, the UNSC, reluctantly opted for the prosecution of 
alleged perpetrators. The Council explained that it was performing its primary mandate of 
restoring and maintaining international peace and security, though the judicial route used was 
unprecedented. The ad hoc nature of the tribunals was a novel sui generis action in the history of 
the UNSC.  This measure was already a problem on its own when consideration is given to the 
diverging views and opinions expressed during the discussions in the offices of the UNSC, and 
immediately after the tribunals were established.  The much supported view was that the UNSC 
was not empowered to establish judicial institutions. 
 
Resolution 827(1993) of 25 May 1993 was adopted pursuant to reports of massive atrocities that 
had been or were being committed in the former SFRY at the time of and subsequent to the 
resolution. It created the ICTY and adopted its statute that provided for an OTP and a college of 
trial and appeal’s judges with a seat in The Hague, in The Netherlands. The Statute defined the 
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material, personal and temporal competence of the tribunal. It also set an array of objectives that 
were expected to be achieved through prosecution of alleged criminals. Allegations of war 
crimes, crimes against humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and acts of 
genocide were reported in Croatia, Serbia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Despite the existence 
of the tribunal, atrocities continued unabated until 2001 and covered the territories of Kosovo 
and Montenegro. This already proved that prosecution was not an optimal way of halting the 
commission of the crimes and the armed conflict that was fueling them. 
 
On 8 November 1994, the UNSC again passed Resolution 955(1994) that established the ICTR 
and adopted its statute providing the same organisational chart as the ICTY. The seat of the 
tribunal for trial purposes was situated in Arusha in the Republic of Tanzania. It shared the 
Appeals Chamber with the ICTY in The Hague. The material and personal competence of the 
tribunal was the prosecution of Rwandan nationals suspected of the commission of genocide, war 
crimes, crimes against humanity and serious violations of Article 3 Common to the Geneva 
Conventions and Additional Protocol II in the year 1994. Those crimes had been allegedly 
committed in Rwanda and in neighbouring states. War has ended when the resolution was 
adopted. Again, this constituted an inconsistent approach in the actions of the UNSC for the 
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The Council could not, with the same explanation, create a 
tribunal aimed at halting an armed conflict in the SFRY and eventually the crimes that 
accompanied that conflict, and establish another for the same purpose in Rwanda while the 
circumstances were not the same. The approach, moreover, constituted an abusive and arbitrary 
interpretation of the powers vested in the UNSC under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, if indeed 
the Council had power and authority to establish ad hoc tribunals as its subsidiary institutions. 
The Council should review its mandate and apply it in a consistent and coherent manner. 
 
In addition to the ordinary goals of criminal prosecutions, the UNSC anticipated that the 
tribunals may also achieve many other objectives that include rendering justice, combating 
impunity through retributive justice and contributing to the process of national reconciliation. No 
criminal court can reasonably undertake to achieve these objectives, simply because they are 
beyond the work of a criminal tribunal. Overburdening the ad hoc tribunals might have been the 
first indication that they could not be effective. To discharge their tasks, the ICTY and ICTR 
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undertook investigations and prosecution of the crimes contained in the constitutive Statutes. 
Investigations in many respects proved insufficiently thorough with a clear lack of 
professionalism, at least in the most important cases. To fill the gaps, manage the insufficiency 
and complexity of the taks, the tribunals chose or resorted to legal techniques that permitted or 
facilitated their work. They relied mostly on guilty pleas and judicial notice to dispose of some 
of the charges.  It is quite illogical to use these techniques while dealing with the most serious 
crimes like genocide with a desire to uncover the truth behind the commission of those crimes 
and to send out a message of “never again”. Prosecutors and judges also preferred imputing 
criminal liability using the doctrines of joint criminal enterprise and command responsibility. 
These modes of ascribing responsibility were unnecessarily stretched to apply to those in the 
accused box, without necessarily meaning that they were commensurate to the real extent of their 
criminal responsibility.  
 
Joint criminal enterprise, in its three categories does not clearly show the guilty mind of the 
perpetrator. Command responsibility developed unevenly applying mostly to politically fallen 
culprits, but not to everyone who should answer for the crimes committed by his/her 
subordinates. It is a consolidated analysis of the method of establishment, the legal foundation, 
the prosecution policies of investigation and prosecution, the legal technics used and the 
preferred modes of ascribing criminal responsibility that brought about the questioning of the 
tribunals’ effectiveness. 
 
Acknowledgment of the complexity of the the matters at hand involving particularly aspects of 
law, politics and diplomacy must be made. The research attempted an application of the 
naturalistic and positivistic theories to find an agreeable approach for all these concerns. 
Moreover the naturalistic and positivistic theories assisted in providing an overall understanding 
of the interconnection and link between the areas that have been highlighted to measure the 
tribunals’ effectiveness. Both theories dueled for primacy over the years. It was argued that the 
establishment of the tribunals and their modus operandi were a reflection of positivism while the 
issue at hand should have been looked at naturalistically or through a balanced combination of 
both. For sure, naturalism cannot explain everything, but it helps to understand the process 
leading to truth. Naturalism constitutes the rights and values that were defended through the 
365 
 
process of prosecution. Positivism facilitated the creation of the tribunals, yet continued to guide 
their operations. It is at this juncture that the values to be defended were overlooked. The work 
emphasised the crucial importance that natural law still occupies in legal philosophy. Naturalism 
and positivism converged in the design and functionality of international criminal justice, 
positivism being more preeminent in the decisions taken by the UNSC and in the adjudication of 
international crimes. Considering the purposes for which ad hoc tribunals were established, 
namely the protection of human rights as universal values, the suggestion is that natural law, 
complimented with ethics and morality should be given particular attention in the design and 
functioning of international criminal tribunals. These considerations were largely absent in the 
conception and work of the ad hoc tribunals. International criminal law should be more a matter 
of values rather than a dictate imposed by powerful bodies including the UNSC. Morality and 
ethics are therefore critical to the upbringing and sustainability, predictability and certainty of 
international criminal justice. This is a very important conclusion to bear in mind. 
 
The establishment of the ad hoc tribunals by the UNSC resolutions was a political exercise. The 
inquiry sought to explain whether or not the Council was the appropriate organ to take such a 
decision. The answer was that establishing an ad hoc tribunal permitted to avoid traditional 
means of negotiating a treaty because some states would allegedly, resist or refuse to ratify such 
a treaty, while the situation required an urgent action. States could drag their feet and frustrate 
the search for solutions.  
 
Treaty-based criminal tribunals that respect the equal sovereignty of all UN member States; 
which are not imposed by binding resolutions, with as many resemblances to domestic criminal 
tribunals, is the solution in this respect. Establishing ad hoc criminal tribunals was also a weak 
alternative to a resolute action to engage a military operation to stop the wars in the former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda. This was the most urgent action to take rather than going the judicial 
route. The serious violations of international humanitarian law were the consequences of war not 
its causes. War fuelled the violations and could have been dealt with as a matter of priority. Had 
war ceased, the violations of international humanitarian law could also stop. This casts doubt on 
the legitimacy and consistency of UNSC’s action itself and that of the ad hoc tribunals to a 
certain extent.  Establishing ad hoc tribunals was an ineffective measure to restore and maintain 
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international peace and security. Peace was not restored in the former Yugoslavia by the mere 
existence of the ICTY. War spread instead and more human casualties were registered. The war 
was stopped by the NATO bombing over Kosovo in 1999.  In Rwanda, the war was already over 
when the Council decided to establish the ICTR. The existence of the ICTR did not bring peace 
to the region because the impunity granted to RPF gave it leeway to attack the DRC many times 
during the time frame of the tribunal. The UNSC’s judicial action for the former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda, proved untimely, inconsistent, contradictory and a complete rhetoric, entirely detached 
from the realities and facts.  
 
The armed conflict situation that prevailed required that the UNSC take a speedy and timely 
military action. The Council would unquestionably be exercising its legitimate authority in the 
most appropriate circumstances.  Establishing ad hoc tribunals failed to properly and legally fit 
in the competence of the UNSC under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Some scholars, later on, 
attempted to legally explain and legitimise the decision, going as far as reading the competence 
of the Council in Article 41 of the Charter because the list of actions that may be taken is not 
exhaustive. From a review of the debates that took place and which were carefully recorded by 
Scharf and Morris, such a reading is non-existent. This is so because there were no legal 
provisions that empowered the UNSC to establish criminal tribunals. The tribunals themselves, 
through preliminary defence motions, affirmed that the UNSC was empowered to establish 
subsidiary organs, including ad hoc tribunals. They meant that they had been legally established 
and had competence to adjudicate according to their statutes.  
 
The preliminary motions on jurisdiction filed by Tadic, Kanyabashi, Nzirorera et al, and 
Milosevic clearly show how contentious and debatable the matter was and still remains.   The 
imposition of ad hoc tribunals without a clear legal foundation should be put to rest. It is not an 
optimal solution to resolve armed conflicts accompanied by serious violations of international 
humanitarian law. The UNSC should revisit its mandate and missions of maintaining 
international peace and security and adopt proper, effective and efficient mechanisms to respond 
to situations that require immediate action. Judicial institutions cannot respond to the urgency 
that war situations necessitate. The judicial route is ineffective, and becomes very weak if 
political calculations and narrow state interests interfere. 
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The overabundant inclusion of aims, goals and objectives in the mandate of the tribunals is 
another proof of the inappropriateness of the decision to establish ad hoc tribunals; robbing them 
of their focus – indeed, their effectiveness. It is hard to believe that a criminal tribunal can 
become a tool for the restoration and maintenance of international peace and security. A criminal 
tribunal cannot become an instrument contributing to the process of national reconciliation 
either. A criminal tribunal must stick to the function of determining individual criminal guilt 
upon allegations that a crime has been committed, that the perpetrator can be identified, 
investigated, arrested, prosecuted and sentenced. Whether at the domestic or the international 
level; criminal prosecutions serve the same purposes of deterrence, incapacitation, retribution, 
and fighting impunity. A criminal tribunal cannot do more than that. The mandate of any 
criminal tribunal must be clearly stated, focused, and not overambitious. Its objectives must be 
reasonably delimited to fit in the functions of a criminal tribunal. Objectives which are beyond 
the functions of a criminal tribunal should be abandoned and reserved to other mechanisms of 
accountability and truth-telling. This was not the case when the ICTY and ICTR were 
established.  
 
The thesis stressed in great detail how the principal actors of international criminal prosecutions, 
particularly prosecutors and judges, should be guided by ethics and morality to better serve 
justice. International prosecutors and judges at the ad hoc tribunals had been found to harbour a 
conviction-minded tendency rather than being justice seekers. Judges and prosecutors proved to 
be too loyal to the UNSC rather than assuming their duties professionally, ethically and morally. 
In many instances, prosecutors were not independent or acted under pressure from interested 
states; judges looked on passively.  
 
There is no professional body or other oversight mechanism in the ad hoc tribunals’ Statutes or 
within the UN that hold prosecutors accountable when they abuse their powers or get involved in 
other prosecutorial misconducts. Furthermore, no body exists to deal with the judges’ passivity. 
An independent mechanism outside of the organisational chart of the ad hoc tribunals solely 
entrusted with overseeing the way prosecutors discharge their function is really needed. The 
mechanism may also consider sanctioning judges when they become idle in front of the 
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prosecution’s misconduct. The body should, however, not interfere with the legitimate exercise 
of independence and discretion by prosecutors and judges. It would instead intervene only where 
the judicial remedies ordinarily available at appeals’ level have proved insufficient. With respect 
to the prosecutor, such mechanism will be set in motion if administrative control and supervision 
within the office of the prosecutor have collapsed to a degree that they can be qualified 
misconduct.  
 
It was also argued that prosecuting high profiles cases should not be an institutionalised priority 
policy or strategy. The policy priority should be investigating and prosecuting anyone rightly and 
out of personal conviction and professionalism rather than out of external pressure or any desired 
outcome beyond doing justice. Policies should clarify what will be investigated, rather than who 
should be investigated. Assumptions that crimes have been sanctioned, condoned or authorised 
by those in high echelons should be supported by factual evidence related to the crimes 
committed. Investigation and prosecution should not be based on the legitimate exercise of 
power and authority as authorised by the constitutions and laws of the countries affected unless 
those constitutions and laws had been enacted for criminal purposes. 
 
Shortcutting the system with legal tactics only frustrates, defeats and dilutes the aims for which 
international prosecution is undertaken. The prosecutor must proceed if he/she has a provable 
case supported by sufficient evidence which, in the conviction of the prosecution, can reasonably 
lead to a finding of guilty without excuses and tactics of delaying the process. Doctrines 
designed or interpreted to fill the gaps encountered in investigations or purely related to the 
nature, extent, severity and complexity of international crimes are not positively contributing to 
the building up of a credible international criminal justice system. Those gaps need to be filled 
by improved principles of justice, even those borrowed from domestic jurisdictions. 
 
For some proponents of the international criminal justice, and to paraphrase Wippman, the study 
of international criminal prosecution bears with it the potential contributions to “the deterrence 
of atrocities, the de-legitimation of dictators, warlords, and notorious human rights violators, and 
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the promotion and maintenance of peace in war-torn countries.”1790 It is perhaps the best and the 
only “hope of humanity in holding back the flood of atrocities that has persisted despite the 
hopes raised at Nuremberg.”1791 So, the expectation of justice through ad hoc tribunals was not 
unrealistic when they were established. It could have been meticulously followed. 
 
Its opponents, but more specifically “conservative commentators and politicians, especially those 
in the United States, condemn recent developments as ineffective, arbitrary, poorly conceived, 
threatening to state sovereignty, and an impediment to the political resolution of complex 
conflicts.”1792According to them, international criminal justice represents “a surrender of national 
authority to politicized foreign tribunals, to be opposed at all costs.”1793 This position is simply 
the deliberate result of political calculations for all those states which do not wish to abide by the 
international criminal justice system, which are domestically self-centred, and lack a universal 
authority. This view fails to state that might is law. For those who are the most powerful, ad hoc 
tribunals work to their advantage. They influence and pressurise them to work in one direction or 
another. They should come out and show how an international criminal tribunal can be apolitical, 
how it should not endanger national sovereignty and contribute to finding solutions to conflicts. 
It is instead these same opponents who hinder and meddle with the international tribunals and 
prevent them from working effectively. The calculated indictment against Milosevic, the arrest 
of Radovan Karadzic and General Ratko Mladic illustrated this assertion; though prosecuting 
these individual was the right thing to do. They were responsible of crimes, but not to the extent 
of their opponents who wanted them out of the way. 
 
This work attempted to dispassionately consider the strengths and weaknesses of the system on 
theoretical and practical grounds for possible improvements where warranted. In practice, it 
analysed instances where the international justice system evolves unevenly or without palpable 
grounds, eventually due to a lack of an agreeable theory. Considering the timing, the 
circumstances and the opportunistic approach adopted by the UNSC in 1993 and 1994 
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respectively when it established the ICTY and the ICTR, it is reasonable that much could not be 
realised in terms of aims, goals and objectives. The effectiveness of the tribunals was at stake. 
Apart from strongly worded statements of intention, these objectives were not even defined and 
delimited. The crimes and subject-matter of the ad hoc tribunals’ mandate were atrocious, 
complex, horrendous and extensive. The Security Council wanted people to believe - in fact, one 
may so assume, what it did not itself believe - that by prosecuting a token of selected individuals, 
even for signalling that impunity will not be torelated, these objectives could be attained 
altogether. One may doubt whether the objectives have been achieved as conceivably 
anticipated. 
 
People have been prosecuted because towards the end of 2010, the ICTY had indicted and 
prosecuted about 161 persons while the ICTR at the same period had indicted and prosecuted 
about 91 people.
1794
 Whether these token figures are reasonable for the lifespan of the tribunals is 
one matter. With this achievement, however, numerous substantial problems were registered. 
They relate to expectations translated in the forms of aims, goals and objectives of those 
particular prosecutions. The objectives were grouped in four categories. 
 
Category one concerned the crucial question of justice as the cornerstone of all other aims and 
goals. Such a choice is in line with the traditional functions of any court of law, whether 
domestic or international, civil or criminal. The second category looked at the general concerns 
of any criminal justice system. Briefly, it is to answer the question about the role of a criminal 
prosecution. The third category analysed the leitmotiv that was advanced by the UN Security 
Council to establish ad hoc tribunals. It was a strategic aim of restoring and maintaining 
international peace and security. It was demonstrated that that objective was unreasonable and 
inappropriate. Finally, the mandate included the political objective of national reconciliation in 
countries of concern. It was a simple expression of intention which did not show how a criminal 
court could in practice contribute to national reconciliation. The ad hoc tribunals did not and 
could not give a voice to all stakeholders to address their ugly past, face their present challenge 
and together design their brighter future.  
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If all these objectives were merged into one entity to fit them all, one might rightly agree with 
Scully who argues that: “international tribunals are often spoken of in lofty terms as if they are 
harbingers of salvation to post-conflict societies, and are expected to bring justice, peace, 
reconciliation, the rule of law, and a plethora of other social goods.”1795 It is not possible. This is 
not a sentiment felt by only people unfamiliar with the ad hoc tribunals. It is even the view of the 
tribunals themselves which have: 
purported to fulfil numerous objectives, including: to produce reliable historical records of crimes 
committed, to satisfy victims, to promote a sense of accountability for gross human rights violations, to 
make advances in international criminal law, and to stop ongoing conflicts – an objective that is far 
removed from the normal concern of national criminal justice systems.
1796
  
 
Though this has been a legitimate and commendable aspiration, the reality turned to be 
something else. The ad hoc tribunals “have necessarily been unable to make-good on all of their 
aspirations. […] The most obvious problem is that the courts’ resulting agenda is overly 
demanding. Indeed, the problem seems self-evident: international tribunals cannot be everything 
to everyone.”1797 The tribunals themselves must acknowledge this reality rather than attempting 
to explain anything and everything to show that they have performed, even where it was 
impossible to perform.  
 
Views about what the tribunals were to effectively achieve were quite apart and diverging 
already at their inception. Some argued that the UNSC failed to use armed force to halt the 
killings in the former Yugoslavia republics and preferred resorting on ad hoc tribunals to redeem 
its credibility. There was no war in Rwanda when the ICTR was established. Despite the 
establishment of the ICTY in 1993, the war went ahead until 2001.  
 
The analysis of the Appeals Chamber decision in Tadic challenge of jurisdiction, Kanyabashi, 
Milosevic and Nzirorera revealed that the UNSC was not the proper channel to establish criminal 
tribunals. The road taken by the Rome Treaty that established the ICC may not only be the most 
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appropriate in this regard, but a signal of the end of ad hoc tribunals.
1798
 A summary of key 
objectives that the tribunals were to achieve shows what the tribunals attained and what they 
failed to do.   
 
In terms of justice, the ad hoc tribunals could have done much better had they been designed 
based on universally acceptable principles of what an uneven justice requires. It is justice that is 
blindfolded, arrived at through objectivity, impartiality, without any external influence or 
pressure, preference or prejudice. Such principles, in the view of Dworkin are those that “are not 
aiming to promote a desirable social, economic or political goal, but rather seeking to meet a 
requirement of justice or fairness or to make a decision conform to ‘some other dimension of 
morality.”1799 The “justice” pursued by the ad hoc tribunals must be put in perspective to better 
formulate an objective conclusion in this respect. Firstly, the ad hoc tribunals were specifically 
designed to “prosecute”, not to render justice. Secondly, interested parties played a greater role 
in this enterprise of prosecution bringing about an uneven justice. Thirdly, objectives and goals 
beyond “rendering justice” assigned to the tribunals are alien to the role of a criminal court. In 
the latter case, the tribunals remained silent rather than making open pronouncements that these 
objectives were unrealistic, indeed unbecoming in their work. 
 
Specific individuals’ subject-matter of investigation and prosecution were clearly targeted at the 
outset. Such targeting was as precise as pointing to the “most responsible”, “big fish”, or those 
“who bear the greatest responsibility.” In many instances, names were openly and repeatedly 
cited and circulated as perpetrators and responsible for crimes. The crimes for which individuals 
were accused of were described in their worst manifestation. The traditional neutrality of any 
court of law was deliberately eroded at the inceptional phase of the ad hoc tribunals. There is a 
dangerous confusion between those most responsible for crimes and most responsible in 
government, political and military administrative layers of society in the former Yugoslavia and 
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Rwanda. There was clear evidence of prosecutors who manoeuvred the system of international 
criminal law with the only motive of securing convictions, scoring marks to impress their bosses 
and building up a career in the legal fraternity or elsewhere.  These instances were illustrated by 
the cases of André Ntagerura, General Gratien Kabiligi, Milan Milutinovic, Slobodan Milosevic, 
Radovan Karadic and Jean Kambanda.   
 
As Reel wrote pursuant to the judgment of General Yamashita, the fallacy with these kinds of 
prosecutions is that they “cover what is essentially a political act with a cloak of legalism.”1800 
Justice arrived at in this way, as Masayoshi suggests, “will be equated with a conviction; and, if 
the defendant(s) are acquitted, the tribunal will be seen to have failed in its purpose.”1801 
International criminal tribunals need to be designed in a neutral way so as to avoid the 
impression that they target individuals rather than targeting what individuals have done wrong. 
Designing a tribunal with such a degree of specification with regard to whom to look for bears 
the danger of targeting a person for what he was rather than for what illegal deeds he did or 
failed to do. It does not give the unprofessional prosecutor or judge an opportunity to perform the 
dual functions of zealously fighting the crimes and being fair to the defendants.  Indeed, it does 
not do justice. 
 
The role that a prosecutor plays in designing the investigative and prosecutorial strategies has 
serious consequences on how a criminal case unfolds. Uviller argues that “no less than the power 
to charge, to dismiss the charges, and to immunize witnesses, the power to tailor a charge to the 
gravity of a particular offense and the deserts of a particular offender is the essence of the 
executive function in the prosecution of a crime.”1802 The bottom line is that international 
prosecutors must wield a high degree of professionalism, much higher than their domestic peers. 
Investigations of crimes of concern to humanity must be given the highest standard of 
professionalism. According to the Report on the NATO bombing of Kosovo, it is advisable that 
before deciding to open an investigation in any case, the prosecutor should have taken into 
                                                          
1800
 Reel A. Frank, The case of General Yamashita, op. cit., p. 243 
1801
 Masayoshi Mukai, “Ad hoc Tribunals: the failure to contribute to precedence-setting for a universal model of 
international justice”, op.cit, p. 50 
1802
 Uviller H. Richard, “The neutral prosecutor: the obligation of dispassion in a passionate pursuit”, Fordham Law 
Review, Vol. 68, Iss.5, 2000, pp. 1695 – 1718, p. 1695 
374 
 
account a number of other factors concerning the prospects for obtaining evidence sufficient to 
prove that the crime has been committed by an individual who merits prosecution in the 
international forum.
1803
 This should be a consistent practice irrespective of the forum in which 
such investigations are carried out. 
 
When those investigations are insufficient or when difficulties are encountered in gathering 
evidence, prosecution should only proceed when investigations are complete. If investigations 
prove completely insufficient to sustain a prosecution, then the case should be abandoned no 
matter what the public will say afterwards. Judges should also discharge when the prosecution 
cases collapse without going into unnecessary and costly proceedings.  
 
Investigations of serious violations of international humanitarian law fail to meet the minimum 
acceptable standard required in domestic systems. The atrocious nature, scale and complexity of 
such crimes cannot always explain these investigative failures.  
 
Guilty plea and judicial notice are legal doctrines that are used for convenience and 
accommodative purposes in cases of minor importance for petty crimes at domestic levels. Both 
these notions are not unfamiliar in legal fraternity. If they are resorted to properly, they are 
legitimate to some extent. This is not the point. The problem is the speed at which they invaded 
the international crimes prosecution as if no pther proper techniques existed. They were 
overwhelmingly relied on in matters of such a seriousness and severity as international violations 
of humanitarian law. They can advance the conviction tendency, but they cannot be or become 
instruments of international criminal justice. Defendants may also use them to secure lenient 
treatments while they might have committed crimes that should be severly punished.  
 
Guilty plea and judicial notice coupled with their surrounding manoeuvring and manipulations 
by ingenious prosecutors and unscrupulous defence lawyers who are mostly interested in 
winning the case rather than truth, do not assist in uncovering the truth around the serious crimes. 
Without the truth, no one can expect justice to be rendered either to the victims, the defendant or 
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to the society at large. They should be resorted to exceptionally and with the necessary caution. 
Otherwise they should be abandoned in international crimes prosecutions. Considering that only 
a few individuals are brought before international criminal tribunals, every effort should be made 
to present compelling evidence sufficient to convict rather than resorting to guilty pleas and 
judicial notice in an attempt to keep the tribunal functioning.  
  
The doctrine of joint criminal enterprise was criticised as being a judicial creativity, forcibly 
introduced in international criminal law. It is a by-product of ingenious judges in the Tadic case 
who wrongly interpreted piecemeal jurisprudence following World War II prosecutions. It 
alleviates the prosecution’s failure to thoroughly investigate serious crimes of international 
concern. Judges and scholars encouraged the reliance on the doctrine, and some like Cassese, 
Provost and Ambos using their academic credentials gave support to the doctrine. Other scholars 
are, however, not unanimous as to whether joint criminal enterprise is clearly and 
unambiguously read in Article 7(1) and 6(1) of the ICTY and ICTR Statutes as a mode of 
commission or whether it has root in customary international law. The doctrine seemed to have 
taken over from the crime of conspiracy or the modes of imputing criminal liability of aiding and 
abetting. Judges denied that this was not the case. Judges did not explain why the concept was 
given much importance and deference without giving the same to other modes of imputing 
criminal responsibility which are clearly provided for in the statutes.   
 
The least one can say is that the doctrine contours are nebulous, so confusing, ambiguous, and 
unpredictable; and its consequences are uncertain. The doctrine needs to be refined and used in a 
very strict manner to better serve justice. It must be based on facts. Other modes of attributing 
criminal responsibility also need the same attention as had benefited “committing”. This will also 
contribute to the development of international criminal law. 
 
Command responsibility is another preferred mode of imputing responsibility to superiors. With 
strong military backgrounds, for obvious reasons command responsibility was for quite a long 
time used to hold military commanders responsible for criminal acts committed by their 
subordinates. Conceptually it was a doctrine of holding accountable irresponsible commanders 
and superiors. It however underwent an uneven development after the end of World War II. 
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Being unilaterally interpreted and applied by the victors to the vanquished to find them culpable, 
it evolved in a biased manner. Some states, particularly the USA, proved hostile to the 
application of the doctrine to their top civilian and military leaders. The doctrine was largely 
applied to fallen military commanders and other senior officials of the Axis after World War II. 
Americans in the majority, and their Allies to a certain extent, applied the doctrine to hold fallen 
German commanders and civilian authorities responsible of atrocities their forces allegedly 
committed.  
 
While at Nuremberg, the top Nazi leadership was prosecuted as the perpetrator of crimes, in the 
Hostage and High Command cases, the doctrine applied to ensure that top enemy commanders 
could be found guilty. In the Far East, the case of General Yamashita and other trials of Japanese 
military and civilian leaders constituted landmark applications of command responsibility with 
the same mindset. These cases were, however, criticised as being a victor’s justice. In this 
atmosphere, it is hard to believe that a consistent and uniform application of command 
responsibility could be reached or that it had ever been.  This worry proved right when American 
martial courts demeaned the ambit and reach of the doctrine in the Medina case. No superior to 
Captain Medina was ever prosecuted while evidence pointed to their culpability. Until now, 
Americans and some of their Allies have not permitted such uniformity.  
 
Considering the influence and role the U.S and their satellites played and continue to play in 
crafting the doctrine of command responsibility and its reluctance to apply it to its own forces, it 
cannot be securely proved that the ad hoc tribunals applied it disinterestedly. Americans apply a 
double standard of the doctrine. Forsythe is right when he suggests that Americans “often 
demand of others what they are unwilling to accept themselves.”1804 It is still a matter of great 
concern the reach of which is not yet known or controllable. The doctrine should be re-imagined 
and be applied to anyone, yet on a case-by-case basis. Moreover, the doctrine must be 
depoliticised. 
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The other major failure of the ad hoc tribunals is the silent but decisive influence played by the 
“victors” and other stakeholders in the proceedings.  In this respect, Masayoshi observes that 
“when the tribunal is created, or even influenced by the enemies of the defendants, the prospects 
for dispassionate judgment fade away. In such cases, trials threaten to become instruments of 
legitimized revenge, bearing the countenance of justice, at the expense of substantive 
fairness.”1805 The Government of Rwanda meddled with the proceedings in Arusha in an attempt 
to get the failed enemies overcharged at the same time securing immunity for the RPA forces. 
The Serbian government likewise was not cooperative to secure indictment of its officials 
accused of serious crimes.  Command responsibility is another example of this worrying political 
meddling. 
 
Equality in prosecuting international crimes must be “founded on the principle that all victims of 
atrocity have a right to justice”1806 even if it is done under the tokenism and selectivity 
approaches. No one can expect the tribunals to prosecute every offender. Ford reinforces this 
desire more clearly in recalling that the interest of justice, peace, the rule of law and respect for 
human rights requires that the rule of law apply to all uniformly, and that formal law be adequate  
to the task of satisfying demands for tangible justice.
1807
 
 
This is also a sine qua non condition to arrive at the truth of a situation. Chuter illustrates this 
well when he writes:  
if the ad hoc tribunals are ever to disseminate their version of the truth, the task will be a long one. This 
situation will improve only if those who demand that courts be set up to establish the truth, are prepared to 
accept the truth when it appears, even if they dislike it. So far, there is little sign of this happening. The situation 
is much more difficult when politics is directly involved, since the issues that war crimes courts address are 
usually inflammatory.
1808
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There is a clear lack of principled commitment to an effective international criminal law more 
generally.
1809As Smith complains, the trials “are constructed for the purpose of political 
consolidation rather than the dispensation of justice.”1810 This remark applies to the ad hoc 
tribunals as well.  There is no acceptable moral justification that a tribunal established to 
prosecute individual suspects “from all sides of an armed conflict” tactically chooses to only 
prosecute one side but not the other. This practice makes it virtually impossible to uncover the 
truth.  
 
Despite numerous explanations provided by the ICTR officials or their associates to partially 
deliver justice, it is a fact that the tribunal did not “indict a single Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) 
suspect implicated in the […] massacres of Hutu civilians in 1994.”1811 The ICTR failure to do 
so is only revolting and too embarrassing. Whereas the ICTR may well escape the charge of 
being a victor’s tribunal, it cannot survive the one of perpetuating a victor’s justice. The ICTR 
work was largely influenced by the Government of Rwanda to the point where it managed to get 
Chief Prosecutor Del Ponte expelled from her functions in an attempt to have RPF forces escape 
prosecutions. This is a great failure in terms of delivering justice, fighting impunity, deterrence, 
national reconciliation and international peace and security. This failure needs to be 
acknowledged as such without further disingenuous arguments. Future international criminal 
tribunals, including the ICC should design a proper strategy to deal with situations where there 
are strong interested parties in these kinds of proceedings. 
 
The ICTY has prosecuted all sides that participated in the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, 
whether Serbs, Croats or Moslems. It however failed to investigate and prosecute NATO air 
bombing of Serbia in 1999. Power was used to defeat any attempt at holding NATO responsible 
of civilian casualties including victims of the bombing. The ICTY feared losing NATO 
cooperation in investigations of Yugoslavs involved in crimes. Nevertheless, refusing to 
investigate NATO casts doubt on the tribunal’s ability, authority and power to investigate and 
prosecute crimes irrespective of who committed them. It is another example of the perpetuation 
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of a victors’ justice in addition to bias.1812No criminal tribunal should ever concede on principles 
even though it may encounter pressure from power-holders. 
 
The ad hoc tribunals were designed and conformed to their Statutes as crafted by the UNSC 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. It has been demonstrated that such an approach was not 
the only one available, nor was it the most proper and effective at the time of establishing the 
tribunals. It was only one way out because the Security Council failed to timely and effectively 
intervene to stop the armed conflict in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda. It did not lack 
power and authority.  It only lacked the political will not the means. Political will is necessary to 
support, but not to influence the nascent system of international criminal law. 
 
The Security Council’s binding resolutions were acted upon by the new institutions.  Yet, 
Husserl suggests that “to act in conformity with law is not necessarily to act justly. […]. An act 
is considered to be just if it bears the stamp of equality. Equality will prove to be the criterion of 
justice.”1813 Moreover, to quote Lyons, “if the claim is that one part of justice is equal treatment 
and, since fidelity to the law always meets this requirement formally, justice is partially realized 
when the law is applied impartially, one is simply confusing necessary and sufficient 
conditions.”1814 Here, equality must be understood in its extended meaning as not only aimed at 
fairness in the treatment of the defendants apprehended, but also as fairness in the process of 
deciding whom to prosecute.
1815
 This requires an effort from criminal tribunals to only judge 
blindfoldedly.  
 
According to Husserl, once again, “acts marked by formal equality spring from an attitude of 
consistency. An act of this type implies an antecedent act; between these two acts exists 
uniformity which is conditioned by a constancy of will on the part of the doer.”1816 To echo this 
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argument, Pound rightly disagrees with the judicial justice which is mechanically tailored on the 
operation of rules to a less degree of principles and conceptions.
1817
 For the sake of certainty, 
predictability and uniformity, any system of criminal justice must be built on principles and 
clearly defined and non-ambitious objectives.  
 
It is however regrettable that the ad hoc tribunals bowed to political and social forces which, 
according to Masayoshi
 “transformed [them] into a comprehensive humanitarian gesture by 
adopting obscure goals and responsibilities extraneous to [their] true purpose.”1818 One such 
obscure goal is the supposed contribution to national reconciliation. A definition of national 
reconciliation was successfully provided. Critical to the definition adopted, is the understanding 
that the process must involve at least two former antagonists or enemies who accept to settle 
their disputes of the past and agree to a common shared future. How a criminal trial may assist in 
this endevour is a question the ad hoc tribunals did not and could not answer. How could they? 
The literature indicates that there is a palpable gap between the tribunals’ rhetorical promises 
aimed at reconciliation and their manifest reality.
1819
Moreover, Barria and Roper suggest that: 
Fundamentally, national reconciliation can only occur in an environment in which both sides feel that 
justice is being achieved. In order to promote national reconciliation there cannot be ‘victim’s justice’. This 
is part of the problem with the stratified concurrent jurisdiction of the ICTR and the national courts. Morris 
argues that as long as individuals perceive that international as well as domestic judicial institutions are 
systematically biased towards one group, reconciliation will never occur.
1820
 
 
This quote tells it all as far as the ICTR is concerned. The ICTR never attempted to reconcile 
both Hutu and Tutsi communities. As is generally well known, some members of these two 
communities were either perpetrators or victims of the crimes that swept through Rwanda 
irrespective of their severity. In the former Yugoslavia, things have not been brighter. According 
to Kerr:  
while it is acknowledged that the ICTY has played a role in shedding light on the atrocities and raising 
awareness of the plight of victims at an international level, societies remain divided along ethnic lines, and 
in spite of some progress on the political level, reconciliation with the past and between victims and 
perpetrators still seems to be some way off.
1821
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It is therefore possible to cautiously argue that criminal tribunals are not proper channels for 
reconciliation. Reconciliation may better fit in truth and reconciliation commissions or other 
transitional mechanisms. Eventually, reconciliation can be attained if justice is done to all 
parties. Yet both the ICTY and the ICTR failed to put this to a test. The tribunals could also have 
clearly stated that reconciation could not be part of their work rather than being silent or offering 
apologies and explanations on something that was impossible to discharge. 
 
The ICTR constitutive resolution specifically states that the tribunal will contribute to the 
“maintenance of peace”, that they will ensure “that such violations are halted and effectively 
redressed” and will lead to a “process of national reconciliation.”1822 Furthermore, as Barria and 
Roper note, “the goal of peace is an understandable mandate of the ICTY. This tribunal was 
created during the conflict as an element of the international community’s peace-building 
initiatives.”1823 These authors observe, however, that:   
In 1993, when the Security Council approved the creation of the tribunal, the conflict within Bosnia was 
still raging. If we are to define peace as the absence of war, we can initially conclude that the ICTY’s goal 
to maintain peace was not achieved. […] the existence of the Tribunal and the possibility of being indicted 
did not seem to encourage an ending of hostilities and the examination of peaceful methods to solve the 
difference between the Bosnian Serbs, Croats and Muslims.
1824
 
 
Barria and Roper also write about the ICTR, and observe that:  
although the ICTR was established in a post-conflict environment, the international community was 
concerned that revenge killings on the part of the Tutsis would undermine peace in the region. Since the 
establishment of the ICTR, estimates are that tens of thousands have perished in clashes between Hutu 
insurgents and Tutsi revenge killings.
1825
 
 
There is therefore a conceptual dichotomy between justice and peace. This dichotomy 
overemphasises the view that the ad hoc tribunals were not proper mechanisms to bring peace 
and security. This quite remote objective cannot reasonably be assigned to an ad hoc criminal 
tribunal. This does not negate the nexus that exists between peace and justice. In addition to this 
dichotomy, the alleged main suspects, like President Milosevic of the FRY, were not arrested in 
the first instance to signal that those who were allegedly fuelling violence were dealt with 
decisively as a matter of urgency. The ICTR’s first case concerned Jean-Paul Akayesu, a local 
                                                          
1822
 Barria A. Lilian & Roper D. Steven, op. cit., p. 357  
1823
 Ibiden, p. 358 
1824
 Idem, p. 358 
1825
 Idem, p. 358 
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mayor, whose judgment was rendered on 2 September 1998. He had been arrested on 10 October 
1995.
1826
 The initial appearance of the accused took place on 30 May 1996
1827
, after 232 days of 
his arrest. The trial finally began on 9 January 1997.
1828
 Akayesu was arraigned while colonel 
Bagosora, a so-called ring-leader was in the custody of the ICTR since 23 January 1997 having 
been arrested in Cameroon on 9 March 1996.
1829
 Bagosora was detained in Cameroon pursuant 
to the Tribunal’s authority from 17 May 1996.1830 He was transferred to the Tribunal Detention 
Facility on 23 January 1997.
1831
 Considering the importance
1832
 the tribunal and the media in 
general was giving to the Bagosora and Milosevic cases, one would expect their adjudications to 
take precedence over any other judgment.  Nothing of this nature happened.  
 
It is imperative to end with Southwick’s remarks where he emphasises that “the good intentions 
behind prosecuting crimes of mass violence should be subject to certain constraints.”1833 For 
example, it must be focused, like any other criminal justice in domestic systems. Role players, 
particularly political interveners should refrain from directing how international criminal justice 
runs its business. They should get their hands off the criminal process. Another constraint is that 
international criminal justice must calibrate its goals and objectives, avoiding by the same token 
being overambitious. Without advocating any model of criminal prosecution; it is true that some 
domestic systems of criminal justice work quite well in full independence, professionalism and 
accountability. They are effective. What is then missing for international criminal institutions to 
readjust their way of doing business and deliver much better results? This thesis has offered 
some useful insight and materials to start with.  
 
 
                                                          
1826
 Akayesu, TC, para. 9 
1827
 Akayesu, TC, para. 12 
1828
 Akayesu, TC, para. 17 
1829
 See Bagosora and Nsengiyumva, A, para. 310 
1830
 Bagosora et al. TC, para. 76 
1831
 Bagosora et al. TC, para. 76 
1832
 For instance, “on 6 March 1998 the Prosecutor submitted a joint indictment, for confirmation by a judge, in 
respect of Théoneste Bagosora and 28 other individuals.” See ICTR Third Annual Report, A/53/429 - S/1998/857, 
23 September 1998 
1833
 Southwick G. Katherine, “Srebrenica as Genocide? The Kristic Decision and the Language of the Unspeakable”, 
Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal, Vol. 8, 2005, pp. 188 – 227, p.190 
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